Hendricks v. Biestek , 2024 IL App (2d) 230008-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (2d) 230008-UNo. 2-23-0008
Order filed July 24, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
ERIC W. HENDRICKS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Lake County.
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 22-OP-1778
)
SCOTT A. BIESTEK, ) Honorable
) David Christopher Lombardo,
Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Jorgensen and Mullen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Trial court’s denial of petition for a stalking no contact order was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 This case concerns a dispute between two former neighbors, Eric Hendricks and Scott
Biestek. Hendricks filed a petition for a stalking no contact order against Biestek in the circuit
court of Lake County. The trial court denied Hendrick’s petition. Hendricks appeals, pro se, from
that order. We affirm.
¶3 According to his petition, on July 30, 2022, Hendricks moved into a Lake Barrington
Shores townhome. That same day, he had a conversation about golf with his next-door neighbor,
2024 IL App (2d) 230008-UBiestek. At the conclusion of their conversation, Biestek gazed at Hendricks intensely, which
Hendricks considered to be “bird-dogging” and trolling.
¶4 One week later, on August 6, 2022, Hendricks again had a conversation with Biestek.
Biestek approached him and complimented his home. Biestek mentioned a former female
neighbor who had moved, and he implied that he had continued interaction with her. Biestek
alluded that he had potential access to Hendricks’ house, which caused Hendricks concern. One
day after this conversation, Hendricks asked Biestek to leave him alone. Biestek indicated that he
would.
¶5 On August 24, 2022, Hendricks was working out in his garage listening to loud music.
Biestek went over to Hendricks house. Hendricks stated he would turn his music down. Hendricks
later learned that Biestek had secretly made a video recording of him exercising in his garage.
Hendricks asserted that as a veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder, this incident significantly
increased his anxiety and affected his sleep patterns. Hendricks thereafter filed a petition for a
stalking no contact order.
¶6 On December 8, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on Hendricks’ petition. Both
Hendricks and Biestek testified regarding the three incidents at issue. Hendricks acknowledged
that although the words Biestek used were friendly, his actions (staring and discussing the previous
resident of his home) were not. As to the third incident, Biestek testified that he brought his phone
with him so that he could call security should the need arise. He pointed his phone in the direction
of Hendricks who was hitting a boxing dummy, and he took a picture of the security camera that
Hendricks had installed.
¶7 At the close of Hendricks’ case, the trial court granted Biestek’s motion for a directed
finding. The trial court found that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a stalking no contact
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2024 IL App (2d) 230008-Uorder. The trial court explained that the first incident involved nothing more than “neighborly
behavior.” As to the second incident, the trial court stated that “nothing in that conversation would
normally lead someone to feel that they were being harassed or intimidated or threatened.” With
the third incident, the trial court found that the videotaping had caused Hendricks some anguish.
However, as Hendricks had failed to establish that Biestek had committed two separate acts of
surveillance, stalking, or anything of that nature, he had failed to meet the statutory requirements
for a stalking no contact order.
¶8 Following the trial court’s ruling, Hendricks filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶9 At the outset, we note that Biestek argues that this appeal is moot because Hendricks has
moved away, and the parties no longer have any contact. An appeal is moot when “it presents or
involves no actual controversy, interest or rights of the parties, or where the issues have ceased to
exist.” Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Election Board, 179 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1997). A
moot appeal must be dismissed. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016
IL 118129, ¶ 21.
¶ 10 We decline to dismiss the appeal as moot. Hendricks’ petition was directed against
Biestek. It was not directed against Biestek at a certain location. Although the chances of
Hendrick and Biestek having any interaction are now much more remote, we cannot say that those
chances are so remote that any issues between the parties have now “ceased to exist.” Richardson,
179 Ill. 2d at 256. We therefore address the merits of Hendricks’ appeal.
¶ 11 On appeal, Hendricks argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for a
stalking no contact order because he established that Biestek engaged in a pattern of conduct that
caused him to experience fear and emotional distress.
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2024 IL App (2d) 230008-U¶ 12 Recognizing that “[s]talking is a serious crime,” the legislature passed the civil Stalking
No Contact Act (Act) in 2010 to provide a remedy for victims who have safety fears or emotional
distress as a result of stalking. 740 ILCS 21/5 (West 2022); Pub. Act 96-246 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010)
(adding 740 ILCS 21/1 et seq.). Under the Act, “stalking” specifically means “engaging in a course
of conduct directed at a specific person,” where the respondent “knows or should know that this
course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or the safety of a
third person or suffer emotional distress.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2022). A “course of conduct”
requires the showing of “2 or more acts.” Id. In addition to surveillance, examples of stalking
include appearing at the person’s home and sending unwanted emails or electronic
communications. 740 ILCS 21/5 (West 2022). The term “contact” is “any contact with the victim,
that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, or that is in disregard of the victim’s
expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued.” 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2022).
¶ 13 When a victim seeks a protective order under the Act, he bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conduct constitutes stalking. 740 ILCS 21/30 (West 2022).
A trial court’s determination that a preponderance of the evidence shows a violation (or no
violation) of the Act will not be overturned unless such a determination is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. See Nicholson v. Wilson, 2013 IL App (3d) 110517, ¶ 22. “A finding is
against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or
if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” Id.; see also
Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Barrington Hills, 133 Ill. 2d 146, 156-57 (1989).
¶ 14 Here, the trial court’s determination denying a stalking no contact order was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. As noted above, Hendricks was required to establish at least
two instances where Biestek had engaged in an act of stalking. At most, he only established one—
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2024 IL App (2d) 230008-Uthe videotaping incident. The other two incidents that Hendricks listed in his petition were not the
type that the Act addresses. They also occurred before Hendricks told Biestek that he wanted
Biestek to leave him alone. The first incident allegedly involved a prolonged bit of staring. The
other incident involved an awkward conversation. Although these incidents clearly caused
Hendricks discomfort, they did not involve the type of actions that Biestek should have known
“would cause a reasonable person to fear for his *** safety *** or suffer emotional distress.” 740
ILCS 21/10 (West 2022). We therefore agree with the trial court’s assessment that Biestek’s
conduct did not rise to the level that warranted a stalking no contact order.
¶ 15 Our determination is bolstered by other cases that have affirmed the trial court’s issuance
of a stalking no contact order, as all those cases involved significantly more egregious facts than
are present here. See Coutant v. Durell, 2021 IL App (3d) 210255, ¶ 78 (over a two-hour period,
respondent delivered 27 text messages, made multiple phone calls, and left six voicemail
messages; vast majority of those communications were of vulgar and insulting nature and
contained “threats of violence or intimidation”); Piester v. Escobar, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶¶
3-4 (respondent surveilled the petitioner at her workplace and recorded her actions on a cell phone,
harassed her on social media, and made a threat against her); McNally v. Bredemann, 2015 IL App
(1st) 134048, ¶ 5 (patient engaged in a nearly five-year-long pattern of unsolicited contact with his
former therapist through e-mail, phone calls, and appearing on therapist’s doorstep and trying to
talk to her); Nicholson, 2013 IL App (3d) 110517, ¶ 5 (respondent installed a hidden camera at
office that allowed him to follow petitioner’s movements around her desk and their office).
¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.
¶ 17 Affirmed.
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