People v. Maslan , 2021 IL App (3d) 200025-U ( 2021 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2021 IL App (3d) 200025-UOrder filed July 16, 2021
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 3-20-0025
v. ) Circuit No. 16-CF-2532
)
NATHAN R. MASLAN, ) Honorable
) Daniel Rippy,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices O’Brien and Schmidt concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to suppress defendant’s
statements.
¶2 The State appeals the Will County circuit court’s order suppressing various statements
made by defendant, Nathan R. Maslan. The State argues that the police officers’ questioning was
general on-the-scene questioning that did not require Miranda warnings and that regardless,
defendant was not in custody and thus, Miranda warnings did not need to be given. Additionally,
the State challenges the court’s finding that defendant’s statements were involuntary. We affirm
in part, reverse in part, and remand.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State charged defendant by a superseding bill of indictment with two counts of
aggravated driving while under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(2), (d)(1)(F),
(d)(2)(G) (West 2016)), six counts of reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a), (d)(2) (West 2016)),
and one count of aggravated use of an electronic communication device (625 ILCS 5/12-610.2(b-
5), (e) (West 2016)). The charges arose from an incident where defendant struck a pedestrian
with his motor vehicle, killing the pedestrian.
¶5 Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress various statements he made to the officers at
the scene of the incident. The motion to suppress alleged that defendant should have been given
Miranda warnings because he was in custody when the officers questioned him.
¶6 The State opposed the motion to suppress, arguing that it was not necessary for defendant
to be Mirandized because the questioning was part of the officers’ general on-the-scene
investigation and that regardless, defendant was not in custody. Additionally, the State sought a
determination that the statements made by defendant were voluntary.
¶7 The evidence presented at multiple hearings on the motion to suppress established that at
2:50 a.m. on August 20, 2016, defendant called 911 and reported that he “hit a person” who was
“walking on the side of the street.” Defendant “clipped him with my, uh, mirror, but I didn’t see
him when he came out.” Later in the call, defendant said the pedestrian “kind of like popped up
in the middle of the street all of the sudden, well not middle of the street, but on the side of the
road and I clipped him.”
2
¶8 The incident occurred in Frankfort Township. The Frankfort Fire Protection District
ambulance arrived within minutes of the call. Will County Sheriff’s Department Deputies Shaun
Moran, Brad Parker and Kevin Spencer and Sergeant Jill Knutsen arrived shortly thereafter,
within approximately 10 minutes of each other. Moran was present at the scene for
approximately five minutes before leaving to accompany the ambulance transporting the fatally
injured pedestrian to the hospital. Will County Sheriff’s Department Deputies Andrew Schwartz,
William Hetfleisch, Michael Cosentino, and Sergeant Vincent Gambino arrived at the scene
between 4 and 4:20 a.m.
¶9 Defendant left the scene in the back seat of Schwartz’s vehicle at 4:31 a.m. Schwartz
took defendant to the hospital for a blood draw, after which defendant was charged. No officer
advised defendant of his Miranda rights while at the scene.
¶ 10 A. Deputy Brad Parker
¶ 11 Deputy Parker testified on June 18, and August 26, 2019. Parker testified that he
responded to a call of a motor vehicle collision resulting in fatal injuries to a pedestrian. Shortly
after arriving on scene, at approximately 3:02 a.m., Deputy Parker made contact with defendant,
the driver of the vehicle. Parker asked defendant what occurred, and defendant “stated that while
he was driving northbound on 80th Avenue, he observed the pedestrian stumble within the
roadway, causing him to strike the pedestrian.” Defendant was coming from the Aqua Lounge,
which is a bar located very close to where the incident occurred. Defendant told Parker that
defendant had consumed four to five beers. Defendant changed his story and next said:
“while he was proceeding northbound on 80th Avenue, he was trying to attempt
to attach his phone to the Bluetooth, his car to the Bluetooth, so that he could
listen to music, and when he was doing so, he took his eyes off the roadway and
3
veered to the right, which is the east side of the road, into the gravel portion of
where the pedestrian was walking, striking the pedestrian.”
¶ 12 After this initial questioning, “due to the extent of the incident, the defendant
accompanied [Parker]” to Parker’s squad car where Parker put defendant in the back seat. Parker
explained that “it’s a very dimly-lit roadway, and [Parker] didn’t want to have another accident
occur.” Parker placed defendant in the squad car “until [the deputies] could complete [their]
further investigation.” Parker did not tell defendant that defendant was the focus of the
investigation or that defendant was a suspect. Defendant was not handcuffed, and Parker never
drew a weapon. The back doors in Parker’s squad car were locked from the inside, such that one
could not get out from inside the vehicle. The squad car windows were up. Parker checked on
defendant while defendant was in the squad car to see if defendant needed anything. Defendant
“would just relay that he was concerned about the pedestrian’s well-being.”
¶ 13 Parker did not believe he touched defendant other than to search defendant for weapons
prior to putting defendant in the squad car. Before searching defendant, Parker told defendant
that he had “to complete a protective pat down prior to getting into the vehicle just for any
weapons or whatnot.” Although Parker stated he searched defendant to look for any weapons,
Parker also testified that the search he conducted was no different than he would have done if he
had placed someone under arrest. Parker did not recall if he removed any items from defendant’s
person, such as keys or a phone. Parker later stated that defendant did not have anything on his
person. When Parker was shown a property report that Parker generated, he acknowledged that at
some point he would have had possession of defendant’s keys, including the vehicle ignition key.
Parker ultimately admitted he did not recall the details of the search.
4
¶ 14 No one else was with Parker when Parker had the conversation with defendant. Parker
indicated his conversation with defendant lasted approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Parker had a
conversational tone while speaking with defendant. Parker did not recall directing defendant’s
attention to the rear passenger side tire of defendant’s vehicle and asking defendant how the
gravel dust got on the tire. Parker could not recall a lot of the particulars from the night of the
incident and stated he had a vague recollection.
¶ 15 B. Deputy Andrew Schwartz
¶ 16 Deputy Schwartz testified that he responded to a call reporting a pedestrian had been
struck by a vehicle. Upon arrival, Schwartz spoke with the other officers on scene, Parker and
Knutsen. Both officers provided Schwartz with a brief summary of the information gathered by
the officers, such as: the people involved, what they observed, what the driver told the officers
and what the paramedics told the officers about the condition of the injured pedestrian.
¶ 17 At approximately 4:10 a.m., Schwartz spoke with defendant, who was waiting in the back
seat of Parker’s squad car. Schwartz opened the door and stood next to the open door while he
spoke with defendant. Defendant remained seated in Parker’s squad car while Schwartz spoke
with him. The conversation was cordial and lasted approximately two or three minutes. Schwartz
did not touch defendant and did not have any weapons drawn.
¶ 18 Schwartz asked defendant a few brief questions about the incident. Defendant relayed to
Schwartz that defendant was driving away from the Aqua Lounge and heading to his home.
Defendant told Schwartz he was trying to pair the Bluetooth on his cell phone with the radio in
his vehicle in order to play music. At some point, defendant “realized that he was on the gravel
shoulder, looked up, and saw what he believed was a person standing near the side of the road.”
Defendant attempted to avoid striking the person. However, defendant thought he hit the
5
pedestrian with the front right of the vehicle. Defendant said he had “[a]pproximately four beers
since—since 11:30 that night” and that he finished his last beer several minutes before leaving
the Aqua Lounge. The collision happened approximately five minutes after he left the Aqua
Lounge.
¶ 19 Toward the end of the conversation with defendant, Schwartz administered a preliminary
breath test to defendant. The test measured defendant’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) as
0.083. Schwartz did not believe that he told defendant the results. Schwartz testified that at that
point in time, defendant was not free to leave.
¶ 20 C. Deputy William Hetfleisch
¶ 21 Deputy Hetfleisch testified that he was called to the scene by his supervisor, Sergeant
Gambino. When Hetfleisch arrived, he spoke with Parker. Parker provided Hetfleisch with basic
information such as the location of the pedestrian and where the pedestrian had been taken.
Hetfleisch did a quick evaluation and walk-through of the scene. Schwartz advised Hetfleisch
that Schwartz had briefly talked to defendant and then administered a portable breath test.
Schwartz told Hetfleisch the results of the test and Schwartz, Gambino and Hetfleisch all spoke
together. Hetfleisch then spoke with defendant at approximately 4:25 a.m.
¶ 22 When Hetfleisch spoke with defendant, defendant was sitting in the back seat of Parker’s
squad car and Hetfleisch stood in the doorway. Gambino and Schwartz were in the vicinity but
Hetfleisch approached defendant alone. Hetfleisch advised defendant that while defendant had
spoken to others, Hetfleisch needed to ask defendant questions as well. Hetfleisch asked
defendant his name and date of birth. After defendant provided that information, defendant
“made the statement of, ‘I am the asshole who hit that guy.’ ” Hetfleisch then asked defendant
where he was coming from and about his alcohol consumption that night. Defendant told
6
Hetfleisch that he was coming from the Aqua Lounge and that he had consumed three quarters of
a beer. Prior to that, defendant was at the Side Street Tavern in Tinley Park and had consumed
three beers. Defendant told Hetfleisch that defendant wished he had stayed at a hotel near the
Side Street Tavern.
¶ 23 Hetfleisch next asked defendant about the moments before the collision. Defendant told
Hetfleisch that he was “connecting to his Bluetooth to select a song from iTunes, at which time
he struck the pedestrian. He stated to [Hetfleisch] that he did not identify the pedestrian prior to
striking him.” Defendant then stopped his vehicle, checked on the pedestrian, and called 911.
Defendant picked up his passenger-side mirror and placed the mirror inside his vehicle.
¶ 24 The tone of Hetfleisch’s conversation with defendant was relaxed. Hetfleisch did not
touch defendant while they were conversing. Defendant was not handcuffed during the
conversation. The conversation lasted less than five minutes. After this conversation, Hetfleisch
spoke with Gambino. Schwartz transported defendant to the hospital for blood and urine testing.
¶ 25 D. Defendant
¶ 26 Defendant testified that on the night of the incident, Parker arrived on the scene, exited
his vehicle, and approached defendant’s vehicle. As Parker approached, defendant was standing
behind defendant’s vehicle. Parker’s squad car emergency lights were still flashing at that time.
Defendant introduced himself to Parker and told Parker that he was the person who called 911
and identified himself as the driver of the vehicle involved in the incident. Upon request,
defendant provided his license to Parker. Defendant told Parker his insurance card was in the
center console of his vehicle and said he would get it. Parker told defendant no and stated that
Parker would retrieve the insurance card from the vehicle. Parker asked if defendant had any
7
weapons or drugs in the car. Parker opened defendant’s door, removed items from the center
console, and placed those items on the front passenger seat of defendant’s vehicle.
¶ 27 Parker then asked where defendant was coming from and going to. Defendant told Parker
he was coming from Club 301 and was going home. Parker asked defendant how the occurrence
happened. Defendant “said I was driving home down 80th Avenue, I saw a pedestrian on the side
of the road stumble into my lane of travel. I swerved to try to avoid him and clipped him with my
mirror.” Defendant admitted this version of events was not true, but he told Parker this because
he panicked. Defendant then asked Parker if he could drink water from a bottle in defendant’s
vehicle, but Parker told defendant he could not.
¶ 28 Next, Parker walked around defendant’s vehicle, looking at it. After Parker circled the
vehicle, he spoke to defendant again. Defendant testified that Parker told him to look at the rear
passenger tire and then asked defendant why there was gravel dust on the tire. Defendant “said
what happened was I took my phone out to play a song, I felt a big bump. I looked up, saw the
pedestrian, cut my wheel hard left to try to avoid him and clipped him with my mirror.”
¶ 29 After this exchange, Parker told defendant to turn around and put his hands on the back
of the vehicle. Parker asked defendant if he had any weapons and after defendant replied that he
did not, Parker searched defendant. Defendant described the search, stating that “[Parker] started
with my shoulders, patted down my shirt area. [Parker] went into my left shorts pocket, took out
my money clip and my keys and put them on top of [my vehicle].” Parker then went to
defendant’s right pocket and took out defendant’s cell phone and put it on top of defendant’s
vehicle. Parker gave defendant the money clip but did not give defendant the cell phone or keys.
1
Testimony during the hearings established that Club 30 and Aqua Lounge were different names
for the same establishment.
8
After Parker completed the search of defendant, Parker grabbed the back of defendant’s right
arm and “[s]aid you’re going to have a seat in the back of my squad.” Defendant took this as a
command and stated that Parker had a firm grip on his arm. Parker then walked defendant to
Parker’s squad car, opened the back door, and told defendant to get in. Parker then closed the
door.
¶ 30 All of the windows in Parker’s squad car were up. Defendant was alone in the back of the
squad car for approximately 45 minutes before he spoke to anyone. At that time, Parker opened
the back door and asked if defendant needed anything. Defendant asked if the pedestrian was
okay, and Parker said he would let defendant know. Parker closed the door and defendant again
sat alone in the squad car for another 15 to 20 minutes before speaking to anyone.
¶ 31 Schwartz then opened the back door to speak with defendant. Parker’s squad car
overhead lights were still flashing at that point. Schwartz asked defendant for the details of the
incident. Defendant was seated in the back of the squad car for the entire conversation and no
one else was present. After a short conversation, Schwartz told defendant to exit the car for a
breath test. Schwartz told defendant that his BAC was 0.083. Schwartz then directed defendant
to return to the back seat of the squad car and closed the door. Defendant waited in the squad car
for another 15 minutes before talking to anyone else.
¶ 32 Hetfleisch opened the back seat door and spoke with defendant. Defendant said, “I am the
asshole who hit that guy,” after he introduced himself to Hetfleisch. While defendant was in
Parker’s squad car, defendant was not sure if the car was running or if the air conditioning was
on. The siren was not on, but the exterior flashing lights were flashing. It was dark outside and
the interior lights of the vehicle were not on, except when the door was opened. According to
9
defendant, it was summertime and the temperature was warm and humid. Defendant was
wearing shorts and a T-shirt.
¶ 33 Defendant did not ask the officers if he could go home. None of the officers told
defendant he was under arrest or said he was not free to leave. Each time that defendant spoke
with an officer it was a one-on-one conversation.
¶ 34 E. Ruling on the Motion to Suppress
¶ 35 After hearing arguments on the motion to suppress, the court took the matter under
advisement. The court then determined that the initial questions Parker asked defendant at the
scene “were harmless up until the point that the Court finds that at the point that Deputy Parker
began asking about the gravel on the tires, that at that point this changed from a[n] accident
investigation to a criminal [i]nvestigation.” The court found that once Parker did a pat-down
search and placed defendant in the back seat of the squad car, a reasonable person would not
believe they were free to leave and Miranda warnings should have been given. The court
determined it was “going to suppress any statements given to Deputy Parker after the point at
which the defendant was patted down.”
¶ 36 The court clarified that “the statements regarding the change of story, I am going to allow
it. Okay, those initial statements.” The court further stated that it was going to allow the
statement that defendant made to Hetfleisch that defendant was “the asshole who hit that guy”
because it was an unsolicited statement. Any questioning regarding what happened from
Schwartz and Hetfleisch was suppressed.
¶ 37 The State then asked the court about the State’s request for a finding that the statements
given to Hetfleisch and Schwartz were voluntarily made. The court’s ruling is not entirely clear,
but appears to conclude that any statements it was suppressing because defendant should have
10
received Miranda warnings were also involuntary statements. After the ruling on the motion to
suppress, the State filed a certificate of impairment pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604
(eff. July 1, 2017) and a notice of appeal.
¶ 38 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 39 The State argues that the trial court’s order suppressing evidence should be reversed. In
support of this contention, the State claims the deputies’ questioning of defendant was general
on-the-scene investigation. Further, the State argues defendant was not in custody during any of
the questioning, such that Miranda warnings were not necessary prior to questioning. The State
further contends the court erred in determining that the statements it suppressed were
involuntary.
¶ 40 On appeal, defendant argues the statements were properly suppressed because defendant
was in custody for purposes of Miranda warnings. Defendant concedes the trial court erred in
finding the statements involuntary.
¶ 41 A. Miranda
¶ 42 We review the circuit court’s suppression ruling under a bifurcated standard. People v.
Oliver, 236 Ill. 2d 448, 454 (2010). The court’s factual findings will only be reversed if they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. We review the court’s legal determination of
whether suppression is warranted de novo. Id.¶ 43 Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), “the prosecution may not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.” Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
11
freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. With regards to the procedural safeguards, before
“any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id.¶ 44 At the outset, the circuit court did not suppress the statement by defendant that he was
“the asshole who hit that guy” after finding this comment was an “unsolicited statement” and
defendant’s inquiries into how the pedestrian was doing were “voluntary” and thus were not
suppressed. 2 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (“Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.”). These
spontaneous statements by defendant are not at issue for purposes of this appeal.
¶ 45 Turning to the remaining statements by defendant, the parties do not dispute that
defendant was not provided Miranda warnings. The parties do not dispute that defendant was
interrogated. Hence, our focus is limited to the issue of whether defendant was in custody. The
case law provides that “[t]he determination of whether a defendant is ‘in custody’ for Miranda
purposes involves ‘[t]wo discrete inquiries ***: first, what were the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he
or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’ ” People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d
492, 505-06 (2003) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). The following
factors have been found relevant to a determination of whether a defendant is in custody:
“(1) the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the questioning; (2) the number
of police officers present during the interrogation; (3) the presence or absence of
2
Based on our review of the transcript containing the court’s suppression ruling, we interpret the
court’s use of “unsolicited” and “voluntary” to describe a spontaneous statement.
12
family and friends of the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure,
such as the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or
fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of
questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused.”
People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 150 (2008).
“[P]ersons temporarily detained pursuant to [ordinary traffic] stops are not ‘in custody’ for
purposes of Miranda” but “[i]f a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop
thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 440 (1984).
¶ 46 Based on this record, we conclude defendant was not in custody when he was initially
questioned by Parker, or while he was standing in close proximity to his own vehicle. The
conversation consisted of very general on-the-scene questioning of brief duration, which lasted
approximately 15 minutes. During this time, there were no indicia of formal arrest or restraints
on defendant’s freedom as defendant spoke to Parker one-on-one. At that time, the situation was
akin to a temporary detention pursuant to a traffic stop, which would not rise to the level of a
custodial situation. See id.¶ 47 However, after Parker searched defendant, removed and retained defendant’s cell phone
and keys, placed defendant in the back seat of the squad car, and then shut the door, the
encounter became custodial. Without access to his keys or cell phone, defendant could not drive
away and lacked the ability to call another person for assistance or to make arrangements for a
ride. When Schwartz and Hetfleisch separately questioned defendant, each stood in or near the
back doorway to the squad car. Defendant was not allowed to exit the squad car during these
13
conversations and remained seated in the back seat. Defendant was effectively locked inside the
squad car, incommunicado, for approximately 70 to 75 minutes. A reasonable person in
defendant’s position would not have felt at liberty to terminate the encounter and leave the scene.
¶ 48 At this juncture, it is not necessary to explicitly address the other factors outlined in
Slater, except to state that we have considered those other factors before reaching the decision to
affirm the trial court’s ruling.
¶ 49 B. Voluntariness
¶ 50 After the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress, the State asked the trial court
to clarify whether the suppressed statements would be admissible for impeachment purposes.
The trial court informed the prosecutor that the incriminating statements would not be admissible
for any purpose due to their involuntary nature. The State challenges this ruling on appeal.
¶ 51 Both the State and defendant agree this ruling was erroneous as a matter of law. We
agree. It is well settled that any statements obtained in violation of Miranda may later be used
during the trial for impeachment purposes, despite being unavailable to the State during its case-
in-chief. People v. Jackson, 180 Ill. App. 3d 78, 89 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222(1971)); see also People v. Rosenberg, 213 Ill.2d 69, 80-81 (2004).
¶ 52 Significantly, defendant did not argue his statements were coerced or involuntary for
purposes of his motion to suppress. Instead, defendant’s motion to suppress focused on a single
theory related to the Miranda violation.
¶ 53 As defendant notes in his brief on appeal, “These are distinct bases for suppression of a
statement, and so to the extent the trial court implied that the statements should also be
suppressed because they were involuntary, that is error. That error does not, of course, impact the
Miranda analysis, which is a separate issue entirely.” We could not have said it better. Thus, we
14
accept defendant’s concession of error. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s determination
that the suppressed statements were involuntary but affirm the trial court’s order granting
defendant’s motion to suppress based on a Miranda analysis. The matter is remanded for further
proceedings.
¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 55 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.
¶ 56 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
15