People v. Conner , 2019 IL App (1st) 172851-U ( 2019 )

2019 IL App (1st) 172851-UNo. 1-17-2851
Order filed December 26, 2019
Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as
precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 16 CR 16024
)
EARL CONNER, ) Honorable
) Neera Lall Walsh,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lampkin and Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The State’s evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated battery by use of a deadly
weapon other than by discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(f)(1) (West 2016)) and
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction should
No. 1-17-2851
be reversed because the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove his use of a “deadly weapon.”
For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 Defendant was charged with multiple offenses arising from an October 3, 2016 incident
that involved Cameshia Martin. Count 1 (the only count at issue in this appeal) charged
defendant with aggravated battery to Martin involving the use of a deadly weapon, a golf club,
pursuant to section 12-3.05(f)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code). See 720 ILCS 5/12-
3.05(f)(1) (West 2016). Defendant was also charged with three counts of domestic battery
against Martin (Counts 3, 4, and 6), as well as separate counts of aggravated battery and
domestic battery against a child under the age of 13 years (Counts 2 and 5). The State nol-
prossed Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6 and proceeded to trial only on Counts 1 and 3. Defendant elected to
represent himself at the subsequent jury trial.
¶4 Martin testified at trial that she and defendant were in a relationship for four years and
that they had a daughter, Zoey. As of October 3, 2016, defendant, Martin, and one-year-old Zoey
lived together in an apartment. On that day, Martin took a bus to her workplace. When she
arrived, her supervisor informed her that, in fact, Martin was not scheduled to work that day.
Because she had the day off, Martin went to a car dealership, as she was interested in buying a
car. Martin did not purchase a car that day. However, she brought paperwork from the dealership
to “show [defendant] I wasn’t lying about where I was at.” Martin then took a bus home. On the
way home, she texted defendant, who asked where she had been. After exchanging messages
with defendant, Martin “had a feeling that * * * it was going to be an argument once I got
home.” Before returning home, she picked up Zoey from another location. Martin and Zoey
returned to their apartment and were watching television in the bedroom when defendant arrived.
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¶5 When defendant came home, he asked to see the paperwork from the dealership. Martin
showed it to him, but “he still didn’t believe [her] that [she] was at a car dealership.” Defendant
threw the paperwork on the ground and told Martin that she was lying. After Martin insisted that
she was telling the truth, defendant struck her on the left side of her face. Martin testified that
Zoey was sitting on the bed next to her at that time. Martin attempted to walk out of the
bedroom, but defendant grabbed her hair and threw her to the ground. While she was on the
ground, defendant hit her with his closed fist and kicked her. He then walked out of the room.
Martin stayed on the floor of the bedroom, crying and “distraught.”
¶6 Defendant re-entered the room and again accused Martin of lying. At one point,
defendant grabbed Zoey “by the arm and kind of slung her across the bed.” Defendant picked up
a golf club that “he kept in the closet.” Martin described it as a “metal golf club” with “a ball at
the end of it.” She asked defendant not to hit her, but he still hit her with the club. She testified
that defendant held the golf club “as if he was playing baseball” when he struck her on the left-
hand side of her back. After defendant hit her with the golf club a second time, Martin grabbed
the club and was able to push defendant away. When defendant walked out of the bedroom,
Martin grabbed her cell phone, exited the bedroom and went downstairs toward the front door of
the apartment building. As she was going downstairs, defendant grabbed her by the hair. Martin
eventually broke free from defendant and ran out of the apartment building. She knew that Zoey
was still in the building, but explained that she left without her because at that time, she thought
that if she did not “get out of [t]here” she would not be able to “save” Zoey. Martin dialed 911
and shortly thereafter flagged down a police car. She told police what had happened, and later
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spoke to paramedics who arrived at the scene. Martin was transported to a hospital, where she
was reunited with Zoey a short time later.
¶7 Martin identified two photographs (People’s exhibits no. 1 and 2), which she testified
accurately depicted a “red bruise” on her back from being struck with the golf club. The
photographs were admitted and published to the jury. Martin also identified a recording of her
911 call, which was published.
¶8 Chicago police officer Paschal testified that he and his partner were in a marked police
vehicle when they were “flagged down” by Martin, who was “visibly distraught and crying.”
After speaking with Martin, Paschal requested an ambulance and radioed for his sergeant,
Christopher Vacek, to come to the scene. Paschal testified that Vacek arrived and spoke with
Martin. Vacek then entered the apartment building where Martin said she lived. Because Vacek
was initially unable to gain access to the apartment, the police contacted the Chicago Fire
Department. Members of the fire department, together with Paschal, Vacek, and other police
officers, went to the apartment. After Vacek “bang[ed] on the door” with no response, the fire
department forced the apartment door open. Paschal and Vacek were the first two officers to
enter the apartment. Inside, Paschal found defendant holding a baby. Defendant was then taken
into custody.
¶9 Paschal testified that, to his knowledge, police did not recover a golf club from the
apartment. He acknowledged that he searched the bedroom and the living room but did not check
any other rooms of the residence.
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¶ 10 The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (Count 1)
and domestic battery (Count 3). The court merged the counts and sentenced defendant to four
years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction
for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, this court considers whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Wheeler,
226 Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007). “On review, all reasonable inferences from the evidence are drawn in
favor of the State. [Citations.] The reviewing court will not retry the defendant or substitute its
judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence, conflicts
in the testimony, or the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.]” People v. Corral, 2019 IL App (1st)
171501, ¶ 71.
¶ 12 “Testimony may be found insufficient * * * only where the evidence compels the
conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 72. “[T]he
fact finder’s decision to accept testimony is entitled to great deference but is not conclusive and
does not bind the reviewing court. [Citation.] Only where the evidence is so improbable or
unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt will a conviction be set
aside. [Citation.]” Id.
¶ 13 In order to sustain defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery, as charged in this case,
the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, in committing a battery,
defendant “[u]se[d] a deadly weapon other than by discharge of a firearm.” 720 ILCS 5/12-
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3.05(f)(1) (West 2016). In order to establish battery, the State was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant “knowingly without legal justification by any means (1)
cause[d] bodily harm to an individual or (2) ma[de] physical contact of an insulting or provoking
nature with an individual.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2016).
¶ 14 In this court, defendant does not dispute that he committed a battery. Rather, he argues
that the evidence was insufficient to establish that, in doing so, he used a deadly weapon, as
required to sustain his aggravated battery conviction. He emphasizes that the golf club described
by Martin was not recovered and argues that, without it, the State could not prove the use of a
deadly weapon. Absent recovery of the golf club, he urges that “it is highly improbable and
defies belief that a golf club was in fact used.” He acknowledges that the photographs admitted
into evidence “depict a red bruise” on Martin’s back, but he argues “there is nothing particularly
remarkable about the bruise to indicate that it was made by a golf club.” Defendant otherwise
suggests that, even if a golf club was used, Martin’s description of it was not sufficient for the
jury to conclude that it constituted a “deadly weapon.”
¶ 15 The aggravated battery statute does not define “deadly weapon,” but this court has held
that “[a] deadly weapon is defined as any ‘instrument that is used or may be used for the purpose
of an offense and is capable of producing death.’ ” People v. Mandarino, 2013 IL App (1st)
111772, ¶ 68 (quoting People v. Blanks, 361 Ill. App. 3d 400, 411 (2005)). In Blanks, our court
further explained:
“ ‘Some weapons are deadly per se; others, owing to the manner in
which they are used, become deadly. A gun, pistol, or dirk-knife is
itself deadly, while a small pocket knife, a cane, a riding whip, a
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No. 1-17-2851
club or baseball bat may be so used as to be a deadly weapon.’
People v. Dwyer, 324 Ill. 363, 364-65 (1927). Those
instrumentalities not considered deadly per se may clearly become
such by the manner in which they are used. [Citation.] When the
character of the weapon is doubtful or the question depends upon
the manner of its use, it is a question for the fact finder to
determine from a description of the weapon, the manner of its use,
and the circumstances of the case. [Citation.]” Blanks, 361 Ill.
App. 3d at 411-12.
“We review the evidence of the use of a deadly weapon in the light most favorable to the State,
to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the element proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” Mandarino, 2013 IL App (1st) 111772, ¶ 68.
¶ 16 We initially note that, in setting forth his argument, defendant does not dispute that, in
general, a golf club can be used in a way that may cause death or serious bodily injury. See
People v. J.O., 269 Ill. App. 3d 287, 291 (1994) (“Reasonable people know that a beating with a
golf club and baseball bats can cause death and/or great bodily injury.”). Defendant also does not
suggest that, as a general matter, proof of a “deadly weapon” requires the actual recovery of that
weapon. Our court has upheld aggravated battery convictions even where the “deadly weapon”
has not been recovered. See, e.g., People v. Marston, 353 Ill. App. 3d 513, 521-22 (2004)
(rejecting argument that State failed to prove that defendant used a pole as a deadly weapon
where, although the State did not introduce the pole, multiple witnesses described it and the jury
saw photographs of the victim’s injuries). Instead, defendant argues that, in this case, without the
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recovered golf club, the remaining evidence was insufficient to prove that Martin was, in fact, hit
with a golf club.
¶ 17 We conclude that, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a
rational jury could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used a
deadly weapon; i.e., the golf club described by Martin. Notwithstanding the failure to recover the
golf club from the scene, we cannot say that the remaining evidence—Martin’s testimony and
the photographic evidence—was “so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt.”
Corral, 2019 IL App (1st) 171501, ¶ 72. Rather, the jury could, and apparently did, credit
Martin’s testimony—including her statement that defendant repeatedly swung a metal golf club
at her “as if he was playing baseball”—to find that defendant used the golf club as a deadly
weapon. Martin also testified that she fled the building without Zoey because she believed it was
the only way she could save her. We will not reweigh that testimony to second-guess the jury’s
credibility findings, which are entitled to great deference. Further, the jury could reasonably find
that Martin’s testimony was corroborated by the photographs introduced at trial, which (as
defendant concedes) showed a bruise on her back. Therefore, the evidence presented was
sufficient to permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant struck Martin
with a golf club, constituting the use of a “deadly weapon” within the meaning of the aggravated
battery statute. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(f)(1) (West 2016). In other words, the State’s evidence was
not so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.
¶ 18 In reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant’s argument that the photographs merely
show a “garden variety” bruise, rather than one that could have been inflicted by a golf club.
Defendant essentially asks us to reweigh the photographic evidence and substitute our judgment
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for that of the jury, which we cannot do. A jury could rationally conclude that the photographs of
Martin’s injury were consistent with her testimony about being hit with a golf club.
¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 20 Affirmed.
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