People v. Johnson , 2021 IL App (4th) 190103-U ( 2021 )

NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under 2021 IL App (4th) 190575-U June 30, 2021
Supreme Court Rule 23 and Carla Bender
is not precedent except in the NO. 4-19-0575 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances Court, IL
allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
ARTHUR L. JOHNSON, ) No. 85CF525
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Jason M. Bohm,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices DeArmond and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted OSAD’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition.
¶2 Defendant, Arthur L. Johnson, appeals from the trial court’s order denying his
motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. The Office of the State Appellate
Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent defendant. OSAD now moves to withdraw on the
basis it can raise no meritorious argument the court erred in denying defendant’s request for
leave. We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In 1985, a jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch.
38, ¶ 18-2a). He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Habitual Criminal Act (Act) (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶¶ 33B-1, 33B-2, 1005-5-3(7)) due to two previous armed robbery
convictions in Champaign County case Nos. 72-X-2002 and 80-CF-602. On direct appeal,
defendant argued, in part, his sentence should be vacated because the Act was unconstitutional;
this court affirmed. People v. Johnson, 144 Ill. App. 3d 1186 (1986) (table) (unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶5 In 1992, defendant filed his initial postconviction petition, arguing, in part, the
Act violated the single-subject requirement in article IV, section 8 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d)). Defendant’s petition was denied following an evidentiary hearing,
and we affirmed the denial on appeal. People v. Johnson, 276 Ill. App. 3d 1144 (1995) (table)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶6 In 1997, defendant filed a successive postconviction petition raising a claim
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. The
petition was dismissed, and this court affirmed the dismissal. People v. Johnson, 299 Ill. App. 3d
1138 (1998) (table) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶7 In 2019, defendant filed the instant motion for leave to file a successive
postconviction petition. In it, he argued his conviction and sentence were void because the
supreme court found Public Acts 89-428 (eff. Dec. 13, 1995) (amending 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3,
3-6-3.1) and 89-203 (eff. July 21, 1995) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii))
unconstitutional as violative of the single-subject rule. The trial court entered a written order
denying defendant’s motion. The court found defendant could not satisfy the cause-and-prejudice
test because (1) the Public Acts identified in his motion were passed after his conviction and
sentence and (2) “it is well-settled that the [Habitual Criminal] Act was constitutional.”
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¶8 Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for leave, and OSAD was appointed
to represent him. OSAD subsequently filed a motion to withdraw as appellate counsel on the
basis it could raise no meritorious argument on appeal. We granted defendant leave to respond to
OSAD’s motion; he did not do so.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 OSAD contends it can raise no colorable argument the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion for leave because any assertion he satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test
would be meritless. We review the denial of a motion for leave to file a successive petition
alleging cause and prejudice de novo. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39.
¶ 11 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2018)) provides a remedy for criminal defendants who claim their conviction or sentence
resulted from a substantial denial of their constitutional rights. See, e.g., People v. Pitsonbarger,
205 Ill. 2d 444, 455, 793 N.E.2d 609, 618 (2002). The Postconviction Act “contemplates the
filing of only one post-conviction petition.” Id. at 456. Thus, “[a]ny claim of substantial denial of
constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. An exception to the procedural bar against successive petitions,
relevant to the instant appeal, is satisfaction of the “cause-and-prejudice” test. Id. at 459. “Cause”
is defined as “some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel’s efforts to
raise the claim in an earlier proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 460.
“Prejudice” can be established by showing the claim at issue “so infected the trial that the
resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)(2) (West 2018).
“[L]eave of court to file a successive postconviction petition should be denied when it is clear,
from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted by the petitioner, that
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the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where the successive petition with
supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings.” People v. Smith, 2014 IL
115946, ¶ 35, 21 N.E.3d 1172.
¶ 12 Here, we agree with OSAD that no meritorious argument can be made defendant
satisfied the “cause-and-prejudice” test such that the trial court erred in denying him leave to file
a successive petition. Although it is true the supreme court found Public Acts 89-428 and 89-203
void as violative of the single-subject rule in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 518, 680 N.E.2d
1372, 1381 (1997), and People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 514, 722 N.E.2d 1102, 1110 (1999),
respectively, these findings have no relation to defendant’s conviction and sentence. Defendant
was sentenced in 1985, whereas Public Acts 89-428 and 89-203 did not become effective until
1995. Pub. Act 89-428 (eff. Dec. 13, 1995) (amending 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3, 3-6-3.1); Pub. Act
89-203 (eff. July 21, 1995) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii)). Moreover, the Public Acts
relevant to defendant’s conviction and sentence—Public Act 80-1099 (eff. Feb. 1, 1978) (adding
1977 Ill. Laws 3264), which created Class X sentencing, and Public Act 81-1270 (eff. July 3,
1980) (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, ¶ 33B-1), which amended the Act—were both
found to comply with the single-subject rule. See People v. Smith, 314 Ill. App. 3d 1111, 1112-
13, 734 N.E.2d 104, 105 (2000) (addressing Pub. Act 80-1099 (eff. Feb. 1, 1978) (adding 1977
Ill. Laws 3264)); People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 255-56, 650 N.E.2d 1026, 1035 (1995)
(addressing Pub. Act 81-1270 (eff. July 3, 1980) (amending Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38,
¶ 33B-1)). Accordingly, no argument can be made the trial court erred in denying defendant
leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION
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¶ 14 For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
¶ 15 Affirmed.
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