In re Aa.C , 2021 IL App (4th) 210019-U ( 2021 )

NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 210019-U FILED
This Order was filed under June 3, 2021
Supreme Court Rule 23 and NO. 4-21-0019 Carla Bender
is not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re Aa.C., Ar.C., and V.C., Minors ) Appeal from
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Champaign County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 18JA79
v. )
Tiffany C., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Adam M. Dill,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court’s fitness finding was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In October 2020, the State filed a second petition to terminate the parental rights
of respondent, Tiffany C., as to her minor children, Aa.C. (born February 25, 2009), Ar.C. (born
December 18, 2007), and V.C. (born September 14, 2010). Following a fitness hearing, the trial
court found respondent unfit. In December 2020, the court found it was in the minors’ best
interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶3 Respondent appeals, arguing the trial court erred by finding her unfit due to a
failure to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to removal of the children
during the period from January 8, 2020, to October 8, 2020, (2) make reasonable progress toward
the return of the children during the same time period, and (3) maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children’s welfare. For the following reasons, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 A. Initial Proceedings
¶6 In October 2018, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship, alleging
the children were (1) dependent, having no parent, guardian, or custodian (count I) and
(2) neglected, pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS
405/2-3(1) (West 2018)), in that their environment exposed them to substance abuse (count II)
and criminal activity (count III). Respondent stipulated to probable cause and immediate and
urgent necessity, and the trial court placed the children in the temporary custody of the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶7 In December 2018, the court entered an order finding the minors neglected
because respondent was incarcerated on a warrant from Tennessee, had no stable housing, and
was engaged in serious substance abuse when the children were in her care. In January 2019, the
court entered a dispositional order (1) finding respondent unfit and unable to care for the minors,
(2) making the minors wards of the court, and (3) placing custody and guardianship of the
minors with DCFS.
¶8 B. Termination Proceedings
¶9 In September 2019, the State filed a motion for the termination of parental rights,
alleging respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minor within the
nine-month period from December 30, 2018, to September 30, 2019. At a January 2020 hearing,
the trial court found the State failed to prove respondent unfit. In October 2020, the State filed a
second motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights, alleging respondent was unfit due to a
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failure to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to removal of the children
during the nine-month period from January 8, 2020, to October 8, 2020; (2) make reasonable
progress toward the return of the children during the same time period; and (3) maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children’s welfare.
¶ 10 In October 2020, the trial court held a permanency hearing and made findings it
believed relevant to the impending fitness hearing. The court found respondent had not made
reasonable and substantial progress toward returning the minors home and had not made
reasonable efforts toward returning the minors home. The court further found respondent must
consistently engage in services.
¶ 11 In November 2020, the matter proceeded to a hearing on the motion for
termination of parental rights. The court heard the following evidence.
¶ 12 1. Ellen Pierce
¶ 13 Ellen Pierce, the caseworker for Lutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI)
throughout the case, testified respondent lived in Tennessee during the period of alleged
unfitness. In January 2020, respondent lived at Hope Center, a treatment facility. When
respondent completed the treatment program, she remained at Hope Center as a resident until she
could regain her financial footing. In April, respondent moved in with respondent father. In
June, respondent relapsed, and through early August she used methamphetamine and cannabis.
In August, respondent was readmitted to a Hope Center facility in Oklahoma. In September
2020, respondent was discharged from the Oklahoma Hope Center and moved in with relatives
in Paris, Tennessee. In November, respondent reported she moved in with a paramour.
¶ 14 Pierce testified respondent maintained inconsistent contact. According to Pierce,
she would not hear from respondent for two to three months. Then respondent would become
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actively engaged and speak with Pierce weekly for approximately a month. Pierce described it
as “windows of no communication and brief communication.” In May and July 2020,
respondent attended two sessions of individual counseling at the Cumberland Treatment Facility
in Tennessee. Pierce testified she confirmed respondent attended two sessions but did not
successfully complete the services and Cumberland could no longer contact her because her
phone number had changed.
¶ 15 Although respondent received substance abuse treatment in the fall, Pierce had no
documentation of the treatment and asked respondent for assistance in obtaining documentation.
Based on respondent’s lack of communication and inability to remain engaged for long periods
of time, as well as reports from family members, Pierce wondered if respondent continued to use
methamphetamine.
¶ 16 In February 2020, Pierce gave respondent contact information for the Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (CADV) so she could engage in domestic violence services.
Respondent contacted CADV but reported she could not afford the classes. In June, respondent
reported she was looking for a provider, but she never engaged in domestic violence services.
Pierce testified respondent never returned consent forms needed to assist her in obtaining
domestic violence services.
¶ 17 Pierce testified respondent had the option to have visits in Illinois but she only
visited twice—once before January 2020 and once in January 2020. According to Pierce,
telephone visits were suspended after the January 2020 visit due to “some concerning behaviors
and responses by the children that we have to address appropriately.” Specifically, Pierce
testified the children were “frightened of losing their stability following telephone
conversations” with respondent and “exhibiting emotional stress during their therapy sessions.”
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During the relevant time period, only Aa.C. asked to speak to respondent. Although Pierce
arranged to have telephone calls during therapy sessions to allow the therapist to monitor the
child, Aa.C. had not requested such a call.
¶ 18 Respondent sent approximately two letters per month to the children until
September. In September and October, respondent sent one letter to V.C. for his birthday.
Between January and October 2020, Pierce attempted to contact respondent two or three times a
month. Pierce attempted to contact respondent via telephone and e-mail, but respondent did not
consistently update her contact information, and Pierce occasionally had no way to contact her.
Respondent reported she was separated from respondent father and was going to seek a divorce.
¶ 19 2. Respondent
¶ 20 Respondent testified she lived in Henry, Tennessee, with a paramour. In March
2019, respondent completed a substance abuse treatment program at Hope Center. In August
2020, respondent returned to Hope Center for a “45-day reconnect” for those who relapse. When
respondent relapsed, she was living with respondent father, which she believed contributed to her
relapse. According to respondent, she had been off drugs since August 4, 2020. Also,
respondent separated from respondent father and filed for divorce.
¶ 21 Respondent testified she was not engaged in individual counseling or substance
abuse services but she recently began domestic violence classes online. According to
respondent, she contacted CADV but could not afford the classes. Respondent provided Pierce
with contact and employment information so that LSSI might provide financial aid, but
respondent had not been asked to sign any consent forms.
¶ 22 Respondent testified she was employed throughout the relevant time period.
Respondent wrote to the children regularly and asked about the possibility of virtual visitation.
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Respondent acknowledged she had to rebuild relationships with the children and testified she
was willing to do so. According to respondent, she maintained contact with Pierce except during
her relapse.
¶ 23 3. Trial Court’s Order
¶ 24 The trial court noted its previous findings from the October 2020 permanency
hearing. The court noted in July 2020 it found respondent made reasonable efforts but not
reasonable and substantial progress. However, had the court known respondent was in a relapse,
it would not have found reasonable efforts.
¶ 25 The trial court found respondent made progress during the relevant time period
but failed to make reasonable and substantial progress over the entire period. The court noted it
found the State failed to prove respondent unfit in January because respondent had made
progress. However, the court noted respondent was in the same place she was in nine months
earlier and any progress she made during the relevant time period merely got her caught up to
where she was in January 2020. The court found respondent failed to make reasonable efforts.
Respondent had the tools to avoid a potential relapse and instead put herself in a position where
she relapsed. Finally, the court found respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of
interest where she failed to use the tools available to her to avoid a relapse or to engage in the
recommended services.
¶ 26 Following the fitness hearing, the trial court held a separate best-interest hearing.
In December 2020, the court entered an order finding respondent unfit due to her failure to make
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of the children,
make reasonable progress toward the return of the children, and maintain a reasonable degree of
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interest for the children’s welfare. The court further found it was in the best interest of the
children to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 27 This appeal followed.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred by finding her unfit due to a
failure to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to removal of the children
during the period from January 8, 2020, to October 8, 2020, (2) make reasonable progress toward
the return of the children during the same time period, and (3) maintain a reasonable degree of
interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children’s welfare.
¶ 30 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the State has the burden of proving
parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. In re Jordan V., 347 Ill. App. 3d 1057,
1067, 808 N.E.2d 596, 604 (2004). In making such a determination, the court considers whether
the parent’s conduct falls within one or more of the unfitness grounds described in section 1(D)
of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)). Evidence of unfitness based on any
ground enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2018)) is
enough to support a finding of unfitness, even where the evidence may not be sufficient to
support another ground. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 210, 766 N.E.2d 1105, 1113 (2002). A
reviewing court will not overturn the trial court’s finding of unfitness unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Jordan V., 347 Ill. App. at 1067. The trial court’s decision is
given great deference due to “its superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their
credibility.” Id.
¶ 31 In this case, the State alleged respondent was unfit on three grounds: she failed to
(1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the
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children during the period from January 8, 2020, to October 8, 2020, (2) make reasonable
progress toward the return of the minors during the same time period, and (3) maintain a
reasonable degree of interest as to the children’s welfare. The trial court found respondent unfit
based on the allegations in the State’s petition.
¶ 32 On appeal, respondent contends the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. We may affirm on any basis in the record, and we need not
review all the grounds for a finding of unfitness if we uphold the trial court’s findings as to one
ground of unfitness. See In re D.H., 323 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9, 751 N.E.2d 54, 61 (2001). As we find
the trial court’s finding as to reasonable progress dispositive, we begin there.
¶ 33 The trial court’s finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the minors during the period from January 8, 2020, to October 8, 2020, was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Reasonable progress is measured by an
objective standard that considers the progress made toward the goal of returning the child to the
parent. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391, 757 N.E.2d 613, 617 (2001). Specifically,
reasonable progress includes a parent’s compliance with service plans and court directives, in
light of the condition that gave rise to the removal of the child. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181,
216-17, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1050 (2001).
¶ 34 Here, respondent was required to engage in various services, including individual
counseling, domestic violence classes, and substance abuse treatment. Additionally, respondent
was to maintain stable employment and housing. It is undisputed respondent failed to engage in
domestic violence services. Although respondent did engage in individual counseling, she
attended only two sessions. During the relevant time period, respondent, who previously
completed a lengthy inpatient substance abuse treatment program, moved back in with
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respondent father and began using methamphetamine and cannabis. During May, June, and July
2020, respondent relapsed and failed to maintain contact with the caseworker. Respondent
reentered a treatment program in August 2020 in Oklahoma. She then moved in with relatives in
Tennessee before moving in with a paramour. Respondent maintained stable employment
throughout the relevant time period, but she failed to maintain stable housing. The court
acknowledged that respondent made some progress by completing a second stay in a
rehabilitation facility, but it concluded the progress was not reasonable, particularly given
respondent’s failure to complete other services, such as domestic violence classes. Moreover, as
the trial court pointed out, any progress respondent made during the relevant time period merely
got her caught back up to where she was in January 2020.
¶ 35 Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say the trial court’s fitness
finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record demonstrates respondent
failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children during the relevant
nine-month period. Respondent does not challenge the court’s best-interest finding.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
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