In re K.C. ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 231166No. 1-23-1166
Second Division
January 31, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
____________________________________________________________________________
) Appeal from the
IN THE INTEREST OF K.C., a minor, ) Circuit Court of
Minor/Respondent-Appellee, ) Cook County, Juvenile Justice
) and Child Protection
(People of the State of Illinois, ) Department, Child Protection.
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Division.
)
v. )
) No. 20JA663
S.W., )
)
Mother-Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable
) Maxwell Griffin, Jr.,
) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case comes to us following ongoing proceedings concerning the adjudication of a
minor child, K.C., who was previously found to be abused and neglected pursuant to section 405/2-
3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3) (West 2020)). Following the entry
of an adjudication order that deemed K.C.’s biological mother and respondent-appellant, S.W.,
unable to care for K.C., the trial court awarded temporary guardianship to the Department of
No. 1-23-1166
Children and Family Services (the Department). K.C. was also appointed a guardian ad litem
(GAL) from the Office of the Public Guardian (GAL). After multiple continuances, as well as
disposition and permanency hearings where S.W. was deemed unable to care for K.C., S.W.’s
counsel filed a motion to return K.C. and his minor sibling to her care. The court, finding S.W.
able to care for K.C., granted the motion and allowed K.C. to return home pursuant to an order of
protection.
¶2 However, following the filing of an emergency motion by K.C.’s GAL which alleged that
S.W. had violated the order of protection, the court subsequently vacated the order and returned
custody of K.C. to the Department. Immediately after the hearing, S.W. filed a combined motion
for a finding of no reasonable efforts and to compel the Department to provide family preservation
services. S.W. also filed a motion to reconsider the court’s vacatur of the order of protection. Both
motions remained unaddressed by the court until a permanency hearing was held. At that hearing,
the court entered a permanency order, finding S.W. unable to care for K.C., and set a permanency
goal of “return home” within 12 months. The court also denied S.W.’s motion to reconsider as
well as the motion for no reasonable efforts.
¶3 On appeal, S.W. argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a finding that
the Department had not made reasonable efforts to prevent K.C.’s removal from the home and to
preserve the reunification of the family. However, because we lack jurisdiction, we do not reach
the merits of S.W.’s claim and must dismiss this appeal.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 A. Petition for Wardship
¶6 Our review of the record reveals a significant amount of motion practice, particularly by
S.W. during the relevant time period concerning this appeal. We have attempted to cull through
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the record to recite only those facts necessary for an understanding of the procedural posture of
the case and of our disposition.
¶7 S.W. is the biological mother of K.C., as well as two other children who were all minors at
the time this case was commenced. 1 On April 22, 2020, the Office of the Cook County State’s
Attorney (State) filed a petition for adjudication of wardship on behalf of all three children. The
petition alleged that K.C. was neglected and abused pursuant to sections 405/2-3(1)(b) (705 ILCS
405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) and 405/2-3(2)(ii) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 2020)) of the Act.
According to the petition, on or about September 29, 2019, S.W. and one of her children had been
involved in a physical altercation that resulted in the minor sustaining a concussion. Additionally,
in November 2019, K.C. and his other siblings observed S.W. and one of K.C.’s sibling’s fathers
involved in a domestic altercation, which resulted in the Department opening an “intact case.”
Finally, on or about April 16, 2020, the petition alleged that S.W. had left one of her minor children
to care for K.C. and their other siblings while she travelled out of state, and later returned home
with one of her children’s fathers with whom she shared a history of domestic violence.
¶8 The petition indicated that both S.W. and one of K.C.’s sibling’s fathers had prior indicated
reports for neglect and abuse. S.W. had also been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and major
depression and anxiety disorder, and had a history of being inconsistent with psychiatric services,
which had resulted in a psychiatric hospitalization earlier that year. S.W.’s treating psychiatrist
was further concerned that S.W. had been abusing her psychotropic medication, and was currently
“psychologically unstable” and suffered from “uncontrolled” psychiatric issues. The petition also
1
Much of the record also concerns S.W.’s other biological children, M.B., age 17 at the time of
petition, and C.W., age 11. For purposes of our disposition, we recite only such facts as are particular to
K.C.
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reported that K.C.’s siblings characterized S.W. as “scary and erratic” when S.W. was not
compliant with her prescribed medication. The petition also alleged that K.C. had been diagnosed
with attention-deficit hyperactivity and anxiety disorder, and had been prescribed psychotropic
medication but was not taking it. S.W.’s psychiatrist further opined that S.W.’s “psychological
instability affect[ed] the children and worsen[ed] their depression.”
¶9 B. Temporary Custody Hearing
¶ 10 On April 22, 2020, the State filed a motion for temporary custody with supporting
affidavits. Therein, the State argued that there was probable cause that K.C. had been neglected
and abused, and that there was “immediate and urgent necessity” to take K.C. into temporary
custody. The motion re-incorporated the facts alleged in the petition for wardship, and further
argued that “reasonable efforts cannot prevent or eliminate the necessity of removal of the minor
from the home.” In support of the motion, the State attached the affidavit of Kharyn Johnson-
Wren, which detailed the Department’s investigation into the matter. 2
¶ 11 On April 22, 2020, a temporary custody hearing was held. 3 A written order entered that
day, finding that: probable cause existed that K.C. was being abused and neglected; an immediate
and urgent necessity existed to support his removal from the home as continuation in the home
was contrary to his welfare; reasonable efforts had been made but had not eliminated the immediate
and urgent necessity to remove him from the home; and it was in K.C.’s best interest to be removed
from the home. Temporary custody was granted to the Department, and a separate order was
2
The form affidavit provides various boxes to be checked by the affiant intended to indicate the
affiant’s status as either an investigator, caseworker, or private agency caseworker. None of the boxes are
checked on the form. Nevertheless, we presume that Johnson-Wren was employed by the Department.
3
The record does not include a transcript of the proceeding.
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entered regarding S.W.’s visitation rights, which included supervised day visits with the minors
and required conditions. Finally, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for all three children.
¶ 12 C. Case Continuances 4
¶ 13 The matter was continued numerous times for status and attempts to notify K.C.’s
biological father of such proceedings. 5 During that time, various permanency and disposition
orders were entered that re-affirmed K.C.’s status as a ward of the court, as well as S.W.’s inability
to care for him. 6
¶ 14 On May 16, 2022, an adjudication order was entered for K.C. The court found K.C. to be
“abused or neglected” pursuant to section 405/2-3 of the Act based on “lack of care” and “injurious
environment[,]” inflicted by S.W. The court based its findings on “credible evidence of [domestic
violence] in the home[,] as well as [S.W.] leaving the children in the care of the minor [K.C.’s
sibling],” which the court found to be an “inappropriate care plan given the facts of the cases.”
However, the court declined to make a finding of dependency, as the “evidence regarding the
mother’s mental illness [did] not rise to th[at] level[.]” The court further set the case for a
disposition hearing on July 25, 2022, which was continued by agreement multiple times throughout
the year. 7
4
Perhaps not unusual given the period of time which has elapsed since the case began, we note that
at least three judges have presided over this matter since its inception, beginning with the Honorable
Bernard J. Sarley. Notably, on the date that the order of protection was entered as to K.C. in accordance
with the minor’s return home, a different judge presided over the matter who was later succeeded by Judge
Griffin.
5
K.C.’s biological father admitted parentage of K.C. during court proceedings on January 7, 2021,
and the court therefore entered a paternity finding via written order that day. However, throughout the entire
course of proceedings, K.C.’s biological father was deemed unable to care for him as shown by numerous
court orders and he remained relatively uninvolved for most of the proceedings.
6
During this time, K.C. and C.W. were placed in the custody of their maternal grandfather.
7
The order expressly noted that the parties had waived the statutory requirement to hold the
dispositional hearing within 30 days of the court’s order. See 705 ILCS 405/2-21(3) (West 2020)).
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¶ 15 On July 25, 2022, the trial court entered a written permanency order. The order did not
recite a permanency goal, but indicated that the Department had “made reasonable efforts in
providing services to facilitate achievement of the permanency goal.” The matter was scheduled
for another permanency hearing and “continued disposition” hearing.
¶ 16 On November 18, 2022, the court conducted a multi-day disposition hearing and entered a
written disposition order for placement that same day. 8 Therein, K.C. was adjudged as a ward of
the court; S.W. was found “unable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to
care for, protect, train or discipline” him; and “reasonable efforts ha[d] been made to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the minor from the home.” The court further found that
“appropriate services aimed at family preservation and family reunification ha[d] been
unsuccessful.” Custody was again granted to the Department. The court also entered a separate
written “order on visiting” that continued to allow S.W. unsupervised day and overnight visits with
K.C. at the Department’s discretion.
¶ 17 Finally, the court also entered a written permanency order with a “return home goal” of 5
months for K.C. The order stated that S.W. had made “substantial progress” toward K.C.’s return
home goal. The court further found that the Department’s service plans were “appropriate and
reasonably calculated to facilitate achievement of the permanency goal” and that the Department
had made “reasonable efforts in providing services to facilitate achievement” of the goal. However,
the selected goals could not “immediately be achieved” because “services [were] ongoing.”
¶ 18 1. S.W.’s Motion to Return Home and the Order of Protection
8
This transcript is not included within the record.
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¶ 19 On January 4, 2023, S.W. filed a motion for extended visitation with the children. Therein,
she indicated that she had completed or was engaged in all required reunification services, and
currently enjoyed unsupervised day and overnight visits with the minors without any concern.
S.W. further alleged that, as shown at the November 18 disposition hearing, both minor children,
including K.C., wished to return home. 9
¶ 20 On January 9, 2023, a hearing was held on S.W.’s motion. S.W.’s counsel called Mia Nalls-
Walker as a witness, who testified that she was a caseworker at Ada S. McKinley Community
Services and had served the family since August 2021. According to Nalls-Walker, S.W. had been
assessed by the Department for both psychiatric services and individual therapy with a focus on
domestic violence issues. S.W. had completed her required parenting classes and most of the
sessions required by the Department. Nalls-Walker further testified that S.W. had “made progress”
in those services and S.W.’s therapist had reported that she had successfully completed therapy
services in May 2022. However, although the therapist had determined that S.W. was no longer in
need of therapy or medication, Nalls-Walker testified that the agency still had concerns regarding
the mother’s mental health.
¶ 21 Nalls-Walker further testified that, since the week of December 20, 2023, K.C. and C.W.
had been home with S.W. on an extended visit, and both had expressed an interest to return home.
Prior to the extended visits, S.W. had been awarded unsupervised day and overnight visits without
any concerns. As such, the agency was in agreement at this time that it was in K.C.’s best interest
to return home, so long as an order of protection was put in place to allow for Nalls-Walker to
9
Additionally, the motion alleged that on December 17, 2022, a hotline call had been made to the
Department concerning a potential altercation between K.C. and his foster parent, where K.C. had allegedly
been placed in a chokehold and then sent to his room. The relationship between the minor children and the
foster parent was a contentious subject between the parties but is not relevant to our disposition at this time.
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continue to visit the minors and that both children continue with their ongoing therapy sessions.
Nalls-Walker indicated that K.C. was on the waiting list for a new therapist, but she had received
an email that day that he now had a potential placement. Nalls-Walker stated that S.W. wanted to
choose the therapist for both children as she had concerns about C.W.’s therapeutic relationship.
Although the agency did not share the same concerns, it believed it was “absolutely” in K.C.’s best
interest to begin therapy as soon as possible and that both children required that support for their
transition back home. Nalls-Walker indicated that S.W. was not yet aware of the new potential
therapist as the agency was waiting for the court to enter an order on that issue today.
¶ 22 Upon examination by the State, Nalls-Walker testified that it was the agency’s
recommendation that K.C. should continue attending the same therapeutic school in which he was
currently enrolled as he had an independent educational plan (IEP) in place. Nalls-Walker further
indicated that S.W. had concerns about K.C.’s transportation to and from school, but that such
concerns would be addressed by the school district. Upon examination by K.C.’s GAL, Nalls-
Walker testified that she had been to S.W.’s home once after the children returned home for their
extended visit. No one had been home at the time of her visit, but the residence had seemed “safe”
and “appropriate.” S.W. had also requested services for family therapy, and the agency would
work with her to identify such community resources.
¶ 23 Following Nalls-Walker’s testimony, the court orally found that S.W., although previously
determined unable to care for the minor children, was now “fit, willing and able to care for, protect,
train, and discipline the minors.” As such, K.C. and C.W. were allowed to return home pursuant
to an order of protection. The court further ordered that the case return for a progress report in 3
months and that, “if it is in the best interest of the children to close the case *** in three months,
that will be the order.” With regard to the conditions of the order of protection, the court
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determined that the “usual conditions” would be in place, in that S.W. would “continue to
cooperate with all reasonable requests” of the Department. In addition, the court ordered the
continuation of therapy for both minors with their current and new providers.
¶ 24 Subsequently that day, the court entered a written “original” disposition order. Therein, the
court found that K.C. had previously been adjudged a ward of the court on November 18, 2022,
but S.W. was now “fit, able, and willing to care for, protect, train, and discipline” him. The court
further found that “[r]easonable efforts have been provided to make it possible for the minor to
return to the parent” and that “[a]ppropriate services aimed at family preservation and family
reunification have been successful.” As such, the court ordered that K.C. should be returned to
S.W.’s custody in accordance with a “405/2-24 Order of Protective Supervision.”
¶ 25 The court also entered a “Supplemental Protective Order” outlining required conditions for
S.W. With regard to K.C., S.W. was ordered to enroll and ensure his attendance in individual
therapy services with a provider identified by the Department. S.W. was also ordered to keep K.C.
at his current school and arrange for his transportation. Finally, the court also entered an extensive
and detailed “order of protection” against S.W., which included, inter alia, cooperating with all
reasonable requests of the Department, ensuring an appropriate care plan for the minors and
notifying the Department prior to any change in residence, ensuring school attendance, and
participation in counseling services.
¶ 26 2. GAL’s Emergency and Supplemental Motion
¶ 27 On March 8, 2023, K.C. and C.W.’s GAL filed an “Emergency Motion to Make a Finding
that Mother has Violated the 2-24 Order of Protection.” The GAL argued that since the minors had
been returned home, S.W. had not complied with the conditions set forth within the order of
protection.
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¶ 28 First, the Department argued that S.W. had not supported K.C. at his therapeutic school as
his attendance had noticeably decreased, he arrived at school sleep-deprived and often slept during
the day, and was exhibiting “defiant, uncooperative, [and] dysregulated” behavior. The motion
further stated that when the school contacted S.W. via email in February 2023 regarding K.C.’s
attendance issues, S.W. blamed K.C.’s lack of attendance on bus transportation issues. On March
6, 2023, the school also emailed S.W. regarding K.C.’s declining behavior and academic
performance. In response to the email, S.W. blamed the school for K.C.’s decline and sent a video
which depicted K.C. and herself mocking the school staff. Although the Department conceded that
“technically” S.W. had not violated the order of protection regarding school and attendance, her
conduct and interaction with school administrators was “purposefully undermining the intent” of
the order. As such, the Department requested that S.W. participate in collaborative meetings with
K.C.’s school.
¶ 29 Second, the Department reported that S.W. had told K.C. and C.W that she was being
evicted from her current home and planned to leave the state immediately, which the Department
confirmed through its own independent research. When the Department confronted S.W. with
these plans, S.W. indicated that she would be taking the minors on a vacation to Michigan for a
month, and further intended to get them Canadian passports. The Department attempted to provide
S.W. with an application for emergency rental assistance, which she did not complete, and were
thus concerned that S.W. would remove K.C. and C.W. from the state. As such, the Department
requested an order prohibiting S.W. from removing the minors without express permission, as well
as proof of housing.
¶ 30 Finally, the Department argued that S.W. was further violating the order of protection as
K.C. was not currently enrolled in therapy, despite the availability of a therapist by the referring
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agency. Although K.C. maintained a strong desire to remain with his mother, the Department was
concerned that S.W.’s “erratic” behavior was affecting K.C.’s behavior and mental health. The
Department further requested that S.W. be evaluated by a psychiatrist and immediately enroll K.C.
into services with his new therapist.
¶ 31 On March 10, 2023, the court held a hearing on the GAL’s motion. S.W. appeared remotely
and by counsel, and indicated that K.C. was not in school because he was “scared” and “having
issues.” She further stated that he was in need of mental health resources, which he had not been
receiving and for which she had “repeatedly” asked. S.W.’s counsel further indicated that his client
was amenable to the GAL’s request for psychiatric services, but would require financial assistance.
The GAL reported that the Department had a “serious concern” that the mother was entering a
“manic phase” and would soon be evicted from her home. After argument, the court entered and
continued the motion to March 16, but orally ruled that S.W. was not to remove K.C. from the
state.
¶ 32 That same day, the court entered a series of additional written orders. Although the court
entered and continued the GAL’s motion to March 16, it also entered a form order entitled
“disposition order,” but which expressly provided that the cause was coming on the GAL’s motion.
Therein, K.C. was adjudged as a ward of the court and S.W. was found unable to care for him. The
court further found that “reasonable efforts ha[d] been made to prevent or eliminate the need for
removal of the minor from the home” and that “appropriate services aimed at family preservation
and family reunification have been unsuccessful.” The court also vacated the order of protection
against S.W. and returned custody of K.C. to the Department for further placement. Finally, a
separate written order prohibited S.W. from removing the minors from the state without further
order of court.
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¶ 33 3. March 16 Hearing
¶ 34 On March 16, 2023, the GAL filed a “Supplemental Emergency Motion to Violate and
Vacate the 2-24 Order of Protection.” Therein, the GAL alleged that K.C. had not been in school
since March 8, 2023. Although S.W. had met with school officials on March 13, S.W. indicated
that she and K.C. were no longer in Cook County and refused to disclose their location. On March
14, K.C.’s caseworker, Nalls-Walker, met with K.C. and S.W. remotely, during which time S.W.
further confirmed that the two were no longer in Cook County and did not provide any new
address. As such, the GAL argued, S.W. continued to violate the terms of the order of protection,
as well as the court’s last order which prohibited S.W. from taking K.C. out of the state.
¶ 35 On that same date, a hearing was held on the GAL’s motions. Nalls-Walker testified that
on March 6, 2023, she became aware that K.C.’s sibling, C.W., had informed their school
administrators that S.W. planned to take the two of them to Michigan by the end of the week.
Nalls-Walker spoke with C.W. on the phone that night, and C.W. indicated that they wished to be
removed from their mother’s home as she and S.W. had several verbal altercations. C.W. also
reported that S.W. did not want them to continue therapy with their current provider. As such, the
agency believed it was in the best interest of the minor to be removed from the home.
¶ 36 Upon examination by S.W.’s counsel, Nalls-Walker testified as follows. S.W. had not been
“upfront” about moving to Michigan, but had stated to her that once the “case was closed,” she
wanted to move where she had “family” and support.” C.W. had experienced other verbal
altercations with S.W. and had decided to speak up once S.W. indicated that the family would be
moving because C.W. did not wish to go. It was also the agency’s position that it was the
“responsibility of the parent” to ensure that the minors continued treatment with their respective
therapists.
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¶ 37 The court then questioned C.W., who further confirmed that S.W. had already left for
Michigan and had taken K.C. with her. Ultimately, the court found, with regard to C.W., that S.W.
had violated the order of protection, and further vacated the order. The court also orally entered a
“modified disposition order” finding S.W. unable to care for C.W. and placing the minor within
Department’s custody.
¶ 38 The court then proceeded to hear testimony regarding K.C. Upon examination by K.C.’s
GAL, Nalls-Walker testified that in February 2023, K.C.’s school psychologist informed her that
he had been missing class since February 22. When he had been present, he had been described as
“dysregulated,” “spiraling,” and “disruptive” to other students and teachers. The school reached
out to S.W. to inquire about his whereabouts, and S.W. indicated that it was a “transportation”
issue. The school responded that transportation was not an issue and that it would support the
family. Later that month, the school reported that the transit issues had been resolved.
¶ 39 On March 6, 2023, Nalls-Walker received another report from the school that K.C. was
absent from class and continued to otherwise be a “constant disruption.” The school psychologist
again reached out to S.W. via email to address the behavior. In response, S.W. sent back two
emails. The first contained a written response which blamed the school on K.C.’s behavior. The
second contained a video where S.W. taped herself asking K.C. questions about school, including
the names he had called his teachers, and laughing together.
¶ 40 On March 8, Nalls-Walker received another report from the school that K.C. had not been
present that day, and later learned that K.C. had not been in school since March 8. The school had
a meeting with S.W. on March 13, which Nalls-Walker was unable to attend. She followed up with
the school psychologist after the meeting, and the school informed her that S.W. had refused to
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tell them where she and K.C. were located. However, S.W. indicated that she was no longer in
Cook County and did not plan to return K.C. to school.
¶ 41 On March 14, S.W. reached out to Nalls-Walker to inform her that the Cook County Sheriff
wanted to speak with her after K.C.’s school called for a wellness check. Nalls-Walker asked S.W.
where she was located. S.W. refused to give an address, but indicated that she was in Michigan
and had no plans to return to Illinois. On March 15, Nalls-Walker visited the family home and
found it empty.
¶ 42 Upon examination by the State, Nalls-Walker testified that, as of two weeks ago, K.C. was
off the waiting list for therapy. The agency believed he was in need of school and therapeutic
services, but S.W. had not enrolled him in any, even after Nalls-Walker informed her that a
therapist was available. It was also the agency’s position that the order of protection as to K.C.
should be vacated as S.W. had failed to cooperate with the court order to ensure K.C.’s safety. The
agency also sought an interstate child protection warrant.
¶ 43 Upon examination by S.W.’s counsel, Nalls-Walker testified as follows. She had informed
S.W. on January 6 that K.C. had been placed on the waiting list for therapy, but services became
available on February 13. She sent the therapist’s information to S.W. via text and email. She
admitted that S.W. had expressed concerns about K.C.’s school’s ability to regulate his behavior.
S.W. told Nalls-Walker that she was in Michigan because she was being evicted and did not have
a place to stay, and had called a few shelters for placement to no avail.
¶ 44 Nalls-Walker admitted that S.W. had asked for housing assistance from the agency. On
March 1, Nalls-Walker sent an application for “Norman funds” 10 to S.W., to which she responded
10
“Norman funds” refer to a program administered by the Department that offers cash assistance to
help attain or maintain housing stability.
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that she needed assistance in completing the form. On March 4, Nalls-Walker visited S.W. at her
home and provided her with physical copies of the form. Nalls-Walker told S.W. that she would
collect the completed forms from her on Monday, March 6. S.W. had previously completed the
same forms in November 2022, with the only difference now being her unemployment. Nalls-
Walker had not been aware of the family’s pending eviction, as S.W had informed the agency that
she had paid her rent for January and February of that year. S.W. had told her that she had been
fired from her job while trying to put together a safety plan and obtain childcare for K.C. Nalls-
Walker admitted that S.W. had requested that the agency assist her with putting together a safety
plan in December 2022. However, the agency had not provided assistance for childcare.
¶ 45 Next, the court questioned K.C., who confirmed that he was in Michigan and his preference
to remain with his mother. He did not know how long he had been in Michigan and was not going
to school there. He believed he was not enrolled in school because he did not have housing. He
had not seen a therapist in Michigan and knew he had to return back to Illinois to receive services,
but stated “we can’t do that.”
¶ 46 Last, the State questioned S.W. She indicated that she was staying at her mother’s house
in New Baltimore, Michigan, as she did not have housing in Illinois. She and K.C. had stayed at a
different address previously. She had been in Michigan since March 11 and was homeless.
¶ 47 After hearing argument, the court orally ruled to vacate the order of protection. It further
stated that it would enter a “modified disposition order” that again designated K.C. as a ward of
the court and that S.W. was unable to care for him. The court further found that S.W. had violated
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the March 10 order not to remove K.C. from Illinois. Finally, the court stated that it would issue
an interstate child protection warrant for K.C. 11
¶ 48 The court also entered a series of written orders that day which memorialized many of its
oral findings above. In a “modified disposition order,” the court also found that “[r]easonable
efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minor from the home”
and that “appropriate services aimed at family preservation and family reunification efforts have
been unsuccessful.” In a separate order, the court granted the GAL’s motion to vacate the order of
protection and found that S.W. had “violated [the] terms of order of protection, including
provisions that K.C. remain in his therapeutic school, and that [S.W.] enroll him in therapy. [S.W.]
also violated the court order of 3/10/2023 prohibiting her from removing the minor from the court’s
jurisdiction.” Last, the court entered an order for a child protection warrant and supplemental order
to bring K.C. back to the Department. S.W. was ordered to contact the Department in order to
facilitate relinquishment of K.C., as well as to appear at the next court date of March 20 either in
person or by electronic means. The order further provided that failure to deliver K.C. to
Department custody would subject S.W. to a contempt proceeding.
¶ 49 4. S.W.’s Combined Motion for No Reasonable Efforts and Motion to Compel
¶ 50 On March 16, 2023, following the immediate hearing, S.W. filed a “combined motion for
no reasonable efforts and motion to compel [the Department] to provide family preservation
services.” 12 Therein, S.W. argued that she had been having trouble obtaining psychiatric and
school transportation services for K.C. due to financial hardship after she was terminated from her
11
During the court’s ruling, S.W.’s counsel indicated that a “motion for no reasonable efforts and a
motion to compel services” would be filed.
12
However, during court proceedings on March 16, it appears that this motion was sent to the other
parties of record prior to the hearing.
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No. 1-23-1166
employment. As such, S.W. requested that the court order the Department to provide family
preservation services as required under the Act and other applicable Illinois law. Additionally,
S.W. sought a finding that, if the court determined that the Department should provide such
services, the court should make an additional finding that the Department had not made
“reasonable efforts” to assist with K.C.’s psychiatric and housing needs since he was returned
home in January.
¶ 51 On March 20, the GAL filed a response to S.W.’s motion. The GAL argued that, upon
information and belief, the Department and its agency had provided several options for K.C.’s
therapy and had continually followed up with S.W. concerning those options. However, the GAL
acknowledged that a therapist for K.C. had only been made available in February 2023 after he
came off the waiting list. The GAL also contested that it was the Department’s responsibility to
provide transportation to K.C. given the express language of the order of protection. The GAL also
acknowledged that S.W. had informed the agency of her financial need, but noted that S.W. had
otherwise declined to provide any further details, including her eviction. Nevertheless, the GAL
pointed out that the Department had arranged to pay some of S.W.’s past due rent in October 2022,
and had attempted to assist S.W. by sending a caseworker to S.W.’s residence in order to deliver
the required forms and further arrange to pick up the forms the following week. However, the
application was never completed.
¶ 52 With regard to the motion for no reasonable efforts, the GAL argued that S.W. failed to
provide evidence that the Department did not meet its obligation to serve the family. The GAL
further noted that, prior to the filing of its motion, an emergency meeting had also taken place
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No. 1-23-1166
between the Department’s legal counsel, the GAL, and S.W.’s attorney to address S.W.’s needs in
order to maintain custody of the minors. 13
¶ 53 5. March 20 Hearing and the State’s Petition for Rule to Show Cause
¶ 54 On March 20, a hearing was held with S.W. present remotely and through counsel. The
GAL reported that K.C. had not yet been returned to Illinois as S.W. reported having car trouble.
The court indicated that it would take “further steps to enter a contempt citation.” The State
responded that it would file a petition for rule to show cause, and the matter was entered and
continued. 14
¶ 55 On March 27, S.W. filed a response to the State’s petition for rule to show cause. Therein,
S.W. argued, among others, that contempt proceedings were improper because any violation of the
order of protection had been due to financial reasons, which was a defense to contempt. 15 S.W.
supplemented her filing with additional exhibits on April 3, 2023, which showed various texts and
email exchanges between Nalls-Walker and S.W.
¶ 56 6. March 27 Hearing
¶ 57 On March 27, a hearing was held on the petition for rule to show cause. S.W. was present
remotely and through counsel, and K.C. had not yet been returned to the state. In addressing the
merits of the petition, S.W.’s counsel argued that S.W.’s actions had been triggered by housing
struggles and the threat of homelessness, and further stated that his arguments “should be
13
On April 18, 2023, the GAL further responded to the motion addressing the compulsion of agency
records.
14
This petition does not appear in the record. It is not clear if one was ever filed or if the State
simply made an oral motion.
15
S.W. also filed a “motion to appoint a conflict free attorney for [K.C.],” in which she argued that
K.C.’s court-appointed GAL had a conflict between advocating for K.C.’s express wishes versus what was
in his best interest. The GAL responded to this motion in writing on March 31, 2023. This motion was
denied on April 3, 2023.
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No. 1-23-1166
considered along with [the] motion for reasonable efforts,” as he believed that the motion “play[ed]
directly into the issues we’re discussing[.]” The court responded that it would only be considering
the petition for rule to show cause. The court subsequently issued a rule for indirect civil contempt,
and continued the matter for a contempt hearing and “all motions filed to date[.]” 16
¶ 58 7. April 3 Hearing
¶ 59 On April 3, 2023, a contempt hearing was held. Prior to proceeding, S.W.’s counsel
indicated that he still had various motions pending before the court, with “the oldest motion” being
“the motion for no reasonable efforts, motion to compel in regards to preservation services[.]”
S.W.’s counsel clarified that the motion was intended to address the agency’s failure to assist S.W.
with housing and provide individual and family therapy for K.C. The court pointed out that one of
the “major bases” for granting the GAL’s emergency motion and vacating the order of protection
had been S.W.’s failure to keep K.C. in attendance at school and therapy. The court further stated
that it was “not looking to have a long drawn-out argument on what the Department did and didn’t
do,” and if the issue was not presented to the court on March 16, then it was “an issue for another
hearing.”
¶ 60 The court briefly took testimony from Nalls-Walker, as well as two witnesses for S.W.,
Jennifer Bauer, a family friend, and S.W.’s mother, Carol Dolan. When questioned by the State,
Dolan indicated that she lived in New Baltimore, Michigan, and had last seen K.C. and S.W. in
January 2023. She denied that both had stayed at her home in March 2023. When questioned by
the GAL as to whether Dolan was aware that S.W. had claimed to be at Dolan’s home in Michigan,
Following the court’s oral ruling, S.W.’s counsel stated: “As your honor is aware, when your
16
Honor vacates an order of protection[,] that was of course a final order. I do intend to file a motion to
reconsider.” He further indicated that he needed “documentary evidence” such as the agency file as
requested in his “motion for no reasonable efforts.”
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No. 1-23-1166
Dolan responded “she can come in whenever” and “she could have been here,” but that the two
had not discussed it. Following continued questioning, the court then orally entered an order for
indirect civil contempt against S.W. 17
¶ 61 8. S.W.’s Motion to Reconsider
¶ 62 On April 10, S.W. filed a motion to reconsider. Therein, S.W. argued that the trial court
had erred by: (1) vacating the order of protection as to K.C. based on violations attributable to
“poverty”; (2) not continuing the matter to allow her to properly investigate the allegations made
by the GAL; (3) questioning counsel on matters concerning attorney-client privilege during the
emergency motion hearing; (4) improperly placing weight on C.W.’s interest to leave S.W. while
failing to consider K.C.’s express wishes to remain with her; and (5) failing to appoint a new
attorney for K.C. S.W. further argued that the court had violated S.W.’s equal protection and due
process rights and sought additional agency records. Finally, the motion sought to reverse the
court’s March 16 order to vacate the order of protection.
¶ 63 On May 19, the GAL filed a response to S.W.’s motion to reconsider. The GAL argued
that S.W. did not allege any change in law or any newly discovered evidence to reconsider the
court’s previous vacatur of the order of protection. The GAL further maintained that the evidence
presented in its emergency motions had sufficiently showed violations of the order of protection,
as well as the court’s express March 10 order prohibiting S.W. from removing K.C. from Illinois.
¶ 64 9. April 18 Hearing
¶ 65 On April 18, a status hearing was held. The State reported that Michigan police had
executed the child protection warrant. K.C. had been recovered by child protective services and
A notice of appeal as to this order was filed on April 13, 2023, and was assigned to our court as
17
case number 1-23-0668. A Rule 23 order disposing of the appeal was issued on December 29, 2023.
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No. 1-23-1166
the Department was arranging to transfer him back to Illinois. S.W. was also being held in a jail in
Michigan. Upon confirmation that K.C. had been recovered by the Department and returned to
Illinois, the court quashed the interstate child protection warrant. S.W.’s counsel further indicated
that he intended to file an “amended” motion to reconsider. He also stated that his other “motion
to reconsider and motion for no reasonable efforts” were pending.
¶ 66 10. S.W.’s Amended Motion to Reconsider
¶ 67 On June 2, immediately prior to a scheduled permanency hearing, S.W. filed an amended
motion to reconsider. Therein, S.W. maintained that the court erred in vacating the order of
protection because the Department had not met its burden in providing “reasonable efforts” to
S.W. as required under the Act and other relevant Illinois law, which otherwise barred the
Department from removing minors from homes based on poverty and financial need. S.W. further
argued that the court had placed an unreasonable condition on her not to leave the state, despite
evidence of imminent homelessness. The motion’s other bases for reconsideration included the
court’s purported errors in: (1) “unreasonably” enforcing the condition requiring K.C. to attend his
current school in-person; (2) failing to continue the case and not allowing her to “investigate and
obtain sufficient records”; (3) not allowing S.W. to conduct any discovery into the Department’s
investigation concerning the foster parent; and (4) failing to appoint a new attorney for K.C. 18 The
motion further requested reversal of the disposition order that vacated the order of protection.
¶ 68 11. April 24 Hearing
S.W. also filed a motion for extension of time to review documents tendered to her by the
18
Department to support her amended motion to reconsider. Although S.W. was granted leave to file the
amended motion to reconsider, the court subsequently denied the motion for extension of time on June 2,
2023.
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No. 1-23-1166
¶ 69 On April 24, 2023, a status was held. Nalls-Walker testified that K.C. had been placed in a
non-relative foster home on April 20, but had further indicated that he preferred to live with his
maternal grandfather. The court continued the matter to June 2, where it stated it would consider
S.W.’s pending motion to reconsider and motion for no reasonable efforts. The court further noted
that it would also hold a permanency hearing as to all three children on that date.
¶ 70 D. Permanency Hearing – June 2, 2023
¶ 71 On June 2, 2023, the court conducted a permanency hearing. S.W. was solely present
through counsel. The court first addressed and denied S.W.’s motion to reconsider. In so doing,
the court noted that it did not:
“THE COURT: *** see any new information in your motion and I don’t see any
new law. You just disagree with the court’s opinion and ruling ultimately in terms of
vacating the order of protection. So unless you can provide to me some new facts that could
not have been discovered at the time of the hearing and the vacation of the order of
protection or some new law that exists or [new] law that I’ve violated, then I’m going to
have to deny your motion[.]”
¶ 72 Subsequently, the court proceeded to conduct the permanency hearing, and expressly noted
that it would also consider “any evidence or testimony in support of [the] motion for no reasonable
efforts[.]”
¶ 73 Nalls-Walker was sworn in as a witness and she testified as follows. At his request, K.C.
had been placed with his maternal grandfather following a week-long placement with a nonrelative
foster parent. On May 20, Nalls-Walker visited him and reported no safety concerns or signs of
abuse, neglect, or corporal punishment. K.C. was currently enrolled in his previous therapeutic
school and communicated with Nalls-Walker over email weekly. K.C. appeared “a bit
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No. 1-23-1166
dysregulated,” and that some days “are good” and “some days are different.” K.C.’s school
psychologist believed he became the most dysregulated when communicating with S.W. K.C.
received therapeutic services at school and had a therapy appointment scheduled for June 10.
Overall, Nalls-Walker felt that K.C. was “confused and all over the place” and “really [didn’t
know] what he wants at the time.” The agency had conducted a meeting to see if he required any
further specialized services, but no determination had been made as they wanted to continue to
assess him in his current placement. The agency had not yet staffed a goal for K.C., but the likely
recommendation would be guardianship. K.C. had indicated that he wanted to be with his mother,
but was not sure that it was a “good place” for him. He also did not want to be placed with his
nonrelative foster parent due the strictness of the household.
¶ 74 Nalls-Walker had attempted to schedule in-person visits or Zoom calls between S.W. and
K.C., but S.W. was resistant to supervised visits. S.W. had communicated to her that she was
homeless and was often hostile to Nalls-Walker over various methods of communication. K.C.
also appeared indifferent to visiting his mother in person and thus no visits were currently
scheduled. The agency had also reassessed S.W.’s needs for services in March 2023 and
recommended additional family therapy and psychiatric assessments, of which Nalls-Walker had
provided referrals for. She had not made an individual therapy referral, but had recommended the
service to S.W.
¶ 75 Upon examination by the State, Nalls-Walker testified as follows. When asked if she was
aware that police had responded to a well-being check for S.W. in Michigan on the basis of suicidal
ideation, Nalls-Walker responded that she had been unaware of that information. She admitted to
receiving a phone call from someone in Michigan concerning that, but had not been provided with
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No. 1-23-1166
much information. Nalls-Walker did not know where S.W. was located, but S.W. had texted her
before today’s proceedings “with some kind of threat.”
¶ 76 Upon examination by S.W.’s counsel, Nalls-Walker admitted that much of her interactions
with S.W. had been hostile and that S.W. blamed her personally for the case’s current status. She
did not know if S.W. was homeless, but knew at one point S.W. had told her she was with one of
the minor siblings’ fathers. She was aware that S.W. was in need of financial assistance based on
her interaction with S.W. in March. She was unaware if S.W. had been employed consistently but
knew of one instance of prior employment. Nalls-Walker reiterated that she attempted to help S.W.
fill out the Norman funds application in March, and documented such efforts in a contact note.
The form was initially sent electronically, but S.W. had indicated that she did not have the
technology to fill out the form, and Nalls-Walker brought the form to her personally on March 7.
This had been the second Norman funds application, with the first paying off her rent arrears in
September or October of last year, and the second one to be used as a referral for low-income
housing. She denied knowledge of any outstanding applications for a Norman voucher. At the time
of the first request, S.W. had not voiced any concerns about housing beyond needing to pay rent.
Nalls-Walker had been unaware of S.W.’s eviction proceedings until a few days after the children
were returned home. It was possible that S.W. had been informing the agency of housing issues
since February 2022, but the agency had not been made aware of eviction proceedings until
recently.
¶ 77 Nalls-Walker further described S.W.’s current behavior as “erratic,” which began around
the time K.C. was removed. The agency’s recommendation for S.W. to engage in continued
services was based on her actions from the end of February until today. When asked if getting
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No. 1-23-1166
S.W. into housing would alleviate some of these issues, Nalls-Walker responded that it was
“possible” but S.W. would not tell the agency of her location and thus it could not assist her. 19
¶ 78 E. Trial Court Ruling on Motion for Reasonable Efforts and Permanency
¶ 79 Following continued questioning, the court orally denied S.W.’s motion for no reasonable
efforts. With regard to K.C., it found the Department had made “reasonable efforts,” that K.C.’s
current placement was necessary and appropriate to the case plan and goal, and that a return home
permanency goal of 12 months was appropriate. It noted that its permanency goal finding was a
bit of a “misnomer because [permanency goals] are not permanent and they can be changed,” given
that the parties had not yet explored the possibilities of adoption or private guardianship. The court
further indicated that any appeal of its decision was “discretionary because there’s no right to
appeal this decision.” The court speculated that the previously entered “modified disposition order
could be appealed” but “but in terms of the reasonable efforts, I don’t know[.]”
¶ 80 Subsequently that day, the court entered numerous written orders. First, the court entered
a permanency order for K.C., which indicated a “return home” of 12 months for K.C. and that
S.W. had not made substantial progress towards the previous return home goal. The order
expressly noted that S.W. had not “cooperated with [the] agency or re-engaged in services since
[the] minor was removed from her care in March, 2023.” The court further determined that the
Department’s services were “appropriate and reasonably calculated to facilitate achievement of
the permanency goal,” which could not immediately be achieved because services were ongoing
19
S.W.’s counsel began to question Nalls-Walker about therapeutic services and the court
interjected, asking why such testimony was relevant. Counsel for S.W. stated that there was a pending
“motion for no reasonable efforts” and that such testimony would go to whether the agency could provide
appropriate services based on its failure to do so in the past. The court admonished counsel on this point
and pointed out that S.W. was not present in court to provide testimony for this line of questioning.
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No. 1-23-1166
and K.C. was still under the age of 21. The court further found K.C.’s placement with his maternal
grandfather as “necessary and appropriate to the case plan and goal,” and that the Department had
made “reasonable efforts in providing services to facilitate achievement of the permanency goal.”
The court also entered written orders denying S.W.’s motion for no reasonable efforts.
¶ 81 This appeal followed. 20
¶ 82 II. ANALYSIS 21
¶ 83 A. The Act
¶ 84 S.W. contends that the trial court’s denial of her motion for no reasonable efforts was
against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, in its response brief, the GAL preliminarily
challenges our jurisdiction to review that ruling. To address this, we first provide some context of
the Act in relation to this appeal’s procedural posture.
¶ 85 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987, 705 ILCS 405/1-1, et seq. (West 2020), governs the
procedures for removal of a minor from their parents’ custody in order to protect the minor’s
safety, moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare. Id. § 405/1-2 (West 2020); In re D.B., 2023
IL App (1st) 230059, ¶ 56. Removal proceedings may be initiated if a minor under the age of 18
is alleged to be neglected or abused. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1). Instances of neglect may be found
20
S.W.’s Notice of Appeal states that the matter is subject to expedited disposition under Supreme
Court Rule 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). Rule 311 governs the mandatory accelerated disposition of appeals
related to child custody, allocation of parental responsibilities, or relocation of unemancipated minors.
However, S.W.’s brief states that our jurisdiction is derived from Rules 301 and 303. We discuss the varying
rules later in our disposition.
21
As noted in the prior footnote, this case is subject to expedited disposition pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018), which requires our court to issue a disposition within
150 days after the filing of a notice of appeal, except for good cause shown. Here, the notice of appeal was
filed on June 30, 2023, making our decision due on or before November 27, 2023. However, this case was
not made ready for review until January 2, 2024, following the filing of multiple motions for extension of
time filed by the parties in this matter. As such, we find good cause exists for the delay in rendering our
decision.
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No. 1-23-1166
where the minor is “not receiving the proper or necessary support, education as required by law,
or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for a minor’s well-
being[.]” Id. § 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2020); see also id. § 405/2-3(1)(b)-(e) (West 2020).
¶ 86 1. The Petition
¶ 87 Child neglect and abuse proceedings are initiated by the filing of a petition for wardship
by the local State’s Attorney. Id. § 405/2-13(1) (West 2020). The trial court then conducts an
adjudicatory hearing within 90 days of service of the petition to determine the question of “whether
the minor is abused, neglected or dependent.” Id. § 405/2-18 (West 2020); Id. § 405/2-14(b) (West
2020). The court must also appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor. Id. § 405/2-17(1)(a) (West
2020)).
¶ 88 At the adjudicatory hearing, if the court finds that the State has met its burden of proving
its allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence, the court then proceeds to a
disposition hearing. Id. § 405/2-21(2) (West 2020); see also D.B., 2020 IL App (1st) 230059, ¶ 57.
There, the trial court is tasked with determining whether the minor shall be made a ward of the
court in accordance with their best interest and the interest of the public. Id. § 405/2-22(1) (West
2020). If a minor is adjudged to be a ward of the court, the court also considers “the proper
disposition best serving the health, safety and best interests of the minor and the public.” Id.
Finally, the court must consider the minor’s “permanency goal” pursuant to section 2-28 of the
Act (id. § 405/2-28) (West 2020)), as well as the nature of the minor’s service plan and the plan’s
accompanying services. Id. § 405/2-22(1). The court must also set a date for the minor’s first
permanency hearing. Id. § 405/2-22(5) (West 2020).
¶ 89 2. Disposition Orders
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No. 1-23-1166
¶ 90 Following the hearing, if the court determines that a ward of the court’s parents are unfit
or unable to care for the minor, the court must enter a written disposition order. Id. § 405/2-23
(West 2020); Id. § 405/2-27(1). The court may further order to place the minor in the custody of
another suitable relative or other person. Id. § 405/2-27(1)-(2) (West 2020). In doing so, the court
shall consider whether, “based on the health, safety, and the best interests of the minor” that: (a)
“appropriate services aimed at family preservation and family reunification have been
unsuccessful in rectifying the conditions that have led to a finding of unfitness or inability to care
for, protect, train, or discipline the minor, or (b) no family preservation or family reunification
services would be appropriate.” Id. § 405/2-27(1.5)(a)-(b) (West 2020). Unless expressly noted, a
disposition order “does not operate to close proceedings on the pending petition” and is “subject
to modification *** until final closing and discharge of the proceedings” under section 2-31 of the
Act. Id.
¶ 91 The court may also enter “any orders necessary” to fulfill the applicable service plan, which
may include “orders requiring parties to cooperate with services,” “restraining orders controlling
the conduct of any party likely to frustrate the achievement of the goal,” and “visiting orders.” Id.
§ 405/2-23(3) (West 2020). A disposition order may also provide for protective supervision and
can include an order of protection. Id. § 405/2-23(2) (West 2020). The order of protection may
include any “reasonable” condition for a specified period of time so long as the condition is based
on the minor’s health, safety and best interests and is otherwise authorized by the Act. Id. § 405/2-
25(1) (West 2020). The order of protection may be modified or extended for a further period of
time, or terminated if the court finds that both the minor and the public’s health, safety and best
interests will be served. Id. § 405/2-25(4) (West 2020)). If a motion is filed alleging violation of
such conditions and the court determines that the violation is “of a critical service necessary to the
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No. 1-23-1166
safety and welfare of the minor,” the court may reallocate temporary custody of the minor and may
begin contempt proceedings. Id. § 405/2-25(9) (West 2020); see also Id. § 405/2-26(1) (West 2020)
(discussing enforcement of orders of protection).
¶ 92 3. Permanency Hearings
¶ 93 The trial court must also conduct a permanency hearing within 12 months of the date that
temporary custody was taken, regardless of whether an adjudication or disposition hearing was
completed. Id. § 405/2-28(2) (West 2020). Subsequent permanency hearings are to be held every
6 months or more frequently if the court deems them necessary, or until the court determines that
the plan and goal have been achieved. Id. At the permanency hearing, the court shall determine the
future status of the child and set a permanency goal, which may include a variety of “return home”
goals, such as: the minor’s return home within 5 months (Id. § 405/2-28(2)(A) (West 2020)); the
minor’s placement in short-term care with the continued goal to return home within a year, to be
evaluated in accordance with the parent’s progress and the minor’s individual needs and age (Id.
§ 405/2-28(2)(B) (West 2020)); or the minor’s placement in short-term care with a continued goal
to return home pending a status hearing and the parent’s reasonable efforts in satisfying his or her
progress goals (Id. § 405/2-28(2)(B-1) (West 2020)).
¶ 94 In determining the permanency goal, the court considers the minor’s best interest in light
of multiple statutorily-defined factors. Id. § 405/2-28. If the court finds that a parent has not made
reasonable efforts or reasonable progress, the court shall identify what actions the parent and the
Department must take in order to justify a finding of reasonable efforts and reasonable progress.
Id. § 405/2-28(2)(B-1). The court will then set the matter for status between 9 and 11 months after
a minor’s adjudication, where the parent’s progress will again be reviewed. Id.
¶ 95 4. Termination of Wardship
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No. 1-23-1166
¶ 96 Wardship proceedings are automatically terminated upon the minor attaining 21 years of
age or upon court order. Id. § 405/2-31(1)-(2) (West 2020). As to the latter, if the court determines
and makes written factual findings that the minor’s health, safety, and best interests no longer
require wardship of the court, the court shall order the wardship terminated and subsequently close
out or discharge any and all proceedings under the Act. Id. § 405/2-31(2).
¶ 97 B. Jurisdiction
¶ 98 The dispositive issue on appeal concerns our jurisdiction. S.W.’s notice of appeal identified
the court’s June 2 judgment as the appealable order, which she characterized as “findings after
disposition hearing.” 22 S.W.’s jurisdictional statement further identifies Supreme Court Rules 301
and 303 as the bases for jurisdiction, and further states that:
“[t]he notice of appeal refers to ‘findings after disposition hearing’ with a judgment
date of June 2, 2023, and that day, the disposition hearing concluded with a denial of the
amended motion to reconsider. In In re William H., 407 Ill. App 3d 858, 865-66 (1st Dist.
2011), the [c]ourt reviewed a similar order entered at the end of the dispositional hearing.
See also In re Jennifer W., 2014 IL App (1st) 140984 ***[.].
The notice of appeal was timely filed on June 30, 2023, within 30 days of [June 2],
2023, 23 when the order appealed from was entered. See Supreme Court Rule 303(a).”
¶ 99 The GAL’s argument for lack of jurisdiction is multi-faceted. 24 First, the GAL contends
that there is no requisite jurisdiction under Rules 301 or 303, as the order denying the motion for
22
The Notice of Appeal did not attach a copy of the subject order. As discussed above, the trial
court entered multiple orders concerning K.C. on June 2.
23 The appellant’s jurisdictional statement initially reflected March 23, 2023, as the date of the order
being appealed. She later clarified that the correct date of the order appealed from was June 2, 2023.
24
The State also filed a brief and adopted the entirety of the GAL’s jurisdictional arguments therein.
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No. 1-23-1166
no reasonable efforts is solely interlocutory in nature, versus that of a disposition order, which is
usually reviewable under the same rules, citing In re Jennifer W., and In re Joseph J., 2020 IL App
(1st) 190305, in support. According to the GAL, a “reasonable efforts” determination is time-
specific and only addresses the adequacy of the Department’s efforts at the time of ruling, which
is usually assessed in accordance with whether family reunification can be achieved with the
Department’s help.
¶ 100 The GAL acknowledges that we may still have jurisdiction if the “no reasonable efforts”
ruling constituted a “necessary step in the procedural progression leading to the disposition order.”
However, the GAL points out, the ruling at issue coincided with a permanency order which
included a “return home” goal pursuant to section 2-28 of the Act, which are generally considered
to be temporary in nature and therefore non-final for purposes of appeal, citing In re Curtis B, 203
Ill. 2d 53 (2002), and In re Faith B, 216 Ill. 2d 1 (2005). Thus, the GAL reasons, because the
court’s permanency ruling still contemplated continuing efforts to reunite K.C. with his mother, it
cannot be considered a final or necessary step in the progression leading to final adjudication of
wardship. With regard to S.W.’s reliance on In re William H. as contained within her jurisdictional
statement, although the GAL concedes that the court there also assessed a “reasonable efforts”
ruling, the GAL points out that the case did not contain any discussion as to jurisdiction and
therefore should not be considered dispositive.
¶ 101 Finally, the GAL concludes, S.W. cannot find solace in any other supreme court rules that
could confer jurisdiction. Specifically, the GAL argues that the “no reasonable efforts” ruling is
not appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304, as it did not “finally” determine the right or status
of a party. Additionally, the GAL continues, although Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) allows for
discretionary review of a permanency order, S.W. would have needed to file a petition for review
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within 14 days of the entry of the challenged order, which did not happen here, citing In re Joseph
J. in support.
¶ 102 In reply, S.W. contends that the “no reasonable efforts” ruling should be construed as
contributing to the final disposition ruling, which, according to her, was the denial of the motion
to reconsider. S.W. concedes that her motion to reconsider was ruled upon prior to the start of the
permanency hearing, but maintains that the timing of the ruling was “arbitrary” and ultimately had
the “practical effect of seeking reconsideration of the finding in the final disposition order that
reasonable efforts had been made” and thus was a “step in the procedural progression.” S.W. also
rejects characterizing the “no reasonable efforts” ruling as related to the court’s permanency order
because, although the latter could be modified, a “no reasonable efforts ruling” is a
“characterization of past action” and thus not subject to modification.
¶ 103 1. Is the Reasonable Efforts Ruling a Final and Appealable Order?
¶ 104 We first turn to Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303, which, according to S.W., are the bases
for our jurisdiction. Rule 301 governs the appeals of “final judgments” in civil cases which are
appealable as of right. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb 1, 1994). Supreme Court Rule 303 works in
tandem with Rule 301 by setting forth the requirements of such an appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1),
(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). Also relevant here is Supreme Court Rule 311, which governs the
accelerated disposition of appeals from final orders relating to child custody, allocation of parental
responsibilities, and relocation of unemancipated minors. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a) (eff. (July 1, 2018).25
25
We also observe that Supreme Court Rule 311 does allow for review of “interlocutory appeals in
child custody or allocation of parental responsibilities cases or decisions allowing or denying relocation
*** **** *** from which leave to appeal has been granted pursuant to Rule 306(a)(5).” (Emphasis added.)
Ill. S. Ct. R. 311. The rule also appears to consider appeals “taken from a judgment or order affecting other
matters, such as support, property issues or decisions affecting the rights of persons other than the child,
unless doing so will delay decision on the child custody or allocation of parental responsibilities or
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¶ 105 In determining whether an order is final and appealable, we consider whether the order
“terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties
either on the entire controversy or on a separate part thereof.” In re Alexis H, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1009,
1012 (2002). A “final judgment” is one that “fixes absolutely the rights of the parties,” where, if
affirmed, “the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment.” Id.¶ 106 As shown above through our summary of the Act and the recitation of this case’s
procedural history, multiple types of orders may be entered throughout a wardship proceeding, and
generally only some are reviewable. For instance, a disposition order is generally considered final
for purposes of appeal. See In re Brandon S., 331 Ill. App. 3d 757, 760 (2002); In re D.S., 307 Ill.
App. 3d 362, 365 (1999). In contrast, a permanency order is generally not considered a final order
as it is subject to review and re-evaluation at a minimum of every six months. See 705 ILCS 405/2-
28(2); see also In re Curtis B, 203 Ill. 2d 53, 58, 59-60 (2002) (a permanency order generally does
not contain any determinations that are “set or fixed as a matter of law.”); Alexis H., 335 Ill. App.
3d at 1012 (following each permanency hearing, a trial court’s permanency order vacates the
original disposition and supersedes it, thus leaving “[a]ll of the rights and obligations set forth in
permanency order *** open for examination and possible revision until the permanency goal is
achieved.”) (quoting Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d at 60)); In re Joseph J, 2020 IL App (1st) 190305, ¶ 24
(noting that a permanency order is interlocutory and non-final).
¶ 107 However, as noted by our supreme court in In re Faith B, 216 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2005), a relevant
consideration as to an order’s finality is the “nature of the order.” For instance, a permanency order
may be considered a final judgment and thus reviewable under Rule 301 if the order appears to be
relocation of the unemancipated minors’ appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311. The interlocutory component of Rule
306(a)(5) is discussed later in our disposition.
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“final and immutable” at the time it was made, meaning that if a permanency “goal has been
reached,” the order may constitute a final judgment. Id. at 17-18. Additionally, a disposition order
may not be final for purposes of appeal if the disposition ruling does not “permanently determine
the rights of the parties nor expressly resolve any issue in the case,” such as “the return home of”
the minor children. Brandon S., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 761. As such, we must assess the circumstances
by which the court’s multiple June 2 orders arose to determine the effect of the court’s ruling as to
the reasonable efforts motion.
¶ 108 The record demonstrates that three substantive orders were entered on June 2: one denied
S.W.’s “no reasonable efforts” motion; another denied S.W.’s amended motion to reconsider, and
the third was a permanency order entered after a hearing. S.W.’s “no reasonable efforts” motion
was filed on March 16, following a hearing on the GAL’s emergency motions and the court’s
March 10 modified disposition order which adjudicated K.C. as a ward of the court. The motion
specifically sought a finding that the Department had not made reasonable efforts since the minors
had been placed back in S.W.’s care. The motion was left unaddressed by the court until June 2,
when both minors were no longer living with S.W.
¶ 109 S.W.’s first motion to reconsider was filed on April 3 and sought reversal of the “[c]ourt’s
March 16 order vacating the minor’s order of protection.” Notably, it did not expressly challenge
the entire March 16 disposition order. In her amended motion, S.W. challenged the court’s: (1)
vacating of the order of protection; (2) the court’s refusal to continue the emergency motion to
allow counsel to raise the issue of “no reasonable efforts”; and (3) other procedural issues during
the court’s hearing. The later filed motion discussed the issue of “reasonable efforts” therein, and
ultimately sought reconsideration of the court’s “dispositional order vacating the order of
protection and return[ing] the minor home.” This motion was also left unaddressed until June 2.
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¶ 110 On June 2, prior to conducting the permanency hearing, the court denied S.W.’s motion to
reconsider after it determined that S.W. did not allege any new evidence or changes in the law as
to its vacatur of the order of protection. The court then expressly stated that it would consider the
motion for no reasonable efforts within the context of permanency hearing, which ultimately
included Nalls-Walker’s testimony as to her efforts to coordinate services with S.W. both while
K.C. and C.W. were in her care, as well as after the children were removed.
¶ 111 In our view, when both motions were originally filed, they attempted to seek
reconsideration of the court’s March 10 order, which vacated the order of protection, in addition
to its March 16 disposition order. Specifically, both challenged the court’s vacating of the order of
protection based on S.W.’s violations, which according to S.W., were in part due to the
Department’s failure to assist her with her express duties outlined therein. However, both motions
appeared to languish for months in court, and although S.W.’s counsel mentioned their pending
nature over the course of numerous court hearings, he did not seek any express entry or denial.
Further, after the court denied the motion to reconsider on June 2, counsel did not object when the
court indicated that it would assess the motion for no reasonable efforts with the evidence
presented during the permanency hearing. Thus, the hearing included testimony regarding the
minor children’s current placement status as well as the events leading up to their removal from
S.W.’s home months prior. As such, S.W.’s motion for no reasonable efforts appeared to merge
directly into the permanency proceedings.
¶ 112 However, merely because the two were considered and ruled on together does not make
their final determinations appealable. As noted prior, a permanency order is generally not
considered to be final. Based on our assessment of the record, we ultimately agree with the GAL
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that the June 2 permanency order was not intended to be final as demonstrated by the court’s oral
pronouncement and the express language of the written order.
¶ 113 In its oral ruling, the court commented that permanency goals are a “misnomer because
they are not permanent and can be changed.” The court also noted that the parties had not explored
the possibility of private guardianship or adoption, and that such goals could be discussed moving
forward. The court also indicated that, if S.W. were to cooperate and engage in services, she could
still work towards a return home goal for K.C. Finally, the court observed that any appeal of its
permanency order would be discretionary, therefore indicating it did not view the order as final.
Compare In re Faith B, 216 Ill. 2d at 17 (finding an “atypical” permanency order to be final in
nature based on its entry with a separate dispositional order, the trial court’s express
pronouncement that the order was final and appealable, the trial court’s refusal to hold a future
permanency hearing, and the trial court’s comment that it believed the only acceptable care plan
was guardianship by another relative and thus left no room for future modification).
¶ 114 The written permanency order also bolsters this conclusion. The order does not make a
final determination as to the termination of parental rights; rather, it delineates a prior reunification
goal to return K.C. home within 12 months. The order further indicated that “services are ongoing”
due to S.W.’s lack of cooperation with the agency and participation in recommended services, as
well as the fact that K.C. was not 21 years old, which would have automatically terminated such
proceedings. See 705 ILCS 405/2-31(1)-(2). Finally, the case was also scheduled for another
permanency hearing in November 2023.
¶ 115 We also do not find that S.W.’s reliance on In re William H., 407 Ill. App. 3d 858 (2011),
compels a different result. There, following an adjudication hearing where the minor child was
found neglected and abused, the disposition hearing was delayed due to the parties’ failure to
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complete required assessments. Id. at 861-62. Prior to the scheduled hearing, the respondent
mother filed a motion requesting a finding that no reasonable efforts had been made to reunify her
and the minor. Id. At the next court appearance, the court conducted a disposition hearing and
heard argument on the respondent’s motion. Id. at 862-63. During the hearing, an agency
caseworker testified that the respondent had not participated in any required agency services and
that the minor’s current placement was safe and appropriate. Id. The court also heard testimony
that the child was in therapy, but that the minor did not wish to have contact with the respondent
and rejected efforts for the agency to coordinate such visits. Id. at 863-64. Following the hearing,
the State and GAL agreed that it was in the child’s best interest to be made a ward of the court,
that the respondent be found unable to care for him, and that her motion for reasonable efforts be
denied. Id. at 864. However, the respondent argued that she should solely be found “unable” and
that the court should grant her motion for no reasonable efforts. Id.¶ 116 The court ultimately adjudged the minor to be a ward of the court, and entered an additional
finding that the respondent was “unable” to care for him. Id. at 865. With regard to the motion for
no reasonable efforts, the court assessed the evidence presented during the hearing, which included
the case’s delayed timeline and the respondent’s refusal to participate in required services. Id. at
864-65. The court denied the motion and found that the Department had made “reasonable efforts”
to reunify the family based on the child’s participation in therapy, as well as the Department’s
attempts to facilitate visits between the child and the respondent, even if such visits had not come
to fruition. Id. at 864-65.
¶ 117 On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial court erred in denying her motion. Although
no jurisdictional argument was raised by any of the parties or discussed by the court sua sponte,
the appellate court construed the reasonable efforts ruling as subsumed within the entire disposition
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hearing and subsequent order. Specifically, the court noted that the trial court’s “reasonable efforts
finding was entered at the end of the dispositional hearing” and thus “became a part of the court’s
dispositional ruling” where the minor was adjudged a ward of the court. Id. at 866; see also In re
Jennifer W., 2014 IL App (1st) 140984, ¶ 48 (where a court’s findings of reasonable efforts
occurred in the course of its disposition ruling, it is reviewed in the same way as any other decision
made during that ruling). The appellate court then proceeded to assess the totality of the disposition
ruling, which was ultimately affirmed in its entirety. Id. at 866, 873.
¶ 118 Preliminarily, in our case, we point out that any arguments regarding “reasonable efforts”
contained within S.W.’s motion to reconsider were denied by the court prior to the start of the
permanency hearing, which it stated would be conducted with the reasonable efforts motion in
mind. Thus, we do not find S.W.’s argument as to the timing of the motion to be persuasive as it
is clear that the motion to reconsider was sufficiently separate from the permanency proceedings.
¶ 119 However, we still find William H. inapplicable. We acknowledge that here, as in William
H., the court’s reasonable efforts finding was subsumed within the hearing and its assessment of
the evidence therein. However, what is distinguishable is the type of proceeding that occurred. In
William H., the proceeding at issue was a disposition hearing, and as noted above, a disposition
order is generally considered final and appealable. See also Joseph J., 2020 IL App (1st) 190305,
¶ 25 (an otherwise interlocutory permanency order considered final when entered in accordance
with a dispositional order). In contrast here, the trial court’s ruling occurred during a permanency
hearing, which generally is not considered to be a final phase in such proceedings, and, as
discussed above, was not intended to be, given that the matter was scheduled for another
permanency hearing as the goal of return home had not yet been achieved. See Id. ¶ 25. Thus, even
when considering both orders together, we still do not find the court’s permanency ruling to
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constitute a final order for purposes of appeal. Accordingly, we do not find that we have requisite
jurisdiction to review the trial court’s June 2 ruling under either Rules 301 or 303.
¶ 120 2. Alternative Jurisdiction under Rules 306(a)(5) and 304(a)
¶ 121 The GAL further argues that, although our supreme court rules may allow for our court to
exercise jurisdiction over permissive appeals of non-final orders, S.W. also cannot find solace
there. We note that S.W.’s reply brief does not address the GAL’s argument that there is no
jurisdiction over her appeal even under Rules 306(a)(5) or 304(a). As such, we would ordinarily
consider any additional argument to be forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)
(points not argued are forfeited). However, for purposes of completeness, we would still be unable
to find that we have jurisdiction to review the merits of the case.
¶ 122 Rule 311 provides that certain interlocutory appeals in child custody matters are reviewable
if “leave to appeal has been granted pursuant to Rule 306(a)(5).” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a). In turn, Rule
306(a)(5) provides that a party may petition for leave to appeal to our court from “interlocutory
orders affecting the care and custody of the allocation of parental responsibilities for
unemancipated minors or the relocation (formerly known as removal) of unemancipated minors”
if such an appeal “is not otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in these rules.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
306(a)(5). Because our supreme court has found permanency orders to be generally interlocutory
in nature, the June 2 permanency order here arguably may have fallen within the ambit of Rule
306(a)(5). See Curtis B, 203 Ill. 2d at 61.
¶ 123 However, Rule 306 governs permissive appeals and thus contains further requirements for
such an appeal that were not met here. One such requirement is that the petition for leave to appeal
must be filed within 14 days of the entry of the order of which the appeal is being sought. See Ill.
S. Ct. R. 306(b)(1) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Our review of the record does not show that S.W. filed such
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a petition, and even if she had, she also did not file her notice of appeal within 14 days of the June
2 order. See Joseph J., 2020 IL App (1st) 190305, ¶ 24 (declining to exercise jurisdiction where
appellant did not file the requisite petition and filed the notice of appeal after 14 days); In re Alicia
Z, 336 Ill. App. 3d 476, 493-94 (2002) (refusing to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Rule
306(a)(5) where there was no showing of required application for permissive appeal and judicial
economy would not otherwise be served). As such, Rule 306(a)(5) cannot serve as a mechanism
for our review.
¶ 124 Additionally, S.W.’s appeal is not proper under Rule 304(a), which allows for appellate
review of a final judgment, even if all claims for relief in the pending matter have not yet been
resolved. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. March 8, 2016). Specifically, the rule provides that:
“If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal
may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all of the parties or
claims only if the trial court has made an express finding that there is no just reason for
delaying either enforcement or appeal or both. Such a finding may be made at the time of
entry of the judgment or thereafter on the court’s own motion or motion of any party.” Ill.
S. Ct. R. 304(a).
¶ 125 As discussed prior, there was no final judgment entered in the instant proceedings. Further,
the trial court did not indicate in either its oral ruling or written order that any of its findings were
immediately appealable within the meaning of Rule 304(a), and even stated on the record that it
did not believe the permanency order was appealable. Thus, we also do not have jurisdiction under
Rule 304(a).
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¶ 126 In sum, we cannot find that we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order under any
articulated basis for review. As such, we decline to address the substantive merits of S.W.’s appeal,
and ultimately dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 127 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 128 For the reasons stated, the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 129 Appeal dismissed.
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In the Interest of K.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 231166Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2020-JA-663;
the Hon. Maxwell Griffin, Jr., Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Suzanne A. Isaacson, of the Cook County Public Defender, of
for Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Charles P. Golbert, Kass A. Plain, and Mary Brigid Hayes, of the
for Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, of Chicago, for
Appellee: appellee.
Enrique Abraham and Gina DiVito, of the Cook County State’s
Attorney, of Chicago, for appellee.
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