People v. Crump , 2021 IL App (1st) 190134-U ( 2021 )

2021 IL App (1st) 190134-UTHIRD DIVISION
June 30, 2021
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 18 CR 05613
)
MICHAEL CRUMP, ) Honorable
) Angela Munari Petrone,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McBride and Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the gun
because the search of his drawstring bag was justified under the automobile exception.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Michael Crump was found guilty of being an armed
habitual criminal and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment followed by three years of
mandatory supervised release. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence because police lacked probable cause to search his drawstring bag
during a traffic stop. We affirm.
¶3 BACKGROUND
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¶4 Motion to Suppress Evidence
¶5 On March 26, 2018, police conducted a routine traffic stop of a car in which defendant
was a back seat passenger. The officers arrested the driver of the car for driving on a suspended
license and ticketed the passenger for open containers of alcohol in the center console. Defendant
was arrested when a search for additional opened containers of alcohol led to the discovery of a
gun in his drawstring bag. He filed a motion to suppress alleging the officers lacked probable
cause to search his bag.
¶6 At the suppression hearing, Officer Francis Johnson testified about the circumstances
surrounding his discovery of the gun in defendant’s bag. On the evening of March 26, 2018, he
was on routine patrol in an unmarked police car with his partner, Officer Klaus, and a sergeant.
Around 8:30 p.m., he stopped a Pontiac Bonneville that made a right turn from Augusta
Boulevard onto Keystone Avenue without signaling.
¶7 Johnson approached the driver’s side of the Bonneville. His partner approached the
passenger’s side. Defendant was seated behind the front passenger and leaning toward the space
behind the driver’s seat. The front seat passenger appeared intoxicated and was yelling. Johnson
smelled and saw two cups of alcohol in the center console. Based on those observations, he
asked everyone to step out of the car. The driver exited the car promptly, but the passengers did
not. Officer Klaus opened the rear passenger door and asked defendant again to get out of the
car. When defendant continued leaning into the area behind the driver’s seat, Klaus unholstered
her gun and repeated her request. Then defendant showed his hands and exited the car. Klaus
moved defendant to the rear of the car and handcuffed him to the driver. The young lady in the
front passenger’s seat got out of the car eventually and was handcuffed to defendant.
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¶8 Johnson testified he and his partner then searched the car for the source of the open
containers of alcohol. His partner found a bottle of alcohol on the front passenger’s floorboard.
Meanwhile, he saw a black drawstring bag on the back seat where defendant had been seated. He
picked up the bag and felt a gun. When he opened the bag, there was a gun inside.
¶9 Johnson and his partner wore body cameras that recorded their encounter with defendant
and the footage was played for the court. The footage from Johnson’s body camera shows
Officer Klaus asking defendant several times to get out of the car; when defendant complies, he
steps out of the car with his back toward her. The footage from Klaus’s body camera also shows
her repeatedly asking defendant to exit the vehicle as he kept his back toward her. When Klaus
draws her gun and repeats her request, defendant backs out of the car with his hands out of
Klaus’s sight. Meanwhile, the young lady in the front passenger seat is upset and yelling. Klaus
helps the young lady out of the car and explains, “we’re not worried about the liquor right now,
we’re worried about other things.” Johnson testified he issued the young lady a citation for the
open containers of alcohol but did not arrest her.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Johnson testified defendant was arrested for the gun found inside
his drawstring bag and the driver was arrested for driving on a suspended license. Although
driving on a suspended license required the vehicle to be impounded, Johnson did not recall
whether an open-container violation required a tow or impoundment. An inventory search of the
vehicle is required in both scenarios. He acknowledged his partner commented on the black
drawstring bag but clarified she did not mention anything until after he picked it up and felt the
weight and profile of a gun. Based on his experience with guns, he instantly recognized the
weight and profile of a gun inside the drawstring bag.
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¶ 11 On redirect examination, Johnson testified he did not smell alcohol on the driver or
defendant. He arrested defendant after finding the gun. Then, he arrested the driver for driving on
a suspended license. At that point, he determined the vehicle had to be towed.
¶ 12 Defendant testified he was seated in the back seat behind the front passenger when the
car was stopped by police. His drawstring bag was on his left side. On cross-examination, he
denied reaching for his bag but admitted he owned the gun found inside.
¶ 13 The defense rested and the trial court heard arguments on the State’s request for a
directed finding. The State argued the officers were entitled to search defendant’s bag for alcohol
based on the open containers in the center console and how defendant exited the car with his
back turned to Officer Klaus. The State also argued the officers were entitled to conduct an
inventory search of the vehicle interior before it was towed, and Officer Johnson recognized
there was a gun inside the bag when he felt the weight and profile of a gun. The State further
argued it did not matter if the officers only realized a tow was required after they searched the
vehicle and found the gun. The State reasoned 625 ILCS 5/6-303(e) required the tow and the
officers would have inevitably discovered the gun during the inventory search.
¶ 14 Defendant argued the inevitable discovery doctrine was not applicable unless the court
found a violation of defendant’s fourth amendment rights. Defendant also argued the gun was
not in plain view of the officers and there was no reason to search his bag because he did not
smell of alcohol. Yet Officer Klaus tells the young lady they are worried about something other
than alcohol.
¶ 15 The court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. In doing so, the court
acknowledged defendant was not intoxicated but noted he ignored lawful requests to exit the
vehicle and then kept his back toward Officer Klaus when he ultimately complied. The court
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stated defendant’s movements, which obscured his hands, led Officer Klaus to reasonably
believe defendant could be armed and dangerous. According to the court, Officer Johnson’s
search of defendant’s bag was lawful and related to concerns for officer safety. The court also
stated the officers would have inevitably discovered the gun during the inventory search of the
car before it was towed.
¶ 16 Jury Trial
¶ 17 At trial, Officer Johnson testified similarly as before at the hearing on defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence. He added the odor of alcohol persisted even after the discovery of the
bottle of liquor on the front passenger’s floorboard. Moreover, based on his service in the
Marines and his experience as a police officer, he knew there was a gun inside the drawstring
bag when he felt its weight and profile. Before inventorying the gun, he made sure the chamber
was empty and removed the magazine of live ammunition.
¶ 18 Officer Diana Klaus testified she asked defendant to get out of the car before the young
lady in the front passenger’s seat because his behavior made her nervous. Defendant ignored her
requests to exit the car. He kept his back turned and moved his arms “trying to conceal
something.” Defendant complied when Klaus unholstered her gun and asked again. Klaus
explained she was trained to always keep the person’s hands in view and if the person refuses to
show their hands, that could be a threat. She also identified the loaded .45 caliber Colt Combat
Commander that was found inside defendant’s drawstring bag.
¶ 19 On cross-examination, Klaus acknowledged she was able to see defendant’s hands when
she first approached the car. She conceded defendant had his back toward her because his knees
were pointed toward the driver’s seat. Defendant sat behind the front passenger whose seat was
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fully reclined, and that required defendant to move his arms to back out of the car. She explained
on redirect examination it was systematic to search the vehicle from front to rear.
¶ 20 Robert Franks, a fingerprint evidence technician, examined the gun including the live
rounds of ammunition in its magazine. He recovered no fingerprints. Katie Anello, a firearms
evidence technician, test fired the gun successfully.
¶ 21 Then, the parties stipulated that defendant had previously been convicted of two
qualifying felony offenses. After the State rested its case in chief, defendant moved for a directed
verdict, which the trial court denied. Defendant chose not to testify and rested.
¶ 22 Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of being an armed habitual
criminal. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial objecting to the denial of his pretrial
suppression motion, which the trial court denied after a hearing. The court then sentenced
defendant to nine years’ imprisonment and three years of mandatory supervised release.
¶ 23 ANALYSIS
¶ 24 Crump now contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
because the officers lacked probable cause to search his drawstring bag during the traffic stop.
Crump concedes the officers lawfully stopped the car for a traffic violation then ordered
everyone out and handcuffed them for safety concerns. However, he argues the traffic stop does
not entitle the officers to search the entire vehicle.
¶ 25 Although the automobile exception permits the warrantless search of a vehicle with
probable cause, Crump asserts the permissible scope of that search is confined to the areas where
the object sought may be found. He argues Officer Johnson was limited to those places where a
bottle of alcohol may be found. In other words, once the officers found a bottle of alcohol on the
front passenger’s floorboard, there was no justification for searching his bag on the back seat. He
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reasons the officers articulated no reason to believe they would find additional alcohol in his bag.
He further argues neither concerns for officer safety nor the inevitable discovery doctrine justify
the search of his bag.
¶ 26 The State maintains the automobile exception allowed the officers to search anywhere in
the vehicle including the passenger compartment for additional opened containers of alcohol.
The “automobile exception” allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant if there is
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity subject to seizure.
People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 312 (1994). The State reasons the officers were not required to
end their search after finding a bottle of alcohol on the front passenger’s floorboard. See People
v. McGhee, 2020 IL App (3d) 180349, ¶ 35 (police officers had probable cause to continue
search for additional alcohol after one bottle had been found).
¶ 27 The State also argues the officers were allowed to conduct a protective search for
weapons in defendant’s bag based on a reasonable belief he was armed and dangerous.
Alternatively, the State argues the officers would have inevitably discovered the gun during the
inventory search necessitated by the vehicle tow.
¶ 28 In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we will uphold the court’s
findings of historical fact unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v.
Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 483 (2005). We remain free, however, to assess the facts relative to the
issues presented and to draw our own conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted.
Id. at 484. We thus review de novo the ultimate question of whether the evidence should be
suppressed. Id. In doing so, we may consider evidence presented at the suppression hearing and
at trial when reviewing the propriety of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress. People v.
Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 55.
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¶ 29 The United States and Illinois constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. A warrantless search
is usually per se unreasonable. People v. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 20 (citing Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)). However, a warrantless search of an automobile is not per se
unreasonable given its transient nature. Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 30 This “automobile exception” allows police to search a vehicle without a warrant based on
probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity subject to seizure.
James, 163 Ill. 2d at 312. Stopping a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, however, does not
justify searching the detainee’s person or vehicle; rather, police officers must reasonably believe
they are facing a situation more serious than a routine traffic violation. People v. Contreras, 2014
IL App (1st) 131889, ¶ 28 (citing People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 271 (2005)).
¶ 31 Police officers have probable cause to search a vehicle where the totality of the
circumstances known at the time of the search, in view of their experience, would cause a
reasonably prudent person to believe a crime occurred and that evidence of the crime is
contained in the vehicle. People v. Parker, 354 Ill. App. 3d 40, 45 (2004) (citing People v. Stout,
106 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1985); People v. Clark, 92 Ill. 2d 96, 100 (1982); and People v. Erickson, 31
Ill. 2d 230, 233 (1964)). The scope of that search “extends to every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Id. (citing People v. Schrems, 224 Ill. App.
3d 988, 995-96 (1992); and People v. Beil, 110 Ill. App. 3d 291, 293 (1982)). The Supreme
Court has held that police officers with probable cause to search a vehicle may inspect a
passenger’s belongings that can conceal the object of the search. See People v. Morales, 343 Ill.
App. 3d 987, 994 (2003) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999)).
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¶ 32 We find the officers were justified under the automobile exception to search defendant’s
drawstring bag for additional opened containers of alcohol. The Illinois Vehicle Code prohibits
transporting, carrying, or possessing any alcohol within the passenger area of a motor vehicle
except in the sealed original container. See 625 ILCS 5/11-502(a), (b) (West 2018). Officer
Johnson testified at the suppression hearing that he smelled and saw two cups of alcohol in the
center console and the front seat passenger appeared intoxicated and was yelling. At that
moment, the officers reasonably believed they were confronting a situation more serious than a
routine traffic violation. See Contreras, 2014 IL App (1st) 131889, ¶ 28. The officers had
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of an open container violation, and
under the automobile exception, they could search any part of the passenger area for opened
containers of alcohol including defendant’s drawstring bag in the back seat. See McGhee, 2020
IL App (3d) 180349, ¶ 35 (the officers had probable cause to search a locked glove compartment
for bottles of beer that could be opened and resealed).
¶ 33 In so finding, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s argument that there was no justification
to search his bag on the back seat after the officers found a bottle of alcohol on the front
passenger’s floorboard. Defendant’s argument presumes the officers had no reason to believe
they would find additional alcohol in his bag. The officers had no obligation to assume that no
additional opened and resealed containers of alcohol were inside the car. See McGhee, 2020 IL
App (3d) 180349, ¶ 36 (officers were not obligated to assume no additional open containers of
alcohol were inside the vehicle).
¶ 34 As our resolution under the automobile exception is dispositive, we need not consider
whether the search of defendant’s bag was also permissible as a protective search for weapons
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under Terry v. Ohio or under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. However, we will briefly
comment on those issues.
¶ 35 Under Terry and Illinois law, an officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop or
detention of an individual upon a reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts and reasonable
inferences, the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. People v. Johnson, 387
Ill. App. 3d 780, 788 (2009) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-23; 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 2006)).
In Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court extended the Terry protective search of a person to the
passenger compartment of a vehicle where the officer reasonably believes the occupant is
dangerous and could gain immediate control of a weapon. Id. at 789 (citing Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1049 (1983)); see also People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835, ¶ 38. The Court stated the justification
for a protective search of a vehicle is not diminished simply because the officer has the person’s
movement under control. Id. (construing Long, 463 U.S. at 1051-52). The Court stated the person
may try to break away from the officer’s control and retrieve a weapon from the vehicle, or if not
arrested, the person may return to the vehicle and gain access to any weapon inside. Id. (citing
Long, 463 U.S. at 1051-52).
¶ 36 Here, the totality of the circumstances confronting Officer Klaus warranted her belief that
her safety or that of others was in danger. See Johnson, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 788-89 (whether a
protective search is proper is an objective test: would a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances believe her safety, or the safety of others, is in danger?). Defendant cites various
cases where factors such as refusing to cooperate, furtive movements, or lateness of the hour,
without more, did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion the person is armed with a weapon.
However, the basis for reasonable suspicion is assessed upon the totality of the circumstances
facing the officers. People v. Evans, 2017 IL App (4th) 140672, ¶ 45. In this case, the officers
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decided to search defendant’s bag based on the quantum of facts they faced, including the
lateness of the hour, the presence of multiple occupants and open containers of alcohol, and
defendant’s refusal to get out of the car and keep his hands visible. See id. ¶¶ 45-47. Moreover,
defendant’s point that all the occupants of the car were handcuffed at the rear of the car when
Officer Johnson searched defendant’s bag ignores the Supreme Court’s observation that the
justification for a protective search of a vehicle is not diminished simply because the officer has
the person’s movement under control; all the occupants of the car were detained at the rear of the
car and within reach of the interior. Johnson, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 789 (construing Long, 463 U.S.
at 1051-52). Having found no violation of the fourth amendment under the totality of the
circumstances, we have no reason to consider the parties’ alternative arguments about the
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. See People v. James, 2021 IL App (1st) 180509,
¶ 36 (we need not discuss the parties’ alternative arguments about the inevitable discovery
doctrine where there was no fourth amendment violation).
¶ 37 CONCLUSION
¶ 38 We conclude the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of
the gun because the search of defendant’s drawstring bag was justified under the automobile
exception. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
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