People v. Gaines , 2024 IL App (2d) 240176-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (2d) 240176-UNos. 2-24-0176, 2-24-0203
Order filed May 17, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of McHenry County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 24-CF-187
)
RAYMOND M. GAINES, ) Honorable
) Michael J. Chmiel,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Birkett and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting the State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial
release and ordering him detained.
¶2 I. INTRODUCTION
¶3 Defendant, Raymond M. Gaines, appeals an order of the circuit court of McHenry County
granting the State’s petition to deny him pretrial release and ordering him detained and an order
denying his motion to reconsider detention, in accordance with section 110-6.1 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
2024 IL App (2d) 240176-U¶4 II. BACKGROUND
¶5 On February 26, 2024, defendant was charged by complaint with two counts of aggravated
battery in a public place (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2022)), a class 3 felony; two counts of
aggravated battery by use of a deadly weapon (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(f)(1) (West 2022)), a class 3
felony; and two counts of aggravated assault on public property (720 ILCS 5/12-2(a) (West 2022)),
a class A misdemeanor.
¶6 The State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release. A hearing was held
on the State’s petition on February 27, 2024. In support, the State proffered a police department
synopsis. The synopsis provides as follows. On February 26, 2022, officers from the Crystal Lake
Police Department responded to a disturbance at the Super 8 Motel. Officers interviewed Steven
M. Mason and his father, Steven L. Mason. Steven M. and Steven L. reported that defendant
entered his room, retrieved a machete, and then struck both Steven M. and Steven L. on the head
with the blunt handled end. Defendant then began wielding the machete in a slashing motion
towards their bodies. Steven L. reported that defendant kicked him and punched him with a fist.
Both Steven L. and Steven M. reported that defendant yelled at them, advising that he would kill
them. Police spoke with defendant’s family and witnesses. All reported that defendant had been
involved in a physical altercation and that defendant had been in possession of a machete during
the fight. Defendant’s family advised officers that the incident started when defendant was in his
room. Steven M. began walking back and forth in the hallway past defendant’s room while making
racial slurs.
¶7 Officers reviewed the surveillance footage and observed Steven M. walking back and forth
in the hallway and yelling. Defendant then began to exit his room as Steven M. began provoking
a fight. Defendant exited his room with a machete in hand, charged at Steven M., and then struck
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2024 IL App (2d) 240176-Uhim with the handled end of the machete. Defendant made several slashing movements at Steven
M. as Steven M. retreated. Steven L. then appeared, and defendant made several slashing
movements with the machete in the direction of Steven L.’s body. Defendant narrowly missed
both victims faces and bodies when slashing the machete in their direction. Defendant then kicked
Steven L. in the stomach before returning the machete to his room. After returning the machete,
defendant continued to charge at Steven M. Following defendant’s arrest, officers collected the
machete and several other weapons from defendant’s motel room.
¶8 In addition to the synopsis, the State argued that defendant posed a flight risk because he
did not have ties to the community. It stated that defendant had been living in the Super 8 Motel
for approximately three months. Prior to that, defendant had lived in Crystal Lake for
approximately one year. The Stated posited that “there’s nothing to keep this defendant here.”
Further, the State argued that defendant posed a real and present threat to the community because
he “has no self-control, exhibited by his response to [the] racial slurs.” Additionally, the State
indicated that defendant had a juvenile criminal history consisting of a battery charge (2018) and
resisting a peace officer (2020). Neither charge had a disposition. The State argued that “going
from a battery, resisting peace officer[,] to use of a machete in handling an argument *** would
certainly indicate a certain type of escalation in how far the defendant is now willing to go to inflict
*** harm” and that defendant seemed to be “escalating with regard to his criminal history.”
¶9 In response, the defense argued that defendant had ties to the area and a concern that he
might be transient was insufficient to establish a flight risk. Additionally, the defense noted that
nothing in defendant’s criminal history demonstrated that he had ever missed a court date. Further,
his criminal history did not show a disposition for either of his cases, only that he had been charged
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2024 IL App (2d) 240176-Uwith the two offenses. Finally, the defense argued that defendant was not a threat to the community
because he was merely responding to somebody at his door instigating a fight.
¶ 10 The trial court granted the State’s petition to detain defendant. In reaching its decision, the
trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the
offenses charged, that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community and
a threat of willful flight, and that no conditions could mitigate that threat. Specifically, the trial
court found it concerning that defendant responded to provocation with a machete.
“Notwithstanding the provocation,” it stated, “you call law enforcement.” Further, it determined
that because defendant had two other cases from two different counties, it found his activities to
be “transient by nature.” Based on these two factors, the trial court stated that it could not “fathom
a set of conditions *** that would properly mitigate *** a risk of harm to an individual or the
community or prevent or work against willful flight.”
¶ 11 On March 4, 2024, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. However, on March 5, 2024,
defendant’s attorney filed a motion to reconsider detention.
¶ 12 A hearing on the motion to reconsider detention was held on March 8, 2024. In support of
the motion, the defense first argued that there was no proof that defendant posed flight risk. Rather,
defendant’s family had secured an apartment in the area. Defendant was the sole provider for his
family, including his disabled mother, so he had no reason to flee. Further, the defense argued that
Steven M. had been attempting to break into defendant’s motel room prior to the altercation. Thus,
defendant “didn’t go out and commit just a random act in the community,” leading to the
conclusion he did not pose a threat.
¶ 13 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider
detention. In its oral and written findings, the trial court stated its finding that pretrial detention
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2024 IL App (2d) 240176-Uwas appropriate was based solely on a finding of dangerousness and not willful flight. It reiterated
that based upon the synopsis and the factual proffer based on the officers viewing surveillance
video, it believed that the proof was evident and the presumption great that defendant committed
the charged offenses. Further, it believed that regardless of defendant’s lack of significant criminal
history, “when [defendant] was placed in a stressful situation possibly not of his own choosing, he
made pretty much every wrong choice you could make.” Thus, it feared that if defendant were
placed in a stressful situation again, he would react in “the exact same way,” and “therefore there
is danger to the community” that could not be mitigated by any less restrictive conditions than
detention. On March 14, 2024, counsel for defendant filed a notice of appeal based on the March
8, 2024, hearing.
¶ 14 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 15 Defendant, acting pro se, filled out a section of a form notice of appeal stating that he was
not charged with a detainable offense or a violation of an order of protection and that he has never
been subject to an order of protection. While his later notice of appeal abandons this argument,
defendant’s memorandum in support of his appeal once again raises the argument that defendant
was not charged with a detainable offense. Defendant further argues that the State failed to prove
that: the proof was evident or the presumption great that he committed the offenses charged; he
posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community; and no less restrictive conditions
could mitigate the threat he posed. We address each of these arguments in turn.
¶ 16 We apply a two-part standard of review to a trial court’s decision to detain a defendant. We
apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard to the trial court’s factual determinations,
including whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant has committed a
qualifying offense, whether a defendant poses a threat, and whether any conditions would mitigate
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2024 IL App (2d) 240176-Uthat threat. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A finding is contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence only if a conclusion opposite to the trial court’s is clearly apparent. In re
Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170, ¶ 17. The ultimate decision of whether a defendant should be
detained is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An abuse
of discretion occurs only if no reasonable person could agree with the trial court. People v.
Williams, 2022 IL App (2d) 200455, ¶ 52.
¶ 17 Defendant first argues that he was not charged with a detainable offense. In support, he
notes that under subsection 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code, a court may deny pretrial release for cases
of “aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.”
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). Defendant contends that because he was charged with
aggravated battery in a public place and aggravated battery by use of a deadly weapon, the
provisions of the Code listing detainable offenses do not apply to him. However, his argument
fails. Subsection 110-6.1(a)(6)(W) specifically lists aggravated battery by use of a deadly weapon
other than by use of a firearm as a detainable offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(6)(W) (West 2022).
¶ 18 Next, defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
he committed the offenses charged. Defendant contends that he only used the handled edge of the
machete and was acting in self-defense. However, defendant’s self-defense argument does not
negate a finding that defendant committed the charged offense. In raising a claim of self-defense,
defendant “presupposes that [he] committed the act and invokes the defense as a justification.”
(Internal citations omitted.) People v. Lewis, 2015 IL App (1st) 122411, ¶ 59. Thus, whether
defendant was justified in committing the offense does not lead to a finding that the State failed to
meet its burden. See People v. Gatewood, 2024 IL App (1st) 240069-U, ¶ 27 (Defendant’s claim
of self-defense did not negate finding that the State met its burden of proving the proof was evident
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2024 IL App (2d) 240176-Uor presumption great defendant committed the offense.). Because the trial court based its
determination on witness statements, surveillance video, and the proffered facts, it did not err in
finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the
offenses charged.
¶ 19 Defendant also argues that the State failed to prove that he poses a real and present threat
to the safety of the community. He contends that he is not a threat because he was protecting
himself and his family, not out in the community looking for trouble. Subsection 110-6.1(g) of the
Code lists several factors for courts to consider in determining whether a defendant poses a real
and present threat to the safety of the community. These factors include, among other factors: the
nature and circumstances of any offense charged; the history and characteristics of the defendant;
the identity of any person or persons to whose safety the defendant is believed to a pose a threat
and the nature of the threat; whether defendant is known to possess any weapons; whether, at the
time of the offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or other release from custody pending
trial; and any other factors deemed by the court to have a reasonable bearing on the defendant’s
propensity or reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West
2022). No one factor is dispositive. See id. While a couple of the factors weigh in defendant’s
favor, as his criminal history is limited and he was not on any type of court supervision at the time
he committed this offense, the other factors weigh in favor of detention. Defendant was arrested
after an altercation where he swung a machete at another individual. Even if defendant did not
provoke that altercation, he chose to arm himself with a machete. When defendant was arrested,
officers collected the machete along with other weapons from his motel room. Further, defendant
poses a threat of harm to the community, rather than one specific person, as he responded to “a
stressful situation” with violence and threat of a deadly weapon.
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2024 IL App (2d) 240176-U¶ 20 Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that no conditions can mitigate the threat posed by his pretrial release. He contends that he could
comply with conditions such as electronic monitoring or anger management classes. Section 110-
6.1(e) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022)) directs a court to consider the conditions
set forth in section 110-10 (725 ILCS 5/110-10 (West 2022)). Here, the court took into account
the facts of the case, noting that there were some factual variations between defendant’s proffer
and what was seen on the surveillance video. It considered defendant’s lack of criminal history but
voiced its concern that if defendant were again placed “in a stressful situation,” he would react in
the same way, causing danger to others. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s
factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and, therefore, its order
detaining did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
¶ 21 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 In light of the foregoing, we affirm the order of the circuit court of McHenry County.
¶ 23 Affirmed.
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