In re S.S. ( 2019 )

2019 IL App (2d) 190638-UNo. 2-19-0638
Order filed December 13, 2019
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re S.S, W.L., M.L., N.R., E.G., I.G., and ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
L.G., Minors ) of Winnebago County
)
) Nos. 18-JA-308
) 18-JA-309
) 18-JA-310
) 18-JA-311
) 18-JA-312
) 18-JA-313
) 18-JA-314
)
) Honorable
(People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) Francis M. Martinez,
Appellee, v. Maria S., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Birkett and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Respondent forfeited her arguments regarding the documentary evidence submitted
by the State at the adjudicatory hearing, so we could not say that the trial court’s
rulings, which were based on those documents, were against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Even otherwise, respondent’s argument failed on the merits.
Additionally, the trial court’s dispositional orders giving guardianship of the
children to DCFS were not against the manifest weight of the evidence or an abuse
of discretion. Therefore, we affirmed.
¶2 Respondent, Maria S., appeals from the trial court’s orders adjudicating seven of her
children neglected, and from its dispositional orders giving guardianship of the children to the
2019 IL App (2d) 190638-UDepartment of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Respondent argues that the adjudication
orders were against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the dispositional orders were an
abuse of discretion. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State filed petitions on September 17, 2018, alleging that the children were neglected
minors because their environment was injurious to their welfare, in that respondent had prior
“indicated” reports 1 regarding the minors and had mental health issues and symptoms that
prevented her from properly parenting, thereby placing the minors at risk of harm. See 705 ILCS
405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018).
¶5 According to a DCFS “Statement of Facts” dated August 21, 2018, and filed on October
17, 2018, respondent had seven children and was pregnant. On July 8, 2018, DCFS received a call
that respondent claimed to be receiving messages from spirits that she had to leave her four oldest
children at an unknown address, or her other children would not be safe. She also said that a man
was coming on a plane at 1:45 p.m. During a visit to the house, respondent stated that she was
fearful due to an attempted break-in at the residence. She said that she did not allow the children
outside and only left the house every three days, to get groceries. A 2013 report stated that
respondent had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder but declined medication because she felt fine.
Respondent had four indicated cases and was not open to receiving services.
¶6 Another DCFS report, dated October 16, 2018, and also filed on October 17, 2018, stated
that respondent’s home was appropriate for the children, there was ample food, and the children
1
An “indicated” report is one where a DCFS investigation determines that credible
evidence exists of the alleged abuse or neglect. 325 ILCS 5/3 (West 2018).
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-Uappeared cared for, though the younger children appeared to need more supervision than
respondent could provide. Respondent was still declining services.
¶7 A shelter care hearing took place on October 17 and 18, 2018, after which the trial court
found probable cause that the children were neglected, but not an immediate and urgent necessity
to remove them from respondent’s care.
¶8 The State filed amended neglect petitions on January 10, 2019, that added two counts. The
allegations in count II overlapped with those in count I. Count II alleged that the children’s
environment was injurious to their welfare because respondent had mental health issues that
prevented her from properly parenting, thereby placing the minors at risk of harm. See 705 ILCS
405/2-3(1)(a), (b) (West 2018). Count III alleged that the children’s environment was injurious to
their welfare in that respondent had failed to ensure that some of children received recommended
mental health treatment, 2 thereby placing the children at risk of harm. See id. The counts for N.R.
differed slightly in that the above-mentioned counts were alleged as counts III and IV, respectively.
N.R.’s count II alleged educational neglect. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2018).
¶9 A Children’s Home & Aid report to the court dated January 8, 2019, was filed on January
11, 2019, and stated as follows. Respondent said that the hotline call to DCFS was about a dream
that she had described. Respondent had completed a mental health assessment and been diagnosed
with PTSD and anxiety. It was recommended that she take medication, but respondent refused
because she did not think she needed it. It was also recommended that respondent participate in
individual and group counseling, but she did not want to participate in groups because she did not
want to listen to other people’s problems, and she did not have anyone to watch the children. The
2
The petitions for L.G. and E.G. stated that they needed the mental health services.
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-Ucaseworker told respondent that she could apply for protective daycare for the younger children,
but respondent replied that she had trust issues and did not feel comfortable with others watching
her children. At a later date, respondent stated that her boyfriend was watching the children while
she went to counseling appointments, but she refused to provide his information for the caseworker
to do a background check. She also refused to sign medical releases, even to verify her assertion
that she had a high-risk pregnancy. Respondent further refused to put outlet covers in the home,
even though she had one- and two-year-old children, because she said that her children knew better
than to put their fingers in outlets. Respondent was also transporting the children in Ubers without
car seats because she did not want to carry car seats everywhere. Respondent stated that when her
baby was born, the baby would sleep in bed with respondent, despite the caseworker informing
her of the risks of co-sleeping.
¶ 10 The report continued that respondent gave birth to a baby girl on November 23, 2018.
Subsequently, respondent informed the caseworker that she practices the “Babalu” religion and
did not want anyone to take pictures of the baby until she was baptized. She believed that her
dreams gave her messages about the future. On December 3, 2018, respondent stabbed the
bassinette with a knife, threw it outside, and threatened to leave the baby outside on the porch if
the baby’s father did not come to get her. Respondent had missed various individual and group
therapy sessions, and her counselor was concerned about her ability to take care of the children.
On December 14, 2018, respondent reported to the caseworker that she had crying spells and that
her mental health provider recommended a two-week inpatient program, but respondent did not
have anyone to watch her children for that long. A few days later, respondent told the caseworker
that she had an argument with the baby’s father, and he took the baby to his grandmother’s house.
Respondent then went there with the police to get the child back. Respondent continued to miss
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-Ucounseling and psychiatric appointments. She also missed “IEP” meetings scheduled for one of
the children. The eldest child had attended only 11 full days of middle school. The elementary-
school-aged children were generally arriving one to two hours late to school. The caseworker had
observed the baby being propped up with a blanket on her side to drink from the bottle, and she
told respondent that this practice was unsafe because the baby was not strong enough to move the
bottle away and could suffocate. Respondent replied that even though the baby was premature,
respondent had observed her hit the bottle away when she did not want it anymore. Respondent
continued to leave blankets and other objects in the crib and pack and play with the baby, even
after the caseworker warned her of the dangers. The caseworker also observed that respondent left
the second youngest child, S.S., in the crib in the bedroom and did not give him attention.
¶ 11 Another shelter care hearing took place on January 16, 2019, after which the trial court
found probable cause that the children were neglected, and an urgent and immediate necessity that
they be removed from respondent’s care. The trial court gave temporary guardianship and custody
of the minors to DCFS, with visitation with respondent at DCFS’s discretion. The trial court stated
that there was not one particular issue that was controlling, but rather its ruling was based on the
totality of the circumstances. Respondent had minor symptoms of depression, but on top of that
were glaring deficits in parenting, such as propping the baby up with a bottle and leaving blankets
in the crib. Respondent was also unwilling to sign releases to verify information, which raised a
“red flag” to the trial court, and she was not getting her children to school on time.
¶ 12 An adjudicatory hearing took place on March 18, 2019. The State presented only
documentary evidence, consisting of N.R.’s education records, mental health records for L.G. and
respondent, a letter from the mental health center stating that it did not have records for E.G., Lake
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-UCounty Health Department records for respondent, and “indicated packets.” Respondent’s attorney
stated that he did not have any objection to the documents being admitted into evidence.
¶ 13 Respondent then testified as follows. For the past five years, the children had been residing
with her, before guardianship and custody was given to DCFS, with the exception that E.G. briefly
went to live with his father after E.G. attempted suicide. Respondent had been engaged in mental
health treatment most of her life. Her present diagnosis was trauma due to rape and domestic
violence. Some of the children also required mental health services, and she had been ensuring
that they received services. She was also properly housing, feeding, and bathing the children, and
was attentive to them. Respondent had trouble getting L.G. to school on a consistent basis because
respondent had high-risk pregnancies and could not get up to take her to school, and respondent
did not have transportation. Respondent observed the baby when she was drinking from a bottle
or had blankets near her. Further, the blankets were special breathable blankets. Respondent had
concerns about S.S. because he kept bumping his head, and autism ran in respondent’s family.
Further, he was in a car accident in February 2018. Therefore, respondent kept him in the playpen
for his safety. She took him to the emergency room but was told that he was okay. Respondent had
signed papers for S.S. to see a specialist, but the children were removed from her care before S.S.
was evaluated.
¶ 14 On cross-examination, respondent testified that the children received mental health
services from late August to September 2016.
¶ 15 M.L.’s uncle testified by phone as a witness for respondent. He testified that he saw
respondent with the children a couple of times per year and that they were in “good hands” with
her.
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-U¶ 16 On April 22, 2019, the trial court found that the State met its burden of proving all of the
counts by a preponderance of the evidence. It stated that there was a long history of indicated
reports dating back to 2008. There was an indicated report in 2008 of burns to L.G. There was a
substantial risk of physical injury found in 2011; inadequate supervision found in 2012;
environmental neglect found in 2013; substantial risk of physical injury by others found in 2016
and in June 2018; and substantial risk of serious injury in September 2018. The indicated reports
created an inference that there was a long history of the children being in an environment injurious
to their welfare. They showed a number of domestic violence issues to which the children were
exposed, and environmental issues stemming from respondent’s mental health. The records further
showed respondent’s need for mental health services and that she was uncooperative with services,
resulting in her creating or maintaining an environment injurious to the children. The evidence
also showed that L.G. and E.G. had discernable mental health issues that went unattended, and the
trial court could then infer that it created an environment injurious to the health of all of the
children. N.R.’s school records showed that he was educationally neglected in that he had
substantial attendance issues. This occurred despite the number of interventions the school
attempted through phone, mail, and in-person contact.
¶ 17 A dispositional hearing took place on June 18, 2019. We summarize the testimony of
Deborah Massey, the case manager. She had become the case manager at the beginning of April
2019. Respondent had reported living in multiple places, including out of her car, and Massey had
not been able to confirm any of the locations. Massey had tried to set up an integrated assessment
of respondent directly and through her attorney, but respondent did not want to discuss the issue.
Respondent had also not completed a new service plan. Respondent mentioned that she was
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-Uinvolved in counseling and had signed consents, but before Massey could receive the updates,
respondent revoked the consent.
¶ 18 Massey had tried to set up visitation, but she was either not able to reach respondent, or
respondent was not willing to talk. Respondent last visited the children about two months before,
which respondent had arranged directly with the foster parents. Massey received information that
respondent was discussing the case by phone with some of the children, which was causing them
anxiety.
¶ 19 Upon the State’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of the evidence and testimony
from the adjudication hearing and the reports to the court dated May 20, 2019, and June 18, 2019.
¶ 20 Respondent testified as follows. She owned a four-bedroom, three-bath home in Rockford.
She was employed at Papa John’s in Waukegan and was on the waiting list for housing with the
Waukegan Housing Authority. If the children came back to live with her, they would live in
Rockford, but her long-term plan was to relocate to Waukegan. Respondent was trying to enlist in
the army and had asked her sister to take care of the children for the three-month boot camp. Her
sister had said that she first wanted respondent to “cross that bridge,” and then they would “sit
down and talk” about it.
¶ 21 Respondent had been attending counseling in Waukegan weekly beginning in mid-April
2019 and was currently waiting to get a new counselor. She had just taken an assessment to attend
parenting classes. Respondent denied that Massey had made any effort to meet with her before the
prior week. Respondent was told by another DCFS office and a Rockford detective that she could
not have any contact with the children until an accusation against her of child molestation was
resolved. Respondent felt that her mental health had always been properly managed, but that the
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-Ucurrent counseling was providing additional help. Other than very recently, the children had been
in her care virtually their entire lives.
¶ 22 On cross-examination, respondent testified that she had been going back and forth from
her house in Rockford to Milwaukee and to Waukegan. When she was in Milwaukee, she stayed
with a friend. She spent the night in her car the majority of the time when she got called to work
at Papa John’s because she worked late, and it was a two-hour drive back to Rockford.
¶ 23 Respondent had signed consents for DCFS to see the dates she was attending counseling,
but not for other information. Respondent had not spoken with Massey directly because respondent
did not have a phone to call her or e-mail to reach her. She had showed up to the office four times
without making an appointment but was never able to talk to Massey.
¶ 24 The trial court stated that it had previously found that respondent had a long history of
mental health issues that prevented her from parenting property, so respondent’s mental health was
the main condition that had to be cured to find fitness. However, there was no evidence presented
that the condition had been resolved and that she was fit, willing, and able to provide a safe and
protective household. Respondent testified that she was attending counseling, but there was no
verification of the testimony. Massey testified that respondent revoked her releases, whereas
respondent testified that she signed a very limited release as to only the dates she was attending
counseling. Either way, the releases were insufficient. That is, the trial court could not find fitness
based on nebulous testimony about counseling when it did not know what issues the counselor
was addressing or whether any progress was being made.
¶ 25 The trial court adjudicated the minors wards of the court and found that guardianship
should be vested with DCFS, with visitation in its discretion. It ordered respondent to sign releases
to DCFS for all of the services that she was engaged in.
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-U¶ 26 Respondent timely appealed.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 Respondent first argues that the trial court’s determination, that the State proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the children were neglected, was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. According to respondent, the State alleged that she had mental health issues that
inhibited her ability to parent, and that she was not taking care of her children’s needs, including
health and educational needs. She maintains that the State presented no witnesses but merely
introduced a mountain of documentary evidence in support of its neglect petitions. She argues that
while the evidence was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, it was to be weighed against
the other evidence. Respondent points to her own testimony that she was able to properly feed,
house, and bathe the children; that she was engaged on and off in mental health counseling for
most of her life; that her children were safe with her; and that she provided them with mental health
treatment. Respondent asserts that in contrast to her testimony, the State’s evidence was not subject
to cross-examination and contained double hearsay in some places.
¶ 29 At an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court must determine whether a preponderance of the
evidence shows that the minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(1), 2-21(1)
(West 2018). A trial court’s finding of abuse or neglect will not be reversed unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, meaning that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident, or the
finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence. In re Natalia O., 2019 IL App (2d)
181014, ¶ 53.
¶ 30 As to respondent’s argument that the documentary evidence was not subject to cross-
examination, respondent herself acknowledges that the records of a public or private agency are
admissible at adjudicatory hearings as business records, and indicated reports are similarly
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-Uadmissible. See 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a), (b) (West 2018); In re Brandon A., 395 Ill. App. 3d 224,
235 (2009). Respondent also argues that there was multilevel hearsay within the records, but the
documents were admitted into evidence without objection by respondent, resulting in forfeiture of
any objection to their admission on appeal. See In re N.T., 2015 IL App (1st) 142391, ¶ 41.
Respondent’s argument is also forfeited due to her failure to specify what portions of the
voluminous records contain the alleged double hearsay, and her failure to cite authority stating that
such information was inadmissible or entitled to less weight than in-person testimony. See Ill. S.
Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (argument shall contain citation of authorities and pages of
the record relied on). That is, a reviewing court is not a repository into which an appellant may
dump the burden of argument and research, nor is it our obligation to act as an advocate, and the
failure to clearly define issues and support them with authority results in forfeiture of the argument.
Atlas v. Mayer Hoffman McCann, P.C., 2019 IL App (1st) 180939, ¶ 33. As respondent has
forfeited any objections to the documentary evidence submitted by the State, it cannot be said that
the trial court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 31 We would reach the same conclusion even looking at the content of the documents as
compared to respondent’s testimony. The documents reveal numerous prior indicated findings by
DCFS. Specifically, in 2008 respondent was indicated for burns by neglect after L.G. burned
herself on hot soup that respondent left unattended. In 2011, respondent was indicated for
substantial risk of physical injury and the children’s environment being injurious to their health
and welfare. Respondent said that she was going to kill L.G. and I.G., they had bruises from
respondent hitting them, the home was roach-infested and full of garbage, and respondent had run
out of medication to treat her bipolar and schizophrenic conditions. In 2012, respondent was
indicated for inadequate supervision. She was absent from the home for a week, and the adults in
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-Uthe home did not know where she was and did not appear capable of caring for the children. The
home was roach-infested and had animal feces and urine everywhere. N.R. was found lying on a
black crib mattress with a diaper that had not been changed in about two days. In 2013, respondent
was indicated for environmental neglect after being found living in a home that was marked
uninhabitable, with no running water or heat, and that was filthy and with beer bottles all around.
Domestic incidents with paramours took place in the children’s presence in 2016 and 2018.
Respondent was indicated in 2018 for substantial risk of physical injury and an environment
injurious to health and welfare by neglect, based on respondent’s messages from spirits and her
refusal to engage in mental care.
¶ 32 N.R.’s educational records show that out of a period of 132 attendance days, he had 65
unexcused absences, 14 excused absences, and 16 tardies. The records also showed that the school
repeatedly contacted respondent about N.R.’s absences and tardies, without improvement. Mental
health records for L.G. showed that she was diagnosed with mental health issues but was missing
counseling appointments without notice. There were no mental health records for E.G. from the
mental health center, despite his prior suicide attempt. Respondent’s mental health records showed
that she was not compliant with the treatment plan recommended by her counselor.
¶ 33 Respondent testified that she had been receiving mental health services for most of her life,
but she did not dispute that she was not currently compliant with her treatment plan, and she did
not provide any evidence of attendance at other services or progress. She testified that the children
received mental health services in 2016, but she did not testify that L.G. and E.G. were currently
receiving such services. She also did not offer any testimony regarding N.R.’s attendance at school,
or about the numerous, prior indicated reports. Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling, that the State
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-Uproved by a preponderance of the evidence shows that the minors were neglected as alleged in the
January 2019 petitions, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 34 Respondent next argues that the trial court’s dispositional order was an abuse of
discretion, because the State did not sustain its burden to prove that she was unfit. Respondent
argues that the State’s use of Massey as a witness did not lend much clarity to the State’s evidence,
as Massey had been the caseworker for only about two months. Respondent maintains that
Massey’s testimony can be summarized as her opinion that respondent was not communicating
and was not engaged in services. Respondent argues that the remainder of the State’s evidence was
documentary, whereas she rebutted both Massey’s testimony and the documentary evidence with
her own testimony, which was subject to cross-examination. Respondent points out that she
testified that she owns a four-bedroom home in Rockford; that she is employed at Papa John’s;
and that she was engaged in counseling and had enrolled in parenting classes.
¶ 35 After an adjudication of neglect or abuse, the trial court must hold a dispositional hearing
to determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor and public for the child to be made a
ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2–22(1) (West 2012); In re Davon H., 2015 IL App (1st) 150926,
¶ 58. The trial court may give guardianship of the child to DCFS if the trial court determines that
the parent is unable, unwilling, or unfit “for some reason other than financial circumstances alone,
to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor *** and that the health, safety and best interest of
the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of his or her parents.” 705 ILCS
405/2-27(1) (West 2018). The State must prove a parent’s “dispositional unfitness” by a
preponderance of the evidence, and we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless its findings
of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or it abused its discretion by selecting an
inappropriate dispositional order. In re A.T., 2015 IL App (3d) 140372, ¶ 13.
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-U¶ 36 We conclude that the trial court’s factual findings were not against the manifest weight of
the evidence, nor did the court abuse its discretion in adjudicating the children wards of the court
and awarding guardianship of them to DCFS. As the trial court emphasized, the main concern
surrounding respondent’s fitness to take care of the children stemmed from her own mental health
issues and failure to demonstrate that she was seeking help. Respondent asserts that she countered
these concerns through her testimony. However, although respondent testified that she was
attending counseling, she had not provided any verification. Massey testified that respondent had
revoked releases regarding her mental health records before Massey could obtain them. Even
accepting respondent’s testimony that she signed releases only as to the dates she attended, such
records would be insufficient to show what mental health issues respondent had, and whether she
was progressing in treating the issues.
¶ 37 We note that respondent’s remaining testimony also largely supported the State’s assertion
that she was unable, unwilling, and/or unfit to care for the children. Respondent testified to owning
a home in Rockford but also testified that she had also been frequently staying in Milwaukee and
Waukegan. She testified that she was working at a Papa John’s in Waukegan and sleeping in her
car there after work, but she did not explain why she could not find a similar job close to her house.
Respondent wanted the children returned to her but also wanted to enlist in the military, which
would require a three-month boot camp, without any certain plans as to where the children would
stay during that time. Additionally, Massey testified that respondent was not cooperative in setting
up an integrated assessment, service plans, or visitation, and that respondent was discussing the
case with some of the children. Finally, the court took judicial notice of evidence and testimony
from the adjudication hearing, without objection by respondent. In light of all of the evidence
presented, we find no basis to disturb the trial court’s rulings.
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2019 IL App (2d) 190638-U¶ 38 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgments of the Winnebago County circuit court.
¶ 40 Affirmed.
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