Sanders v. CSX Transportation, Inc. , 2024 IL App (1st) 230481 ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 230481Fourth Division
Filed May 23, 2024
No. 1-23-0481
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
ANNETTE SANDERS, as Independent Administrator )
of the Estate of Joseph Sanders, Deceased, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) Cook County
Plaintiff-Appellee,
)
No. 2019 L 004599
v. )
) The Honorable Clare E.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., ) McWilliams, Judge, presiding.
Defendant-Appellant. )
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This is a survival and wrongful death action brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (FELA) (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (2018)) by plaintiff-appellee, Annette Sanders, the independent
administrator of the estate of her late husband Joseph Sanders (Estate), against defendant-
appellant, CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), Joseph’s former employer. CSX appeals from the
denial of its motion for a new trial after judgment was entered on a jury’s verdict in favor of the
Estate. CSX argues that a new trial is warranted where it was prejudiced by a misstatement of law
in the Estate’s closing argument and the trial court’s instruction to the jury as to the credibility of
its fact witness. We affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 CSX is a corporation engaged in interstate commerce by rail and operates locomotives,
railroad cars, and repair facilities. Joseph was employed by CSX as a plumber and sheet metal
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worker from 2002 to 2014. He primarily worked at a large CSX train yard and operating facility
known as the Barr Yard in Riverdale, Illinois. The Barr Yard consists of various buildings including
repair shops and mechanical buildings. Joseph also had a lengthy history of heavy cigarette
smoking. Joseph was diagnosed with colon cancer in June 2016, and he died from the cancer in
March 2018.
¶4 In 2019, the Estate first filed a survival and wrongful death suit under FELA against CSX.
In the second amended complaint, the operative pleading, the Estate alleged that during his
employment with CSX and while working in its buildings, yards, and right of ways, Joseph was
exposed daily to various toxins known to cause cancer, including asbestos and diesel fumes and
exhausts. Specifically, the second amended complaint alleged that Joseph routinely worked in
close proximity to running locomotives and other diesel-powered equipment, where he inhaled
diesel fuel, and was required to install and maintain pipe systems that exposed him to asbestos dust
and fibers. CSX should have known of the carcinogenicity of these toxins based on various studies,
proceedings, and literature. Joseph’s exposure to these toxins was cumulative and occurred at
different levels over his time with CSX and caused in whole or in part the development of his
colon cancer and death.
¶5 According to the second amended complaint, CSX had a duty to provide Joseph with a
reasonably safe place to work and was required to measure the toxic substances that were released
into the workplace, warn him of the dangers, and provide him with hazard control and protective
equipment. CSX breached its duty to Joseph by failing to use ordinary care and caution to provide
a safe workplace as required by FELA; monitor and reduce the level of toxins to a safe level; limit
Joseph’s exposure to toxins; provide protective equipment, proper ventilation, and exhaust
systems; and warn of the risks of contracting cancer. As a result of the breaches, Joseph
experienced injuries and damages.
¶6 CSX filed an answer denying that it was negligent and asserting affirmative defenses. In
one affirmative defense, CSX alleged that Joseph’s claimed injuries and damages “were caused,
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in whole or in part, by pre-existing conditions, or other contributory or concurrent conditions or
factors.” The Estate in reply denied this assertion.
¶7 In preparation for trial, the Estate filed a number of motions in limine, including a motion
under Illinois Rule of Evidence 615 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) “to prohibit and exclude all witnesses from
the courtroom during the trial proceedings except when said witnesses shall testify.” At a hearing,
upon the agreement of CSX, the court orally granted this motion.
¶8 The case proceeded to a six-day jury trial in August 2022 on the Estate’s survival action
only for Joseph’s pain and suffering by stipulation of the parties.
¶9 Beginning with voir dire, Jason Pritchard was seated at the CSX counsel table and was
introduced to the venire by defense counsel as Joseph’s former supervisor. When Pritchard was
deposed on March 8, 2021, he testified that he was still employed by CSX as a track supervisor, a
salaried position. During discovery, William H. Bullock, Ph.D., was identified at his deposition as
the corporate representative of CSX.
¶ 10 As the first witness, the Estate called Dominick Horne, its sole lay fact witness under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). Pritchard continued to sit at the defense
counsel table throughout this testimony.
¶ 11 Horne testified that, from 2007 to 2014, he was employed by CSX as a sheet metal
worker/pipe fitter and plumber. After an investigation led by Pritchard, Horne was terminated.
During Horne’s employment, Joseph was his supervisor at the Barr Yard, where they were the only
plumbers and pipe fitters during their eight-hour shift. Their primary duties included replacing and
repairing pipes that were wrapped or insulated and located within the buildings and across the
yard. In doing this work, they would remove the old insulation from the pipes and replace it with
fiberglass. When finished with the pipe work, Horne would sweep up the remaining debris and
dust. He did not wear a mask or a respirator.
¶ 12 Horne recalled one occasion when he and Joseph were in the loft of the track department
building and preparing to run pipes to an ongoing addition to that building. Joseph became alarmed
when he saw what he thought was asbestos. Joseph told Horne he would ask Pritchard “what they
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were going to do about the issue.” Horne did not know whether Joseph in fact informed Pritchard
about the asbestos, but he later observed an asbestos removal crew at the track department building.
¶ 13 Horne saw pipes with the same type of insulation in the engine house where the
locomotives were repaired. Joseph and he worked in the engine house on a daily basis. At the same
time, other employees were maintaining locomotives. Up to four locomotives could fit in the
engine house, and more than one locomotive would be running when he and Joseph were working
there. The running locomotives created diesel exhaust, which he could see and smell. The engine
house was “filthy,” with soot everywhere, and was later condemned and closed. Joseph and he
were also exposed to diesel fumes while working in other parts of the Barr Yard. For example, they
would climb the sand tower and work above the running locomotives on the ready track. Joseph
told Horne that he had worked in every building in the yard.
¶ 14 According to Horne, CSX regularly provided safety training but not on “asbestos in the
workplace,” the dangers of diesel exhaust, or the use of masks and respirators. There were no
asbestos warnings on pipes and masks, and respirators were not available.
¶ 15 The Estate next called Pritchard as an adverse witness. During his testimony, Pritchard
revealed that he was no longer employed by CSX after working there from 2009 to 2020. CSX
was reimbursing him for his time in court.
¶ 16 Pritchard became a supervisor in 2010 with the title of facilities manager and oversaw the
Chicago region of CSX. In his role, Pritchard traveled throughout his assigned territory and was
not at the Barr Yard every day. He supervised both Joseph and Horne. Horne worked with Joseph
but was not supervised by Joseph. They were to notify him of any safety concerns. He did not
recall Joseph reporting an asbestos issue. Pritchard agreed that Joseph worked around asbestos and
that asbestos was not labeled. There was asbestos-lined piping in the Barr Yard. CSX protected
employees by training them to identify asbestos and then not “disturb it.” Employees were also
trained to stop work and notify a supervisor if they believed there was asbestos at the site. There
was no training on diesel exhaust.
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¶ 17 When examined by counsel for CSX, Pritchard explained the “regimented” safety
programs for CSX employees. Safety training was done annually, monthly, and quarterly, and there
was a safety briefing each morning. As a manager, he attended the trainings with the employees
under his supervision, including Joseph and Horne. An annual environmental certification program
included asbestos management policy and the use of respirators. There is no reasonable concern
when asbestos is intact and not disturbed. Employees were told to stop work and report to their
managers if they thought there was asbestos that was disturbed or damaged. CSX employees were
not permitted to remove the pipe insulation.
¶ 18 Pritchard testified that, when the track department building was being renovated, the
contractor notified CSX that the pipes were safe to remove without abatement. The floor tiles in
the building were found to need asbestos abatement.
¶ 19 He never assigned Joseph or Horne to do work in the engine house. From the time Pritchard
started at CSX in 2009 through 2014, when Joseph stopped working at CSX, the engine house was
not operational and in any event was not under his management. The engine house was later
remodeled and reopened. The Halsted and Ashland towers were also nonoperational and boarded
up when Pritchard joined CSX. Those buildings did contain asbestos. Pritchard asserted that
Joseph would have been working outside in the yard a large part of the time and not inside the
buildings.
¶ 20 After Pritchard’s testimony, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court expressed
concern that Pritchard had been at the defense counsel table as the corporate representative through
Horne’s testimony when he was no longer employed by CSX. The court believed that Pritchard’s
presence had defeated the order excluding witnesses from the courtroom and that the jury had seen
him speaking to defense counsel during the proceedings. CSX counsel explained that Pritchard
was a “table representative” as Joseph’s supervisor and he did not need to be a current employee;
this practice was common in railroad cases. The court adjourned for the day, indicating that the
issue would be further discussed.
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¶ 21 On the next day, the parties presented memoranda and argument to the court addressing the
propriety of Pritchard sitting at the defense counsel table. The Estate argued that it was unaware
that Pritchard was no longer a CSX employee and that he could not be the corporate representative
and in the courtroom during testimony. The Estate requested as relief that the court strike
Pritchard’s testimony, allow its expert witness to be in the courtroom and hear the testimony of
Bullock, or give a curative instruction to the jurors that would explain what happened and allow
them to “weigh it.” CSX continued to maintain that it had done nothing improper by having a
former employee represent CSX. During the discussions, the parties agreed that Pritchard would
not be recalled as a witness, and the court allowed him to remain in the courtroom but not at the
defense counsel table. When the court expressed a view that allowing the Estate’s expert to sit in
the courtroom during Bullock’s testimony would be problematic, the Estate withdrew that request.
The court took the other requests to strike Pritchard’s testimony or give curative instructions under
advisement. The court did decide to instruct the jury at that time that attorneys are allowed to speak
to witnesses and that the jurors were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses. When the
trial resumed, the court gave those instructions without objection.
¶ 22 The Estate then called Bullock, CSX’s director of occupational health and safety, as an
adverse witness. He has been employed by CSX since 2007. CSX identified him in this case both
as a corporate designee with the ability to bind the company and as its expert in industrial hygiene.
¶ 23 Dr. Bullock explained that industrial hygienists assess and protect workers from potential
risks due to chemicals and physical or environmental agents based on medical sciences and
engineering studies. Before coming to CSX and since 1986, he developed experience in asbestos
and respiratory protection and is a certified asbestos inspector. Bullock explained that the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has set an employee’s permissible
exposure limit (PEL) to asbestos as 0.1 fibers per cubic centimeter for eight hours a day, five days
a week, 52 weeks a year for a work lifetime. The short-term exposure limit (STEL) is “a 30-minute
excursion limit” of one fiber per cubic centimeter. An employee can be exposed to the STEL a few
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periods a day as long as the eight-hour average is still below 0.1 fibers per cubic centimeter.
Employers are required to ensure their facilities meet these limits.
¶ 24 Asbestos is dangerous when it is in a “friable” state, meaning “it can be crumbled or
reduced to powder by hand pressure.” If there is asbestos present in a building, abatement must be
done prior to renovation or demolition.
¶ 25 He is familiar with the Barr Yard and has been there on five or six occasions for inspections,
the last time being in 2015 or 2016. He never inspected the engine house. His qualitative
assessments of the Barr Yard gave him no reason to do quantitative assessments such as testing of
the air in relation to the plumbers and pipe fitters. In his professional judgment there were no
potential risks to these employees. Joseph would have been working outside for the most part and
did not have the same exposure as employees in the shops. During the time Joseph was working
for CSX, there were some buildings in the Barr Yard that had “friable pipe wrapping” or other
asbestos-containing material, but most of the buildings were “asbestos-free.” He referred to studies
of air sampling at the Barr Yard with no test results indicating “exposure even close to the PEL.”
Further, the engine house at the Barr Yard was closed, which meant Joseph and Horne could not
have been working in there. Further, CSX has a rule that locomotives cannot be run inside
buildings.
¶ 26 Bullock testified to the opinions that he reached as to this case. First, CSX provided Joseph
with a safe workplace that was free of recognized hazards and met or exceeded the standards for
being a reasonably safe place to work. Second, there were no known environmental agents
encountered by Joseph at work that posed a potential risk to developing colon cancer. Next,
Joseph’s potential exposure to asbestos would have been “trivial” or low-level. Finally, Joseph’s
potential exposure to diesel fumes was well below published safe levels. He was not overexposed
to asbestos or diesel exhaust, and his work environment did not contribute to his health conditions.
¶ 27 Hernando Perez, Ph.D., a board-certified industrial hygienist, testified as an expert for the
Estate. He is a lead industrial hygienist and environmental hygiene program manager for the
federal government and does consulting work for the law firm representing the Estate. As the
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consultant on this case, he reviewed relevant documents and records and the depositions of Horne,
Pritchard, and Bullock and spoke to Horne by phone. Perez then prepared reports and reached
opinions. Generally, after his review, he believed that “there was asbestos in friable condition in
[the] Barr Yard that was not being what we call managed in place.”
¶ 28 During his testimony, he described CSX reports beginning in 1991 that identified asbestos-
containing material in various buildings in the Barr Yard, including thermal insulation around
pipes. A 1991 report showed thermal insulation around pipes in the track department building.
Plumbers should be notified of the existence of friable thermal insulation in the Barr Yard before
they work in the spaces. There was a reduction in the number of pipes with thermal insulation over
the years, which Perez believed was the result of plumbers replacing the pipes and not by
abatement.
¶ 29 The OSHA general duty clause requires employers to provide “a safe and healthful working
environment.” 1 He believed CSX violated this duty in several ways. Joseph’s work in the engine
house would have exposed him to diesel fumes, which were carcinogenic, at high unsafe levels.
Perez opined that, when Joseph and Horne cut through the thermal insulation when repairing or
replacing pipes and swept up the debris and dust, their exposure to asbestos would have been above
the OSHA STEL. He concluded that Joseph and Horne had these high-level exposures to asbestos
two to three times a month for years. CSX also should have provided Joseph with respirators but
failed to do so.
¶ 30 Steven Newman, M.D., a physician board-certified in pulmonary and internal medicine,
testified as the Estate’s medical causation expert.
¶ 31 He explained that there are two types of causation, general and specific causation. General
causation involves the theories that epidemiologists use to determine whether certain elements or
agents can cause disease. Specific causation involves a determination as to whether a substance
1 Dr. Perez referred to “OSHA” throughout his testimony without distinguishing between the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. § 615 et seq. (2018)) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration that was created by that act.
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caused disease in a particular individual. As to general causation, based on his review of studies
by the International Agency for Research on Cancer and other literature, Newman opined within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that tobacco, asbestos, and diesel fumes are “indisputably”
capable of causing colon or colorectal cancer. And as to specific causation, he concluded within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that these three substances “undoubtably” caused Joseph’s
colon cancer. “All three were the witch’s brew, the perfect storm that killed Mr. Sanders.”
¶ 32 The Estate also presented the testimony of Erik Swenson, M.D., a treating physician by
videotape. Mrs. Sanders testified as to Joseph’s pain and suffering.
¶ 33 CSX called Douglas Weed, M.D., Ph.D., as an expert witness in epidemiology. He follows
certain prescribed methodologies in determining general and specific causation. The first condition
for specific causation is that “the general causation relationship has to be established.” Using this
methodology and a systematic review of the literature, Weed concluded that science had not
recognized that colon cancer can be caused by asbestos and diesel fumes. He opined within a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty that smoking was the sole cause of Joseph’s colon cancer.
¶ 34 Before both parties rested and outside the presence of the jury, the court returned to the
issue of Pritchard being at the defense counsel table and present during the testimony of Horne.
The court first denied the Estate’s request to strike Pritchard’s testimony as “draconian” relief. In
deciding whether to give curative instructions to the jury to address the harm, in its role as a
“gatekeeper,” the court made several observations. The court found that the exception to Rule of
Evidence 615 for a designated corporate representative did not apply here to justify Pritchard’s
presence at counsel table. The court said that Pritchard and Horne had a “seminal” relationship to
the case, as their testimony was of great importance to the parties. Because it was not known that
Pritchard was no longer in the employ of CSX, the Estate did not have an opportunity to object,
and CSX had gained an unfair advantage by having Pritchard hear the testimony of Horne. The
court believed that corporate representatives are generally “figureheads” and “take the stand for
very minimal purposes and not the significant type of testimony that was given here by Pritchard.”
The court informed the parties that it would give the following curative instruction to the jury:
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“The second witness in this case was Jason Pritchard. It was
represented to you that Pritchard was a corporate representative of the
defendant’s CSX Corporation. We later learned, during his testimony
for the first-time during trial, that he was no longer employed by CSX
and left the corporation approximately two years earlier.
Had the court known this fact, Pritchard would have been excluded
from the courtroom, like all the other witnesses during a trial, and would
not have been able to testify about Mr. Horne’s in-court testimony. You
may consider this fact when evaluating the credibility of a witness.”
¶ 35 Upon returning to the courtroom, the parties rested, and the court gave the curative
instruction and excused the jury. CSX moved for a mistrial based on the curative instruction, which
the court denied.
¶ 36 During closing argument, the Estate discussed the evidence relating to its claims that CSX
breached its duties to provide a reasonably safe workplace and as to its negligence. The argument
included the following discourse about the testimony of Perez:
“[THE ESTATE’S ATTORNEY:] When you violate OSHA, PEL,
that’s negligence. Okay? This is what’s important. The FELA concept is
that the railroad failed to provide Joseph Sanders with a reasonably safe
place to work. That makes them negligent.
When you violate OSHA PEL, that’s negligence. So what Dr. Perez
focused on is not the 8-hour time weighted average over his whole
career, because we can’t meet that burden. We can’t put Joe around
asbestos.
But what he can say is there was a clear violation of the OSHA
exposure limit for short-term exposures, remember the STEL limit.
And what he said was that if Mr. Sanders and Mr. Horne did what
they described, what they did is they would go in there, they would have
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to cut off the old insulation, they would have to replace the pipe itself.
When they’re done, they’ve got to sweep it up and get it out of there. If
that took 30 minutes or more, Dr. Perez said that’s an OSHA STEL
violation. An OSHA STEL violation is negligence.
[CSX’S ATTORNEY]: Objection, misstates the law.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[THE ESTATE’S ATTORNEY]: It’s negligence under the FELA.”
The Estate went on to say that it had to prove that CSX knew or should have known about the
existence of asbestos in the workplace.
¶ 37 The Estate finished its closing argument by discussing the evidence relating to causation
and the contributory negligence of Joseph. Counsel explained that only if the jury found that the
Estate had proved CSX was negligent and that Joseph’s injuries were caused in part by CSX would
it then determine damages and the percentage of contributory negligence.
¶ 38 CSX, in its closing argument, asserted that there was no evidence that it failed to comply
with any government standard with respect to asbestos or diesel fumes and that it was not negligent
in its training and providing a safe workplace. A main thrust of the CSX argument was that Joseph’s
colon cancer and death were caused solely by his long history of cigarette smoking and failure to
follow medical advice.
¶ 39 In its instructions to the jury, the trial court cautioned that the law applicable to the issues
was contained in its instructions and that the jury must follow the law given in the instructions.
Further the jury was to disregard any statement or argument of an attorney that was not supported
by the law or the evidence. The court defined negligence using the pattern instruction (Illinois
Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 10.01 (approved Dec. 8, 2011)):
“When I use the word ‘negligence’ in these instructions, I mean the
failure to do something which a reasonably careful person or entity
would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the
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evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person or
entity would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide.”
The court also instructed that, under FELA,
“whenever an employee of the railroad is injured while engaged in the
course of his or her employment, the railroad shall be liable in damages
to the injured employee where the negligence of any of the officers,
agents or other employees of the railroad or any defect or insufficiency
due to the railroad’s negligence caused or contributed to cause the injury
and death of the employee.”
¶ 40 The jury was instructed that the Estate had the burden of establishing CSX’s negligence in
one of the ways claimed by the Estate, including the claim that CSX had exposed Joseph “to
harmful levels of diesel exhaust and asbestos.” The instructions informed the jury that CSX denied
it was negligent and denied that Joseph was exposed to harmful levels of diesel exhaust or asbestos
at work. Further, the jury was told that CSX claimed that Joseph was contributorily negligent in
that he failed to look after his own health by smoking cigarettes and not following medical advice.
¶ 41 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Estate but found Joseph was 65% contributorily
negligent. The damage award of $2.2 million for pain and suffering was reduced to $770,000.
¶ 42 CSX filed a motion for a new trial. CSX argued that the court erred in providing the curative
instruction because Pritchard was a proper representative of CSX and his presence was not
prejudicial. Further, CSX contended that, in closing argument, counsel for the Estate had misstated
the law when speaking of the OSHA STEL in a way that amounted to arguing for a negligence
per se standard.
¶ 43 The court denied the motion. The court reasoned that CSX’s use of Pritchard as a railroad
corporate representative, given the specific facts and under the circumstances here, was an attempt
to get around the order excluding witnesses from the courtroom during the presentation of
evidence. The court further found that the challenged argument did not result in substantial
prejudice to CSX or deprive it of a fair trial.
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¶ 44 CSX timely appeals.
¶ 45 ANALYSIS
¶ 46 On appeal, CSX contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial. We will
reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial only where we find an abuse of discretion.
Vanderhoof v. Berk, 2015 IL App (1st) 132927, ¶ 79. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling
is arbitrary, fanciful, or one that no reasonable person would make.” Evans v. Cook County State’s
Attorney, 2021 IL 125513, ¶ 41.
¶ 47 Claimed Misstatement of the Law During Closing Argument
¶ 48 CSX first contends that it is entitled to a new trial because the Estate misstated the standard
of liability under FELA in closing argument and the trial court overruled its objection to the
misstatement of law. The Estate responds that its counsel was properly commenting on the
evidence and that CSX was not prejudiced or deprived of a fair trial.
¶ 49 Generally, counsel is afforded much latitude in closing argument and to make reasonable
inferences from the evidence. Parsons v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161384,
¶ 57. An improper closing argument can provide a basis for a new trial. Lagoni v. Holiday Inn
Midway, 262 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1034 (1994). The trial court has the initial discretion in determining
whether statements made by counsel have denied a party a fair trial. Id. at 1034-35. For a closing
argument to constitute grounds for reversal of judgment, it must be clearly improper and
prejudicial. Id. at 1035.
¶ 50 If the trial is considered as a whole and the inappropriate closing argument did not result
in substantial prejudice to the losing party or prevent a fair trial, then there is no need to order a
new trial. Davis v. City of Chicago, 2014 IL App (1st) 122427, ¶ 84. A reversal is not necessary
unless errors in the closing argument cause significant prejudice, suggesting that the outcome
would have been different in the absence of the contested statement. Id.¶ 51 FELA provides that a railroad carrier, while engaging in interstate commerce, shall be liable
in damages to any employee for “injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence
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of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.” 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2018). In an action under FELA,
negligence is the test of liability. Wetherbee v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 191 F.2d 302, 306
(7th Cir. 1951). An employer’s liability for personal injuries sustained by its workers is not absolute
insurance under FELA. Id. The plaintiff need only prove slight negligence of the defendant to
prevail on his or her claim. Harrison v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 264 Ill. App.
3d 857, 863 (1994). FELA does not define the elements of a claim under the statute, but it is
founded on the common-law principles of negligence and injury. See Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v.
Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 165-66 (2007). To be more specific, under FELA, the plaintiff needs to
provide proof of the common-law components of negligence—duty, breach, foreseeability, and
causation. Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 161 F.3d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1998).
¶ 52 CSX maintains that the Estate informed the jury that a violation of an OSHA standard was
negligence per se by telling “the jury—repeatedly—that any violation of an OSHA exposure limit,
standing alone, ‘is negligence’ under FELA.” In making this argument, CSX cites a line of federal
cases that CSX maintains found that a violation of OSHA standards does not constitute negligence
per se under FELA. See, e.g., Ries v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1992).
In Ries, the court held that a violation of an OSHA regulation does not result in a finding of
negligence per se nor a bar to contributory negligence in a FELA action. Id. at 1165. However, the
court also found that a violation of an OSHA regulation may be admitted as evidence of the
railroad’s negligence. Id.
¶ 53 The comments at issue were a small portion of a lengthy closing argument. The Estate’s
counsel, at a point where he was discussing the testimony of Dr. Perez, referred to a violation of
the OSHA PEL or STEL three times and said, “that’s negligence.” As the court in Ries found, the
violation of OSHA standards was admissible as to CSX’s negligence. The Estate’s counsel did not
explicitly say that a violation of these standards constituted per se negligence. In making the
comments, the Estate also referred to its overriding claim that CSX failed to provide a reasonably
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safe workplace. And after making the argument as to the OSHA standards relating to asbestos
levels, the Estate told the jury that it must prove that CSX knew or should have known that asbestos
existed in the workplace. The Estate also later discussed the evidence as to causation and told the
jurors that they must assess the contributory negligence of Joseph.
¶ 54 When considered in the context of its entire closing argument, we are not convinced that
the Estate made a negligence per se argument or that evidence of a violation of the OSHA exposure
standing alone would require a finding that CSX was negligent and that contributory negligence
was barred.
¶ 55 Further, we find that CSX was not prejudiced or deprived of a fair trial by any confusion
or misstatement in the closing argument as to a violation of the OSHA standards. In response to
the Estate’s closing arguments, CSX in its closing argument maintained that it had not violated any
relevant standards as to asbestos or diesel fuel, that it was not negligent in any way, and that
Joseph’s own conduct was the sole cause of his injuries and damages.
¶ 56 The jury was instructed that it was to disregard any misstatement of law made by the
lawyers and that it must follow only the law as set forth in the instructions from the court. CSX
does not raise any errors in the jury instructions. As noted above, the instructions fully set forth
the Estate’s burden of proof and the applicable law relating to negligence and contributory
negligence for this FELA action. The jury returned a verdict that included a finding that Joseph
was 65% contributorily negligent, which shows the jury did not find there was negligence per se.
Any confusion that may have been caused by the Estate’s closing argument did not result in
prejudice or an unfair trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for
new trial on this basis.
¶ 57 Curative Instruction as to Jason Pritchard
¶ 58 CSX also argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding how to weigh the
credibility of its witness, Pritchard. CSX specifically contends that, despite the motion in limine
order barring witnesses from the courtroom during proceedings, Pritchard was allowed to be in the
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courtroom under an exception in Illinois Rule of Evidence 615 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) for a designated
corporate representative. The Estate responds that the trial court acted well within its discretion in
giving the curative instruction.
¶ 59 Rule 615 provides:
“At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own
motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of *** (2) an officer or employee of
a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney.”
Id.
The exclusion of witnesses from the proceedings “is a time-honored practice” that ensures that a
witness will not shape his or her testimony to address the testimony of prior witnesses. (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) People v. Chatman, 2022 IL App (4th) 210716, ¶ 71. While other
jurisdictions—such as federal courts—consider the exclusion of witnesses to be a matter of right,
in Illinois, the trial court has sound judicial discretion over witness exclusion. Id. ¶ 67.
¶ 60 The corporate-representative exception to Rule 615 accepts the risk associated with having
witnesses present during proceedings so that corporate parties will be on equal footing with natural
parties and have a representative in the courtroom. See 29 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 6245 (2d ed. April 2023 Update). But that exception applies only
to “an officer or employee” of the corporate party. Ill. R. Evid. 615 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Some case
law has held that courts have the discretion to permit former employees to be designated as
corporate representatives for the purpose of the rule. See, e.g., Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.,
325 F.3d 776, 785 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that the trial court did not err by allowing former
employee of corporation that was no longer operating to serve as corporate representative). It
would follow that courts also have discretion to not allow former employees to serve as corporate
representatives. Wright & Miller, supra, at§ 6245 (“To the extent there is any question that a
witness is exempted from exclusion under Rule 615(b), the courts have discretion to determine the
applicability of that provision.”).
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¶ 61 The trial court made clear that its decision to give the curative instruction was based on the
unique circumstances of this case and its role as “gatekeeper.” First, the court and the Estate had
no knowledge that Pritchard was no longer employed by CSX until he testified at the trial. As a
result, the Estate had no opportunity to object, and the court had no opportunity to consider whether
as a former employee Pritchard could sit at the defense counsel table or was subject to the motion
in limine order under Rule 615. Second, Horne was the only witness for the Estate who testified to
the conditions under which Joseph worked at the Barr Yard and the extent and frequency of
Joseph’s exposure to asbestos and diesel fuel. Pritchard, as the supervisor of both Joseph and
Horne, was the only witness for CSX who could refute or limit the impact of Horne’s testimony.
The court found that Horne and Pritchard had great significance to the prosecution and defense of
the case. After observing both witnesses during their testimony, the presence of Pritchard at
counsel table, and his interactions with CSX’s counsel, the trial court was in the best position to
assess any harm from Pritchard being present in the courtroom, particularly during Horne’s
testimony. Third, Pritchard was not just a “figurehead” witness but a witness offering substantial
evidence on behalf of CSX and against the Estate.
¶ 62 The court took a reasonable approach to the issue and chose the least “draconian” relief
requested by the Estate. It denied the request to strike Pritchard’s testimony and to allow Perez to
be in the courtroom during Bullock’s testimony. Instead, the court instructed the jury that it could
consider the fact Pritchard had heard Horne’s testimony in assessing Pritchard’s credibility. The
curative instruction was not given immediately after Pritchard’s testimony and was not repeated
when the court instructed the jury at the end of the case. The general instructions informed the
jurors that they were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and that each party, whether
an individual or corporation, should receive their fair consideration and that the court’s “rulings,
remarks or instructions do not indicate any opinion as to the facts.”
¶ 63 In light of the purpose of excluding witnesses during proceedings, we find the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in giving the curative instruction and, in the context of the case and the
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other instructions, there was no prejudice to CSX. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for a new trial on this ground.
¶ 64 CONCLUSION
¶ 65 For these reasons, we affirm the denial of the motion for a new trial.
¶ 66 Affirmed.
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Sanders v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 2024 IL App (1st) 230481Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2019-L-
004599; the Hon. Clare E. McWilliams, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Michael A. Scodro, of Mayer Brown LLP, of Chicago, and Evan
for M. Tager and Carl J. Summers, of Mayer Brown LLP, of
Appellant: Washington, D.C., for appellant.
Attorneys Stephen F. Monroe, of Marc J. Bern & Partners, LLP, of
for Chicago, and Jonathan Sternberg, of Jonathan Sternberg,
Appellee: Attorney, P.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellee.
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