Kronenberg v. Foxland Properties, Inc ( 2024 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 230281-UOrder filed February 1, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
PATRICK E. KRONENBERG, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Du Page County, Illinois,
)
v. ) Appeal No. 3-23-0281
) Circuit No. 20-AR-186
)
FOXLAND PROPERTIES, INC., ) Honorable
) Robert G. Gibson,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hettel and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment
in the defendant’s favor.
¶2 The plaintiff, Patrick E. Kronenberg, filed a pro se complaint founded in negligence against
the defendant, Foxland Properties, Inc. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which
the circuit court granted. The plaintiff appeals.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The plaintiff’s pro se amended complaint set forth the following. In August 2019, he
entered into a lease agreement with Sudbury Investments, LLC to rent a home located in Naperville
from September 1, 2019, to June 30, 2020. The lease provided, among other things, the plaintiff
was responsible for “all outside maintenance including lawn and landscaping care[.]” On
November 17, 2019, branches from a tree on the leased property fell onto the plaintiff’s vehicles
during a windstorm. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit claiming the defendant, the alleged
owner of the subject property, was negligent by failing to recognize, inspect, and address the
preexisting hazard of a high-risk tree located on its property. He claimed damages of $27,232.04.
¶5 The parties engaged in discovery and the matter was scheduled for trial. There are two
evidentiary matters of particular relevance. First, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel the
defendant to provide records clarifying the role of Pete Carrol (the defendant’s insurance agent)
with Pekin Insurance (the defendant’s insurer). The court denied the motion, noting discovery was
closed and the issue of insurance was inadmissible at trial. Second, the plaintiff filed a “statement
of witnesses” listing Brittany Humphrey, the plaintiff’s girlfriend, and her statement providing: (1)
she was present when the subject tree was inspected by David Bruckner, an arborist, after the
windstorm and (2) Bruckner told her there was decay at the base of the limbs possibly caused by
a previous lightning strike from years prior and the tree was a hazard and needed to be removed.
¶6 At the final pretrial conference, the court asked what evidence the plaintiff had of the
defendant’s negligence. The plaintiff responded the defendant was in a better position to inspect
the tree as the property owner, especially as the defendant purchased the property about a year
before the lease and should have obtained a property inspection at the time of purchase. However,
the plaintiff acknowledged that he did not put the defendant on notice of the tree’s condition, and
the plaintiff could not point to any evidence indicating the defendant had any notice of the tree’s
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condition. The court entered an order striking the jury trial date but stated it was keeping all
materials in the event the trial was rescheduled. The court set the matter for a status hearing and
the filing of any dispositive motions.
¶7 The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and argued it had neither actual nor
constructive notice of the tree’s condition. The defendant relied on the following: (1) the plaintiff
had exclusive use of the premises for three months before the windstorm; (2) the lease provided
the plaintiff was responsible for all outside maintenance; (3) the plaintiff never complained to the
defendant or Sudbury Investments about the condition of the tree; (4) the plaintiff did not claim to
have observed branches falling or any sort of damage or decay to the tree prior to the windstorm;
(5) the plaintiff did not park his cars anywhere other than near the tree in fear that the tree may
cause damage to his vehicles; and (6) the plaintiff’s suggestion that the defendant should have
obtained an inspection at the time of purchase was not supported by law.
¶8 The court granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor. The plaintiff appeals.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, the plaintiff argues the court erred when it (1) deprived him of a scheduled fair
trial, (2) denied his motion to compel records, and (3) denied his witnesses the opportunity to be
heard. In response, the defendant points out that the plaintiff does not challenge the court’s
dispositive order wherein it granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor. Therefore, the
defendant argues, the plaintiff forfeited any challenge as to summary judgment and the court’s
order should be affirmed. In his reply brief, the plaintiff does not address this forfeiture.
¶ 11 We agree the plaintiff fails to argue the court erred when it granted summary judgment or
that any of the discovery issues he now raises would have precluded the entry of summary
judgment. Thus, even if the court erred in the ways contended by the plaintiff, the summary
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judgment still stands. Further, the plaintiff’s appellate brief is wholly insufficient as it fails in many
respects, such as its omission of citation to relevant legal authority. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.
Oct. 1, 2020). The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, is not entitled to more lenient treatment
than attorneys. Parties that choose to represent themselves without a lawyer must comply with the
same rules and are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys. Holzrichter v. Yorath, 2013
IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 78. We will not raise issues on behalf of a party as it is entirely improper
and would transform this court’s role from that of a jurist to that of an advocate. People v. Givens,
237 Ill. 2d 311, 324 (2010). Therefore, the plaintiff has forfeited the issues he raises on appeal.
¶ 12 Forfeiture aside, the issues the plaintiff raises would nonetheless fail. First, the court had
the authority to strike the trial date even if the plaintiff planned to call certain witnesses and
proceed with the motion for summary judgment. The court inquired into the plaintiff’s evidence
before striking the trial date and informed the plaintiff all materials would be kept in the event the
case was rescheduled for trial. It is undisputed the court possesses the inherent authority to control
its own docket and the course of the litigation. J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182, 196 (2007). The
plaintiff provides no support as to how the court abused this authority. Also, the court acted within
its discretion to deny the plaintiff’s motion to compel, which the plaintiff purportedly filed to learn
of Pete Carrol’s role, however, interrogatories already revealed he was the defendant’s insurance
agent, and as the court explained, insurance matters in this case were inadmissible and discovery
was closed. As such, these matters have no bearing on the court’s entry of summary judgment, and
the court did not err as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor.
¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 14 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.
¶ 15 Affirmed.
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