People v. McDonagh , 2021 IL App (2d) 200324-U ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (2d) 200324-UNo. 2-20-0324
Order filed July 6, 2021
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of McHenry County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 19-CM-995
)
COLEMAN P. McDONAGH, ) Honorable
) Mary H. Nader,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Zenoff and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: On appeal from defendant’s two battery convictions, (1) the superseding
information adequately informed him of the nature and cause of the charges; (2) he
forfeited his one-act, one-crime challenge, and in any case, the record is clear that
his convictions were based on separate acts; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to
convict him of both batteries.
¶2 Defendant, Coleman P. McDonagh, appeals his convictions of two counts of battery (720
ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018)) related to an altercation that occurred at a marina. He
contends that (1) the State’s superseding information was defective, (2) his convictions violate the
2021 IL App (2d) 200324-Uone-act, one-crime rule, and (3) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In August 2019, defendant was charged by complaint with battery, specifically that, on or
about July 28, 2019, defendant “knowingly caused bodily harm to Michael Starykowicz, in that he
pushed Michael Starykowicz with his forearm causing him to fall on to [sic] the bow of a boat.”
On January 23, 2020, the State filed a superseding information alleging two counts of battery.
Count 1 alleged that defendant committed the offense of battery under “section 12-3(a)(1) of Act
5 of Chapter 625 [sic] of the Illinois Compiled Statutes,” in that defendant “knowingly without
legal justification caused bodily harm to Michael Starykowicz, to wit: [defendant] struck Michael
Starykowicz about the body, causing pain.” Count 2 alleged that defendant committed the offense
of battery under “section 12-3(a)(2) of Act 5 of Chapter 625 [sic] of the Illinois Compiled
Statutes,” in that defendant “knowingly without legal justification made physical contact of an
insulting or provoking nature with Michael Starykowicz, to wit: [defendant] struck Michael
Starykowicz about the body.” The State told the court that it sent notice to defendant that it was
filing the information “just clarifying the language on the battery” and adding the second count.
The court asked if there was any objection to the information being filed, and defense counsel
answered, “No.” That same day a bench trial was held.
¶5 Starykowicz testified that he was age 62 and that, on July 28, 2019, he was at a marina with
his wife. Starykowicz had brought his boat in and tied it at the end of the pier. He and his wife
saw defendant pulling his boat around other boats, “banging his boat into those boats,” and
climbing onto the boats. According to Starykowicz, defendant’s boat began “banging” his. He
testified that he jumped out of his boat, ran up the pier and started to tell defendant, “Pull your
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2021 IL App (2d) 200324-Uboat back. Pull your your [sic] boat back. What are you doing? Pull your boat back.” Defendant
then hit Starykowicz twice with his fist, the second time hitting him in the side of the head, causing
pain in the back of his head and neck. Starykowicz testified that he then jumped onto his boat to
push defendant’s boat away and that defendant jumped on the back of his left leg and twisted it.
Starykowicz repeatedly testified that defendant had a large stature, stating, for example, that “you
can see the size of him.”
¶6 Starykowicz testified to the lasting effects of the incident. He continued to have problems
with his knee and was currently wearing a knee brace. He had seen a doctor three times about the
knee and needed further testing. His doctor also diagnosed him with a mild concussion. He
testified that he had floaters in his left eye and problems with balance and short-term memory.
¶7 Starykowicz testified that, during the incident, defendant jumped onto Starykowicz’s boat,
damaging the cover, a buoy locker cover, the windshield, and a swim platform cover. The police
came, and Starykowicz gave them a statement. On cross-examination, Starykowicz denied
swearing at defendant or running up to him. When defense counsel suggested that defendant
jumped onto the boat cover, lost his balance, and fell on Starykowicz, Starykowicz said, “No. He
jumped on me. He didn’t jump on the cover.” Starykowicz admitted that he had no visible injuries
after the incident. He told the police he had been injured, but he did not recall mentioning any
injury in his statement to the police. He initially told the police only about the damage to his boat
cover. Not until afterward did he discover the additional damage.
¶8 Officer Christopher Tolle testified that he responded to the call about the incident.
Defendant told him that a piece of rope had become wrapped around his propeller, disabling his
boat, and that a dockhand helped guide him in. Defendant said that he jumped onto other boats to
make sure that his boat did not hit them. Defendant told Tolle that, as he approached Starykowicz’s
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2021 IL App (2d) 200324-Uboat, Starykowicz yelled obscenities at him. Defendant jumped onto Starykowicz’s boat to protect
it from getting hit, but the boat cover ripped. Starykowicz pushed defendant. Tolle did not see
any visible injuries on Starykowicz, and Starykowicz did not show him any damage to the boat.
¶9 Detective Jason Greenwald testified that he advised defendant that he was being charged
with battery. Defendant was confused as to why he was being charged. Defendant told Greenwald
that he pushed Starykowicz only because Starykowicz had pointed a finger at him in close
proximity.
¶ 10 Defendant testified that his boat became incapacitated and that a dockhand helped him get
around the other boats at the pier. He said that, as he came upon Starykowicz’s boat, Starykowicz
started to swear and kept repeating, “ ‘Don’t touch my fucking boat.’ ” According to defendant,
Starykowicz got out of his boat and walked quickly toward defendant while swearing at him.
Defendant described Starykowicz as having a “frustrating look on his face.” Starykowicz came
into defendant’s personal space, and defendant pushed him back as he approached. Defendant
said that Starykowicz “had his finger in my face.” Defendant had children in his boat and felt
nervous and threatened.
¶ 11 Defendant testified that he intended to jump onto Starykowicz’s boat to push the boats
apart, but his foot went through the cover and he fell. He said that Starykowicz grabbed him and
wrestled with him on the boat. Defendant denied striking Starykowicz at any time. He also denied
that his boat hit other boats at the marina. Defendant acknowledged writing in his statement to the
police that, while he was on Starykowicz’s boat, Starykowicz jumped him from behind and
grabbed him and that he then pushed Starykowicz away.
¶ 12 The State introduced into evidence a video from the marina. The video has no audio and
depicts the incident from a distance. The video shows defendant’s boat coming very close to, and
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2021 IL App (2d) 200324-Upossibly bumping into, other boats at the pier. When defendant’s boat approaches Starykowicz’s
boat, Starykowicz walks briskly toward defendant, who then pushes or hits him. Starykowicz then
jumps onto his boat to try to push defendant’s boat away. Defendant jumps onto the boat behind
Starykowicz, and either falls on Starykowicz or pushes him down. The two then have a brief
scuffle during which defendant appears to grab Starykowicz. The video also shows defendant
walking on both the front and back of Starykowicz’s boat and either trying to push his own boat
away or taking a rope from people on his boat. While the video at times shows multiple people on
the pier, no dockhand is seen guiding in defendant’s boat.
¶ 13 During closing arguments, the State argued that defendant struck Starykowicz on the pier
and then again on the boat. The court found defendant guilty on both battery counts. The court
stated that “[t]he video is probably the most truthful thing of all of the testimony.” The court noted
that it showed defendant guiding his boat toward Starykowicz’s properly docked boat. The court
found that Starykowicz, who was older and of smaller stature than defendant, moved toward
defendant with a normal gait. The court also found that defendant clearly pushed Starykowicz
while they were on the pier and that defendant again pushed Starykowicz while they were on the
boat. The court further found that the battery caused bodily harm to Starykowicz based on his
testimony about his injuries.
¶ 14 Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He also argued that the superseding information was defective
because it listed the wrong statutory chapter for the offenses. The trial court, however, found that
the incorrect citation was a typographical error and that the information apprised defendant of the
offenses with sufficient specificity for defendant to prepare and present his defense at trial. The
court also determined that the evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
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2021 IL App (2d) 200324-Udoubt. The court found that defendant caused bodily harm as charged in count 1 when he pushed
Starykowicz on the boat and twisted his leg, and that defendant made physical contact of an
insulting or provoking nature as charged in count 2 when he initially pushed Starykowicz on the
pier. Defendant was ordered to pay restitution and sentenced to supervision. He appeals.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Defendant first contends that the superseding information was defective because it did not
distinguish the conduct underlying each count.
¶ 17 A defendant has a fundamental right to be informed of the “nature and cause” of the
criminal accusations against him. People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d 318, 321 (1996). The “nature
and cause” of the accusation refers to the crime committed rather than how it was committed. Id.Section 111-3(a)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) requires that the charging
instrument set forth “the nature and elements of the offense charged” (725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3)
(West 2018)).
¶ 18 Although a charging instrument may be attacked at any time for failure to charge an
offense, the timing of the challenge determines which standard applies. Where the defendant
challenges a charging instrument before trial, the question is whether the instrument strictly
complied with the requirements of section 111-3 of the Code. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d at 321-22.
But where, as here, the defendant attacks the sufficiency of a charging instrument for the first time
on appeal, the instrument is construed more liberally, and we must determine whether the
instrument provided the defendant with enough specificity as to the crime charged so that he could
(1) adequately prepare his defense and (2) be able to plead a resulting conviction as a bar to future
prosecutions arising out of the same conduct. People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill. 2d 79, 86-87 (2005);
DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2d at 322.
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2021 IL App (2d) 200324-U¶ 19 “A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means
(1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking
nature with an individual.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2018). Count 1 used the language of the
statute, alleging that defendant knowingly without legal justification caused bodily harm to
Starykowicz by striking him about the body, causing pain. Count 2 likewise used the statutory
language, alleging in count 2 that defendant knowingly without legal justification made physical
contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Starykowicz by striking him about the body.
These allegations sufficiently informed defendant of the nature and cause of the charges against
him. This was confirmed by defendant’s presentation at trial of a defense that pertained to both
batteries. Specifically, defendant claimed that he pushed Starykowicz because he felt nervous and
threatened when Starykowicz approached him with a pointed finger and invaded his personal
space.
¶ 20 Defendant also argues that the information was insufficient because it provided the wrong
statutory citation for the offenses. However, the incorrect chapter number was an inconsequential
typographical error. See People v. Dean, 303 Ill. App. 3d 758, 761 (1999). A formal defect in an
information, such as a typographical error, may be corrected at any time. 725 ILCS 5/111-5(a)
(West 2018); People v, Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 244-45 (1994). Thus, the error in the chapter
number does not entitle defendant to relief.
¶ 21 Defendant next argues that his convictions must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime
rule because the State did not specify in the superseding information which acts supported which
crime and did not apportion the acts at trial. Defendant, however, did not raise the issue in the trial
court, and the State argues that he thereby forfeited it.
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2021 IL App (2d) 200324-U¶ 22 A defendant cannot be convicted of more than one offense “carved from the same physical
act.” People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977). However, it is well settled that, to preserve an
alleged error for review, the defendant must object at trial and include the alleged error in a
posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Here, defendant did not raise the
issue in the trial court. As a result, we may review this claim of error only if defendant has
established plain error. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010); see Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff.
Jan. 1, 1967). “The plain-error doctrine is a narrow and limited exception.” Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at
545. To obtain relief under this rule, a defendant must show that:
“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error
alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the
seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious
that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the
judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225
Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).
“Under both prongs of the plain-error doctrine, the defendant has the burden of persuasion.”
Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. “If the defendant fails to meet his burden, the procedural default will
be honored.” Id. A defendant who fails to argue for plain-error review cannot meet his burden of
persuasion. Id. Thus, “when a defendant fails to present an argument on how either of the two
prongs of the plain-error doctrine is satisfied, he forfeits plain-error review.” Id. at 545-46.
¶ 23 Here, defendant did not raise his one-act, one-crime below, and he does not argue that plain
error applies on appeal. Accordingly, defendant’s argument on the issue is forfeited. In any event,
we also note that, while the information did not apportion the acts to the crimes, the record as a
whole shows that the State was proceeding on the theory that defendant committed two batteries
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2021 IL App (2d) 200324-Ubased on two different acts of striking Starykowicz, once on the pier and once on the boat. Further,
because it was a bench trial, the court, unlike a jury, would have “understood the need to consider
whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant’s actions constituted separate
offenses.” People v. Span, 2011 IL App (1st) 083037, ¶ 88. Indeed, the trial court stated, when it
denied the motion for a new trial, that it had convicted defendant of two batteries based on different
acts, i.e., the conduct on the boat (count 1) and the conduct on the pier (count 2). Thus, the record
definitively shows that defendant was not convicted of two crimes based on a single act.
¶ 24 Finally, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Amigon, 239 Ill. 2d 71, 77 (2010). The critical inquiry is whether the evidence could reasonably
support a guilty finding, regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. People v.
Lissade, 403 Ill. App. 3d 609, 612 (2010). The fact finder is responsible for determining the
witnesses’ credibility, weighing their testimony, and deciding on the reasonable inferences to be
drawn from the evidence. See People v. Hill, 272 Ill. App. 3d 597, 603-04 (1995). “Because the
trier of fact is best positioned to judge the credibility of the witnesses and resolve disputes in the
evidence, its decision is entitled to great deference.” Lissade, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 612. We will
reverse the defendant’s conviction only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or
unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Id.¶ 25 Defendant argues that there was a lack of evidence that his physical contact with
Starykowicz was not an accident. We disagree. Starykowicz testified that defendant struck him
on the pier and, when he went onto the boat, defendant jumped on him, twisting his leg and causing
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2021 IL App (2d) 200324-Uinjury. The video largely corroborates that testimony. To the extent that the video is not clear
whether defendant fell on the boat or jumped on Starykowicz, Starykowicz specifically testified
that defendant jumped on him. Defendant also argues that the State failed to prove that bodily
injury occurred, but Starykowicz specifically testified about the injuries caused by both batteries.
Accordingly, the State proved defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
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