People v. Lacey , 2024 IL App (5th) 231064-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (5th) 231064-UNOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 05/24/24. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-1064
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County.
)
v. ) No. 20-CF-3125
)
ORLANDUIS LACEY JR., ) Honorable
) Ronald R. Slemer,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Boie and Sholar concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Where the defendant failed to file his motion to withdraw guilty pleas within 30
days after sentencing, this court cannot consider the instant appeal on the merits,
and therefore the defendant’s appointed appellate counsel is granted leave to
withdraw, and this appeal must be dismissed.
¶2 The defendant, Orlanduis Lacey Jr., pleaded guilty to aggravated domestic battery, as well
as two other felony crimes in a separate case, and he was sentenced to imprisonment on all three.
Nearly four months after his sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw pleas. The circuit
court noted the motion’s filing date, which was more than 30 days after sentencing, and entered
an order finding that it had lost jurisdiction over the case. In an attempt to appeal from that order,
the defendant filed a notice of appeal, which was also untimely. The defendant’s appointed
attorney on appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), has concluded that this
1
appeal must be dismissed, due to a lack of jurisdiction. On that basis, OSAD has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a supporting brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). OSAD
properly served the defendant with a copy of its Anders motion and brief. This court granted the
defendant an opportunity to file a pro se brief, memorandum, etc., showing cause why the
judgment should not be affirmed or why OSAD should not be allowed to withdraw as counsel.
However, the defendant has failed to file any type of response to OSAD’s motion. This court has
thoroughly examined OSAD’s Anders motion and brief, as well as the entire record on appeal.
This court concludes that OSAD must be granted leave to withdraw as counsel, and that this appeal
must be dismissed.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In December 2020, the defendant was charged with aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS
5/12-3.3(a-5) (West 2020)), a Class 2 felony, and domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West
2020)), a Class A misdemeanor.
¶5 On April 28, 2023, the defendant, his private attorney, and an assistant State’s attorney
appeared in the circuit court. The attorneys informed the judge that the parties had reached an
agreement encompassing four Madison County cases—the instant case (case No. 20-CF-3125) and
case Nos. 22-CF-1571, 20-CF-2843, and 21-CF-572. They described the terms of the agreement
as follows. In the instant case, the defendant would plead guilty to aggravated domestic battery,
and he would be sentenced to three years of imprisonment, at a truth-in-sentencing rate of 85%. In
case No. 22-CF-1571, the defendant would plead guilty to escape and to unlawful possession of a
weapon by a felon, and he would be sentenced to 12½ years of imprisonment on each of those two
counts, at a truth-in-sentencing rate of 50%, with the two sentences to be concurrent with one
another but consecutive to the term of imprisonment in the instant case. Finally, in case No. 21-
2
CF-572, a felony crime would be amended to a Class A misdemeanor, and the defendant would
plead guilty to that misdemeanor and would be sentenced to time served, while in case No. 20-CF-
2843, the charge or charges would be dismissed. (These two latter cases were not mentioned again
during the plea hearing. They will not be mentioned again in this order.)
¶6 The judge then questioned the defendant. In response, he stated that he was 26 years old,
had a GED, understood English, was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, had been in jail
for five or six months, and understood the parties’ negotiations.
¶7 The judge admonished the defendant that under the negotiated agreement, he would plead
guilty in the instant case to aggravated domestic battery, and the judge described the specific
conduct alleged in that count. The defendant indicated his understanding of that charge and his
desire to plead guilty to it. The judge also admonished the defendant that in case No. 22-CF-1571,
he was charged with escape and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, respectively, and the
judge described the specific conduct alleged in those two counts. The defendant indicated his
understanding of those two charges, too.
¶8 The judge further admonished the defendant that he had a right to plead guilty or not guilty;
that he had a right to a trial, whether jury or non-jury; and that by pleading guilty, there would be
no trial. The judge admonished him that the State had the burden of proving his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he had the presumption of innocence, that he had a right to testify or not
testify, that he had a right to subpoena and cross-examine witnesses, and that he had a right to an
attorney. The defendant indicated that he understood all of these rights and concepts.
¶9 The judge then explained the possible sentences for aggravated domestic battery, as it was
charged in the instant case, and for escape and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, as they
were charged in case No. 22-CF-1571. These possible sentences included the possible terms of
3
imprisonment under statute, the terms of mandatory supervised release (MSR), and monetary fines.
The defendant indicated his understanding of the possible sentences under law. The judge also
reviewed the specific, agreed-upon sentences for those three offenses, including the appropriate
truth-in-sentencing rates—85% for aggravated domestic battery, 50% for escape and unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon. The defendant indicated his understanding of the agreed-upon
sentences. The State supplied factual bases for all of these pleas. Defense counsel stipulated that
the evidence would be as the State had recounted.
¶ 10 The defendant entered pleas of guilty to all three counts, i.e., aggravated domestic battery,
escape, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. In response to the court’s queries, the
defendant indicated that no one had forced him or threatened him to plead guilty and that no one
had promised him anything, apart from the negotiations, to persuade him to plead guilty, and that
he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. The judge said that he would bind himself to the
negotiations and impose the negotiated sentences, as previously described.
¶ 11 The judge found that the defendant understood the charges against him, the penalties that
he faced, including the consecutive nature of sentencing, and his rights. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(a)
(eff. July 1, 2012). He also found that the defendant “freely, voluntarily, and knowingly” waived
his rights and entered pleas of guilty. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). Also, the judge
found sufficient factual bases for those pleas. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 402(c) (eff. July 1, 2012). The
parties waived preparation of a presentence investigation report, stating that the defendant’s
criminal history was accurately stated in the record. His history included a 2014 conviction in
Madison County for the Class 1 felony of residential burglary.
4
¶ 12 The judge accepted the defendant’s guilty pleas and entered judgment thereon. In response
to the judge’s queries, the defendant indicated that he did not have any questions about his
sentences and that he did not have any questions for his attorney.
¶ 13 Finally, the judge fully admonished the defendant about his right to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct.
R. 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001). These admonishments included informing him of the need to file, in
the circuit court, a written motion to withdraw his pleas “within 30 days of today’s date,” and of
the need to include in that motion all of the issues or claims of error that he wished to raise, or else
they would be waived. The judge also described the consequences of having the motion granted,
including vacatur of the imposed sentences and the reinstatement of any dismissed charges.
¶ 14 Immediately after the appeal admonishment, the defendant requested a 30-day furlough.
Over the State’s objection, the court granted the furlough. So ended the guilty-plea hearing and
sentencing of April 28, 2023.
¶ 15 In a written order also entered on April 28, 2023, the circuit court ordered that the defendant
was to be released from the county jail on May 1, 2023, and that the defendant was to turn himself
in to the county sheriff on May 30, 2023, at 9 a.m. The court also entered a written sentencing
order, sentencing the defendant (as agreed) to 3 years of imprisonment for aggravated domestic
battery in the instant case, and 12½ years of imprisonment for both escape and unlawful possession
of a weapon by a felon, with the 12½-year sentences concurrent with one another but consecutive
to the 3-year sentence for aggravated domestic battery, all to be followed by the statutorily-
mandated term of MSR. The written order also noted the defendant’s 30-day furlough.
¶ 16 An order entered by the court on June 5, 2023, stated that the defendant had reported to the
jail (apparently on the appointed date, at the appointed time). It ordered that he be transferred to
the Illinois Department of Corrections immediately.
5
¶ 17 On August 22, 2023, the defendant placed into the prison mail system a motion to withdraw
his guilty pleas and vacate the sentences. On August 28, 2023, the motion was file-stamped by the
clerk of the circuit court. For his motion, the defendant used a preprinted form with the blanks
filled in. The motion’s gravamen appeared in a hand-written paragraph that addressed both the
timing of the motion’s filing and the grounds for withdrawing the pleas. This paragraph read, in
its entirety, as follows:
“I was unable to file my motion within the 30[-]day deadline [d]ue to not having ac[c]ess
to a library. I left Madison [C]ounty 6/19/22, an[d] [d]ue to my escape I was in
Seg[regation] while at [G]raham I filed as soon as I could. First reason I would like to
withdraw my guilty [p]lea is, I wasn[’]t credited for none of the time I served when I got
my 22-CF-1571 on 6/18/22. Also they told me in my plea they was gone [sic] run my 3 at
85% case first which it wasn[’]t [sic]. They [a]lso extended term my possession case which
was 3 to 7 they gave me 12½ yrs. Lastly I felt forced I had just hired my [l]awyer 1 month
before they set a trial date, I haven[’]t even got a[n] offer yet or went over my motion of
[d]iscovery, I was treated unfairly.”
¶ 18 On September 5, 2023, the circuit court entered a short, written order that ruled on the
defendant’s motion to withdraw his pleas. The order noted the date that the defendant had pleaded
guilty, which was April 28, 2023, and the date on which the circuit clerk had file-stamped the
motion to withdraw pleas, which was August 28, 2023. The order then concluded, “The court has
no jurisdiction.”
¶ 19 Fifty-five days after the court’s order was entered—that is, on October 30, 2023—the clerk
file-stamped the defendant’s notice of appeal. (Nothing in the record indicates the date the
defendant placed the notice of appeal into the prison mail system.)
6
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 The defendant is attempting to appeal from the circuit court’s order finding that it lacked
jurisdiction over his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. As previously noted, the defendant’s
appointed counsel on appeal, OSAD, has filed an Anders motion to withdraw as counsel, on the
basis that this court lacks jurisdiction and therefore this appeal must be dismissed. The defendant
has not filed any type of response to OSAD’s Anders motion.
¶ 22 The question of whether this court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of a defendant’s
appeal is a legal question, subject to de novo review. People v. Salem, 2016 IL 11693, ¶ 11.
¶ 23 On April 28, 2023, the defendant, pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement with the
State, pleaded guilty to three counts in the instant case and in case No. 22-CF-1571. That same
day, he was duly sentenced to imprisonment. On August 22, 2023—nearly four months after
sentencing—he mailed to the clerk of the circuit court his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. A
motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within 30 days after sentencing. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d)
(eff. July 1, 2017). Since the defendant failed to file his motion within the 30-day timeframe, the
circuit court had lost jurisdiction to rule on that motion, just as the circuit court stated in its
dispositive order entered on September 5, 2023. See People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003)
(where a defendant files his postplea motion more than 30 days after sentence is imposed, the
circuit court is divested of jurisdiction). Compliance with Rule 604(d)’s time requirement is also
a condition precedent to an appeal; if a defendant fails to meet this requirement, the appeal must
be dismissed. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d at 300-01 (failure to file a timely Rule 604(d) motion precludes
a court of review from considering the appeal on the merits). Accordingly, this court cannot
consider this appeal on the merits. Regardless of what else can be said about the defendant and
this appeal—e.g., his failure to file the notice of appeal within 30 days after the final judgment was
7
entered on September 5, 2023 (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021))—his instant appeal
must be dismissed.
¶ 24 CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the reasons stated above, OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted,
and the instant appeal is dismissed.
¶ 26 Motion granted; appeal dismissed.
8