Pedigo v. Rosenthal ( 2020 )

FILED
NOTICE 2020 IL App (4th) 190057-U May 19, 2020
This order was filed under Supreme
Court Rule 23 and may not be cited
Carla Bender
as precedent by any party except in NO. 4-19-0057 4th District Appellate
the limited circumstances allowed Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
DANNY PEDIGO, WANDA PEDIGO, TONY ) Appeal from the
CAPRANICA, and LINDA CAPRANICA, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Sangamon County
v. ) No. 13MR975
WAYNE ROSENTHAL, in His Official Capacity as )
Director of Natural Resources, ) Honorable
Defendant-Appellee. ) Brian T. Otwell,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court properly granted the
Department’s motion to dismiss where plaintiffs’ claims were barred by
res judicata.
¶2 Plaintiffs, Danny Pedigo, Wanda Pedigo, Tony Capranica, and Linda Capranica,
brought a complaint in mandamus against defendant, Wayne Rosenthal, in his official capacity
as Director of the Illinois Department of Natural Resources (Department), to compel eminent
domain proceedings to determine the amount of compensation to which plaintiffs are entitled for
the Department’s taking of certain parcels of property for public use in the construction of a bike
trail on an old railroad right of way. Despite the caption of the complaint as one against
Rosenthal, the complaint makes no allegations against him either individually or as director of
the Department but only makes allegations against the Department and asks for relief requesting
Rosenthal be ordered to institute eminent domain proceedings.
¶3 The Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing plaintiffs’
complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the trial court granted the motion to
dismiss. We affirm the trial court’s judgment granting defendant’s motion to dismiss.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 The origins of this dispute can be traced to February 6, 2001, when the
Department filed a complaint for condemnation proceedings against plaintiffs. The Department
sought fee simple title to plaintiffs’ property for the acquisition, development, and construction
of the Chatham Trail Bikeway, a seven-mile bike trail from Chatham to Springfield. The trial
court found the whole of the property to be condemned was only a very small amount of land
constituting 0.9 acres, of which the Department was bringing proceedings to acquire title to only
0.147 acres. On appeal, this court found the trial court erred and the 0.9 acre parcel was really a
part of a whole property of 58.89 acres. We reversed and remanded for the trial court to assess
damages caused to the remainder of plaintiffs’ 58.89 acres. Illinois Department of Natural
Resources v. Pedigo, 348 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1050, 811 N.E.2d 761, 766-67 (2004). Upon
remand, a jury awarded damages of $25,000 to plaintiffs for the value of the 0.147 acres of land
taken and the damage to the remaining 58.89 acres. This amount was affirmed on appeal.
Department of Natural Resources, State of Illinois v. Pedigo, No. 4-06-0259 (Apr. 18, 2007)
(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶6 A. Sangamon County case No. 07-MR-561
¶7 In October 2007, plaintiffs filed a five-count complaint for mandamus. Plaintiffs
alleged the Department (1) took the remainder of the 0.9 acre portion of plaintiffs’ property as a
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drainage ditch for the bike trail; (2) allowed the construction of the bike trail without provision
for either of two farm crossing easements over the bike trail; (3) allowed the construction of the
bike trail without allowing plaintiffs their right of way to cross at convenient places; (4) took
(a) their right to natural drainage to their land, (b) their right to have no damage to their land, and
(c) the benefit and advantage of having a railway on a strip of their land; and (5) denied them the
privilege of using part of a strip of their land for roadway purposes at the entrance to their
property. In March 2008, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint for mandamus relief and the
Department filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Plaintiffs appealed.
¶8 In January 2013, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding “plaintiffs’
allegations of damages they suffered, which did not claim actual physical takings of property, did
not establish a right to eminent domain proceedings in the circuit court and were required to be
brought in the Court of Claims.” We further found “[s]everal, if not all, of plaintiffs’ counts in
their complaint did not set forth enough facts for any relief to be considered or granted.” Pedigo
v. Flood, 2013 IL App (4th) 120023-U, ¶¶ 24-25.
¶9 B. Current Proceedings
¶ 10 In November 2013, plaintiffs initiated this suit with the filing of a complaint in
mandamus alleging the construction of the Chatham Trail Bikeway was not limited to the 0.147
acres taken by the Department but included all of the land and property rights pertaining to
plaintiffs’ 0.9 acre parcel. Plaintiffs sought an order directing the current director of the
Department to institute eminent domain proceedings.
¶ 11 In January 2014, the Department filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint
pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West
2012)) and a memorandum in support of its motion. The Department argued plaintiffs’ complaint
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was barred by res judicata as the complaint presented identical claims which were previously
adjudicated. The Department further argued plaintiffs’ attempt to allege new facts were similarly
barred by res judicata as plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise those allegations in prior
proceedings.
¶ 12 In January 2017, the trial court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss,
finding the allegations in plaintiffs’ mandamus complaint “barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.” Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider. In May 2017, the trial court granted
plaintiffs’ motion and allowed plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint in mandamus.
¶ 13 On September 1, 2017, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in mandamus.
Plaintiffs alleged the Department physically took a 0.287 acre parcel (Area J) located within
plaintiffs’ aforementioned 0.9 acre parcel without payment of just compensation. Plaintiffs
described the Area J parcel as consisting of land beyond the 0.147 acre parcel acquired by the
Department. Further, as a result of the taking, plaintiffs alleged (1) the substantial impairment or
loss of plaintiffs’ previously existing right to cross the public bike path at convenient places,
(2) the physical taking of access to a public roadway and to remaining land of the plaintiffs, and
(3) the right to use a portion of a strip of land at the entrance of plaintiffs’ property for roadway
purposes.
¶ 14 On September 6, 2017, the Department filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
second amended complaint for mandamus relief. The motion and memorandum in support of the
motion adopted the allegations of the Department’s previously filed motion to dismiss and
maintained plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata. In December 2018, the trial court
granted the Department’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint, finding “[i]t *** clear that
many of the claims raised in the Complaint were indeed raised and decided in connection with
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those matters.” The court further found that “to the extent that claims regarding the land
comprising Area J [were] not previously adjudicated, the claims regarding that parcel could have
been raised in the Plaintiffs’ complaint filed in October, 2007.” The court found the claims “with
respect to Area J appear to allege a damage to property rather than a taking.”
¶ 15 This appeal followed.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in granting the Department’s
motion to dismiss their second amended complaint in mandamus based on res judicata. The
Department maintains the court’s decision was proper and contends that the instant cause arises
out of the same core of operative facts as plaintiffs’ complaint in Sangamon County case No. 07-
MR-561. Orders dismissing an action pursuant to either section 2-615 or section 2-619 of the
Code are reviewed de novo. Thurman v. Champaign Park District, 2011 IL App (4th) 101024,
¶ 7, 960 N.E.2d 18.
¶ 18 “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction acts as a bar to a subsequent suit between the parties involving
the same cause of action.” River Park, Inc. v. Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 302, 703 N.E.2d
883, 889 (1998).
“ ‘The purpose of res judicata is to promote judicial economy by requiring parties
to litigate, in one case, all rights arising out of the same set of operative facts and
also [to] prevent[ ] the unjust burden that would result if a party could be forced to
relitigate what is essentially the same case.’ ” Id. at 319 (quoting Henstein v.
Buschbach, 248 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1015-16, 618 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (1993)).
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¶ 19 It is well established that res judicata bars not only matters that were decided in
the first action, but all matters that could have been decided in that action. Id. at 302.
“For the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the following three requirements must
be satisfied: (1) there was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, (2) there is an identity of cause of action, and (3) there is
an identity of parties or their privies.” Id. (citing Downing v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 162 Ill. 2d 70, 73-74, 642 N.E.2d 456, 458 (1994)).
We analyze the three requirements below.
¶ 20 First, we analyze whether a final judgment on the merits was entered in plaintiffs’
prior case. A judgment is final when it terminates the litigation and fixes absolutely the rights of
the parties, leaving only enforcement of the judgment. A & R Janitorial v. Pepper Construction
Co., 2018 IL 123220, ¶ 17, 124 N.E.3d 962. “For purposes of res judicata, a judgment is not
final until the possibility of appellate review has been exhausted.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Dookeran v. County of Cook, 2013 IL App (1st) 111095, ¶ 18, 987 N.E.2d 826.
¶ 21 A final judgment on the merits was entered in Sangamon County case No. 07-
MR-561. On April 27, 2011, the trial court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ complaint in mandamus. See Pedigo, 2013 IL App (4th) 120023-U, ¶ 12. Plaintiffs
appealed and in January 2013, this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. ¶ 28. In May
2013, the Illinois Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Thus, we find the
first requirement for applying res judicata met where a final judgment on the merits was entered
in plaintiffs’ prior case.
¶ 22 Second, we analyze whether there is an identity between plaintiffs’ present cause
of action and their cause of action in Sangamon County case No. 07-MR-561. “A cause of action
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is defined by the facts which give a plaintiff a right to relief.” Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172
Ill. 2d 325, 338, 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1206 (1996). In determining whether actions are the same for
res judicata purposes, Illinois courts apply the transactional test. River Park, Inc., 184 Ill. 2d at
310-11. Under this approach, “separate claims will be considered the same cause of action for
purposes of res judicata if they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of
whether they assert different theories of relief.” Id. at 311.
¶ 23 Plaintiffs’ present cause of action is based on the same operative facts as
plaintiffs’ cause of action in their prior case. In Sangamon County case No. 07-MR-561,
plaintiffs sought mandamus relief, arguing on appeal the trial court should not have granted the
Department’s motion to dismiss because the Department (1) took the remainder of the 0.9 acre
portion of their property as a drainage ditch for the Chatham Trail Bikeway, (2) allowed the
construction of the bikeway without provision for two farm crossings, (3) allowed the
construction of the bikeway without allowing plaintiffs their right of way to cross at convenient
places, and (4) took plaintiffs’ privilege to use a strip of land at the entrance to their property for
roadway purposes by allowing the construction of the bikeway. See Pedigo, 2013 IL App (4th)
120023-U, ¶¶ 8-10.
¶ 24 Here, as in Sangamon County case No. 07-MR-561, plaintiffs again sought
mandamus relief and argued (1) major portions of Area J, a 0.287 acre portion within plaintiffs’
0.9 acre parcel, consisted of either the slope or drainage course of the Chatham Trail Bikeway,
(2) portions of vegetation in Area J were caused to be “sprayed and killed,” (3) the physical
taking of two farm crossings, (4) substantial loss or impairment of plaintiffs’ right to cross the
bikeway at convenient places, and (5) the Department took plaintiffs’ right to use a strip of land
at the entrance of their property “for roadway purposes.”
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¶ 25 We find plaintiffs’ present cause of action is based on the same cause of action in
Sangamon County case No. 07-MR-561, where the causes of action arise from the same core of
operative facts. Like Sangamon County case No. 07-MR-561, plaintiffs’ present cause of action
sought to compel eminent domain proceedings based on the same alleged takings by the
Department of the same property and related property rights. We find the second requirement for
applying res judicata was met where there is an identity of cause of action between plaintiffs’
present cause of action and plaintiffs’ cause of action in plaintiffs’ prior case.
¶ 26 Nonetheless, plaintiffs contend they were unable to assert a physical taking in
Sangamon County case No. 07-MR-561, thus barring application of res judicata, because the
Department was free to abandon the taking up until it opened the bikeway to the public on
October 25, 2009, and plaintiffs were unaware of the bikeway’s opening until “approximately
July 4, 2013.” We disagree. Plaintiffs offer no reason for the delay other than being unaware of
the bikeway’s opening before reading about it in a newspaper article in July 2013. Nothing
precluded plaintiffs from discovering those facts sooner. Whether plaintiffs were entitled to
eminent domain proceedings for the taking and damaging of their property due to the
construction of the Chatham Trail Bikeway was an element of the cause of action in Sangamon
County case No. 07-MR-561. As the Department points out, prior to the trial court’s dismissal of
the matter on April 27, 2011, plaintiffs could have investigated the property and sought to amend
their complaint and litigated the issue. For whatever reason, plaintiffs elected not to do so.
Permitting them to proceed on that basis now would amount to a second bite at the apple. See
Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 534, 809 N.E.2d 88, 98 (2004) (“[R]es judicata prevents a
party from taking two bites out of the same apple.”).
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¶ 27 As to the third element, the parties are the same and there is no dispute over
whether there is an identity of parties or their privies. Because all requirements are met, we find
plaintiffs’ claims barred by res judicata. The trial court properly granted the Department’s
motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ second amended complaint for mandamus relief.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 30 Affirmed.
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