People v. Beasley , 2024 IL App (1st) 221482-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 221482-UFourth Division
Filed February 1, 2024
No. 1-22-1482
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(a).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appeal from the
Respondent-Appellee, Circuit Court of Cook County
v. No. 16 CR 02468
JAMES BEASLEY, The Honorable Marc W. Martin,
Petitioner-Appellant. Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE OCASIO III delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Rochford and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying Beasley’s postconviction
petition after a third-stage evidentiary hearing because Beasley did not show that
he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to cite a nonretroactive statutory
amendment to the sentencing range that came into effect while his appeal was
pending.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 James Beasley was arrested and charged by indictment with theft following a January 2016
incident. Beasley allegedly removed two skids of copper from a manufacturing facility. Beasley
was charged with one count of theft of property exceeding $10,000 but less than $100,000, a
Class 2 felony. See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2016). Following a jury trial, Beasley was
found guilty.
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¶4 Beasley then filed a motion for a new trial which the circuit court denied. The matter then
proceeded to sentencing.
¶5 The State argued that Beasley’s extensive criminal history, which included seven armed
robberies and two attempted armed robberies for which he was sentenced to in 2004. Beasley
received concurrent sentences of 20 years for the robberies and 10 years for the attempted
robberies. Beasley also had a prior conviction for forgery and two prior convictions for burglary.
Based on Beasley’s criminal background he was sentenced to a Class X “habitual criminal”
sentence. On December 13, 2016, Beasley was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
¶6 Beasley filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied.
¶7 On appeal, Beasley was represented by private counsel. On July 18, 2017, appellate counsel
filed a brief challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, raising multiple claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him
to 25 years in prison because the court improperly considered the value of the items taken as an
aggravating factor and where the offense was non-violent in nature.
¶8 The State filed its brief on February 21, 2018, and Beasley then filed a reply brief on March
27, 2018. At about the same time, Illinois law changed removing Class 1 and Class 2 theft
convictions as predicates for Class X “habitual criminal” sentencing. See Pub. Act 100-3, § 35 (eff.
Jan. 1, 2018) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95) It is worth noting that neither brief mentioned the
amendment.
¶9 On July 20, 2018, the appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence. People v.
Beasley, 2018 IL App (1st) 163373-U. The appellate court also highlighted that due to Beasley’s
criminal history he was subject to a Class X sentence of between 6 and 30 years in prison. The
appellate court held that a prison term of 25 years was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 10 On December 12, 2018, Beasley moved for post-judgment/postconviction relief.
Represented by private counsel, Beasley filed a “Substituted Motion to Vacate Void Judgment
(Count One); and Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Count Two).” This filing challenged
Beasley’s Class X sentence on the basis that the statute was void; alleged that because a change of
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law occurred while his direct appeal was pending, the change of law applies to him, and the 25-
year sentence exceeded the amended statutory minimum; and raised the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to present arguments about the amended sentencing on direct
appeal.
¶ 11 Beasley asserted that when he was sentenced on October 27, 2016, the court imposed a
25-year prison sentence due to his prior felony convictions. Beasley’s prior felony convictions
rendered him subject to mandatory imprisonment of 6 to 30 years under the Class X statute. After
Beasley was sentenced, a provision in the Safe Neighborhoods Reform Act amended the statute
and removed Class 1 and Class 2 theft convictions as grounds for Class X sentencing. See Pub.
Act 100-3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95). The amendment went into effect
on January 1, 2018, while Beasley’s direct appeal was still pending. Beasley argued that because
his appeal was pending his sentence should have been declared void or at least voidable.
¶ 12 On January 15, 2021, the State filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the sentence was
not void and the amended statute did not apply to Beasley because it was not retroactive. The State
also argued that Beasley failed to show that counsel’s assistance was ineffective or that he suffered
from any prejudice.
¶ 13 On April 30, 2021, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss as to count one
and denied as to count two. The ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim advanced to
third- stage proceedings. With respect to Count One, the circuit court found that, pursuant to People
v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, it had subject matter and personal jurisdiction when it conducted
the sentencing hearing. It also held that the judgment of the sentence was not “void” and the
original trial court had imposed a sentence within the then-applicable statutory range. As to Count
Two, the circuit court held that as a matter of law, the amendment to the Class X sentencing statute
was not retroactive to cases pending on direct appeal. However, the circuit court ruled that the
analysis of whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring the amended statute to
the appellate court’s attention did not end simply because the amendment was not retroactive. The
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circuit court declared it “cannot definitely answer” whether there was prejudice under Strickland
and therefore advanced the proceedings to a third-stage hearing.
¶ 14 Appellate counsel was called as a witness at the third-stage evidentiary hearing. He testified
that he acknowledged that Beasley was subject to Class X sentencing due to his Class 2 felony
conviction. He was aware that the statute Beasley was subject to was amended during the pendency
of the case. He was aware that under the new amendment Class 1 and Class 2 theft convictions
would no longer qualify for Class X sentencing. He testified that he did not cite the new
amendment because it was “prospective and not retrospective.” He stated that it would not be
appropriate to cite the new amendment since it did not apply to Beasley. He testified that although
it would not be harmful to cite the statute, he took “an oath as a lawyer to not file a frivolous
petition.”
¶ 15 In its ruling, the circuit court noted that it could not totally discount the proposition that a
citation to the non-binding statutory amendment could have potentially been supportive for
sentencing-related arguments on appeal and disagreed with appellate counsel that citing the law
change would have been unethical. The court concluded that the sentencing court did not abuse its
discretion by failing to apply a nonexistent statute and that an amendment that is nonretroactive
itself is not grounds for remand. The circuit court also held that Beasley failed to show that
appellate counsel’s representation was deficient and that it did not need to reach the prejudice
prong. It denied Beasley’s petition.
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 We begin our analysis with a discussion of the standard of review to be employed in this
case. Beasley argues that the circuit court erred on denying his claim that appellate counsel
provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 18 “The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a mechanism by which criminal
defendants can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights
under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both.” People v. Haynes, 192 Ill.
2d 437, 464-65 (2000). A postconviction petition is a collateral attack on a prior conviction, People
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v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348, 359 (2000), and is limited to constitutional issues which were not and
could not have been raised on direct appeal. People v. King, 192 Ill. 2d 189, 192-93 (2000). The
Act creates a three-stage procedure for postconviction relief. People v. Makiel, 358 Ill. App. 3d
102, 104 (1st Dist. 2005). Where a petitioner raises non-meritorious claims, the court may
summarily dismiss them. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 408 (2000). If the court does not
dismiss the petition at the first stage, it advances to the second stage where an indigent person can
obtain appointed counsel and the State can move to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b),
122-4, 122-5 (West 2022). If the petitioner makes a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation, the petition advances to the third stage, where the court conducts an evidentiary hearing.
725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2022). At the third stage the petitioner has the burden of proving a
substantial constitutional violation. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). Based on the
facts presented during the evidentiary hearing, the court must determine whether to grant or deny
a postconviction petition. People v. King, 316 Ill. App. 3d 901, 913 (1st Dist. 2000).
¶ 19 Determinations made by the circuit court following the evidentiary hearing in a
postconviction proceeding must not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous. Id. The term
“manifest error” has been defined to mean error which is clearly “evident, plain, and indisputable.”
People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384–85 (1997). Here, Beasley filed a postconviction petition
alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to cite an amended statute that could
have supported his claim that the Class X sentence of 25 years was an abuse of discretion.
Beasley’s petition was denied by the circuit court although it pointed out that, if the amended
statute was brought to the attention of the appellate court, it could have aided argument for
sentencing.
¶ 20 In examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court follows the two-
pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under this standard, the
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and that but for this deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s
performance was prejudicial to the defense. People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 613 (2001).
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“Prejudice exists when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d
213, 224 (1998). A petitioner’s failure to make the requisite showing of either deficient
performance or sufficient prejudice defeats a claim of ineffectiveness. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill.
2d 500, 529-30 (1999).
¶ 21 Effective assistance in a constitutional sense means competent, not perfect,
representation. People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 344 (2000). A court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The strategic decisions made by counsel are virtually unchallengeable.
People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465 (1994). The fact that another attorney would have taken a
different legal approach is not a factor in the competency determination. Id.¶ 22 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, petitioner must show
that the failure to raise a particular issue was objectively unreasonable and that his appeal was
prejudiced by the omission. People v. Williams, 209 Ill. 2d 227, 243 (2004). “Appellate counsel
is not obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not incompetence of counsel
to refrain from raising issues which, in his or her judgment, are without merit, unless counsel’s
appraisal of the merits is patently wrong.” Easley, 192 Ill.2d at 329. Additionally, the defendant
is not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s decision not to raise an issue unless that underlying issue
is meritorious. Id.¶ 23 On direct appeal from Beasley’s conviction, appellate counsel raised three issues in the
opening brief, once of which challenged his 25-year sentence as excessive and an abuse of
discretion. While the appeal was pending, Public Act 100-3 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018) came into effect,
including an amendment to the “habitual criminal” statute such that defendants convicted of
Class 1 and Class 2 felony theft were no longer subject to Class X sentencing. Beasley concedes
that, because his sentence was imposed before the amendment became effective, controlling
precedent foreclosed any argument that the amendment applied to him retroactively. See People v.
Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶¶ 54-56. He argues, however, that the amendment could still have been
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cited in support of the argument raised by counsel on direct appeal that his sentence was excessive
in relation to the seriousness of the offense on the theory that the amendment represented an
expression of public policy by the legislature that a Class X sentence was not an appropriate
punishment for the offense. He notes that “[a] claim that punishment is constitutionally excessive
is judged not by the standards of the past but rather by those that currently prevail.” People v.
Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 ¶ 15. He also notes that legislative enactments are the best evidence of
prevailing contemporary standards. Id. ¶ 34 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)).
¶ 24 The circuit court denied relief because it found that appellate counsel was not deficient. It
is a basic principle of appellate review, though, that “ ’the question before the reviewing court is
the correctness of the result reached by the lower court and not the correctness of the reasoning
upon which that result was reached.’ ” (Alteration marks omitted.) People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d
118, 128 (2003) (quoting People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994)). Thus, we can affirm the
judgment below for any appropriate reason disclosed by the record, even if the circuit court did
not rely on those grounds. Id. at 129. Here, although the circuit court did not reach the prejudice
prong of the Strickland analysis, we find that its judgment denying postconviction relief can be
sustained on that basis. See People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331 (2010) (“If it is easier to dispose
of an ineffective assistance claim on the ground that it lacks sufficient prejudice, then a court may
proceed directly to the second prong and need not determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient.”).
¶ 25 To show that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, Beasley was
required to prove that he was prejudiced by the failure to cite the amended statute. See Brown,
2014 IL App (4th) 120887, ¶ 22. In other words, he had to show that the result of the appeal would
have been different had counsel cited the statutory amendment. Cf. People v. Simms, 182 Ill. 2d
348, 362 (2000) (explaining that whether counsel’s failure to raise an issue was prejudicial requires
the court to “examine the merits of the underlying issue”). In Beasley’s direct appeal, we concluded
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that his 25-year sentence was not excessive based on the significant aggravating circumstances
disclosed by the record:
“A reviewing court will not alter a defendant’s sentence absent
an abuse of discretion by the trial court. People v. Alexander, 239
Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). This broad discretion means that we cannot
substitute our judgment simply because we may weigh the
sentencing factors differently. Id. at 212-13. A trial court abuses its
discretion in determining a sentence where the sentence is greatly at
variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or if it is manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. at 212.
When balancing the retributive and rehabilitative aspects of a
sentence, a court must consider all factors in aggravation and
mitigation including, inter alia, a defendant’s age, criminal history,
character, education, and environment, as well as the nature and
circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s actions in the
commission of that crime. People v. Raymond, 404 Ill. App. 3d 1028,
1069 (2010). *** Because the most important sentencing factor is
the seriousness of the offense, the court is not required to give
greater weight to mitigating factors than to the severity of the
offense, nor does the presence of mitigating factors either require a
minimum sentence or preclude a maximum sentence. Id.Due to his criminal background, the defendant was subject to a
Class X sentence of between 6 and 30 years in prison. See 730 ILCS
5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2014).
At sentencing, the trial court noted, in pertinent part, that
defendant’s criminal history dated back to 1993, that defendant had
completed his parole shortly before the offense, that the offense
required a forklift, and that the value of the items taken was
approximately $37,000. Based on our review of the record, this
court cannot say that a prison term of 25 years was an abuse of
discretion. See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212.” Beasley, 2018 IL App
(1st) 163373-U ¶¶ 38-41.
Had appellate counsel brought to our attention that Beasley’s 25-year sentence exceeded the
maximum sentence that he would have been eligible for after the amendment came into effect, we
would have factored that point into our analysis. But it would not have changed his plainly
aggravating criminal history, which showed that two decades of efforts to rehabilitate him had not
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worked. Nor would it have changed the fact that, far from “pilfer[ing] $44 in quarters from a
vending machine” (see People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 1), he used a forklift to steal
more than $37,000 worth of metal from his former employer. There is no doubt that his sentence
is a severe one, and other judges may well have found a lesser penalty appropriate. Still, at the
time that Beasley was sentenced, the trial court had discretion to sentence him to a term of up to
30 years in prison. Even in view of the reduced sentencing range under the amended statute, we
are unable to say that his 25-year sentence was an abuse of that discretion. Hence, Beasley was not
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to cite the statutory amendment on direct appeal, which means that
he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.
¶ 26 CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
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