In re I.M. , 2024 IL App (4th) 231591-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 231591-UThis Order was filed under
FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is May 23, 2024
NO. 4-23-1591
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re I.M., a Minor ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Knox County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 22JA41
v. )
Jessica M., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Curtis S. Lane,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Finding no issues of potential merit to support an appeal in this case, appellate
counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
¶2 Respondent Jessica M. is the mother of I.M. (born in 2022). In November 2023, the
trial court adjudicated the minor to be neglected. In December 2023, the court found respondent
unfit and placed guardianship and custody of the minor with the Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS). The identity of the minor’s father is unknown.
¶3 Respondent appealed, and her appointed appellate counsel moved to withdraw
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In her supporting brief, appellate counsel
contends that this appeal presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. Notice was given
to respondent, and no written response was filed. We grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 A. Neglect Petition
¶6 In July 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of I.M. The
petition alleged that the minor was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court
Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)) in that his environment
was injurious to his welfare because respondent (1) gave birth to I.M. in Iowa to evade DCFS
involvement, (2) was found dispositionally unfit as to her four older children, (3) is not allowed to
visit her older children due to a no-contact order resulting from her behavior during supervised
visits, and (4) gave false information as to her address and the name of I.M.’s father. Following a
shelter care hearing, the trial court found probable cause to believe I.M. was neglected and granted
temporary custody of the minor to DCFS.
¶7 B. Adjudicatory Hearing
¶8 In October 2022, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing. The court took judicial
notice of the case files in Knox County case Nos. 19-JA-35, 21-JA-37, 21-JA-38, and 21-JA-39,
the four cases involving respondent’s older children.
¶9 Brooke Matykiewicz, a DCFS caseworker, testified she was the caseworker in
I.M.’s case and his older siblings’ cases. Matykiewicz believed respondent gave birth to I.M. in
Iowa to “escape DCFS.” She did not know the identity of I.M.’s father. In the cases involving
respondent’s four older children, Matykiewicz stated respondent was found unfit and the
permanency goal for those cases was “[s]ubstitute care pending court determination on termination
of parental rights.”
¶ 10 Matykiewicz described respondent’s behavior at supervised visits with the older
children as “[v]ery chaotic.” She regularly heard respondent yelling, screaming, and cursing in
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front of the older children. Eventually, a no-contact order was issued against respondent after she
threatened the older children and the visitation specialist during a supervised visit in January 2022.
Respondent has had no contact with the older children since this incident.
¶ 11 Matykiewicz stated her last in-person meeting with respondent occurred at a child
and family team meeting at the end of June 2022 and her last contact with respondent was through
a text message at the end of July 2022. Respondent initiated the child and family team meeting to
assess the placement of I.M., with whom respondent was pregnant at the time.
¶ 12 Respondent testified on her own behalf. However, after she admitted to contracting
COVID-19, the trial court ordered respondent to leave the courtroom. At the time, a sheriff’s order
prohibited any person with COVID-19 from entering the courthouse. The adjudicatory hearing
was continued.
¶ 13 In October 2022, the adjudicatory hearing resumed. Respondent failed to appear,
and the hearing was again continued. In November 2022, respondent’s counsel filed a motion to
withdraw due to a lack of communication with respondent and her failure to appear at multiple
hearings. Following a December 2022 hearing, the trial court granted counsel’s motion to
withdraw. The court later appointed counsel to represent respondent.
¶ 14 The adjudicatory hearing resumed in November 2023. Respondent testified she
began mental health treatment in 2019. She attended counseling twice a month and had monthly
appointments with her psychiatrist. She testified to consistently taking psychiatric medication over
this period.
¶ 15 Respondent next described the January 2022 visitation incident. According to
respondent, two of the older children alleged abuse in their foster home. Respondent admitted she
“reacted in an inappropriate fashion” but claimed she responded “[l]ike any protective mother
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would.” Following the incident, respondent stated she contacted Matykiewicz at least twice a
week, but Matykiewicz refused to respond. Instead, respondent had to set up team meetings
through Matykiewicz’s supervisor.
¶ 16 Respondent completed two parenting programs, finishing the most recent one about
a year before I.M.’s birth. She further completed a domestic violence program in 2018 or 2019 and
a substance abuse evaluation. For her employment, respondent stated she worked as an
independent nursing contractor and was working in a nursing home when I.M. was born.
Respondent claimed she “temporarily” resided in Moline, Illinois, but she did not elaborate on the
location of her current residence.
¶ 17 The trial court adjudicated I.M to be neglected based on anticipatory neglect. The
matter was set for a dispositional hearing.
¶ 18 C. Dispositional Hearing
¶ 19 In December 2023, the trial court held a dispositional hearing, at which respondent
was not present. At the State’s request, the court admitted into evidence a DCFS dispositional
report, service plan, and Court Appointed Special Advocates report, all dated December 2023, and
a parental capacity assessment dated January 2021.
¶ 20 According to the January 2021 parental capacity assessment, DCFS first became
involved with respondent’s family due to domestic violence between respondent and Eric S., the
biological father of the four older children. The older children were removed from the home after
the children sustained repeated physical injuries while in the care of respondent. In November
2017, a medical examination of two of the children revealed bruising and physical injuries
consistent with physical abuse, and it was reported one of those minors ingested
methamphetamine. After being returned to respondent’s care in April 2019, one of the minors
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sustained a black eye after respondent allegedly hit the minor in the eye for taking her phone. In
September 2019, another one of the children was taken into DCFS custody after sustaining a skull
fracture while in respondent’s care.
¶ 21 Nicolette Fox, a DCFS child welfare specialist, testified she was assigned to I.M.’s
case in November 2022. Under the service plan, respondent was required to complete a parenting
class, domestic violence services, a mental health assessment, and drug testing; she was also
required to cooperate with DCFS and maintain stable housing and income.
¶ 22 Respondent had not completed an integrated assessment in I.M.’s case. Although
respondent completed two parenting classes in the older children’s cases, she was required to take
an additional parenting class “in light of her parenting capacity.” Respondent also completed a
domestic violence program in the older children’s cases. However, because respondent had not
provided her address, Fox stated there was no way to verify if respondent had any additional
domestic violence incidents. For mental health services, respondent signed the releases and was
currently attending therapy at Robert Young. However, Robert Young reported respondent
discontinued her psychiatric medications in August 2022 “because she didn’t feel like she needed
them anymore.”
¶ 23 As for her cooperation with DCFS, Fox described respondent as “very inconsistent
in contact.” Fox noted respondent would sometimes answer texts and phone calls and set up
meetings, but other times she would not hear from respondent for months. Specifically, after giving
birth to I.M. in July 2022, respondent had no contact with DCFS until January 2023. Fox also
indicated respondent still had not provided her current address. The last two physical addresses
provided by respondent were either vacant lots or invalid addresses when searched on Google
Maps. Respondent never provided any documentation of where she worked.
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¶ 24 Fox testified respondent was also uncooperative with drug testing. Although
respondent was required to complete drug testing twice a month, she provided a total of two
negative drug tests over the course of a year. Respondent told Fox “she drug tests at work so she
doesn’t feel like she needs to at DCFS.” Fox indicated she did not have access to any drug tests
respondent may have completed through her employment.
¶ 25 Respondent has never had visitation with I.M. The first time respondent asked for
visitation was in February 2023, seven months after the minor’s birth. However, Fox explained
that DCFS issued a no-visitation decision for I.M. due to (1) an existing no-visitation decision for
the older siblings and (2) therapeutic and physician recommendations that respondent should not
have visitation with I.M. Fox noted that, regardless, respondent was required to complete her drug
tests as a prerequisite to starting visitation, and her failure to do so meant visitation was not a
possibility.
¶ 26 The trial court found respondent unfit, made I.M. a ward of the court, and placed
guardianship and custody with DCFS. The unfitness finding was based on two grounds: first, she
failed to make reasonable progress or efforts to correct the conditions which led to the removal of
the four older children; and second, she failed to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of I.M. during the first 30 days after his birth.
¶ 27 This appeal followed.
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 Appellate counsel moves to withdraw, arguing this case presents no potentially
meritorious issues for review. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-86 (2000) (holding Anders
applies to parental rights cases). Counsel states in her motion that she has examined the record and
found no issue of arguable merit. She lists two potential issues for review: (1) whether the trial
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court erred in finding the minor was neglected and (2) whether the court erred in finding
respondent was unfit and making the minor a ward of the court. Because we agree with counsel
that any argument as to these potential issues would be frivolous, we grant the motion to withdraw
and affirm the court’s judgment.
¶ 30 A. Adjudicatory Finding
¶ 31 Appellate counsel contends no potentially meritorious argument could be raised to
challenge the trial court’s order finding I.M. to be neglected.
¶ 32 Under the Juvenile Court Act, the trial court must follow a two-step process when
deciding whether a minor should be made a ward of the court. In re A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 18.
In the first step, the court conducts an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the minor is
abused, neglected, or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2022); In re Z.L., 2021 IL
126931, ¶ 59. Section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022))
defines a neglected minor as any minor “whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare.”
While the term “injurious environment” is often characterized as an amorphous concept that cannot
be defined with particularity, it has generally been recognized as including “the breach of a parent’s
duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for his or her children.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re J.C., 2012 IL App (4th) 110861, ¶ 30.
¶ 33 “[C]ases involving allegations of neglect and adjudication of wardship are
sui generis, and must be decided on the basis of their unique circumstances.” In re Arthur H., 212
Ill. 2d 441, 463 (2004). The burden is on the State to prove allegations of neglect by a
preponderance of the evidence, i.e., that the allegations are more probably true than not. A.P., 2012
IL 113875, ¶ 17. On review, a trial court’s finding of neglect will not be reversed unless it is
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contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d at 464. “A finding is against
the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Id.
¶ 34 The allegations in the petition here were premised upon the theory of anticipatory
neglect. Under this theory,
“the State seeks to protect not only children who are the direct victims of neglect
or abuse, but also those who have a probability to be subject to neglect or abuse
because they reside, or in the future may reside, with an individual who has been
found to have neglected or abused another child.” Id. at 468.
However, “there is no per se rule that the neglect of one child conclusively establishes the neglect
of another child in the same household.” Id. Instead, the trial court must assess both “the
circumstances surrounding the sibling” and “the care and condition of the child in question.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “[W]here the child is alleged to be neglected under the
theory of anticipatory neglect, *** the court needs to evaluate the individual with whom the child
will reside.” In re Zion M., 2015 IL App (1st) 151119, ¶ 34.
¶ 35 In this case, the record adequately supports a finding of anticipatory neglect of I.M.
Between 2017 and 2019, respondent’s older children were taken into protective custody on three
separate occasions after sustaining physical injuries while in her care. Even after the older children
were removed and custody was granted to DCFS, respondent’s behavior around the children
showed no improvement. Her supervised visits at the DCFS office were described as “[v]ery
chaotic,” and she could be heard yelling, screaming, and cursing while in the presence of her
children. Most disturbingly, evidence was presented that respondent directed threats towards the
older children and a visitation specialist during a January 2022 supervised visit. This incident
occurred mere months before respondent gave birth to I.M.
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¶ 36 Respondent’s evasive and uncooperative behavior continued after I.M.’s birth. She
did not report I.M.’s birth to DCFS, despite being told to do so by her caseworker. Matykiewicz
found out about the birth only after calling four or five hospitals. Respondent named multiple
individuals as I.M.’s father, two of whom were DNA tested and eliminated. The identity of the
father remains unknown. Respondent also refused to provide her residential address to DCFS or
the trial court.
¶ 37 At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, respondent remained dispositionally unfit
in the older children’s cases and had not progressed toward their return. The goal for the older
children’s cases was substitute care pending termination of parental rights, and visitation had not
been restored due to the no-contact order against respondent. On this record, the State sufficiently
proved anticipatory neglect of I.M. by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we agree
with appellate counsel that there is no potentially meritorious argument to be made that the trial
court’s finding of neglect was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 38 B. Dispositional Findings
¶ 39 Appellate counsel determined no potentially meritorious argument could be made
to warrant reversal of the trial court’s order finding respondent unfit and making the minor a ward
of the court.
¶ 40 Following an adjudication of neglect, “the trial court then moves to step two, which
is the dispositional hearing.” A.P., 2012 IL 113875, ¶ 21. At the dispositional hearing, the court
determines “whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public that the minor be made a
ward of the court.” 705 ILCS 405/2-22(1) (West 2022). If the minor’s parents are found to be unfit,
unable, or unwilling to care for the minor, the court may properly place guardianship and custody
of the minor with DCFS. Id. § 2-27(1)(d). A court’s dispositional findings will be reversed “only
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if the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial court committed
an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re K.B., 2012 IL App (3d) 110655, ¶ 23.
¶ 41 In this case, respondent failed to demonstrate any meaningful effort in completing
the requirements under the service plan. While she completed two parenting classes, a domestic
violence program, and attended therapy, she almost totally failed to comply with drug testing and
discontinued taking her psychiatric medication. Moreover, her lack of cooperation with DCFS
persisted throughout the case. It took respondent seven months after DCFS took protective custody
of I.M. to even request visitation with the minor, which was never granted, due in part to her failure
to comply with drug testing. At the time of the dispositional hearing, respondent had yet to provide
valid proof of her residence or her employment. On this record, we agree with appellate counsel
that no potentially meritorious arguments can be raised on appeal that the trial court’s dispositional
findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
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