In re M.K. ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •           NOTICE                         
    2021 IL App (4th) 210049-U
    FILED
    This Order was filed under
    NO. 4-21-0049                               June 11, 2021
    Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                                Carla Bender
    not precedent except in the                                                             4th District Appellate
    limited circumstances allowed
    IN THE APPELLATE COURT
    Court, IL
    under Rule 23(e)(1).
    OF ILLINOIS
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    In re M.K., a Minor                                         )     Appeal from the
    )     Circuit Court of
    (The People of the State of Illinois,                       )     Livingston County
    Petitioner-Appellant,                         )     No. 19JA71
    v.                                            )
    Mark Z.,                                                    )     Honorable
    Respondent-Appellee).                         )     Jennifer H. Bauknecht,
    )     Judge Presiding.
    JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.
    Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
    ORDER
    ¶ 1 Held:        The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that denied the State’s
    expedited petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights because the trial
    court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    ¶2               Respondent, Mark Z., is the father of M.K. (born March 2010). In December
    2019, the State filed an amended petition for adjudication of wardship seeking to terminate
    respondent’s parental rights in an expedited manner. See 705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 2018). In
    November 2020, the trial court found M.K. was a neglected minor and respondent was an unfit
    parent pursuant to section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2018).
    ¶3               In December 2020, the court conducted a dispositional hearing and adjudicated
    M.K. a ward of the court. However, the court denied the State’s request to terminate
    respondent’s parental rights because it found (1) the Department of Children and Family
    Services (DCFS) did not make reasonable efforts at reunification, (2) the State had not shown an
    aggravating circumstance, and (3) termination was not in M.K.’s best interest.
    ¶4              The State appeals, arguing that the trial court’s findings regarding (1) reasonable
    efforts and (2) aggravating circumstances were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
    conclude that the trial court properly declined to terminate respondent’s parental rights because
    the court found that termination was not in M.K.’s best interest.
    ¶5                                      I. BACKGROUND
    ¶6                                     A. Procedural History
    ¶ 7 In November 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging in relevant
    part that M.K. was a neglected minor, as defined by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705
    ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2018)), in that respondent “inflicts, causes to be inflicted, or allows to
    be inflicted upon such minor physical injury, by other than accidental means, which causes ***
    impairment of physical health[.]” The State further alleged that respondent created a substantial
    risk of physical injury and an environment injurious to M.K.’s welfare due to domestic violence.
    On the same day that the petition was filed, the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing and
    placed temporary custody and guardianship with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.
    ¶8              In December 2019, the State filed an amended petition requesting the court
    terminate respondent’s parental rights because he was an unfit parent in that he “failed to protect
    the minor from conditions within her environment injurious to the minor’s welfare, pursuant to
    750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) [(West 2018)].” The State further alleged it was in M.K.’s best interest to
    have respondent’s parental right terminated and sought that determination on an expedited basis.
    ¶9                 B. The Joint Adjudicatory and Parental Termination Hearing
    ¶ 10            In June 2020, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing at which it also
    considered whether respondent’s parental rights should be terminated because he was an unfit
    -2-
    parent as alleged in the amended petition. We note that a report of proceedings for the hearing
    does not appear in the record. The docket entry for that date indicates that the State presented the
    testimony of two witnesses and the court admitted into evidence (1) a DVD of an interview with
    respondent and (2) pictures of M.K. depicting bruising on her face.
    ¶ 11           In July 2020, the trial court conducted a continued adjudicatory hearing at which
    respondent moved for a directed finding on the issue of unfitness. The court continued the matter
    and allowed the parties to submit written arguments. In his brief in support of his motion for
    directed finding, respondent argued that the State had failed to demonstrate that aggravating
    factors existed to justify the expedited termination of parental rights and “there was no showing
    that reasonable efforts are inappropriate and unsuccessful.”
    ¶ 12              The State responded that section 2-21(5) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-21(5) (West
    2018)) controlled and set forth the procedure for expedited termination proceedings. At the
    adjudicatory stage, the State was required to prove (1) by a preponderance of the evidence that
    the child is abused or neglected and (2) by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is an
    unfit person. The State maintained that whether an aggravating factor existed and reasonable
    efforts had been made were issues to be proved at the dispositional or best interest stage of the
    expedited proceedings. The State explained, “Because this case is currently in the adjudicatory
    phase of the proceedings the State will make no further argument regarding reasonable efforts or
    aggravating circumstances and will merely assert that the State has every intention of providing
    such evidence at the appropriate stage of the proceedings: the dispositional/best interest hearing.”
    ¶ 13           In November 2020, the trial court concluded the adjudicatory hearing and entered
    a written order finding that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that M.K.
    was abused and neglected. The docket entry stated as follows: “Court finds that State has met the
    -3-
    burden of proof by preponderance of evidence and finds minor abused and that there is clear and
    convincing evidence that State has met the burden of proof on counts with mother and father.”
    The court continued the case for a best-interest and dispositional hearing.
    ¶ 14                              C. The Dispositional Hearing
    ¶ 15           In December 2020, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing and
    considered whether it was in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
    ¶ 16                                 1. The State’s Evidence
    ¶ 17           Taylor McDonald testified that she was the caseworker on the case since it was
    opened in November 2019. McDonald testified that M.K. was involved in a prior termination
    case when she was three years old, seven years before the instant hearing. That case was opened
    because M.K.’s mother had substance abuse problems. Respondent stated to McDonald that, in
    that prior case, he completed domestic violence, anger management, and parenting services. The
    outcome of the case was that M.K. was returned home to respondent.
    ¶ 18              McDonald testified that throughout the entire life of the case, M.K. had been with
    her maternal grandmother, who wished to adopt M.K. McDonald stated that M.K.’s grandmother
    (1) provided for all of her material needs, (2) was with her every day, and (3) helped her go to
    school, doctor’s appointments, and counseling. McDonald stated M.K. had a strong bond and
    relationship with her grandmother, and M.K. told McDonald that she wanted to remain in that
    placement.
    ¶ 19           McDonald further testified that M.K. was in school but the school was conducting
    e-learning. M.K. “has some acquaintances at school.” Regarding ties to the community,
    McDonald stated that M.K. had a babysitter and friends in the neighborhood.
    ¶ 20           On cross-examination, McDonald acknowledged that since the beginning of the
    -4-
    COVID-19 pandemic, no parenting classes had been offered. Regarding “substance abuse or
    mental health programs, outpatient counselling,” “[t]hey are doing everything virtually,
    assessments and everything.” McDonald testified that she made a referral to “IHR” for
    respondent. (We note that IHR stands for the Institute of Human Resources, also known as IHR
    Counseling Services, which provides mental health and substance abuse services in Pontiac,
    Illinois.) McDonald agreed that respondent gets frustrated easily, is dyslexic, and has a hard time
    comprehending what he reads, all of which adds to his frustration. McDonald acknowledged she
    did not know whether respondent had access to the internet “but the virtual classes are usually
    over [a] phone call or Zoom.” McDonald did not know if respondent was familiar with Zoom.
    (We note that “Zoom” is an online video conferencing program which requires an internet
    connection to operate.) McDonald stated respondent had not had any visitations with M.K.
    because there was a no-contact order from a criminal case that arose out of the physical abuse
    that opened the parental termination case.
    ¶ 21                             2. The Respondent’s Testimony
    ¶ 22           Respondent testified that he had an eleventh grade education and had a hard time
    reading—including the things the caseworker gave him—because he was dyslexic. Respondent
    loved his daughter and wanted to remain in her life. Respondent stated he was willing to go to
    classes, take counseling, and do anything else DCFS wanted him to do, and he would “try my
    best as much as I can.” Respondent stated that he had completed those services before when he
    first got custody of his daughter. Respondent said the process was difficult because of his
    dyslexia but with hard work he was able to do it and would be able to do it again.
    ¶ 23           Respondent stated that he lived “out of town this time” in Graymont, Illinois,
    which did not have any counselors or facilities where he could receive services. Respondent
    -5-
    stated it was difficult for him to get to Pontiac to take classes through IHR. Respondent testified
    that he had never done a “Zoom meeting” and did not even know what Zoom was. Respondent
    added that he recently got a new phone and was willing to try Zoom if his phone could operate
    the program.
    ¶ 24           Respondent admitted that he gets frustrated easily, which creates a problem, but
    he was willing to take direction from a counselor or teacher to learn better methods.
    ¶ 25           Respondent testified that when he got along with M.K., they enjoyed doing
    outdoor activities together. Respondent stated that M.K. was a good, loving, smart, fun child, but
    she also had problems. Respondent stated he believed he could deal with those problems, “but
    sometimes I think I need to work on myself, too.” Respondent stated, “We need to bond a lot
    more. We need more time with one another.” Respondent said he could discipline M.K. safely
    and would avoid corporal punishment as much as possible.
    ¶ 26           On cross-examination, respondent stated that he told his caseworker he was
    willing to engage in services and had asked for transportation to an appointment at IHR.
    Respondent did not understand what the meeting was for, and it caused him frustration,
    particularly because “I had to drive in illegally because I was trying my hardest to get there.”
    (We note that the dispositional report stated that respondent had spent time in prison for driving
    on a revoked license.) Respondent was further frustrated because each time he went to IHR,
    someone there asked him questions about M.K. that respondent could not answer because he had
    a no-contact order.
    ¶ 27              Respondent agreed that he first met with McDonald over a year ago and at the
    meeting, he told her that he did not intend to engage in services because he had completed them
    once before. Respondent acknowledged that McDonald had told him “[f]rom day one” that he
    -6-
    needed to complete services. Respondent stated he tried to get into classes but he did not
    understand what “they” wanted from him and could not provide answers to their questions.
    Respondent stated that he had been to IHR three times. Respondent did not know what his
    appointments were for, whether to complete assessments or do counseling. Respondent stated, “I
    don’t know what’s going on over there. That’s why I was getting frustrated because they kept
    telling me the same stuff over and over,” and respondent did not understand any of it.
    ¶ 28           Respondent testified that he could deal with M.K.’s mental health and behavioral
    problems, although he also stated that “people” did not know what her problems were and they
    were still trying to figure it out. Respondent clarified that he “heard what they [diagnosed M.K.
    with]; but they keep throwing different stuff at her. So, I don’t know.” The State asked, “How
    are you going to deal with [M.K.’s] problems if you don’t know what they are?” Respondent
    answered, “Well, it looks like I’ve got to go to counseling and figure that stuff out.”
    ¶ 29                                  3. Arguments of Parties
    ¶ 30              The trial court asked the State for clarification on how to proceed given the dual
    purpose of the hearing: dispositional and best interests. The State said the best way to handle the
    issues was by addressing them separately and taking them in order. Regarding the dispositional
    hearing, the State requested a finding that M.K. be adjudicated a ward of the court, that DCFS
    had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal, and that respondent be
    declared unfit (for reasons other than financial circumstances alone) to care for, protect, or
    discipline the minor and that it was in M.K.’s best interest for custody and guardianship to be
    granted to DCFS.
    ¶ 31           Regarding the termination portion of the proceedings, the State recommended that
    it was in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The State argued that
    -7-
    aggravating circumstances were present based on respondent’s domestic abuse, which the State
    characterized as “a pattern.”
    ¶ 32           As to reasonable efforts towards reunification, the State argued that reasonable
    efforts had been made because respondent (1) had completed identical services several years ago
    but still abused M.K., (2) stated multiple times he refused to participate in services, and (3) had
    not started any services in the six months since McDonald made referrals. The State also argued
    that the statutory best interest factors all weighed in favor of keeping M.K. with her grandmother
    and against returning her to respondent.
    ¶ 33           In response, respondent argued that “the uniqueness and I think the risks attendant
    here being in substitute care I don’t believe favors the State; and I think it favors denying the
    petition in this particular case.” Respondent noted that the dispositional report painted a very
    different picture than the State. Far from “flourishing” in foster care, M.K. was “not making
    significant progress in therapy, continues to struggle with relationship permanency, unable to
    maintain friends because of bullying, often has outbursts and throws things, hits the foster parent,
    spits in her face. *** That to me is not a young lady that *** is flourishing in her current
    placement to me.”
    ¶ 34           Respondent further argued that (1) the State had not demonstrated an aggravating
    circumstance and (2) the case was similar to any other physical abuse case. Respondent
    emphasized that the purpose of the Act was to reunify families when possible and argued that
    because M.K. and respondent both had problems, respondent should be allowed a fair chance to
    engage in services. Respondent was not familiar with technology and had transportation
    problems, both of which exacerbated his difficulties engaging in services because of COVID-19
    restrictions. Respondent concluded that he thought termination was premature and not in M.K.’s
    -8-
    best interest.
    ¶ 35             Regarding the dispositional portion of the proceedings, the guardian ad litem
    (GAL) agreed that the State had met its burden that M.K. should be adjudicated a neglected
    minor and made a ward of the court. Regarding termination and the child’s best interests, the
    GAL acknowledged that the State could “list off all the checkmarks.” However, the GAL added
    the following, “I think a strong argument can be put forward in this particular case that there was
    never an attempt to reunify this family. There was never an attempt really to see what could or
    couldn’t be completed. I understand that there was services that were offered in this particular
    case; and I understand that those services were not completed; but I can’t say that there was a
    real attempt at reunification of this family.” For those reasons, the GAL recommended that it was
    not in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
    ¶ 36                                4. The Trial Court’s Findings
    ¶ 37             The trial court first discussed the State’s arguments that aggravating
    circumstances were present. The court “d[id]n’t think from a factual standpoint that this rises to
    the level of I’m going to say aggravating circumstances as argued by the State for a couple of
    reasons.” First, the court disagreed with the State’s characterization of the physical abuse.
    Instead of a “beating,” the court found that respondent’s actions constituted “excessive corporal
    punishment.” Further, the court noted that the State was not proceeding on a theory of repeated
    abuse, of which the court further noted it had no competent evidence, just the two original
    instances.
    ¶ 38             The trial court agreed that there had not been reasonable efforts at reunification.
    The court noted that M.K. had problems dating back to before she was born and her mother used
    heroin (“And I see [grandmother] agreeing with me because she knows that I know a lot about
    -9-
    [mother].”). The court stated that there was not a reasonable effort to reunify the family and the
    conduct of respondent was not “so abhorrent and so aggravating that he is not entitled to at least
    an opportunity to correct that condition.”
    ¶ 39              The court noted that respondent had learning disabilities, “really can’t read; and
    that makes it extremely difficult for him; and I believe whenever he’s been in court he’s been
    respectful but obviously is limited in regards to his cognitive abilities to understand a lot of
    things that happen.” The court believed that under those circumstances, it expected more help to
    be offered, but “instead we have him kind of flailing out there with COVID and everything is
    shut down. Nobody can for periods of time get into whatever type of services that they need.”
    ¶ 40           The trial court found that respondent clearly had an interest in M.K., noted that
    respondent twice considered surrendering parental rights but ultimately decided not to, “and I
    think that’s because he genuinely does not understand some of the stuff that’s being thrown at
    him on a regular basis in connection with this case.” The court continued, stating as follows:
    “So, I do not think this is a situation where early, or expedited termination is
    appropriate. I do think that *** the system made a decision to fast track this for
    termination; and all of the efforts and eggs were put in that basket and to the
    detriment of [M.K.] who now has zero relationship with her dad; and now we
    have a huge uphill battle to not only try to correct that relationship but also
    provide the services for dad so that he can hopefully reunify with his daughter.
    So, I do, I do not believe that the services that have been offered to date
    have been reasonable or geared towards a return home goal. I do believe as father
    sits there that h[e] is unfit and unable to care for the minor child and that the
    return or that the goal should be return home within 12 months.”
    - 10 -
    ¶ 41           The trial court added that it was not addressing visitation because M.K.’s
    counselor needed to be consulted and communication figured out, stating, “And dad also hit the
    nail on the head because he understands that he also has his own issues to work on, and so this is
    a very good time for you to do that and focus all your efforts on that.” The court warned
    respondent that if he did not start services quickly and was not engaged in them by the time the
    court held another permanency hearing, “we are back where we’re at right now.” The court
    admonished respondent that he needed to cooperate with DCFS, participate in services and
    referrals to correct the conditions that led to M.K.’s removal, and if he failed to make progress,
    his parental rights could be terminated.
    ¶ 42           The trial court entered a written order in which it found that it was in the best
    interest of M.K. and the public that M.K. be made a ward of the court and adjudicated a
    neglected minor. The court further found respondent “unfit” and it was in the best interest of the
    minor to remove the minor from his custody. The court found that “reasonable efforts and
    appropriate services aimed at family preservation and reunification have not been made.” The
    court placed guardianship and custody with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.
    ¶ 43           This appeal followed.
    ¶ 44                                       II. ANALYSIS
    ¶ 45           The State appeals, arguing that the trial court’s findings regarding (1) reasonable
    efforts and (2) aggravating circumstances were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
    conclude that the trial court properly declined to terminate respondent’s parental rights because
    the court found that termination was not in M.K.’s best interest.
    ¶ 46                              A. Aggravating Circumstances
    ¶ 47           As an initial matter, we conclude the State waived any argument that the trial
    - 11 -
    court erred by requiring the State to show aggravating circumstances to terminate respondent’s
    parental rights at the dispositional hearing. To be clear, we fully agree with the State that no such
    showing is required. See In re Tyianna J., 
    2017 IL App (1st) 162306
    , ¶ 63, 
    70 N.E.3d 282
    . All of
    the necessary elements are set forth in section 2-21(5) of the Act. Nonetheless, at all times before
    the trial court, the State argued that it had demonstrated aggravating circumstances and failed to
    argue that it need not prove an aggravating circumstance. Indeed, in its brief to the trial court at
    the adjudicatory hearing, the State informed the court that evidence of aggravating circumstances
    should be considered at the dispositional hearing and the State intended to make such a showing.
    ¶ 48           The doctrine of invited error bars a party from requesting the trial court to proceed
    in a certain manner and later claiming on appeal that the trial court erred by following that
    request. People v. Cox, 
    2017 IL App (1st) 151536
    , ¶ 73, 
    89 N.E.3d 898
    . It is well settled that a
    party cannot complain of an error it injected into the proceedings, induced the court to make, or
    to which that party consented. Id.; see also In re S.R., 
    2014 IL App (3d) 140565
    , ¶ 26, 
    24 N.E.3d 63
    . Generally, the State is subject to waiver and forfeiture the same as any other litigant (see
    People v. Sophanavong, 
    2020 IL 124337
    , ¶ 21), and we hold it to that standard here.
    ¶ 49                        B. Requirements for Expedited Termination
    ¶ 50           Even if we excused the waiver, the outcome would be the same. As we explain,
    the trial court found that the State failed to prove an essential element in section 2-21(5)—
    namely, reasonable efforts at reunification—and that finding was not against the manifest weight
    of the evidence.
    ¶ 51                                         1. The Law
    ¶ 52           Section 2-21(5) of the Act provides the requirements that must be satisfied for a
    trial court to terminate parental rights at a dispositional hearing. In essence, that section provides
    - 12 -
    a road map for expedited termination proceedings in the trial court. That section provides as
    follows:
    “The court may terminate the parental rights of a parent at the initial dispositional
    hearing if all of the following conditions are met:
    (i) the original or amended petition contains a request for termination of
    parental rights and appointment of a guardian with power to consent to adoption;
    and
    (ii) the court has found by a preponderance of evidence, introduced or
    stipulated to at an adjudicatory hearing, that the child comes under the jurisdiction
    of the court as an abused, neglected, or dependent minor under Section 2-18; and
    (iii) the court finds, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence admitted
    at the adjudicatory hearing that the parent is an unfit person under subdivision D
    of Section 1 of the Adoption Act; and
    (iv) the court determines in accordance with the rules of evidence for
    dispositional proceedings, that:
    (A) it is in the best interest of the minor and public that the child be
    made a ward of the court;
    (A-5) reasonable efforts [at reunification] are inappropriate or such
    efforts were made and were unsuccessful; and
    (B) termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian
    with power to consent to adoption is in the best interest of the child
    pursuant to Section 2-29.” 705 ILCS 405/2-21(5) (West 2018).
    ¶ 53           In this case, the State filed an amended petition seeking termination in December
    - 13 -
    2019. At the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court first found M.K. was an abused and neglected
    minor by a preponderance of the evidence. Then, after considering that same evidence, the court
    determined that respondent was unfit by clear and convincing evidence.
    ¶ 54             At the dispositional hearing, the court needed to consider (1) whether it was in the
    best interest of M.K. and the public that she be made a ward of the court, (2) whether reasonable
    efforts at reunification were inappropriate or were made and were unsuccessful, and (3) whether
    termination of respondent’s parental rights was in M.K.’s best interest.
    ¶ 55                                      2. Best Interest Finding
    ¶ 56             The State complains that the trial court never made any findings about whether
    termination of respondent’s parental rights was in M.K.’s best interests. However, the court
    essentially made that finding when it determined that reasonable efforts at reunification had not
    been made and that respondent and M.K. should have the opportunity to work towards
    reunification.
    ¶ 57             This court has long held that trial courts are not required to recite and evaluate
    every best interest factor either orally at the hearing or in a written order. In re Tajannah O.,
    
    2014 IL App (1st) 133119
    , ¶ 19, 
    8 N.E.3d 1258
    . “To the contrary, our law is clear that a trial
    court need not articulate any specific rationale for its decision, and a reviewing court need not
    rely on any basis used by a trial court below in affirming its decision.” In re Jaron Z., 
    348 Ill. App. 3d 239
    , 263, 
    810 N.E.2d 108
    , 127 (2004).
    ¶ 58             A reviewing court “will not disturb a trial court’s decision that terminates an
    individual’s parental rights at the best-interest stage of a combined hearing under section 2-21(5)
    of the Act unless that decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re N.B., 
    2019 IL App (2d) 180797
    , ¶ 43, 
    125 N.E.3d 444
    . A decision is against the manifest weight of the
    - 14 -
    evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. In re Nylani M., 
    2016 IL App (1st) 152262
    , ¶ 48, 
    51 N.E.3d 1067
    .
    ¶ 59           Here, the trial court engaged in a lengthy and detailed discussion about the issues
    argued by the parties. Although the parties, and consequently the court, focused on
    (1) aggravating circumstances and (2) reasonable efforts at reunification, the court’s discussion
    clearly sets forth—and supports—its conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights
    was not in M.K.’s best interest. The trial court’s determinations on these factors necessarily
    reflect its conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in M.K.’s best
    interest.
    ¶ 60              In particular, the trial court stated “unfortunately the delay [caused by COVID-19]
    only made things worse for the relationship between [respondent] and [M.K.]” The court
    repeatedly expressed frustration that “everything is shut down” due to the pandemic and both
    respondent and M.K. suffered as a result of their unique circumstances. The court also
    emphasized that (1) M.K. “has a lot of problems,” (2) those problems stem from the mother
    using heroin while pregnant, and (3) those problems “go back much further than this incident.”
    The court further emphasized that “[t]here’s a lot of work to be done here,” and respondent
    “clearly has an interest in [M.K.].” “So, I do not think this is a situation where early, or expedited
    termination is appropriate.” “[A]ll of the efforts and eggs were put in [the expedited termination]
    basket and to the detriment of [M.K.] who now has zero relationship with her dad; and now we
    have a huge uphill battle to not only try to correct that relationship but also provide the services
    for dad so that he can hopefully reunify with his daughter.”
    ¶ 61           In sum, the trial court expressed a clear belief that it was in M.K.’s best interest to
    have the opportunity for a relationship with and to return home to respondent. The court
    - 15 -
    recognized that respondent had difficulties but believed they could be overcome and classes
    could be completed. Additionally, the court emphasized that respondent had successfully
    completed services in the past and was hindered by a no-contact order from the criminal case,
    also before the same judge. Further, the court recognized that M.K. had many of her own
    difficulties which presented challenges for her grandmother. Given the uniqueness of these
    circumstances, the court concluded that it was not in M.K.’s best interest to terminate
    respondent’s parental rights without further efforts at reunification. That decision was not against
    the manifest weight of the evidence.
    ¶ 62                       3. Reasonable Efforts Towards Reunification
    ¶ 63           Alternatively, the trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were not made was
    also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In this case, respondent had stable housing,
    had successfully completed services in the past, and cared for M.K. for several years before she
    was removed from his care. The court expressed clear concern that respondent was not given a
    sufficient opportunity to engage in services due to (1) his dyslexia and resulting illiteracy,
    (2) lack of transportation, and (3) lack of availability of services due to COVID-19. The court
    believed that extra care was required from DCFS because it was clearly aware of respondent’s
    literacy problems. The court also noted that DCFS should have been more helpful and diligent in
    helping defendant arrange services remotely because of the pandemic.
    ¶ 64           Certainly, DCFS had made some efforts, and the trial court considered the
    adequacy of those efforts. The court credited respondent’s testimony that he did not know what
    was required and the DCFS was not explaining it to him in a way he could understand.
    ¶ 65           We give extra deference to trial courts when they consider competing versions of
    events and find one credible. See In re Ta.T., 
    2021 IL App (4th) 200658
    , ¶ 57. The trial court is
    - 16 -
    in the best position to determine what was reasonable under the circumstances. In re Jay H., 
    395 Ill. App. 3d 1063
    , 1070, 
    918 N.E.2d 284
    , 290. The court is intimately familiar with (1) the
    parties, (2) the locality, (3) conditions on the ground, etc. See id.; Williams v. Williams, 
    2018 IL App (5th) 170228
    , ¶ 64, 
    120 N.E.3d 167
    . At the dispositional and best-interest stage, the court is
    allowed to consider anything it finds helpful. Jay H., 
    395 Ill. App. 3d at 1069-70
    . We do not
    substitute our judgment for that of the trial court or second-guess what information it determined
    was helpful and appropriate to consider because we are not in a position to do so. In re
    Parentage of W.J.B., 
    2016 IL App (2d) 140361
    , ¶ 25, 
    68 N.E.3d 977
    .
    ¶ 66           The trial court’s findings are abundantly clear that it believed respondent was
    unfit and M.K. should not be returned to his care. But the court was equally clear that it believed
    termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in M.K.’s best interests because there had not
    been sufficient efforts towards reunification. Given this context and our highly deferential
    standard of review, we conclude that the trial court’s findings at the dispositional hearing were
    not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    ¶ 67                                    III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 68           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    ¶ 69           Affirmed.
    - 17 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 4-21-0049

Filed Date: 6/11/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/17/2024