House of the Rainbow, Inc. v. City of Springfield , 2021 IL App (4th) 200015-U ( 2021 )

NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 200015-USupreme Court Rule 23 and is June 9, 2021
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed
NO. 4-20-0015 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
HOUSE OF THE RAINBOW, INC., and DAVID R. ) Appeal from the
KETTELKAMP, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Sangamon County
v. ) No. 14MR445
THE CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, and J. )
MICHAEL HOUSTON, Mayor, ) Honorable
Defendants-Appellees. ) Rudolph M. Braud Jr.,
) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court dismissed the appeal, concluding it was without jurisdiction
where plaintiffs did not appeal from a final judgment.
¶2 Plaintiffs, House of the Rainbow, Inc., and David R. Kettelkamp, appeal from the
circuit court’s award of summary judgment in favor of defendant, the City of Springfield, Illinois
(City). On appeal, plaintiffs argue we should reverse the circuit court’s award of summary
judgment and remand with instructions for the court to vacate its order granting such relief and to
dismiss related administrative cases. Because plaintiffs have not appealed from a final judgment,
we are without jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In June 2013, the City filed administrative complaints against plaintiffs, alleging
violations of section 155.010(a) of the 1988 City of Springfield Code of Ordinances (City Code)
based upon the way plaintiffs were using certain properties.
¶5 In March 2014, an administrative hearing officer conducted a hearing on the City’s
complaints. After receiving evidence and arguments, the hearing officer took the matters under
advisement.
¶6 In April 2014, the administrative hearing officer issued an administrative decision,
finding the way plaintiffs were using the subject properties was in violation of the City Code. The
hearing officer ordered plaintiffs to pay a fine of $300 per day per subject property commencing
21 days from the date of the decision and continuing daily until the use of the subject properties
followed the City Code.
¶7 In May 2014, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking review of the
administrative decision. Plaintiffs named and served as defendants both the City and its mayor, J.
Michael Houston (Mayor).
¶8 In June 2014, the City and the Mayor filed a combined answer along with the record
of the administrative proceedings.
¶9 In October 2014, plaintiffs filed (1) a motion to stay the accrual of any fines until a
final resolution and (2) a motion to clarify and amend the administrative record. Plaintiffs did not
set either motion for a hearing. Except for the case being reassigned to a different judge, no further
action was taken in the circuit court until March 2019.
¶ 10 In March 2019, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs later filed
a response. Following a December 2019 hearing, the circuit court entered a docket entry granting
the City’s motion.
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¶ 11 This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiffs argue we should reverse the circuit court’s award of summary
judgment and remand with instructions for the court to vacate its order granting such relief and to
dismiss the related administrative cases. The City disagrees, contending we should affirm the
award of summary judgment.
¶ 14 Prior to reaching the merits of this appeal, we have a duty to consider our
jurisdiction. In re Estate of Prunty, 2018 IL App (4th) 170455, ¶ 19, 99 N.E.3d 614. In the
jurisdictional statement of their appellate brief (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(4)(ii) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017)),
plaintiffs contend we have jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1,
1994) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). The City agrees with plaintiffs’
contention.
¶ 15 Rule 301 provides, “Every final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is
appealable as of right.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). Rule 303, in turn, sets forth the
guidelines for effectuating an appeal from a final judgment of a circuit court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff.
July 1, 2017). For purposes of Rule 301, a final judgment is one which “fixes absolutely
and finally the rights of the parties” in a lawsuit; it is final if it “determines the litigation on the
merits so that, if affirmed, nothing remains for the [circuit] court to do but to proceed with its
execution” of the judgment. Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d
221, 232-33, 840 N.E.2d 1174, 1181-82 (2005). Absent an express finding by a circuit court that
there is no just reason for delaying an appeal, “any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not *** appealable and is subject
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to revision at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and
liabilities of all the parties.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016).
¶ 16 Here, plaintiffs filed their complaint in the circuit court against both the City and
the Mayor. The City and the Mayor then filed a combined answer to plaintiffs’ complaint. After
almost four and a half years of inactivity, the City, individually, filed a motion for summary
judgment, which the court granted. As the record stands, there has been no resolution on plaintiffs’
complaint as it relates to the Mayor. Absent such a resolution, we find there is no final judgment
for purposes of Rule 301. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal is, in effect, premature. We are without
jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.
¶ 17 In so finding, we note, even if Houston was no longer the mayor when the City filed
its motion for summary judgement, Houston leaving office did not remove the mayor as a party.
Instead, the action continued against the successor in office. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(d) (West
2018) (“If *** any public officer ceases to hold *** office and that fact is suggested of record, the
action shall proceed *** against his or her successor.”).
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 Because plaintiffs have not appealed from a final judgment, we are without
jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
¶ 20 Appeal dismissed.
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