In re Guardianship of M.E. , 2024 IL App (3d) 230423-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 230423-UOrder filed July 19, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
In re GUARDIANSHIP OF M.E., a minor, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
(Susan M. Borowski and Wayne K. Borowski, ) Du Page County, Illinois.
)
Petitioners-Appellees, ) Appeal No. 3-23-0423
) Circuit No. 15-P-969
v. )
) The Honorable
Jeremy Evans, ) Craig R. Belford
) Judge, Presiding.
Respondent-Appellant.) )
____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Brennan and Hettel concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: Under the facts of this case, the trial court did not err or violate the appellant’s
constitutional rights by denying his motion for unsupervised parenting time or by
requiring him to seek and obtain leave of court in person before making additional
filings.
¶2 The appellant, Jeremy Evans, filed a motion seeking unsupervised parenting time with his
minor child, M.E. Evans failed to timely appear at the hearing on the motion, and the trial court
denied the motion. Based on Evans’s filing history, the trial court also required him to obtain
leave of court by personally appearing in the courtroom before filing any similar pleadings.
Evans appeals, and we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On May 31, 2023, Evans filed his sixteenth pro se motion for leave to file a motion
seeking unsupervised parenting time with his minor daughter. The Borowskis, the minor’s
grandparents and plenary guardians, opposed that motion. On June 6, the trial court granted
Evans leave to file his motion for unsupervised time. “At Jeremy Evans' insistence for a ruling
on the Motion for Unsupervised Parenting Time, instanter,” the trial court also “granted
parenting time on Father's Day, 2023,” and required that time to be supervised. A hearing on
Evans’s motion for unsupervised parenting time was set for August 17. Evans filed a renewed
motion for unsupervised parenting time on July 7.
¶5 The August 17 hearing on Evans’s pending motion began, but he was not present in the
courtroom at that time. The record on appeal shows that the trial court “note[d] that Mr. Evans is
not present this morning in person or on Zoom. The matter is set for 9:30. The time is 9:38.” The
proceeding continued, with the trial court hearing argument from counsel for the Borowskis, who
were the plenary guardians of the minor, and the minor’s co-guardians ad litem before it orally
denied Evans’s motion. In its written order, the trial court stated numerous reasons for its denial
of the motion:
“a. The Court has denied Jeremy Evan’s last 16 pleadings seeking unsupervised parenting
time;
b. Jeremy Evans has alleged no new facts in support of the July 7, 2023 motion;
c. Jeremy Evans’ criminal history;
d. Jeremy Evans’ lack of contact with the minor child between supervised visits;
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e. Jeremy Evan’s inconsistency when supervised parenting time is granted; and
f. Jeremy Evan’s disruptive and disrespectful behavior in courtroom.”
¶6 Moreover, after stating at the hearing that “this Court has previously held that Mr. Evans
may not make any new filings contesting the guardianship without leave of court,” the trial judge
added another restriction in its written order, barring Evans “from filing any additional pleadings
or motions seeking unsupervised parenting time without first seeking and obtaining leave of
Court to do so.” “To seek leave of Court to file any future pleadings seeking unsupervised
parenting time, Jeremy Evans must first file a pleading seeking leave of court and must appear in
person in the courtroom before the Court and be granted permission to move forward with any
such pleading.” (Emphasis in original.)
¶7 In his appellate brief, Evans states that, on August 17, he “appeared in court 10 minutes
later and when he walked in the courtroom, the trial court already ruled on the motion.” The next
day, he filed a motion for leave of court, seeking to be heard on his parenting time motion. In it,
he alleged that he “was unable to appear in court on time on 8/17/ 2023 due to being pulled over
in the Du Page County Courthouse parking lot for a misunderstanding that the respondents
daughter, who is the mother of the minor, Molly Borowski caused. Due to her harassment to the
petitioner, she illegally placed a revocation on Petitioners vehicle unbeknownst to the petitioner.
Petitioner has paperwork to show the Court on why petitioner was late.”
¶8 On August 24, the trial court denied Evans’s motion for leave to file, noting that he failed
to comply with the August 17 order, which specifically required him to request leave “in person
in the courtroom.” The order stated that “Mr. Evans did not appear in person in the courtroom
this morning [August 24] to present his Motion for Leave to File but instead, in direct violation
of this court's August 17, 2023, order, attempted to log into the court's Zoom call to present said
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Motion remotely. *** Because Mr. Evans' attempt to log into the Court's Zoom call to [sic] was
in direct violation of this court's August 17, 2023, order, the Court did not admit Mr. Evans to
the Zoom call.” Because he “failed to appear in person in the courtroom to present his Motion for
Leave to File, that Motion is DENIED.” Evans timely appealed only the August 17, 2023, order.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 The issues Evans presents on appeal require us to consider whether the trial court
properly denied his motion for unsupervised parenting time and required him to obtain leave of
court during an appearance “in person in the courtroom” before he “fil[es] any additional
pleadings or motions seeking unsupervised parenting time.” Evans asserts that the applicable
standard of review is abuse of discretion, citing Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries,
Inc., 213 Ill. App. 3d 591, 594 (1991). As the court in Zurich Insurance explained, a court abuses
its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without applying judgment, or, in light of all the relevant
facts, its ruling exceeds all reasonable limits and ignores fundamental legal principles, resulting
in substantial prejudice. Id. at 594-95.
¶ 11 Evans argues that the trial court’s August 17 order violated his due process right to notice
and an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” He further
argues it was unconstitutional to bar him from filing “any pleadings when it comes to his God
given right” to parent his child. He also broadly claims he was wrongfully denied any
opportunity to exercise his first amendment right to speak or to prove that unsupervised
parenting time was merited, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2018)).
¶ 12 In their appellate brief, the Borowskis request that this court strike a portion of Evans’s
brief “as it contains argument and recites information not necessary for the understanding of the
case.” “[S]triking an appellate brief, in whole or in part, is a harsh sanction and is appropriate
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only when the violations of procedural rules hinder our review.” Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality
LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 15. Although Evans offers only broad outlines of his
constitutional claims and sometimes includes arguments that extend beyond the scope of the trial
court’s August 17 order, we conclude that our review is not hindered.
¶ 13 A.
¶ 14 In addressing the trial court’s denial of Evans’s motion for unsupervised parenting time,
we note that the hearing on that motion had been completed, and the trial court had made its oral
ruling, before Evans arrived in the courtroom. The trial judge stated during the hearing that
Evans was not present in court at 9:38 a.m., despite the proceeding being scheduled to begin at
9:30 a.m. As the hearing proceeded, the court heard arguments from the Borowskis’ counsel and
the minor’s co-guardians ad litem before making an oral ruling denying the motion. The trial
court supported its determination by reciting several factors, many of which were included later
in its written order. Those factors included Evans’s failure to allege any new facts to support his
oft-repeated visitation requests, the strong recommendations of the co-guardians ad litem that
supervised visitation continue, Evans’s extensive and continuing criminal history, his failure to
contact the minor child outside of supervised visitation times and inconsistent follow-through at
scheduled visits, as well as his “disruptive and disrespectful behavior” in court.
¶ 15 Without Evans present to prosecute his motion, we cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion by acting arbitrarily or ignoring the law and facts in denying his motion. Accordingly,
we affirm the denial of Evans’s motion for unsupervised parenting time.
¶ 16 We note that Evans subsequently filed a motion seeking an opportunity to explain his
absence from the August 17 hearing and to present his motion for unsupervised parenting time.
The trial court denied that motion on August 24, 2023. We cannot, however, consider that matter
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on appeal because the August 24 order was not included in Evans’s notice of appeal. Therefore,
it is not properly before us.
¶ 17 B.
¶ 18 Evans next argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by barring him
“from filing any future pleadings.” That claim, however, misreads the trial court’s order. The
court did not bar Evans from making any additional filings or seeking additional relief. He was
simply barred “from filing any additional pleadings or motions seeking unsupervised parenting
time without first seeking and obtaining leave of Court to do so” (emphasis added) and was
required to seek that leave by “appear[ing] in person in the courtroom before the Court”
(emphasis in original). The trial court did not preclude Evans from making any additional filings;
it simply established a procedure for him to follow. By following those procedures, he may be
permitted to seek additional judicial relief.
¶ 19 Under the unusual circumstances here, the establishment of those procedures is not an
abuse of the trial court’s sound discretion. Although Evans asked that his August 18 motion over
zoom, he does not argue in that proceeding or before this court that the filing restrictions
imposed by the trial court are so onerous as to bar him from accessing justice. Indeed, the only
rationales he cites to oppose the restrictions are that the Borowskis’ counsel had added it merely
“to inconvenience” him and that the Borowskis had not always been required to be present in
court. Importantly, Evans did not claim that the filing restrictions actually prevented him from
filing legitimate requests for unsupervised visitation.
¶ 20 “Settled law recognizes that trial courts possess ‘inherent powers that are “governed not
by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” ’ Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45
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(2016) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). [Indeed], the trial court
may rely on its inherent authority to enter any orders necessary to prevent abuse or manipulation
of the system. See, e.g., Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill. 2d 48, 66 (1995) (‘The recognition
of the court's inherent authority is necessary to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases
caused by abuses of procedural rules, and also to empower courts to control their dockets.’).”
Palos Community Hospital v. Humana Insurance Company, Inc., 2021 IL 126008, ¶ 35.
¶ 21 Here, Evans had filed 15 prior motions for unsupervised parenting time before the motion
that was decided on August 17, and each of those prior motions had been denied. As the trial
court noted, the motion heard on August 17 did not assert any new circumstances to justify a
different outcome. Moreover, the filing procedures mandated in the trial court’s August 17 order
largely duplicated ones previously imposed to address Evans’s repeated filings to contest the
guardianship order. Under the unique facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court’s order
setting forth procedures for Evans to follow if he chooses to file additional requests for
unsupervised visitation were not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the order entered by the Du Page County Circuit Court
on August 17, 2023.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
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