People v. Mosley , 2023 IL App (5th) 230823-U ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (5th) 230823-UNOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 12/01/23. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0823
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
not precedent except in the
the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
under Rule 23(e)(1).
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County.
)
v. ) No. 20-CF-1002
)
BERNARD MOSLEY JR., ) Honorable
) Robert B. Haida,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Moore and Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We vacate the circuit court’s detention order where the State filed an untimely
petition to detain.
¶2 Defendant, Bernard Mosley Jr., appeals the September 20, 2023, order of the circuit court
of St. Clair County that granted the State’s verified petition for pretrial detention and ordered him
detained. Pretrial release is governed by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known
as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act), 1 as codified in
article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)).
See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Code); Rowe
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“The Act has also sometimes been referred to in the press as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Neither
name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL
129248, ¶ 4 n.1.
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v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). On
appeal, defendant argues that the court erred by granting the State’s verified petition to detain
where the Act does not allow the State to file a petition to detain defendants who remain in custody
after having been ordered released on the condition of depositing security. Defendant also argues
that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike the State’s verified petition. Because
defendant was arrested and detained prior to the date the Act went into effect, this appeal presents
a narrow issue relevant to only those defendants who were arrested and detained prior to the
effective date of the Act. For the following reasons, we vacate the court’s detention order and
remand the cause for further proceedings.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 6, 2020, defendant was charged by criminal complaint with one count of felony
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2020)) and two counts of armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)). 2
On the same date, defendant was arrested and the circuit court set defendant’s bond at $1,250,000,
requiring the deposit of 10%. The court also appointed counsel to represent defendant. The defense
filed a motion to reduce bond on August 17, 2020, which the court denied. The court held an
arraignment hearing on August 28, 2020, at which time defendant pled not guilty.
¶5 On August 23, 2023, following discovery and multiple continuances, the defense filed a
motion for defendant’s release “pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5,” alleging that defendant was
entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of section 110-5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West
2022)). The defense requested that the circuit court order defendant’s release without the condition
of depositing security or set the matter for hearing “pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-5 or 5/110-6.1
and grant any and all other relief” the court deemed proper. The court entered an order on
2
On August 21, 2020, a grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging defendant with the same.
2
September 11, 2023, setting the matter for hearing “pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 and 725 ILCS
5/110-7.5” on September 21, 2023.
¶6 On September 12, 2023, the State filed a verified petition for pretrial detention pursuant to
section 110-6.1 of the Code (id. § 110-6.1). The State alleged that defendant was “charged with a
forcible felony offense as defined in 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) and the defendant’s pretrial
release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.”
Accordingly, the State requested that the circuit court deny defendant’s pretrial release.
¶7 On September 18, 2023, the Act became effective. On September 20, 2023, the circuit court
held a hearing. At the outset, the court stated that the hearing was held pursuant to “725 ILCS 110-
7.5 and also 110-6.1.” After considering the parties’ arguments, the court found, by clear and
convincing evidence, “that the proof [was] evident and the presumption great that the defendant
committed the qualifying offense as an accomplice.” The court also found that defendant posed a
potential flight risk and that release conditions could not, in combination, mitigate the possible
threat that defendant would flee. The court further found that defendant posed a real and present
danger to the safety of other persons in the community and that there were no conditions or
combination of conditions that could mitigate that danger. Thus, the court entered a detention order
outlining these findings the same day. In its detention order, the court noted that defendant was
charged with a detainable offense—a non-probational forcible felony. The court also noted that a
detention hearing was held pursuant to “725 ILCS 110-7.5.” The court also stated, “We have future
court dates, and I will be required to revisit [defendant’s] continued detention at those subsequent
court dates.”
¶8 On October 3, 2023, defendant filed a timely appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18,
2023). At a status hearing held on October 6, 2023, the circuit court reviewed defendant’s detention
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and found that his continued detention was necessary to avoid the real and present threat or danger
to any person or persons or the community and/or willful flight from prosecution. Thus, the court
ordered that defendant remain detained.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, defendant first argues that the circuit court erred when it granted the State’s
petition to detain because the Act does not allow the State to file a petition to detain defendants
who remain in custody after having been ordered released on the condition of depositing security.
Specifically, defendant argues that the State was not permitted to file a petition to detain due to the
timing requirements of section 110-6.1(c)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022)).
Defendant acknowledges that his attorney did not move to strike the State’s petition and did not
include this error in his notice of appeal. Defendant seeks review under the second prong of the
plain-error doctrine. Under the second prong of plain-error review, a reviewing court may consider
a forfeited error when the error is so serious that it deprives the defendant of a substantial right.
People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 170 (2005). In the alternative, defendant contends that his
counsel’s failure to object to the State’s petition constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶ 11 This court recently considered this issue in People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698.
This court, in applying a de novo standard of review, considered “the defendant’s claim that the
State had no authority to file its petition and thus the trial court had no basis upon which to enter
the order denying pretrial release.” Id. ¶ 14. In interpreting subsection (c)(1) of section 110-6.1 of
the Code, this court concluded that “the State may file a petition to detain at the time of the
defendant’s first appearance before a judge; no prior notice to the defendant is required.” Id. ¶ 16.
This court also concluded that, “[a]lternatively, the State may file a petition to detain the defendant
within 21 calendar days after the arrest and release of the defendant; however, reasonable notice
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is to be provided to the defendant under this circumstance.” Id. This court noted that “[t]he
exception to these timing requirements is set forth in section 110-6(i) (725 ILCS 5/110-6(i) (West
2022)).” Id.¶ 12 In applying these statutory provisions to the facts of that case, this court noted that “section
110-6 [was] not applicable to the defendant because he had not been released from detention
following his arrest and he had not been charged with any new offenses.” Id. ¶ 18. This court also
noted that “the exception to the timing requirements set forth in section 110-6.1(c)(1) [was] also
not applicable to the defendant.” Id. Consequently, this court held that “the State’s petition to
detain the defendant pursuant to section 110-6.1 was untimely and that the trial court did not have
the authority to detain the defendant pursuant to the untimely petition.” Id.¶ 13 Similarly, in the present case, the State’s petition to detain defendant pursuant to section
110-6.1 was untimely where the State did not file a petition to detain at the time of defendant’s
first appearance or within 21 calendar days after defendant’s arrest and release. In addition, as in
Vingara, defendant had not been released from detention following his arrest and he had not been
charged with any new offenses. Accordingly, the exception to the timing requirements set forth in
section 110-6.1(c)(1) did not apply to defendant. Thus, we reach the same conclusion to that
reached in Vingara—that the State’s petition to detain defendant pursuant to section 110-6.1 was
untimely and that the circuit court did not have the authority to detain defendant pursuant to the
untimely petition.
¶ 14 This court noted, however, that defendants, such as defendant here, who have previously
imposed pretrial conditions, including the deposit of monetary security, have two options available
under the Code. Id. ¶ 22. Specifically, this court noted:
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“Under sections 110-5(e) and 110-7.5(b), a defendant may file a motion seeking a hearing
to determine the reasons for continued detention. If the trial court finds that the defendant’s
continued detention is due to the ‘unavailability or the defendant’s ineligibility for one or
more pretrial conditions previously ordered by the court or directed by a pretrial services
agency,’ the trial court is required to ‘reopen’ the conditions of release hearing. 725 ILCS
5/110-5(e), 110-7.5(b) (West 2022). During the hearing, the court will be required to
determine what available conditions exist that will reasonably ensure the appearance of the
defendant, the safety of any person or the community, and the likelihood of the defendant’s
compliance with all conditions of pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West 2022). Thus,
the court may consider the matters set forth in subsection 110-5(a) (725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)
(West 2022)). Alternatively, a defendant may elect to remain in detention until such time
as the previously set monetary security may be paid. Some defendants may choose this
second option, which allows for the possibility of pretrial release if the previously set
monetary security is posted, as opposed to requesting a hearing pursuant to the first option,
after which they might be detained without any possibility of pretrial release. This is
analogous to when a change in the sentencing law occurs after a defendant has committed
the offense—the defendant is given the opportunity to choose to be sentenced under that
law that existed at the time of the offense or the newly enacted law. People v. Horrell, 235
Ill. 2d 235, 242 (2009).” Id.¶ 15 In the present case, the defense appeared to file a motion for release “pursuant to 725 ILCS
5/110-7.5,” requesting a hearing pursuant to “725 ILCS 5/110-5 or 5/110-6.1.” The circuit court
indicated that it held a hearing pursuant to “725 ILCS 110-7.5 and also 110-6.1.” At the hearing,
the court considered what available conditions existed that would reasonably ensure the
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appearance of the defendant, the safety of any person or the community, and the likelihood of the
defendant’s compliance with all conditions of pretrial release. In doing so, the court found that
defendant posed a flight risk and that there were no conditions or combination of conditions that
could mitigate the threat of defendant’s flight. The court also found that defendant posed a real
and present danger or threat to the safety of any person or persons of the community and there
were no conditions or combination of conditions that could mitigate the real and present danger or
threat. The court concluded that less restrictive conditions would not ensure the safety of the
community or ensure defendant’s appearance in court. After reviewing the record, it appears that
the court granted the State’s petition to detain without considering defendant’s request for a
hearing pursuant to subsection (e) of section 110-5 of the Code.
¶ 16 Because the court lacked the authority to grant the State’s petition to detain and this error
affected substantial rights of defendant under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, we
vacate the circuit court’s detention order, reinstate the original bond order, and remand the matter
back to the court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan 1, 1967); People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564-
65 (2007); People v. Swan, 2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 26. On remand, defendant may elect to
stand on the terms of his original pretrial conditions—an election that requires no action on his
part—or he may pursue his previously filed motion for a hearing under section 110-5(e). Swan,
2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 25. If defendant decides to pursue his previously filed motion, he
shall be entitled to a timely hearing within 48 hours of his formal request pursuant to section 110-
5(e). Id. Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive, we need not address defendant’s
remaining arguments on appeal.
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¶ 17 We also note the defendant filed a motion to cite additional authority. The authority
referenced is from this court and was issued within the past 30 days. We are well aware of our own
authority. Accordingly, the motion to cite additional authority is denied.
¶ 18 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 19 For the reasons stated, we vacate the circuit court’s order granting the State’s petition to
detain and remand the matter back to the court for further proceedings.
¶ 20 Order vacated; cause remanded.
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