The Claymore Condominium Assoc. v. Majewska , 2024 IL App (3d) 230171-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 230171-UOrder filed May 30, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
THE CLAYMOOR CONDOMINIUM Appeal from the Circuit Court
ASSOCIATION, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
) DuPage County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-23-0171
v. ) Circuit No. 20CH410
)
KATARZYNA MAJEWSKA, ) The Honorable
) Anne Therieau Hayes
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
)
____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Brennan and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) Because the Claymoor Condominium Association provided adequate notice to
the defendant and ratified its attempts to remedy her violation of the
condominium’s declaration, the trial court properly granted summary judgment
for the Association; and (2) under the totality of the evidence, the trial court’s
grant of the Association’s fee petition was not an abuse of discretion.
¶2 In 2020, the Claymoor Condominium Association filed a complaint against Katarzyna
Majewska, who owned a unit within the condominium complex. The complaint alleged that she
violated the Association rules by invading the building’s common elements when she raised the
ceiling height in her unit without seeking prior approval from the Association’s board of
directors. The focus of the parties’ dispute became whether approval was necessary when the
area at issue was a “limited common element.”
¶3 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with the trial court granting the
Association’s motion and denying Majewska’s motion. As permitted by the condominium’s
declaration, the Association filed a petition for fees and costs and was awarded over $96,000.
Majewska appeals both the entry of the summary judgment order and the fee award. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 After Majewska purchased a unit in the Association in January 2020, she began to
renovate by replacing the windows and raising the ceiling height in one room by approximately
26 inches. She did not request permission from the Association’s Board of Directors for the
change in the height of the ceiling. After learning of the ceiling renovation, the Board determined
that the change violated the applicable rules and sent a letter to Majewska notifying her of the
violation.
¶6 When Majewska failed to remedy the violation, the Association filed a complaint in the
Du Page County circuit court in May 2020, seeking (1) a permanent injunction requiring
Majewska to return her ceiling and the common area above it to their original conditions and (2)
a declaratory judgment that Majewska “is responsible for obtaining board approval prior to
performing or otherwise making an addition, alteration or improvement to the Association’s
Common Elements, as required by the Declaration and cited by the Association” and “is
responsible for reimbursing the Association for all attorney’s fees and costs incurred as a result
of enforcing the terms of its Declaration.” The Association filed a motion for summary judgment
in September, but no hearing was held on that motion.
2
¶7 In November 2021, Majewska filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking
dismissal of the Association’s complaint with prejudice “based on the failures of the Plaintiff to
follow mandatory statutory procedures” for notice and due process. After a hearing, Judge Paul
Fullerton denied Majewska’s motion, finding “that sufficient notice under the Declaration and
the Illinois Condominium Property Act and an opportunity to be heard were given to Defendant
on March 30, 2020, by the Plaintiff.” In March 2022, Majewska filed a counterclaim, asserting
the Association’s breach of contract by failing to follow the mandated procedures.
¶8 On October 14, 2022, the Association and Majewska filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. After a hearing, the trial court granted the Association’s motion and denied
Majewska’s motion. The trial court denied Majewska’s motion to reconsider because “the
movant has failed to demonstrate newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, or an error in
the Court’s application of the facts to the law in this case.” After obtaining leave of the court, the
Association filed a petition seeking $96,155.08 in attorney fees and other costs in January 2023,
which was granted after a hearing. Majewska appeals from the grant of the Association’s
October 2022 summary judgment motion and petition for fees and costs.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, Majewska asserts that the trial court erred by: (1) awarding summary
judgment for the Association and (2) granting the Association’s request for attorney fees. We
address each issue and the applicable standard of review in turn. 1
¶ 11 A. Summary Judgment
1
The Association’s appellate brief requests that this court disregard or strike the portions of Majewska’s
brief that fail to comport with the applicable Supreme Court Rules. Although we find that portions of that brief are
not fully compliant with the Rules, we deny the Association’s motion and will consider the brief as submitted.
3
¶ 12 Initially, Majewska argues that the facts refute the trial court award of summary judgment
for the Association. In considering a summary judgment order, the applicable standard of review
is de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).
An order of summary judgment may be properly entered only if no genuine issues of material
fact remain, entitling the movant to judgment as a matter of law, and no reasonable person could
draw a different conclusion from the undisputed facts. In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, the factual record must be liberally construed in favor of the nonmovant. Duniver v.
Clark Material Handling Co., 2023 IL 128141, ¶ 24.
¶ 13 Majewska notes that the parties agreed in the trial court that the work done to her ceiling
involved a “limited common element.” She argues that the condominium declarations make
“limited common elements” and “common elements” “completely separate categories with
separate rules in relation to the Plaintiff,” with owners being allowed to make any changes
“within the Unit *** without the prior written approval of the Board.” Because, in her view, the
ceiling was a ”limited common element” but not a “common element,” Majewska argues that she
was not required to seek prior Board approval. With no need for Board approval, her ceiling
renovation did not violate the declarations, entitling her to summary judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 14 The condominium declaration here is a contract between Majewska, as the owner of the
unit, and the Association. Forest Glen Community Homeowners Association v. Bishof, 321 Ill.
App. 3d 298, 303 (2001). When the declaration was originally recorded in 1966, it included a
Plat of Survey showing the units, the common elements, and the balconies. The plat also
established “the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the units.” For units located on the third
floor, such as Majewska’s unit, the vertical boundaries “do not extend to the attic area above the
horizontal boundaries of the unit (i.e., ceilings).” In addition, the Plat expressly states that “the
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‘horizontal and vertical planes forming boundaries of units coincide with top of concrete sub-
floors, bottom of joists, and interior face of perimeter masonry walls or wooden stud walls.’ ”
(Emphases added.) Nothing in the Plat suggests that the space above the ceiling is within the
boundary of any units. In fact, section 1(e) of the declaration specifically defines a “unit” “as the
space enclosed and bounded by the horizontal and vertical planes as shown on the Plat.”
¶ 15 Sections 1(f) and 1(g) of the declaration define the building’s “common “elements” “as
all of the Property, except the Units” and its “limited common elements” “as those portions of
the Common Elements contiguous to and serving exclusively a single or adjoining Units,
including but not limited to the ceilings.” Those definitions closely track the ones found in
section 2 of the Illinois Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/2 (West 2022)).
¶ 16 Critically, section 2(e) of the Act specifically states that “common elements” include
“limited common elements.” 765 ILCS 605/2(e) (West 2022) (stating “ ‘Common Elements’
means all portions of the property except the units, including limited common elements unless
otherwise specified”). Section 2(s) of the Act emphasizes the legislature’s intent to create
overlapping definitions of “common elements” and “limited common elements,” stating
“ ‘Limited Common Elements’ means a portion of the common elements so designated in the
declaration as being reserved for the use of a certain unit or units to the exclusion of other units,
including but not limited to balconies, terraces, patios and parking spaces or facilities.”
(Emphasis added.) 765 ILCS 605/2(s) (West 2022). Our case law has also recognized that a
condominium’s limited common elements constitute a subset of its common elements. Lake
Barrington Shore Condominium Ten Homeowners Ass’n v. May, 196 Ill. App. 3d 280, 283
(1990) (stating “the limited common elements are a subset of the common elements”). Moreover,
paragraph 17 of the declaration expressly states that “[n]o alterations of any Common Elements,
5
or any additions or improvements thereto, shall be made by any Unit Owner without the prior
written approval of the Board.” Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous provisions of both the Act
and the declaration, we reject Majewska’s claim that Board approval was not required because
her ceiling renovation did not affect the “common elements.”
¶ 17 Nonetheless, she contends that no violation occurred because her renovations did not
damage any other unit, the common elements or the property, or create any danger. That
contention, however, is blatantly incorrect. By raising the height of her ceiling to intrude into the
common space above it, Majewska reduced the set of common elements shared by all unit
owners and attempted to use it exclusively as part of her unit. Our courts have long held that
converting common elements for a single condominium owner’s exclusive use is improper. See
Picerno v. 1400 Museum Park Condominium Ass’n, 2011 Ill. App. (1st) 103505, ¶ 14 (holding
that it is well-settled that other owners’ interests are diminished when one unit owner is given
exclusive use of an area); Carney v. Donley, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1009-10 (1994) (holding that
the erection of balcony extensions amounted to an exclusive use that diminished other unit
owners’ ownership interest in the common elements); Sawko v. Dominion Plaza One
Condominium Ass’n No. 1-A, 218 Ill. App. 3d 521, 529-30 (1991) (holding that the board of
directors diminished a unit owner’s interest in the common elements by allowing non-exclusive
parking spaces to be used exclusively by certain individuals); Stuewe v. Lauletta, 93 Ill. App. 3d
1029, 1031 (1981) (holding that, barring approval by all unit owners, a developer’s grant to one
owner of a lease with a covenant for a parking space that had been part of the common elements
was improper). Majewska’s arguments are contrary to both our precedents and common sense.
¶ 18 Majewska also contends that summary judgment was improper because genuine
questions of material fact remain about the validity of the procedures the Association used to
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notify her of the violation and instigate the instant litigation. Due to those procedural defects, she
asserts that the Association’s complaint must be dismissed.
¶ 19 Majewska first maintains that she was not given proper notice and opportunity to be
heard about the alleged violation. The trial court specifically addressed that claim at least twice,
first in ruling on her November 2021 motion for partial summary judgment and later in its ruling
on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment motion.
¶ 20 The record on appeal shows that the judge presiding over the hearing on Majewska’s
motion for partial summary judgment, Judge Paul Fullerton, found that the Association provided
adequate notice, stating in his written order “that sufficient notice under the Declaration and the
Illinois Condominium Property Act and an opportunity to be heard were given to Defendant on
March 30, 2020, by the Plaintiff.” During the hearing on that motion, the judge also stated,
“The Court's clear. Notice was sent. And then the notice said if you would like to
have a hearing, or you object to the board's position, then you have that opportunity.
Contact us. We'll set that hearing, or we'll allow you to come before the board. So that's
the opportunity to be heard.
There is no obligation on the part of the board to summon any of the condo
owners to come before them to either dispute whatever is being sent by the board or to air
a grievance or their position. It just -- it doesn't work that way.
So I guess the long story short is the motion for partial summary judgment is
denied. There was due process here, according to the caselaw and the statute as far as
notice and an opportunity to be heard. ***
7
It seems to the Court that a lot of time has been wasted with respect to this
argument. There's nothing either in the declarations or in the statute that would require
the board or the condominium association to do something beyond what they've done.
So -- at least for the hearing point.”
¶ 21 When Majewska raised the notice issue again in her motion for summary judgment,
Judge Anne Hayes noted that Majewska had previously “asserted [1] that she was never given a
warning or violation notice, [2] that the board never approved in an open meeting of the board to
initiate this litigation and [she] never had an opportunity to discuss the issues before the board,
and finally [3] [that she was] never given a right to appear before the board for any hearing.” In
issuing her ruling, the judge cited with approval Judge Fullerton’s prior rejection of that claim
and quoted from his comments during that hearing.
¶ 22 The March 30, 2020, letter sent by the Association’s counsel to Majewska specifically
identified the nature of the alleged violation, the section of the declaration that it violated, and
the remedy requested by the Association, namely, to return the “ceiling to the previous height,
and otherwise return the attic space above [the] unit to its previous condition.” The letter further
warned that if the problem was not timely remedied, “the Association shall proceed with all legal
and equitable remedies available to it. This shall include filing a lawsuit against you to obtain a
Court Order requiring you to comply with the governing documents and return the ceiling and
attic to its previous condition prior to the construction and improvements within your unit.” The
letter also specifically gave Majewska an adequate opportunity to be heard before any action was
taken against her, stating,
“[i]n the event you feel that you received this notice in error or otherwise would like to
dispute the asserted violation, you may request a hearing with the Board. Such a request
8
must be provided, in writing, to our office, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this
correspondence. Otherwise, you must comply with this demand and return the unit’s
ceiling and the Association’s attic to its previous condition.”
Despite receiving the letter, Majewska did not request a hearing before the Board. We
conclude that both trial court judges correctly found that Majewska received sufficient notice and
opportunity to be heard on the alleged violation.
¶ 23 Majewska next claims that the Association’s Board of Directors was barred from
ratifying its decisions to have counsel send the March 30 notice of violation and, subsequently,
to pursue litigation, citing section 18(9)(A) of the Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS
605/18(9)(A) (West 2022)), and Lake Point Tower Condominium Ass’n v. Waller, 2017 IL App
(1st) 162072.
¶ 24 Pursuant to section 18(9)(A), the bylaws of a condominium association must provide, at a
minimum,
“that every meeting of the board of managers shall be open to any unit owner, except that
the board may close any portion of a noticed meeting or meet separately from a noticed
meeting to: (i) discuss litigation when an action against or on behalf of the particular
association has been filed and is pending in a court or administrative tribunal, or when the
board of managers finds that such an action is probable or imminent, ***, (iv) discuss
violations of rules and regulations of the association, ***; that any vote on these matters
shall take place at a meeting of the board of managers or portion thereof open to any unit
owner.” 765 ILCS 605/18(9)(A) (West 2022).
¶ 25 Majewska contends that Lake Point and section 18(9)(A) require the dismissal of the
Association’s complaint because its board did not vote at an open meeting to send the March 30
9
notification letter or to instigate litigation. That contention misreads Lake Point. That decision
did not require a vote before the Association could file its complaint. Rather, it explained that
“another panel of this court recently indicated that an association's complaint is not required to
allege as an element of a forcible entry and detainer action that the association's board voted at
an open meeting to initiate litigation. See North Spaulding Condominium Ass'n v. Cavanaugh,
2017 IL App (1st) 160870, ¶ 22.” (Emphases added.) Lake Point, 2017 IL App (1st) 162072,
¶ 13. “Before the trial court dismissed [the action in Lake Point], the Board voted at an open
meeting to pursue litigation against Waller. This eliminated her basis for asserting that the
Association had no authority to pursue collections litigation against her. Additionally, Waller
*** cited no case law supporting her position that the Board's vote constituted an improper
attempt at ratification or that all declarations must specifically authorize a board to ratify earlier
actions in order for ratification to be effective.” (Emphasis added.) Lake Point, 2017 IL App (1st)
162072, ¶ 22.
¶ 26 A condominium board’s ability to ratify a prior action was also implicitly recognized in
Alliance Property Management, Ltd. v. Forest Villa of Countryside Condominium Ass'n, 2015 IL
App (1st) 150169, ¶ 41. In that decision, the court stated “ ‘ “For ratification to occur, the
principal must, with full knowledge of the act, manifest an intent to abide and be bound by the
transaction.” ’ Gambino v. Boulevard Mortgage Corp., 398 Ill. App. 3d 21, 56 (2009) (quoting
Stathis v. Geldermann, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 844, 858 (1998)).”
¶ 27 Majewska next claims that the Board never voted to ratify its prior actions in an open
meeting. That claim is refuted by the record, however. The minutes from a “Manager’s Meeting”
held on October 20, 2020, expressly state that, with a quorum of its members present, the board
unanimously ratified previous Board decisions “to send to legal counsel requesting a notice of
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violation of architectural approvals, guidelines and provisions of the Declaration to non-
compliant owner,” “to authorize legal counsel to send violation/notice demand to owner
regarding violation of architectural approval, guidelines and provisions of the Declaration,” and
“to authorize legal counsel, upon expiration of deadline for compliance, to file lawsuit against
owner in violation of architectural approval, guidelines and provisions of the Declaration.”
Moreover, as the court in Lake Point concluded, a condominium association is not required “to
prove that it properly noticed and conducted an association board meeting where a vote was
taken to authorize” its actions. Lake Point, 2017 IL App (1st) 162072, ¶ 15 (citing North
Spaulding Condominium Ass'n v. Cavanaugh, 2017 IL App (1st) 160870, ¶ 22).
¶ 28 Although Majewska contends that the minutes from the Manager’s Meeting were
insufficient to support the Association’s claim, she failed to raise that argument before the trial
court. Thus, it is forfeited on appeal. PNC Bank, National Ass'n v. Kusmierz, 2022 IL 126606,
¶ 34.
¶ 29 Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, we agree with
the trial court that: (1) the Association provided Majewska with sufficient notice of the alleged
rules violation; and (2) that the board properly ratified its prior determinations that: (a)
Majewska’s ceiling renovation violated the rules; and (b) its legal counsel would notify
Majewska of that finding and, subsequently, initiate the underlying lawsuit. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s grant of the Association’s summary judgment and denial of Majewska’s
summary judgment motion.
¶ 30 B. Attorney Fee Award
¶ 31 Majewska argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Association’s
request for attorney fees. See Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 2013 IL
11
110505, ¶ 52 (stating the applicable standard of review). On appeal, the abuse-of-discretion
standard is highly deferential, with reversal “occur[ring] only when the trial court’s decision is
arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted
by the trial court.” Haage v. Zavala, 2021 IL 125918, ¶ 40.
¶ 32 Majewska asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the
reasonableness of the award, which was for the full amount requested, and the fact that it was
nearly half her unit’s sale price and was not shown to bear any “reasonable connection between
the fees and the amount involved in the litigation,” as required in Kaiser v. MEPC American
Properties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 984 (1987). The result was that she was “ostensibly
punished for defending herself” despite having “meritorious defenses.” She asks this court to
vacate the fee award in its entirety or, alternatively, to reduce the amount to reflect only the fees
paid since the entry of the judgment order, or vacate the award and replace it with “an in rem
award relating to the condominium unit.”
¶ 33 The Association’s March 30, 2020, notification letter informed Majewska that “in
accordance with the Declaration and Section 9.2 of the Act, all legal fees and costs incurred by
the Association in addressing your violation shall be assessed to your account.” In addition,
paragraph 22 of the declaration states:
“22. Remedies. In the event of any default by any Unit Owner under the provisions of the
Act, Declaration, By-Laws or rules and regulations of the Association, the Association
*** shall have each and all of the rights and remedies which may be provided for in the
Act, Declaration, By-Laws or said rules and regulations or which may be available at law
or in equity, and may prosecute any action *** against such defaulting Unit Owner
and/or others *** for damages or injunction or specific performance, or for judgment for
12
payment of money and collection thereof, ***, or for any other relief. All expenses of the
Association in connection with any such actions or proceedings, including court costs
and attorneys' fees and other fees and expenses and all damages, liquidated or otherwise,
together with interest thereon at the rate of seven percent (7%) per annum until paid,
shall be charged to and assessed against such defaulting Unit Owner, and shall be added
to and deemed part of his respective share of the common expenses, and the Association
shall have a lien for all of the same ***.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 9.2 of the Act reiterates the Association’s right to a fee award, stating:
“(a) In the event of any default by any unit owner *** in the performance of his
obligations under this Act or under the declaration, bylaws, or the rules and regulations of
the board of managers, the board of managers or its agents shall have such rights and
remedies as provided in the Act or condominium instruments including the right to
maintain an eviction action ***.
(b) Any attorneys' fees incurred by the Association arising out of a default by any unit
owner *** in the performance of any of the provisions of the condominium instruments,
rules and regulations or any applicable statute or ordinance shall be added to, and
deemed a part of, his respective share of the common expense. (Emphasis added.) 765
ILCS 605/9.2(a), (b) (West 2022).
Thus, Majewska was on notice that she would be liable for the Association’s attorney fees if she
were to be found in default “under the provisions of the Act, Declaration, By-Laws or rules and
regulations of the Association.”
¶ 34 Majewska contends that the fee award must be reversed because the trial court did not
find that she was in “default,” which “is a prerequisite for a finding that fees should be
13
reviewed.” She does not, however, offer any legal authority to support that bare contention.
Although the trial court’s ruling did not use the word “default,” the court expressly concluded
that Majewska violated the terms of the declaration by failing to obtain the required Board
approval prior to raising the height of her ceiling. That finding clearly demonstrates the court’s
finding that Majewska committed a breach/default of the terms of the declaration. Nothing
requires the trial court to use the word “default” when rendering its ruling. Under the express
terms of the declaration, the Association was entitled to seek its legal fees and costs after
Majewska was determined to have violated the applicable rules.
¶ 35 Nonetheless, Majewska claims that “[t]here is absolutely no right of a condominium
association to even seek a personal judgment or any judgment against a homeowner relating to
allegations stemming from the Condominium Property Act – including Section 9.2(b) on which
this trial judge relied in entering an attorney fee judgment.” She asserts that the only remedies
available to the Association are a lien on the owner’s interest, a foreclosure action, or a forcible
entry and detainer action. That claim is conclusively refuted, however, by paragraph 22 of the
declaration, which expressly grants the Association “each and all of the rights and remedies
which may be provided for in the Act, Declaration, By-Laws or said rules and regulations or
which may be available at law or in equity,” permitting it to seek and obtain “damages or
injunction or specific performance, or *** judgment for payment of money and collection
thereof, ***, or for any other relief.” (Emphases added.) That paragraph also authorizes the
Association to be awarded the costs of any successful legal action, “including court costs and
attorneys' fees and other fees and expenses and all damages, liquidated or otherwise, together
with interest thereon.” (Emphasis added.) See also 765 ILCS 605/9.2(b) (West 2022) (providing
that an association may be awarded the attorney fees related to a unit owner’s default on any
14
condominium document or applicable statute). Here, the trial court’s grant of the Association’s
request for attorney fees is entirely consistent with the applicable language.
¶ 36 Majewska next argues that any award had to be made in rem due to the Association’s
“limited authority” in homeowner disputes. In support, she cites Board of Directors of Warren
Boulevard Condominium Ass’n v. Milton, 399 Ill. App. 3d 922 (2010). That decision involved a
condominium association’s action brought under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (735 ILCS
5/9–101 et seq. (West 2008)) that sought possession of the unit, an inherently in rem remedy,
based on the owner’s failure to pay the required assessments. Milton, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 923.
Here, in contrast, the Association sought, and obtained, a permanent injunction requiring
Majewska to restore the ceiling in her unit, and the space above it, to their original conditions.
After successfully prosecuting that cause of action, the Association filed a petition for its
attorney fees, as permitted under the declaration. It did not seek possession of Majewska’s
condominium unit. The types of legal actions and remedies at issue in Milton and the instant case
are readily distinguishable. Milton does not require the trial court to enter an in rem award.
¶ 37 Majewska also claims that the trial court failed to conduct a “reasonableness analysis”
“and simply entered judgment on whatever time the Plaintiff decided to bill its client,” citing
LaHood v. Couri, 236 Ill. App. 3d 641, 648-69 (1992). We initially note that the fee request in
Couri is distinguishable because it was not supported by detailed billing records, in contrast to
the lengthy compilation of detailed billing records attached to the Association’s petition.
¶ 38 To establish the reasonableness of its fee request, the Association had to provide evidence
on: (a) the specific services rendered; (b) the person who rendered the services; (c) the time
expended; (d) the hourly rate charged; (e) the attorney’s skill and standing; (f) the nature of the
case; (g) the novelty and/or difficulty of the work and the issues; (h) the importance of the
15
matter; (i) the amount of responsibility involved; (j) the customary and usual charges for similar
services; (k) the benefit received by the party; and (l) the reasonableness of the connection
between those fees and the sums at issue in the case. Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties, Inc.,
164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 983-84 (1987). To support its request for fees, the Association included an
affidavit from its counsel explaining her experience and the context underlying the need for
various fees as well as detailed records about the legal services that had been performed.
¶ 39 At the hearing on the fee petition, the trial court both acknowledged and applied the
relevant Kaiser factors. The trial court also noted that the Association had repeatedly and
consistently stated its intent to apply the fee-shifting provision in the declaration if it won the
case. The trial court expressly found that the hourly rate charged was reasonable, usual, and
customary for the area and type of work and considered the qualifications of the Association’s
counsel as stated in her affidavit. Moreover, the court reviewed the trial docket, noting “that at
every stage, every issue was litigated,” which increased the fees incurred by the Association. The
court considered specific issues that were raised and litigated, noting that some, such as
Majewska’s due process claim, were raised repeatedly, requiring the Association to relitigate the
question each time. As the judge noted, “[i]t seems to the Court that a lot of time has been
wasted with respect to this argument.” The court also pointed out that defendant raised only a
general objection to the total amount of fees requested, without objecting to any particular
charge. Finally, the court expressly stated that the Association was not seeking fees incurred
between December 20, 2022, and the petition’s hearing, March 22, 2023, despite the need for
counsel to make multiple appearances on the Association’s behalf during that time. Based on our
review of the fee petition, the supporting evidence offered by the Association, and the trial
16
court’s statements at the hearing, the decision to grant the Association’s fee petition was not an
abuse of that court’s sound discretion.
¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 41 For the reasons stated, we affirmed the orders of the Du Page County Circuit Court
awarding summary judgment to the Association, as well as its requested fees.
¶ 42 Affirmed.
17