In re Marriage of Bychina , 2021 IL App (2d) 200303 ( 2021 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2022.04.04
09:35:27 -05'00'
In re Marriage of Bychina, 2021 IL App (2d) 200303Appellate Court In re MARRIAGE OF ELENA BYCHINA, Petitioner-Appellant, and
Caption BORIS ASTRAKHANTSEV, Respondent-Appellee.
District & No. Second District
No. 2-20-0303
Filed June 18, 2021
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 19-D-48; the
Review Hon. Michael W. Reidy, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Julia Bikbova, of Northbrook, for appellant.
Appeal
No brief filed for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Schostok and Brennan concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Petitioner, Elena Bychina, petitioned to dissolve her marriage to respondent, Boris
Astrakhantsev, and included in her petition a count for breach of a federal contract under which
respondent had promised to support petitioner, who is a recent immigrant to this country. The
trial court acknowledged that it could reach the merits of the contract count but declined to do
so and directed petitioner to seek relief in federal court. Petitioner appeals. We reverse and
remand.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A. Marriage and Affidavit of Support
¶4 Petitioner, age 32, and respondent, age 55, met in August 2012 in Russia and began a
relationship. Shortly thereafter, respondent, a United States citizen, returned to the United
States, and the couple continued their relationship by phone and online. In 2013, respondent
returned to Russia to see petitioner. He proposed marriage during a trip to Thailand. On
December 29, 2014, petitioner entered the United States on a K-1 visa, otherwise known as a
fiancée visa.
¶5 The parties married in Florida on March 9, 2015. Shortly after the marriage, on June 8,
2015, respondent executed a Department of Homeland Security United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) under section 213A of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended and codified under title 8, chapter 12, of the
United States Code. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4), 1183a (2018). As petitioner’s sponsor,
respondent promised to support petitioner, the beneficiary, at an income level of at least 125%
of the federal poverty level 1 and to reimburse any government agencies for certain means-
tested benefits paid to petitioner. Id. § 1183a(a)(1)(A)-(C).
¶6 By way of background, the Affidavit of Support’s purpose is to preclude admission to the
United States of any alien who “is likely at any time to become a public charge” (id.
§ 1182(a)(4)(A)), and it constitutes a contract between the sponsor and the United States
government for the benefit of, as relevant here, the sponsored immigrant (8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d)
(2020)). “The sponsored immigrant *** may seek enforcement of the sponsor’s obligations
through an appropriate civil action.” Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(e) (2018) (with respect to
financial support, sponsored alien may bring action to enforce Affidavit of Support against
sponsor “in any appropriate court”). The sponsor’s obligations end if he or she dies. 8 C.F.R.
§ 213a.2(e)(2)(ii) (2020). Further, the sponsor’s obligations end if the sponsored immigrant
(1) becomes a United States citizen, (2) has worked or can be credited with 40 quarters of
coverage under the Social Security Act, (3) no longer has lawful permanent resident status and
has left the United States, (4) becomes subject to removal but obtains a new grant of adjustment
1
For reference, the Department of Health and Human Services’ 2021 poverty guideline for the 48
contiguous states and the District of Columbia for a household of two persons is $17,420 in annual
income and is $12,880 for a household of one person. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines,
86 Fed. Reg. 7732, 7733 (Feb. 1, 2021). Multiplying the two-person-household figure by 125% yields
$21,775, and the result for a one-person household is $16,100. A sponsor’s support duty, one court has
held, must be based on a household size equivalent to the number of sponsored immigrants living in
the household. Erler v. Erler, 824 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016).
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of status based on a new affidavit, or (5) dies. Id. § 213a.2(e)(2)(i). As relevant here, divorce,
as the Affidavit of Support states, does not terminate the sponsor’s obligations under the Form
I-864. See, e.g., Younis v. Farooqi, 597 F. Supp. 2d 552, 554 (D. Md. 2009); Shumye v. Felleke,
555 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
¶7 In the signature section of the Affidavit of Support, respondent certified under penalty of
perjury that he “agree[d] to submit to the personal jurisdiction of any Federal or State court
that has subject matter jurisdiction of a lawsuit against [him] to enforce [his] obligation under
this Form I-864.” (Emphases added.).
¶8 B. Dissolution Proceedings
¶9 On January 8, 2019, petitioner petitioned for dissolution of the parties’ marriage. In her
petition, she included a count for breach of contract, alleging that respondent breached his
promise to her (as a third-party beneficiary) under the Affidavit of Support, where he canceled
her medical insurance (in January 2018) and had failed to financially support her (since late
December 2018). Petitioner asserted that she was a full-time student at the College of Du Page,
was not employed, and did not expect to gain full-time employment at any point in the near
term. Respondent worked as an independent-contractor truck driver for an interstate
transportation company. Petitioner asserted that she would not be able to become a United
States citizen until late 2022 or later (and only if she gained the requisite knowledge and
command of the English language). (By instituting the divorce action, she was giving up her
ability to become a citizen in three years and would instead have to wait five years.) As a lawful
permanent resident of the country, she asserted, she was prohibited from seeking and obtaining
any public benefits. Thus, respondent, under the Affidavit of Support, was required to support
her until she became a citizen. Petitioner sought enforcement of the Affidavit of Support,
attorney fees, and costs.
¶ 10 Respondent answered the petition, raised the affirmative defense of fraud, and
counterpetitioned for a declaration of the invalidity of the marriage, arguing that he was
fraudulently induced into the marriage, because petitioner merely sought United States
citizenship. According to respondent, petitioner never intended to live as husband and wife
with him, have children, or remain married past the acquisition of her permanent-resident
status.
¶ 11 Petitioner moved for temporary maintenance, and the trial court granted the motion on
February 21, 2019. The trial court subsequently found respondent in contempt for failing to
pay rent on a temporary basis, temporary maintenance, and interim fees. Respondent posted
bonds that were turned over to petitioner. In a subsequent filing, petitioner alleged that she was
employed as an Uber driver and was a student at the College of Du Page.
¶ 12 C. Trial and the Court’s Order
¶ 13 Trial occurred on March 13, 2020. Respondent’s attorney appeared, but respondent did not
appear or present evidence. Petitioner was the only witness to testify, and the record on appeal
does not contain a report of proceedings from the trial.
¶ 14 On May 8, 2020, the trial court dissolved the parties’ marriage but declined petitioner’s
request to enter judgment on the breach-of-contract count and directed her to seek that relief
in federal court. In extensive written findings, the court noted that the parties’ marriage was of
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short duration, there were no children and virtually no assets, and there was modest debt; the
central issues were maintenance and the Affidavit of Support.
¶ 15 As relevant here, on the dissolution count, the court determined that an award of
maintenance for petitioner was not justified under the current circumstances. The court would
review maintenance for her in 18 months (and set the end date at three years for petitioner to
file a maintenance claim), wherein it would assess any steps petitioner took to become self-
supporting. It barred respondent from seeking maintenance and rejected respondent’s fraud
affirmative defense and his request to find that the marriage was invalid.
¶ 16 The parties’ income was unclear, the court determined, as both parties were incredible on
the subject. Petitioner, the court found, was underemployed and did not testify how many hours
she worked per week or month. She had a university degree from Russia and was hardworking
and intelligent. Although English is her second language, the court noted, she had a greater
understanding of it than she portrayed in court (as evidenced in part by her responding in
English to a question in court before it was fully translated into Russian).
¶ 17 The court related that petitioner had testified that she underwent a medical procedure that
resulted in her being unable to conceive a child. 2 When she informed respondent, he advised
her that he no longer wished to be in a relationship with her. During the pendency of the
proceedings, respondent had been ordered to pay monthly rent for the parties’ apartment, but
he did not comply with the order and was found in indirect civil contempt of court. The court
also found him incredible on the issue of his income but did not find him in contempt, because
he was “purportedly no longer working and had medical issues.” In subsequent proceedings,
the court noted, respondent had not paid his temporary-maintenance arrearage or interim
attorney fees and was found in indirect civil contempt (for failing to pay $8450). It issued a
body writ when respondent failed to make any payments toward the purge and failed to appear
in court. The true nature of respondent’s medical condition, the court found, was unknown. He
worked as a truck driver, warehouse worker, and then “possibly a baby-sitter.” Respondent’s
income and the sources thereof were unknown.
¶ 18 As to petitioner, the court determined that she had the ability to work more hours than she
did and that, when she has needed more income, she has worked more hours and earned more.
She drove for Lyft and Uber. Despite not receiving maintenance payments from respondent,
she did not see her needs increase. “[W]hen she had a need, she was able to meet that by
working more hours.” She “is either under-reporting her income or is, otherwise,
underemployed.” The court found that petitioner had the ability to earn over $2000 per month,
where she had done so on two occasions in the prior year. The 18-month review date for
maintenance, the court noted, was to assess what additional efforts petitioner made to become
self-supporting and to review efforts she made concerning her federal case, if she had brought
one.
2
According to the trial court, petitioner returned to Russia in 2018 to undergo a procedure for a
“serious health problem.” As a result, petitioner told respondent in the fall of 2018 that she would be
unable to conceive. On December 31, 2018, respondent informed her that he was not going to live with
her anymore and that he was leaving to go to another state to live and did not want a future with her.
Respondent also stated that he did not want to file for divorce but that petitioner could do so if she
wanted. The trial court found that respondent “essentially abandoned” petitioner in 2019.
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¶ 19 Turning to the breach-of-contract count, the trial court noted that petitioner had requested
a finding that respondent breached his obligations under the Affidavit of Support, wherein he
promised to support petitioner at an income level at least 125% of the federally determined
poverty level. The trial court found that petitioner’s case law was not relevant to this case,
where one case did not involve a Form I-864 (In re Marriage of Spircoff, 2011 IL App (1st)
103189) and another case, an unpublished decision, did not apply to petitioner’s situation (In re
Marriage of Amin, 2011 IL App (2d) 100431-U, ¶¶ 14, 32 (finding that, contrary to the
respondent’s assertion, trial court had considered Affidavit of Support in its determination of
maintenance and set maintenance above the amount that would have been awarded under the
affidavit)).
¶ 20 Here, the trial court noted that petitioner had argued that the court had jurisdiction to decide
the contract count, because she was a third-party beneficiary of the Affidavit of Support.
However, the court stated that the issue before it was not whether the court “could” decide the
issue but whether it “should” do so—specifically, whether the trial court or federal court was
the more appropriate court to decide the issue. Citing Wenfang Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418,
421-23 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a sponsored immigrant has no duty to mitigate damages
in a suit seeking to enforce an Affidavit of Support), the court determined that, for several
reasons, petitioner’s suit to enforce the Affidavit of Support “arises under Federal law.”
¶ 21 First, the trial court determined that federal court was “the appropriate court” to hear the
case
“in light of the inherently conflicting nature of the Affidavit of Support obligations and
Illinois statutory and case law. For instance, in Illinois, the Court can find that a party
is underemployed and impute income to that party. Moreover, an Illinois court can
impose upon a party an obligation to take advantage of a job opportunity. Additionally,
in Illinois, a court can look at a party’s efforts at becoming self-supporting. This is in
direct contravention of the federal law which prohibits courts from requiring sponsored
immigrants to mitigate their circumstances.”
¶ 22 Second, the court found that providing the federally required level of support “is not
necessary if the immigrant can obtain employment at a wage equal to or above the specified
level.” The court characterized petitioner’s financial situation as “implausible,” given that she
had been living without any support from respondent for nearly one year. Her work hours were
unknown, and, the court further noted, petitioner testified that she worked six hours but without
further clarification (i.e., whether daily, weekly, or monthly). Petitioner also did not testify as
to any impairment to working more than the 15 hours per week she spent studying and taking
English classes. The court determined that petitioner could work more hours. Given her
testimony that, on two occasions, she earned over $2000 in a month (earning $2700 on one
occasion), the court found that petitioner could earn between $24,000 and $32,400 per year in
gross income, which is above the federal poverty guidelines. The court further found that
petitioner was a “very capable, resourceful, hard-working (when she wants to be), young
woman.” She has a college degree, is proficient in two languages, and demonstrated continued
improvement in her English proficiency. She had obtained a driver’s license, helped run
respondent’s business (she “was extremely knowledgeable about the finances, revenue[,] and
expenses of” respondent’s company), and worked part-time for Uber and Lyft. The court
characterized her as the type of immigrant who “can obtain employment at a wage equal to or
above the specified federal poverty guideline level.”
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¶ 23 Third, the court noted that it did not wish to “inhibit” petitioner from seeking relief in
federal court. The court again noted the conflicting considerations in federal and Illinois law
and the fact that the court did not want the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel to
bar a cause of action in federal court, “especially since this Court can impute income to
[petitioner] at an amount above the federal poverty guidelines and make a finding that [she] is
capable of obtaining employment at a wage equal to or above the specified level.” Also, the
court noted that, based on petitioner’s gross income and court-ordered temporary maintenance
payments and judgments, it could find that respondent had not breached his obligations under
the Affidavit of Support to maintain petitioner at 125% of the poverty guidelines. The trial
court noted that it had considered the Affidavit of Support and found that “it is likely that
[petitioner’s] relief will be granted in federal court. The Court has also reserved the issue of
maintenance to allow [petitioner] to file her case in federal court and see if she is successful
and, if not, this Court [retains] jurisdiction to redress any shortcoming.” Accordingly, it found
that, because the Affidavit of Support “arises under Federal law, the Federal District Court is
the appropriate Court in which to bring suit.”
¶ 24 Turning to respondent’s fraud count, the court rejected the claim, finding that respondent
presented no evidence of any fraud and did not appear for trial. On the contrary, the court found
that the marriage was “one born out of love, commitment[,] and mutual[ ] informed consent.”
It was not until petitioner’s medical procedure that respondent wanted out of the marriage.
¶ 25 Petitioner appeals.
¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 Petitioner’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to address the merits
of her breach-of-contract count. She asserts that, as a court of general jurisdiction, the court
had no discretion to decline review of her action to enforce the Affidavit of Support. Petitioner
requests that we reverse or vacate in part the court’s order and remand with directions to review
the merits of her claim. For the following reasons, we conclude that the court erred in refusing
to address the merits of petitioner’s contract claim.
¶ 28 Preliminarily, we note that respondent has not filed an appellee’s brief. Because the record
is simple and the claimed errors are such that we can easily decide them without the aid of an
appellee’s brief, we address the merits of the appeal. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v.
Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).
¶ 29 Whether a court has discretion to review a particular claim presents a question of law. We
review de novo legal questions. Salgado v. Marquez, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1075 (2005). To
the extent that the central issue here can be characterized as a question of the proper forum, it
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc., 136
Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1990). A court abuses its discretion where no reasonable person would adopt
the court’s view. Prairie v. Snow Valley Health Resources, Inc., 324 Ill. App. 3d 568, 571
(2001). We note that, regardless of the standard of review, our holding is the same.
¶ 30 Petitioner argues that, as a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court must review a
common-law breach-of-contract action brought by a third-party beneficiary to the contract,
specifically an immigrant spouse’s action to enforce an affidavit of support as part of a
dissolution proceeding. She contends that, although her right under the Affidavit of Support is
created by federal law, the enforcement of the contract is a matter of state common law,
whether as a legal breach-of-contract claim or an equitable claim for specific performance.
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¶ 31 Addressing the trial court’s comments concerning the conflicts between Illinois divorce
law and federal law, petitioner argues that this did not constitute a valid reason for refusing to
address her claim to enforce the Affidavit of Support. She also contends that she was deprived
of her choice of venue, based on the trial court’s erroneous determination that, if it reviewed
her claim, then petitioner would be precluded from seeking relief in federal court. Petitioner
argues that the court’s concerns were irrelevant, as petitioner herself asked the court to rule on
the matter, and that any mitigation concerns are irrelevant to assessing an Affidavit of Support.
Finally, petitioner argues that it is unreasonable and burdensome for her to file and prosecute
a separate action in federal court to enforce the breached contractual obligation under the
Affidavit of Support. She contends that immigrant spouses have few resources to maintain
both a state dissolution action and a federal claim to enforce an affidavit of support. Here,
petitioner asserts, the parties conducted extensive discovery to establish petitioner’s earned
income after the parties separated and during the period when respondent was no longer
providing her any support. Petitioner also notes that she paid the filing fees and costs to file
her petition in state court and a modest retainer to her counsel to initiate the proceedings. (In
her brief, counsel asserts that, in this appeal, she represents petitioner pro bono.) Requiring her
and other similar immigrant spouses to maintain separate actions will cause an undue burden
on “such litigants who are already in poverty and without means of support, while also causing
an inefficient use of judicial resources.” Petitioner asserts that it would also cause an
unreasonable delay in the sponsored immigrant’s ability to begin receiving support. A federal
court, she posits, would either have to make a decision based on an unknown—how well
petitioner would be supported after a dissolution, which is based on whether the state trial court
awards maintenance, which, in turn, reduces respondent’s obligation—or, as the more likely
outcome, wait until after the state trial court’s final decision, thereby causing unnecessary delay
and costs.
¶ 32 Again, the Affidavit of Support “is legally enforceable against the sponsor by the sponsored
alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(B) (2018); see also 8 C.F.R. § 213a.2(d) (2020). The sponsor’s
obligation under the affidavit does not terminate in the event of divorce. See, e.g., Younis, 597
F. Supp. 2d at 554; Shumye, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1024. By signing the Affidavit of Support, the
“sponsor agrees to provide support to maintain the sponsored alien at an annual income that is
not less than 125 percent of the Federal poverty line during the period in which the affidavit is
enforceable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(a)(1)(A) (2018). The terms of the affidavit provide for the
appropriate “ ‘measure of damages that would put [the sponsored immigrant] in as good a
position as [he or] she would have been had the contract been performed.’ ” Shumye, 555 F.
Supp. 2d at 1024. To determine the appropriate damages, courts compare the sponsored
immigrant’s annual income for the particular years at issue, rather than the aggregate income
for the entire period, against the 125% poverty threshold for each particular year. Id. at 1024-
25. A sponsor may also be held liable for attorney fees, other costs of collection, and
“corresponding remedies available under State law.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(c) (2018).
¶ 33 The “right of support conferred by federal law exists apart from whatever rights [a
sponsored alien] might or might not have under [state] divorce law.” Wenfang Liu, 686 F.3d at
419-20. A sponsor is required to pay only the difference between the sponsored immigrant’s
income and the 125% of poverty threshold; there is no requirement to pay spousal support
when the sponsored immigrant’s income exceeds the poverty threshold for a household. See
Barnett v. Barnett, 238 P.3d 594, 598-99, 598 n.13 (Alaska 2010).
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¶ 34 The bases the trial court stated for its finding that federal court was the appropriate court
for the breach-of-contract claim were that (1) Illinois divorce law conflicts with Affidavit of
Support obligations under federal law, (2) petitioner’s financial situation was “implausible”
and she could earn more than the federal poverty guideline, and (3) it did not wish the doctrines
of res judicata or collateral estoppel to preclude petitioner from obtaining relief in federal
court, where she was, in the trial court’s view, likely to obtain relief; further, the court had
reserved maintenance so that petitioner could seek relief in federal court and, if she were
unsuccessful, the court retained “jurisdiction to redress any shortcoming.”
¶ 35 State courts have jurisdiction to hear claims seeking to enforce Form I-864 obligations.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Kumar, 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 868 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding that
immigrant wife had standing to enforce in state court support obligation under Form I-864 as
a binding contract; “state courts regularly exercise jurisdiction over contract claims involving
I-864 affidavits brought by the sponsored immigrant”; citing cases for same); Motlagh v.
Motlagh, 2017-Ohio-8667, 100 N.E.3d 937, ¶ 9 (App. 2 Dist.) (“[c]ourts have typically
interpreted the statute[, i.e., 8 U.S.C. 1183a(e),] as permitting a sponsored immigrant to seek
enforcement of the affidavit in divorce actions”; citing cases for same).
¶ 36 Here, the trial court, without any motion or responsive pleading, sua sponte declined to
rule on petitioner’s contract claim. Petitioner argues that the trial court had no discretion to
decline to rule on her claim seeking enforcement of the Affidavit of Support. While courts
may, in limited circumstances, decline to address otherwise valid claims, the circumstances
here do not support the trial court’s refusal to do so. See, e.g., Crissman v. Strickland, 43 Ill.
App. 3d 496, 498 (1976) (discussing inherent power of court to sua sponte dismiss claims
pursuant to de minimis rule); McGann v. Illinois Hospital Ass’n, 172 Ill. App. 3d 560, 565
(1988) (citing Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 286 Ill. 564 (1919) (court has inherent authority
to protect itself from vexatious litigation)).
¶ 37 The court partly based its determination on the fact that Illinois divorce law conflicts with
the obligations under Form I-864. This was error. Respondent’s obligations under the Affidavit
of Support are separate from any obligations, such as maintenance, he may have under Illinois
divorce law. See Motlagh, 2017-Ohio-8667, ¶ 13 (noting that a spousal support award under
Ohio divorce law is an equitable remedy and that the Form “I-864 obligation involves a
federally granted contractual remedy that is independent of spousal support and survives
divorce”). Where a spousal support award is insufficient to maintain the sponsored immigrant’s
income at the federally specified minimum level, the sponsor remains liable under the Affidavit
of Support for the amount necessary to reach the minimum level. Id. ¶ 14. The Form I-864
obligation may be enforced in a state divorce action, it has been noted, through specific
performance of the contract, by an order for spousal support under state law, or by a
combination of both. 3 Id. ¶ 13. Here, the trial court was entirely capable of fashioning a
remedy under both counts of petitioner’s petition, and it erred in declining to address the merits
of the contract claim.
¶ 38 The trial court erred in determining that federal court was preferable because the trial court
had not decided the maintenance issue, it required more time to assess the issue, and it wished
to allow petitioner time to seek relief in federal court on her contract claim before returning to
3
Petitioner was not obligated to file her case in federal court, and she could have filed her contract
claim anywhere in the circuit court’s civil division.
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the trial court for the court’s maintenance determination. It required petitioner, whose claim
was properly before a court that could decide the issue and which she had asked to decide it,
to incur additional costs and delays in filing a new action in another court. There is no argument
to be made that the federal court can better assess a claim for breach of an obligation under
Form I-864. A state court is as capable as a federal court of addressing the contact issue raised
by such a claim, as was evidently recognized by the courts in Kumar and Motlagh. Moreover,
the circumstances here do not present a scenario that warrants declining petitioner’s request to
hear her claim. If the trial court believed that it could better determine maintenance if it were
aware of the federal court’s resolution of the contract claim, this was erroneous, because the
trial court itself could have resolved the contract claim before it turned to assess maintenance.
Motlagh, 2017-Ohio-8667, ¶ 13; see also Greg McLawsen, The I-864 Affidavit of Support: An
Intro to the Immigration Form You Must Learn to Love/Hate, 48 Fam. L.Q. 581, 590 & n.58
(2015) (querying why Form I-864 claims “are litigated mostly in federal court” and noting
choice is “somewhat puzzling” and could be based on “mistaken view that [Form] I-864
enforcement involves ‘federal law.’ The better understanding is that enforcement is a suit on a
contract, precisely the type of dispute that a state court of general jurisdiction is competent to
adjudicate”).
¶ 39 Finally, we disagree with the trial court’s concerns that any findings it made concerning
the contract claim would preclude relief in federal court on the basis of collateral estoppel or
res judicata. See Davis v. United States, 499 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2007) (remedy available
from state court’s allegedly erroneous “construction of the Affidavit of Support is an appeal
within the state court system and ultimately to the United States Supreme Court, not a collateral
attack in the lower federal courts”); see also McLawsen, supra, at 590-91 (noting that issue
preclusion/collateral estoppel could preclude a subsequent federal claim where Form I-864 was
adjudicated in a dissolution action, but also noting that claim preclusion/res judicata could bar
subsequent Form I-864 claim where such claim should have been raised in family law court,
although decisions are mixed). Petitioner herself chose the trial court as the venue she desired
to rule on her contract claim, and the claim, as the trial court acknowledged, was properly
before it. The court did not identify any remedies that it believed were uniquely available to
petitioner in federal court, and we cannot contemplate any in the context of an action to enforce
an obligation under the Affidavit of Support. Under these circumstances, the court erred in
declining to rule on the merits of her claim.
¶ 40 In summary, because the trial court’s bases for declining to rule on the merits of petitioner’s
breach-of-contract claim were not valid under the circumstances of this case, we reverse and
remand for the court to consider petitioner’s claim.
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed, and
the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
¶ 43 Reversed and remanded.
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