People v. Guye ( 2019 )

2019 IL App (1st) 170136-UFOURTH DIVISION
December 26, 2019
No. 1-17-0136
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
) Appeal from the
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County
Respondent-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 91 CR 23697-02
)
LORENZO GUYE, )
) Honorable
Petitioner-Appellant. ) Kenneth J. Wadas,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lampkin and Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County where the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution does not prohibit life sentences
imposed upon adult offenders and the court properly considered petitioner’s youth
and its attendant characteristics when sentencing him.
¶2 Petitioner Lorenzo Guye appeals the circuit court of Cook County’s denial of his motion
for leave to file a second successive postconviction petition pursuant to the Illinois Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). On appeal, petitioner
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contends his life sentence for an offense he committed when he was 18 years old violated the
United States and Illinois Constitutions where the trial court did not consider the characteristics
associated with his age or alleged intellectual disability prior to sentencing him. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 Petitioner, age 18 at the time of the offense, was indicted by a grand jury in 1991 of
multiple counts of first degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated discharge of a firearm.
The following evidence was adduced at petitioner’s trial.
¶5 On August 15, 1991, Chicago Housing Authority officers (officers) Jimmie Haynes
(Officer Haynes), William Browder (Officer Browder), and Sharlene House (Officer House)
were patrolling the interior of a building located in the Robert Taylor Homes on the 4500 block
of South Federal Street. The officers exited the building with Silas Noble (Noble), the building’s
janitor. As they proceeded to the officers’ vehicle, they heard several gunshots. Officer Haynes
was shot in the hip and collapsed. As the shooting continued, Officer House and Noble dragged
Officer Haynes toward the officers’ vehicle and out of the line of fire.
¶6 Officers Browder and House transported Officer Haynes to the hospital, where he died
from a single gunshot wound. A .223 caliber bullet, which was most often used in rifles, was
recovered from the radio Officer Haynes carried. The testimony indicated that this bullet could
have been fired from an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle.
¶7 Antwan Hughes (Hughes) testified at trial that at the time of the incident he was 14 years
old and a member of the Gangster Disciples street gang. The Gangster Disciples claimed certain
buildings in the Robert Taylor Homes as their territory. The Black Disciples, a rival gang,
claimed the remaining buildings. On the evening of the offense, approximately 20 to 30
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members of the Gangster Disciples, including petitioner, attended a meeting behind their
buildings where they discussed retaliating against the Black Disciples. Several of the gang
members made threats to the Black Disciples, and petitioner promised to “f*** up one of them
CHA [(Chicago Housing Authority)] pigs.”
¶8 Hughes further testified the Gangster Disciples held a second meeting that night in one of
their buildings. Hughes recognized petitioner, as well as Ellean Nance (Nance) and an individual
named Darnell, at this meeting. 1 Petitioner was armed with a rifle with a scope attached, Nance
was armed with a firearm known as a Mach 10, and Darnell was armed with a .32 caliber
automatic pistol. During the meeting, a Chicago Housing Authority police vehicle was parked in
front of a nearby building which was claimed by the Black Disciples. The Gangster Disciples
exited the rear of their building and Hughes ran to his residence in the Robert Taylor Homes. As
he ran, Hughes observed petitioner, Nance and Darnell open fire at the building in front of which
the Chicago Housing Authority police vehicle was parked. After Hughes entered his residence,
he observed petitioner running through one of the Gangster Disciples’ buildings. Petitioner was
no longer carrying the rifle.
¶9 The State published a written statement which was prepared by a Cook County state’s
attorney after he questioned petitioner and which petitioner reviewed and signed. The statement
indicated that petitioner believed the officers were allied with the Black Disciples. The basis of
this belief was due to the fact that the officers were constantly “hassling” members of the
Gangster Disciples. On the day of the offense, petitioner learned that several officers had
stopped and frisked a group of Gangster Disciples without justification. Prior to the gang’s first
meeting on the evening of the offense, petitioner observed officers push a member of the
1
Hughes did not know Darnell’s last name.
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Gangster Disciples. The gang member then struck one of the officers and all of the officers drew
their weapons, causing petitioner to leave the scene.
¶ 10 Petitioner further stated that after the gang’s second meeting that evening, he was
informed that members of the Black Disciples were entering the Gangster Disciples’ territory.
He then retrieved his AR-15 and ran to the side of a building controlled by the Gangster
Disciples. He observed several individuals exiting a building controlled by the Black Disciples,
including 2 or 3 officers, and fired the rifle in their direction. He thought he struck a member of
the Black Disciples. Petitioner then ran into a building and stashed the rifle in an incinerator.
Several weeks later, petitioner learned the Chicago police were searching for him in connection
with the shooting. When police officers searched the residence in which petitioner was living,
they discovered petitioner hiding in a closet.
¶ 11 Lionel Williams (Williams) testified that on the evening of the offense, he observed
petitioner carrying a .9 millimeter Tech handgun and a .357 caliber handgun. The next week,
Williams overheard petitioner state that Chicago police officers were searching for him and he
thought he shot an officer.
¶ 12 Petitioner presented evidence indicating that investigators did not recover rifle
ammunition casings from the scene.
¶ 13 After closing arguments, petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder, two counts of
attempted murder, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. The trial court subsequently
determined that petitioner was eligible for the death penalty as he was 18 years old at the time of
the offenses and the victim was a peace officer.
¶ 14 The matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing where the State presented the following
evidence regarding petitioner’s prior offenses. Chicago police officer Gregory Callaway (Officer
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Callaway) testified that in January 1989, he was called to an apartment in the Robert Taylor
Homes where he found Robert Davis (Davis), petitioner’s cousin, on the floor having been shot
in the neck. Davis died as a result of the wound. Officer Callaway learned that petitioner was
attempting to unload or decock a handgun when it accidentally discharged, striking Davis.
Petitioner was charged with reckless conduct, adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court, and
sentenced to the Illinois Youth Center. He was released on parole in October 1989.
¶ 15 The State also submitted a stipulation of the facts recounted in People v. Dajuan Banks,
260 Ill App. 3d 464 (1994), Dajuan Banks being petitioner’s alias. In that case, three months
prior to the instant offense, petitioner and a codefendant opened fire into a group of unarmed
members of the Black Disciples. Three individuals were struck and wounded. Petitioner was
apprehended by Chicago police officers while running from the scene with a .357 caliber
handgun. He was convicted of three counts of aggravated battery with a firearm, and three
counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. Those convictions were affirmed on appeal.
¶ 16 In mitigation, petitioner’s mother, Shirley Guye (Shirley), testified petitioner’s father
never acknowledged that petitioner was his son. She testified petitioner failed 7th grade,
repeated it, then moved directly into 9th grade. Petitioner was then enrolled in special education
classes but was ridiculed by his classmates and ultimately dropped out. The State, however,
introduced rebuttal evidence that petitioner was regularly absent from 7th grade prior to his
failing that grade and from high school prior to dropping out.
¶ 17 Shirley further testified that when petitioner was approximately 11 years old, he suffered
a head injury which caused him to lose consciousness and receive treatment at a hospital.
Shirley additionally stated that after accidentally killing Davis, petitioner “distanced himself
from reality” and from her as “it was very hard for him to deal with” the incident. Shirley also
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admitted that she used to openly sell drugs in front of petitioner in order to support her family,
and that defendant’s brother was detained in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC).
¶ 18 Dr. Michael Gelbort (Dr. Gelbort) testified on behalf of petitioner as an expert in the field
of clinical psychology. In August 1993, he performed a neuropsychological test on petitioner,
called the Halstead Reitan test, which tested petitioner’s cognitive functioning. Dr. Gelbort also
reviewed petitioner’s health records, academic records, and the results of a different type of
psychological examination performed by Dr. Susan Messina (Dr. Messina) which tested
petitioner’s intellectual functioning. Dr. Gelbort opined that his testing revealed a “notable
abnormality,” specifically that “one half of [petitioner’s] brain does not work nearly as well as
the other.” Dr. Gelbort explained that this abnormality was exemplified by petitioner’s IQ scores
from the Halstead Reitan test. He testified that a “normal” IQ score is around 100. The
dominant, verbal, left hemisphere of petitioner’s brain produced an IQ score of 75 points. The
non-dominant, visual, right hemisphere of petitioner’s brain, by contrast, produced a score of
around 97-100. Dr. Gelbort testified that petitioner’s abnormality was also exemplified by his
verbal memory test, in which he tested “slightly above average,” compared to petitioner’s visual
memory test, which placed him between the 4th and 10th percentiles. Dr. Gelbort opined that
petitioner was “in the borderline range of mental deficiency,” but that his tests were affected by
the fact that he was regularly absent from school.
¶ 19 Dr. Gelbort further testified the evaluation revealed petitioner had “some difficulty with
impulsivity, *** with judgment, with reasoning, with the ability to appreciate the ramifications
of one’s own behavior.” Petitioner also had difficulty recognizing “appropriate kinds of
behavior” or how to “size up a situation correctly.” Dr. Gelbort opined that “while there could
be some personality attributes leading to that kind of behavior, there certainly is evidence of
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organic dysfunction, brain dysfunction that would lead to that kind of behavior as well.” He
further testified, however, that petitioner was capable of conforming his behavior to accepted
norms of conduct and could appreciate the criminality of his acts.
¶ 20 According to Dr. Gelbort, petitioner’s condition could have been the result of a
congenital problem or a traumatic brain injury that occurred early in petitioner’s life. He opined
that the forceps used during petitioner’s birth, in conjunction with petitioner’s head injury, could
account for his “neurological defect.” However, no MRI or EEG was ever performed on
petitioner.
¶ 21 Pertinent to this appeal, the record includes the results of Dr. Messina’s evaluation as the
trial court granted petitioner’s request for an IQ test, ordered that such a test be performed by the
Psychiatric Institute of Cook County, and further ordered that the results be provided to the
State’s Attorney’s office. Dr. Messina conducted a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test on
petitioner in July 1992, which tested petitioner’s intellectual functioning. The test revealed
petitioner received a verbal IQ score of 75, a performance IQ score of 106, and a full scale IQ
score of 85, which placed him in the “low average” range of intellectual functioning.
¶ 22 Petitioner’s presentence investigation (PSI) report indicated petitioner dropped out of
high school in 11th grade, he had no history of employment, and he was supported by his
mother. The PSI further revealed petitioner had no contact with his father, but “got along well”
with his family, including his mother, two sisters, and his brother. Moreover, according to the
PSI: petitioner stated he spent his free time with his six children; he reported that he was in good
mental health but abused alcohol, having started drinking at the age of five; and he denied using
drugs, but reported that he had been a member of the Gangster Disciples for eight years.
¶ 23 The State argued for the imposition of the death penalty and maintained the statutory
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mitigating factors weighed against petitioner, specifically: (1) petitioner had a history of prior
criminal activity; (2) the murder was not committed while petitioner was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (3) petitioner did not act under the compulsion of
threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm; and (4) petitioner was
personally present during the commission of the offense. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (West 1994).
In response, defense counsel recounted petitioner’s neuro-psychological history and family
history, and urged the trial court to spare petitioner’s life given his background, age, and any
doubts as to whether petitioner, rather than Nance or Darnell, had shot Officer Haynes.
Petitioner declined to speak in allocution.
¶ 24 In ruling on petitioner’s sentence, the trial court stated that it observed petitioner’s
demeanor and considered the evidence in mitigation. The trial court also indicated it had
reviewed the PSI. The court then made the following findings. Petitioner’s statement that he
enjoyed spending time with his children was a mitigating factor. Petitioner had significant
criminal convictions, including aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of a
firearm, and two convictions related to the death of another human being. Nevertheless,
sentencing courts have been directed by the appellate court to consider “the prospects pursuant to
our constitution that this person can be restored to useful citizenship, what are his chances for
rehabilitation.” Although petitioner had a “miserable background” as his mother was a drug
dealer and his father did not acknowledge him, many individuals with similar backgrounds do
not murder police officers. Petitioner, however, made a voluntary decision to associate with a
gang and to use a firearm on three separate occasions.
¶ 25 The court determined that petitioner had a “zero percent chance of successfully
rehabilitating himself. This defendant has volitionally chosen a life of misdeed and crime rather
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than a life of useful citizenship.” The court further stated that “for all of the social
disadvantages, for all of the intellectual deficits, this defendant chose to align himself with a
gang *** and he chose to take the life of one of the members of the thin blue line.” The court
found the statutory mitigating factor existed that the murder was committed while petitioner was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and declined to sentence
petitioner to death. Instead, the trial court sentenced petitioner to life without parole for murder
and 30 years for attempted murder to be served in the IDOC. 2
¶ 26 Petitioner appealed his conviction, arguing the State failed to prove he was guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. People v. Guye, 278 Ill. App. 3d 1133(table) (1996) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Petitioner filed his first
postconviction petition in 1998, alleging (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (2) ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, (3) the State knowingly introduced perjured testimony, and (4)
he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court dismissed the petition at the
first stage.
¶ 27 In 2001, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition
arguing that pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), his sentence was
unconstitutionally enhanced beyond the statutory maximum based on facts that were not
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, namely that he knew the victim was
a peace officer. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion, finding Apprendi did not apply
retroactively.
¶ 28 Petitioner subsequently sought and was granted leave to file late notices of appeal for the
denial of his initial and successive postconviction petitions. The appellate court found it lacked
2
The conviction for aggravated battery with a firearm was merged with the attempted murder count.
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jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s untimely appeal from the dismissal of his initial postconviction
petition. People v. Guye, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1090 (table) (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). In addition, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
leave to file a successive postconviction petition, finding Apprendi was not implicated and,
regardless, it did not apply retroactively. Id.¶ 29 Petitioner subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, which was
dismissed in 2003. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 3
¶ 30 In 2016, petitioner filed a second successive postconviction petition, the subject of this
appeal. He asserted that the appellate court in People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580,
¶¶ 95-101, extended the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489
(2012), and ruled that trial courts must give young adults the same considerations as juveniles
before imposing life sentences. Petitioner argued Miller and House applied directly to his case
because he (1) was 18 years old at the time of the offense, (2) had a low IQ, (3) was diagnosed as
being underdeveloped, and (4) was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence pursuant to section
1005-8-1(a)(1)(c)(iii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(iii) (West
1994)). 4 He asserted his life sentence therefore violated the eighth amendment of the United
States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Petitioner
supported the instant successive postconviction petition with Dr. Gelbort’s testimony from his
sentencing hearing. The trial court denied petitioner leave to file the instant successive
3
The habeas corpus petition and the federal court orders are not contained in the record.
4
We note that petitioner was sentenced to a discretionary life sentence pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch.
38, ¶ 1005-8-1(1), which states that the sentence for murder “shall not be less than 20 years and not more than 60
years,” but “if the court finds *** that any of the aggravating factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 *** are
present, the court may sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) Here, the
trial court found petitioner knowingly murdered a peace officer who was in the course of performing his official
duties, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38., ¶ 9-1(b)(1), and imposed a life sentence rather than the death penalty.
Petitioner acknowledges on appeal that his sentence was discretionary.
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postconviction petition. This appeal followed.
¶ 31 ANALYSIS
¶ 32 On appeal, petitioner contends his motion for leave to file the instant successive
postconviction petition was improperly denied and requests that either his sentence be vacated
and the matter remanded for a new sentencing hearing, or that the matter be remanded so he may
file the instant petition. Petitioner maintains his sentence violates the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) pursuant to Miller, and the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) pursuant to House,
because the trial court failed to consider his youth and its attendant characteristics prior to
sentencing. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, ¶¶ 95-101. He
further argues, for the first time, that pursuant to People v. Coty, 2018 IL App (1st) 162383,
¶¶ 75-77, he is intellectually disabled and the trial court was therefore required to consider the
characteristics that accompany his disability before imposing a life sentence. For the reasons
discussed below, we affirm.
¶ 33 The Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) provides criminal defendants a remedy
to address substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional rights in their original trial
or sentencing hearing. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 455 (2002). The Act
contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition without leave of court (725 ILCS
5/122-1(f) (West 2016)), and any claim not presented in an original or amended petition is
waived (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2016)). One basis for relaxing the bar against successive
postconviction petitions is where a petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for the failure to
raise the claim earlier. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016); People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 157
(2010). “Cause” refers to an objective factor external to the defense that impeded petitioner’s
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efforts to raise his claim in the initial postconviction proceeding. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West
2016); Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 462. “Prejudice” refers to a claim that “so infected the trial
that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West
2016); Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464.
¶ 34 Petitioner must establish both cause and prejudice in order to prevail. People v.
Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15. Moreover, claims not raised in the successive postconviction
petition are generally forfeited and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. People v.
Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 153266, ¶ 27; People v. Merriweather, 2017 IL App (4th) 150407,
¶¶ 14-19. We review the denial of leave to file a successive postconviction petition de novo.
People v. Terry, 2016 IL App (1st) 140555, ¶ 28. Under de novo review, we perform the same
analysis that the trial court would perform. People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 151.
¶ 35 We initially address petitioner’s contention that the trial court failed to consider his
alleged intellectual disability prior to imposing a life sentence as required by Coty. Coty, 2018
IL App (1st) 162383, ¶¶ 75-77. Although petitioner fails to argue cause for failing to raise the
claim earlier, it is apparent he could not have done so as Coty was decided two years after the
instant successive petition was filed. However, petitioner raises the issue for the first time on
appeal rather than in a subsequent successive postconviction petition and thus his claim pursuant
to Coty is forfeited. See People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 148-50 (2004) (claims raised for the
first time on appeal are forfeited but may be raised in a successive postconviction petition);
Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 153266, ¶ 27; Merriweather, 2017 IL App (4th) 150407, ¶¶ 14-19;
see also People v. Anderson, 375 Ill. App. 3d 121, 139-40 (2007) (noting that there is no limit to
the number of successive postconviction petitions that can be filed in the trial court).
Nevertheless, forfeiture is an admonition to the parties and not a limitation on this court. People
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v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 142 (2006). We therefore address the merits of petitioner’s claim,
and for the following reasons, we find his argument meritless.
¶ 36 The court in Coty provided additional protections to intellectually disabled offenders.
Coty, 2018 IL App (1st) 162383, ¶¶ 69-77. 5 The court based its conclusion on our Supreme
Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-21 (2002), which noted that mildly
intellectually disabled individuals have an IQ score below 70. Id. at 308 n.3. Our review of the
record in this case reveals that petitioner is not intellectually disabled. According to
Dr. Gelbort’s report and Dr. Messina’s report, petitioner’s lowest IQ score, which represented
only a portion of petitioner’s cognitive or intellectual functioning, was 75—five points above the
threshold relied on in Atkins. See id. The remainder of petitioner’s IQ scores were well above
that threshold. Moreover, neither Dr. Gelbort nor Dr. Messina indicated petitioner was
intellectually disabled. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice regarding his
constitutional challenge based on an alleged intellectual disability. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)
(West 2016); Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464.
¶ 37 Petitioner next contends he has established cause for failing to challenge his sentence
pursuant to Miller and House in a prior proceeding because Miller and House had not yet been
decided. We agree. Our supreme court has determined that Miller’s new substantive rule
constitutes cause where it was not available earlier. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 42. We
therefore turn to consider whether the trial court erred in determining petitioner failed to
demonstrate prejudice. See Guerrero, 2012 IL 112020, ¶ 15.
¶ 38 Petitioner maintains he established prejudice because the trial court failed to take into
account his youth and its attendant characteristics before imposing a life sentence in violation of
5
To be clear, the court in Coty stated that it used the preferred nomenclature “intellectually disabled” rather
than the term “mentally retarded.” Id. ¶ 1 n.1. We will employ the same terminology here.
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the federal and state constitutions. Petitioner relies on United States Supreme Court decisions
holding that the eighth amendment protects juvenile offenders from capital punishment and
mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; Graham
v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). He further
argues that our appellate court extended these protections to young adults in People v. Williams,
2018 IL App (1st) 151373, ¶¶ 19-23, People v. Harris, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 67-69, and
House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, ¶¶ 95-101.
¶ 39 In response, the State contends the protections established in Miller pursuant to the eighth
amendment apply only to juveniles (see Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; People v. Harris, 2018 IL
121932, ¶ 61), and the proportionate penalties analysis extending Miller to young adults applies
only to mandatory life or de facto life sentences (see People v. House, 2019 IL App (1st)
110580-B, ¶¶ 63-65). The State additionally argues that, regardless, petitioner’s sentence
complies with Miller because the trial court considered petitioner’s youth and its attendant
characteristics prior to imposing a life sentence. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78. For the reasons
discussed in more detail below, we find (1) petitioner’s life sentence does not violate the eighth
amendment as he was an adult at the time of the offense, and (2) petitioner’s sentence does not
violate the proportionate penalties clause because the trial court properly considered the factors
set forth in Miller (see id.).
¶ 40 We begin by addressing petitioner’s eighth amendment claim. The eighth amendment
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. Const., amend. VIII. Inherent in that prohibition
is the concept of proportionality. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. In applying this rule, the
Supreme Court in Roper held the eighth amendment prohibits capital sentences for juveniles.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. The Supreme Court subsequently determined in Graham that the eighth
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amendment prohibits mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles who commit
nonhomicide offenses, and in Miller the Court ruled the eighth amendment prohibits mandatory
life without parole sentences for juveniles who commit murder. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Miller,
567 U.S. at 489.
¶ 41 The Court’s holdings were grounded in its concern, based on scientific research about
adolescent brain development, that juveniles lack maturity, are more vulnerable to negative
influences, and are more amenable to rehabilitation. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70. The Court,
however, drew a line between juveniles and adults at the age of 18 years. Id. at 574; see also
Miller, 567 U.S. at 465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75; Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 56, 60-61.
While the Court acknowledged that the line was an imprecise “categorical rule,” it nonetheless
stated that “a line must be drawn.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. As petitioner was 18 years old at the
time of the offense, he falls on the adult side of that line and presented no evidence as to why he
should be an exception to the rule expressed in Miller. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489.
Accordingly, petitioner’s eighth amendment challenge necessarily fails. See id; Harris, 2018 IL
121932, ¶¶ 56, 60-61. Petitioner has therefore failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to his
eighth amendment claim. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016); Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464.
¶ 42 Petitioner next contends that Williams, Harris, and House extended the reasoning in
Miller to young adults challenging their life sentences pursuant to the proportionate penalties
clause of the Illinois Constitution. See Williams, 2018 IL App (1st) 151373, ¶ 19-23; Harris,
2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 67-69; House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, ¶ 95-101. After
petitioner filed his opening brief, however, the appellate court’s holding in Harris was reversed
by our supreme court, and the appellate court was directed to vacate its judgments in Williams
and House and consider the effect of Harris. Harris, 2018 IL 121932; People v. Williams, No.
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123694 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory order); People v. House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28,
2018) (supervisory order). 6 Our supreme court in Harris determined that because the 18-year-
old defendant failed to raise his as-applied challenge in the trial court, an evidentiary hearing was
not held, and the trial court did not make the necessary findings of fact regarding the defendant’s
specific circumstances. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 40. Accordingly, the record did not contain
evidence about how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development that helped
form the basis of the Miller decision applied to the defendant’s specific facts and circumstances.
Id. ¶ 46. The defendant’s claim was therefore premature, and was more appropriate for a
postconviction proceeding (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)) or a petition seeking relief
from a final judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-
1401 (West 2016)). Id. ¶ 48. Thus, the court left open the possibility that an adult defendant
could present evidence demonstrating Miller applies to his particular circumstances in a
challenge pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 45-48.
¶ 43 In addition, our supreme court in People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40, held that the
rationale of Miller applies to discretionary sentences of life without parole for juvenile
defendants. In that case, the defendant received a discretionary sentence of life without parole
for a murder that he committed at age 17. Id. ¶ 1. Upon the denial of leave to file his successive
postconviction petition, the defendant maintained that his sentence was unconstitutional under
Miller and its progeny because the trial court did not apply the factors presented in Miller
regarding his youth and its attendant characteristics. Id. ¶¶ 20-22. Although our supreme court
ultimately affirmed the dismissal of the defendant’s successive postconviction petition, in doing
6
The court in House subsequently reaffirmed its finding that the 19-year-old defendant’s mandatory life
sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶¶ 64-65. We will
discuss House in more detail below.
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so it set forth the framework with which we are to evaluate whether or not a juvenile defendant’s
discretionary sentence of life without parole passes constitutional muster:
“Under Miller and Montgomery [v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718
(2016)], a juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, but
only if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable
depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of
rehabilitation. The court may make that decision only after considering the defendant’s
youth and its attendant characteristics. Those characteristics include, but are not limited
to, the following factors: (1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the
offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home
environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any
evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile
defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile
defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46.
Furthermore, according to Holman, a key feature of the juvenile’s sentencing hearing is that the
defendant had the “opportunity to present evidence to show that his criminal conduct was the
product of immaturity and not incorrigibility. Id. ¶ 49 (citing Montgomery, 577 U.S. at ___, 136
S. Ct. at 736). The Holman court went on to expressly consider situations where a defendant was
sentenced prior to Miller and observed that, “[i]n revisiting a juvenile defendant’s life without
parole sentence, the only evidence that matters is evidence of the defendant’s youth and its
attendant characteristics at the time of sentencing.” Id. ¶ 47. The court further noted that
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whether evidence of a defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances exists “depends upon
the state of the record in each case.” Id. Accordingly, “[a] court revisiting a discretionary
sentence of life without parole must look at the cold record to determine if the trial court
considered such evidence at the defendant’s original sentencing hearing.” Id.
¶ 44 Here, we acknowledge that the trial court did not have the benefit of the Harris decision
and therefore did not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Miller applies to
petitioner’s particular circumstances as an 18-year-old adult. See Harris, 2018 IL 121932,
¶¶ 40, 45-48. Nevertheless, as in Holman, the record here is sufficient to review petitioner’s
claim that the sentencing court failed to consider the Miller factors prior to imposing a life
sentence. See Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 47-50.
¶ 45 In reviewing petitioner’s claim, we find the facts of Holman instructive. See id. ¶¶ 48-50.
In that case, our supreme court determined the defendant’s sentence complied with Miller, even
where Miller was decided after the sentencing hearing. Id. ¶¶ 6, 47-50. In reaching this
conclusion, our supreme court relied on the following facts. The trial court explicitly stated that
it considered the trial evidence, the PSI, and evidence and arguments from the sentencing
hearing. Id. ¶ 48. The trial court knew the defendant’s age at the time of the offense, and the
parties highlighted his age during the sentencing hearing. Id. The PSI and psychological reports
provided some insight into the defendant’s mentality, but they did not depict him as immature,
impetuous, or unaware of risks. Id. The PSI included information about the defendant’s family,
including that his father and stepfather had died, and he maintained a close relationship with his
mother and siblings. Id. Although there was some dispute as to whether the defendant or his
accomplice shot the victim, both were “intimately involved” with the offense. Id. The trial court
was informed of the defendant’s susceptibility to peer pressure, as well as his low intelligence
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and possible brain damage from a head injury, but no evidence indicated the defendant was
incompetent and could not communicate with police officers or prosecutors or assist his own
attorney. Id. Moreover, a psychiatrist who treated the defendant spoke highly of his verbal
intelligence. Id.
¶ 46 As for the Holman defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation, the PSI included a statement
from the defendant’s probation officer, who found “ ‘no predilection for rehabilitation,’ ” in light
of the defendant’s “ ‘history of senseless criminal acts of mortal violence toward others and lack
of remorse for his victims.’ ” Id. The defendant was provided an opportunity to present
evidence demonstrating his criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not
incorrigibility but chose to offer nothing. Id. ¶ 49. The defendant declined to present evidence
related to any of the statutory factors in mitigation, but the trial court heard the aforementioned
evidence related to the Miller factors. Id. ¶ 50. In addition, there was significant evidence
related to the statutory factors in aggravation, including the defendant’s convictions for his
involvement in two unrelated murders. Id. ¶¶ 13, 50. The trial court explicitly made a finding of
permanent incorrigibility prior to sentencing the defendant to life without parole, stating “ ‘the
Court believes that this Defendant cannot be rehabilitated, and that it is important that society be
protected from this Defendant.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 17, 50. Based on this evidence, our supreme court
found the defendant’s sentence passed constitutional muster under Miller. Id. ¶¶ 48-50.
¶ 47 After reviewing the record in this case, we find the evidence presented by the parties and
considered by the trial court is comparable to the evidence introduced and considered in Holman.
See id. The trial court considered evidence of petitioner’s youth and its attendant characteristics
at the time of sentencing and petitioner had the “opportunity to present evidence to show that his
criminal conduct was the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility.” See id. ¶ 49. With
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respect to the first Miller factor—petitioner’s age at the time of the offense and any evidence of
immaturity, impetuosity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences—when imposing
petitioner’s sentence the trial court explicitly stated that it listened to and considered the evidence
in mitigation. The trial court knew defendant’s age at the time of the offense, and the parties
highlighted his age during the sentencing hearing. Moreover, Dr. Gelbort provided detailed
testimony into petitioner’s mentality, including testimony that petitioner had “difficulty with
impulsivity, *** with judgment, with reasoning, with the ability to appreciate the ramifications
of one’s own behavior.” He further testified, however, that while there was evidence of organic
brain dysfunction, there could also be personality attributes resulting in petitioner’s behavior. In
addition, Dr. Gelbort testified petitioner could conform his behavior to acceptable norms of
conduct and could appreciate the criminality of his actions. Furthermore, unlike the
characteristics attributable to juveniles, there was no indication petitioner’s condition was
transient.
¶ 48 As to the second Miller factor—petitioner’s family and home environment—petitioner’s
family background was outlined in his PSI, testified to by his mother, Shirley, and argued by
defense counsel. The trial court was informed that Shirley sold drugs in front of petitioner in
order to support her family and that petitioner’s father did not acknowledge petitioner as his son.
In addition, Shirley testified that two and a half years prior to the instant offense, petitioner
accidentally shot and killed his cousin, with whom he was “best friends.” Shirley stated the
incident caused petitioner to distance himself from everyone and “from reality.” Petitioner’s PSI
indicated he got along well with his mother and three siblings, although his younger brother was
in prison. The trial court was also informed of petitioner’s six children and found petitioner’s
statement that he enjoyed playing with them was a mitigating factor. The trial court explicitly
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acknowledged petitioner’s background, stating that it was “miserable” as “[h]is mother was a
drug dealer, his father didn’t acknowledge him.” The court further stated, however, that “there
are many people with similar backgrounds who don’t go out and murder policemen.”
¶ 49 With respect to the third Miller factor—petitioner’s degree of participation in the
homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressure—the trial court was aware of the facts of
the case as the same judge presided over petitioner’s trial and sentencing hearing. The State
noted during its argument in aggravation that petitioner was directly responsible for the offense.
Moreover, no evidence was presented indicating petitioner was susceptible to peer pressure. In
fact, the record reveals that petitioner voluntarily promised to attack an officer and willingly
followed through with his promise. There was no indication he was coerced, pressured, or
participated out of fear.
¶ 50 As to the fourth factor—petitioner’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with
police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys—the trial court was
informed of petitioner’s low intelligence (associated with only one half of his brain) and possible
brain damage from a head injury, but no evidence indicated petitioner was incompetent and
could not communicate with police officers or prosecutors or assist his own attorney. Moreover,
Dr. Gelbort testified the right hemisphere of petitioner’s brain, i.e., his visual memory, was
actually above average. The court specifically found petitioner’s intellectual deficit was a
mitigating factor such that it precluded the imposition of the death penalty.
¶ 51 Finally, with respect to the fifth factor—petitioner’s prospects for rehabilitation—the trial
court explicitly acknowledged that it was directed “to consider what are the prospects pursuant to
our constitution that this person can be restored to useful citizenship, what are his chances for
rehabilitation.” The trial court recounted petitioner’s significant criminal history and specifically
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acknowledged his social disadvantages and intellectual deficits, but ultimately concluded that
petitioner was permanently incorrigible, stating “[t]his defendant has zero chance of successfully
rehabilitating himself.”
¶ 52 The record therefore demonstrates that, as in Holman, (1) the trial court was aware of
petitioner’s age, (2) psychological reports provided insight into petitioner’s mentality, (3) the
trial court received detailed information regarding petitioner’s family and background, (4) the
trial court knew petitioner was intimately involved in the offense, (5) the trial court learned of
petitioner’s low intelligence and possible brain damage from a head injury, (6) a psychologist or
psychiatrist spoke positively about petitioner’s intelligence as it related to one aspect of
petitioner’s intellectual functioning, and (7) the trial court made an explicit finding of permanent
incorrigibility. See id. ¶¶ 48, 50. We thus conclude that the evidence discussed above was the
type that Miller requires trial courts to consider in a juvenile sentencing hearing. See id. ¶¶ 46-
50. Moreover, as in Holman, petitioner was provided the opportunity to present evidence that his
crimes were the product of immaturity and not incorrigibility—including evidence regarding his
age, education, psychological abnormalities, and family history—and the trial court considered
that evidence. See id. ¶ 49.
¶ 53 We acknowledge that a different sentencing court could have reached a different sentence
based on the evidence presented at petitioner’s sentencing hearing. Nevertheless, “nothing in
Miller or Holman suggests that we are free to substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing
court. Our role is to evaluate the sentencing hearing to ensure that a juvenile defendant had the
opportunity to present evidence related to the hallmarks of youth and that the trial court
considered the defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics.” People v. Croft, 2018 IL App
(1st) 150043, ¶ 33. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that petitioner’s sentencing
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hearing was constitutionally defective pursuant to the proportionate penalties clause. See Harris,
2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 45-48; Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶¶ 46-50. Accordingly, petitioner has
failed to demonstrate prejudice. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016); Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at
464. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for leave to file his
second successive postconviction petition.
¶ 54 In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that on remand, the appellate court in House
reaffirmed its finding that the 19-year-old defendant’s mandatory life sentence violated the
proportionate penalties clause. House, 2019 IL App (1st) 110580-B, ¶¶ 64-65. The court made
clear, however, that its conclusion was based on the fact that the trial court was precluded from
considering any mitigating factors presented by the defendant before imposing a mandatory life
sentence. Id. ¶¶ 63-65. In contrast, the trial court in this case considered a plethora of evidence
regarding mitigating factors prior to imposing a discretionary sentence. Moreover, the defendant
in House was convicted under a theory of accountability—a significant mitigating factor—as he
was merely a lookout during the offense and was not the actual shooter. Id. ¶¶ 46, 64. Here,
unlike the defendant in House, petitioner was directly responsible for the offense. See id.Accordingly, the concerns raised by the court in House are not implicated here. See id. ¶¶ 63-65.
¶ 55 CONCLUSION
¶ 56 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 57 Affirmed.
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