People v. Wells , 2024 IL App (2d) 230521-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (2d) 230521-UNo. 2-23-0521
Order filed February 8, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 23-CF-1050
)
DERRICK WELLS, ) Honorable
) Victoria Rossetti,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hutchinson and Schostok concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The failure to hold an immediate hearing on the State’s petition to detain did
not require reversal of detention order where defendant filed a motion for pretrial
release and the proceedings on defendant’s motion would have been meaningfully
the same regardless of whether the State had filed its petition; (2) the trial court’s
finding that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed
the charged offense was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the
trial court’s finding that the State proved that defendant was a threat to any
individual or the community was not against the manifest weight of the evidence;
but (4) the trial court’s failure to include oral or written findings indicating whether
any condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the
threat posed by defendant required remand.
2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U¶2 Defendant, Derrick Wells, appeals the November 20, 2023, order of the circuit court of
Lake County denying pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act
(Act). See Pub. Acts. 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) and 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023);
Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date of Act as September
18, 2023).1 Defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that (1) the proof
is evident or the presumption great that he committed the charged offenses, (2) he was a threat to
any individual or the community, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate
the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. Defendant also
argues that the failure to hold an “immediate” hearing on the State’s petition to detain “weighs in
favor of reversal.” For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the trial court’s detention order and
remand with directions.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On May 29, 2023, defendant was arrested for and charged by complaint with various
offenses, including first degree murder. Defendant’s bond was set at $5 million (10% to apply).
Defendant was unable to post bond, so he remained incarcerated. On June 28, 2023, a Lake County
grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with three counts of first degree
murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2022)).
1
The Act has also been referred to as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-
Today (SAFE-T) Act. However, neither the titles “Pretrial Fairness Act” nor “SAFE-T Act” is
official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or the public acts. Rowe, 2023 IL
129248, ¶ 4 n.1.
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U¶5 A pretrial services “Public Safety Assessment Report” (Report) was completed on May 31,
2023. The Report indicated that defendant was 32 years of age and scored a three on the “failure
to appear” scale and a three on the “new criminal activity” scale. 2 The Report also reflected that
defendant had a prior failure to appear, although it was older than two years. The Report noted that
defendant had prior misdemeanor and felony convictions, which included convictions of criminal
trespass to land (2013), possession of cannabis (2013), and aggravated battery of a peace officer
(2022). The Report further indicated that, on February 15, 2022, defendant pleaded guilty to the
charge of aggravated battery of a peace officer and was sentenced in Cook County to 24 months’
probation, which probation was being monitored by Lake County.
¶6 On September 15, 2023, the State filed a “Verified Petition to Detain” (Petition) pursuant
to section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State requested the court
to order the detention of defendant pending trial. In the Petition, the State noted the offenses for
which defendant was arrested and asserted that “[i]n light of the specific facts of this case and/or
*** [d]efendant’s criminal history, this offense qualifies as one for which a Court can order
detention awaiting trial.” The State further asserted that “[t]he proof is evident, or the presumption
great, that *** [d]efendant committed the [described] offense.” In paragraph three of the Petition,
the State alleged as follows:
“[T]he Defendant’s pre-trial release would pose a real and present threat to the safety of a
person, persons or the community for the following specific reason: Defendant is charged
with [f]irst [d]egree [m]urder following an incident that occurred on May 29, 2023 in
2
The Report does not indicate the scoring range of either the “failure to appear” or “new
criminal activity” scales.
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-UWaukegan, Lake County, Illinois. Defendant *** had been in the parking lot of the
Bowlero at a bar-b-que party when a fight broke out. Defendant *** provided a loaded
firearm to [c]o-[d]efendant [Josiah] Mars who then shot the victim twice in the chest area.
The victim ultimately succumbed to the gunshot wounds, dying at a local area hospital.
These actions provide a threat to the public and community as the offense occurred in a
public parking lot with numerous individuals present, involved a firearm, and resulted in
the death of another.”
The State further alleged that, absent pretrial detention, there is a high likelihood of willful flight
to avoid prosecution as set forth in section 110-6.1(a)(8) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8)
(West 2022)) because “[d]efendant’s forcible felony charge resulted in the death of another and
carry [sic] the possibility of natural life in prison, providing an incentive of willful flight to avoid
prosecution.” Finally, the State asserted that there is “no set of conditions which mitigate or
alleviate the risk(s) set forth in paragraph 3” because “[a]s effective as pre-trial monitoring may
be in many cases, there is not [sic] technology that can confine *** [d]efendant to his home with
certainty nor can Pre-Trial Bond Services Division engage in effective 24-hour surveillance of ***
[d]efendant’s residence.” No action was taken on the State’s Petition, and defendant, still not
having posted bond, remained incarcerated.
¶7 Meanwhile, on October 30, 2023, defendant filed a “Motion for Pretrial Release” (Motion).
In the Motion, defendant acknowledged that an individual charged with a forcible felony may be
detained pending trial if he or she poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or
persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case. See 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022). Defendant alleged, however, that “there is and will be no evidence that
[he] poses a real and present threat to any person” because he is blind and needs assistance in the
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-Uactivities of daily living. Defendant also denied that he is a flight risk and indicated that, if released,
he will comply with any conditions imposed by the court and will reside with his mother and
brother in Thornton, Illinois. At a case management conference, the trial court scheduled a hearing
on defendant’s Motion for November 20, 2023.
¶8 At the November 20, 2023, hearing, the State initially noted that it had filed a verified
petition to detain. The State asserted that defendant was charged with “Class X murder,” which
qualifies as a detention-eligible offense. The State then stated that “the proof is evident and the
presumption great that *** defendant has committed the offense of first degree murder, as this
matter has also previously been indicted.” As for the factual basis, the State proffered that on May
29, 2023, defendant and Mars attended a party in the parking lot of a bowling alley in Waukegan.
A fight broke out and defendant provided Mars with a loaded firearm. Mars then shot the victim
twice in the chest area. The victim succumbed to the wounds at a local hospital. The State argued
that defendant “is a great threat to the community and no combination of pretrial factors would
ensure the community’s safety” because “[t]his [was] a public event with multiple individuals
present where *** defendant’s actions resulted in the death of another.” The State therefore
requested that the court enter an order detaining defendant pending trial.
¶9 In response, defense counsel argued that the State failed to meet its burden. Defense
counsel provided some additional details regarding the events of May 29, 2023. He stated that
defendant, who is blind, was driven by Mars to the bowling alley for a party. During the party, two
women got into a fight. The victim and Mars, both of whom were armed, attempted to intervene.
Mars and the victim got into a fight and Mars shot the victim. Defense counsel further argued that
the only evidence that the State had tying defendant to the alleged crime—which evidence came
from one of the women who was involved in the initial fight—was that defendant gave a gun to
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-UMars. According to defense counsel, however, the woman gave two conflicting statements. At one
point, she stated that she heard shots while she was on the ground during the fight. At another
point, she stated that defendant gave the gun to Mars, who then shot the victim. Defense counsel
also asserted that another person claimed that defendant gave Mars the gun two days before the
incident at the bowling alley. Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant “had some altercation
two days before with some relative of the [victim] and then said that he was angry at the [victim].”
But, he argued, since the victim was already dead, there is no specific, articulable fact that
defendant is a threat or danger to anyone else. Defense counsel stated that being in jail is extremely
difficult for defendant because he is the victim of a shooting incident several years earlier that
resulted in a brain injury and vision loss. Defense counsel said that, if released, defendant would
reside with family in Thornton and would abide by any conditions imposed by the court. Defense
counsel represented that defendant had “only one prior, which involved an altercation with a
policeman during an arrest or something like that, but he was on probation at the time.”
¶ 10 Following defense counsel’s remarks, the trial court inquired if defendant was on probation
on May 29, 2023. Defense counsel responded, “I am new to the case. I think he was. I think he
completed his probation.” The State indicated that defendant “was either just done or just
finishing” probation on May 29, 2023. The court noted that defendant was sentenced to 24 months’
probation on February 15, 2022. The court then stated, “[o]h, this is out of Cook. There’s a Cook
County case. I’m sorry. Never mind.”
¶ 11 The court found that the offense with which defendant was charged to be a detainable
offense. The court further found that the State had shown by specific, articulable facts that
defendant, although blind, was at a party in a parking lot with a number of people, that defendant
had a loaded weapon, that he gave the loaded weapon to another person, and that the other person
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-Ushot the victim who died. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the State had proven by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant
committed the offenses, (2) he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the
community, (3) there are no conditions or combination of conditions that can mitigate the real and
present threat to the safety of any person, and (4) less restrictive conditions would not assure safety
to the community. As such, the court ordered that defendant be detained pending trial. The court
signed a preprinted order of detention, checking boxes where applicable to reflect its ruling.
Thereafter, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 The Act amended the Code by abolishing traditional monetary bail in favor of pretrial
release on personal recognizance or with conditions of release. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2(a)
(West 2022). In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release. 725
ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Under the Code, as amended, a defendant’s pretrial
release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations (qualifying offenses). 725 ILCS
5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). For most of the qualifying offenses, upon filing a verified
petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has
committed the offense (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)), that the defendant’s pretrial
release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community (725
ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7), (e)(2) (West 2022)) or a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid
prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8), (e)(3) (West 2022)), and that no condition or combination
of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community
or the risk of defendant’s willful flight from prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)).
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U“Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact
as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023
IL 127712, ¶ 74.
¶ 14 We review a trial court’s decision to detain a defendant using a two-part standard of review.
We apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard to the trial court’s factual determinations,
including whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant has committed a
qualifying offense, whether a defendant poses a threat, and whether any conditions would mitigate
that threat. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A finding is contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence only if a conclusion opposite that to the trial court’s is clearly apparent. In
re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170, ¶ 17. The ultimate decision of whether a defendant should
be detained is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An
abuse of discretion occurs only if no reasonable person could agree with the trial court. People v.
Williams, 2022 IL App (2d) 200455, ¶ 52. Questions of law and the construction of statutes are
reviewed de novo. People v. Swan, 2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 16.
¶ 15 On appeal, defendant raises four arguments. First, defendant argues that the State failed to
meet its burden of establishing that the proof is evident and the presumption great that he
committed first degree murder. Second, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of
any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. Third,
he argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of
any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. Lastly,
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-Udefendant argues that the failure to hold an “immediate” hearing on the State’s Petition (see 725
ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022)) “weighs in favor of reversal.”
¶ 16 A. Immediate Hearing
¶ 17 We first address defendant’s argument that the failure to hold an “immediate” hearing on
the State’s Petition “weighs in favor of reversal.” Section 110-6.1(c)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(c)(2) (West 2022)) provides that upon filing a petition to detain by the State, “the court
shall immediately hold a hearing on the petition unless a continuance is granted.” In this case, the
State’s Petition was filed on September 15, 2023. The Act became effective on September 18,
2023 (see Rowe, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date of Act as September
18, 2023)), but no hearing was held until November 20, 2023. Indeed, the State does not dispute
that the hearing on its Petition—held more than two months after both the date the Petition was
filed and the effective date of the Act—was not “immediate” as the statute requires.
¶ 18 Despite the State’s concession, we find defendant’s argument unavailing where, as here,
it was defendant’s motion for pretrial release which prompted the hearing which resulted in the
detention order at issue. In People v. Wetzel-Connor, 2023 IL App (2d) 230348-U, ¶ 27, this court
noted the overlapping nature of the factors to consider raised in a petition by the State for pretrial
detention and a motion by a defendant for pretrial release. In that case, the court rejected a claim
that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike a petition by the State to detain because
the defendant had filed a motion for pretrial release and the proceedings would have been
essentially the same regardless of whether the State had filed its petition. Wetzel-Connor, 2023 IL
App (2d) 230348-U, ¶ 27. Likewise in this case, regardless of whether the State ever filed a petition
to detain, the proceedings on defendant’s motion for pretrial release would have been meaningfully
the same. See People v. Borgert, 2023 IL App (2d) 230371-U, ¶ 19. Accordingly, we reject
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-Udefendant’s argument that the failure to hold an “immediate” hearing on the State’s Petition weighs
in favor of reversal.
¶ 19 B. Qualifying Offense
¶ 20 Next, we address defendant’s claim that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing
that the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed first degree murder. As charged
here, a person commits first degree murder when he or she kills a person without lawful
justification and, in performing the acts which cause the death the person, (1) either intends to kill
or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to
that individual or another (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2022)) or (2) knows that such acts create a
strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2)
(West 2022)). First degree murder is a qualifying offense under the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022).
¶ 21 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that the proof is evident or the presumption
great that he committed first degree murder because it merely read into the record a paragraph
describing the events of May 29, 2023, and there was no evidence as to precisely when defendant
allegedly handed Mars a loaded gun. At this stage, however, the State was not required to prove
the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The statute merely requires clear and
convincing evidence. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022). “Clear and convincing evidence”
requires more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, n.3. As noted above, evidence is “clear and
convincing” if it “leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the
proposition in question.” Chaudhary, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74.
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U¶ 22 The State’s proffer indicated that defendant brought a loaded weapon to a party that was
held in a parking lot at which numerous individuals were present and which was accessible to the
public at large. At some point, defendant handed the weapon to Mars who got into a fight with and
eventually shot the victim. The trial court relied on these facts to conclude that the State had proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant
committed first degree murder. We agree with the trial court that the State has met its burden here.
Defendant does not point to anything that is inherently incredible in the State’s proffer. He does
posit that the recited evidence could support the conclusion that Mars fired the weapon in self-
defense during the fight because the victim was allegedly armed. However, this argument is best
left for trial. Defendant also argues that there was no explanation offered as to how defendant was
aware that giving a gun to Mars would result in first degree murder charges. But the fact that
defendant merely provided a weapon to the individual who allegedly inflicted the fatal shots does
not necessarily relieve him of culpability. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 398 Ill. 256, 262-263
(1947) (finding that the defendant, who procured a gun and participated in an unlawful assembly
preceding the fatal shooting, was responsible for the act of co-defendant in killing the victim);
People v. Amigon, 388 Ill. App. 3d 26, 33 (2009) (“[A] defendant will be found criminally liable
where his or her criminal acts ‘set in motion a chain of events’ culminating in the victim’s death”),
aff’d, 239 Ill. 2d 71 (2010); People v. Robinson, 113 Ill. App. 2d 89 (1969) (abstract only) (holding
that both parties who acted in concert in assault which resulted in death of victim were equally
accountable for death regardless of which one inflicted fatal wound). Hence, we conclude that the
trial court’s finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident
or the presumption great that he committed first degree murder was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-U¶ 23 C. Threat
¶ 24 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the State proved by clear
and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or
persons in the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. According to
defendant, the State merely used the “alleged facts of the charged crime” as a basis to argue that
he presented a threat to others. Relying principally on People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753,
defendant argues this was improper.
¶ 25 Under the Code, factors that the trial court may consider in making a determination of
dangerousness, i.e., that the defendant poses a real and present threat to any person or the
community, include, but are not limited to: (1) the nature and circumstances of any offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon, or a sex offense;
(2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the identify of any person to whom the
defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by or
attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding the statements; (5) the age
and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of the victim or
complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any
weapons; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, the defendant was on
probation, parole, or other form of supervised release from custody; and (9) any other factors,
including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022)), the court
deems to have a reasonable bearing on the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent,
abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).
¶ 26 In Stock, the court, in addressing whether the State had proven that no less restrictive
conditions of release would serve to mitigate any threat the defendant posed, found that the mere
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-Ufact that a defendant is alleged to have committed a violent crime is insufficient to establish that
no less restrictive conditions of release would serve to mitigate any threat the defendant posed.
Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18; see also People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028,
¶ 18 (“But the fact that a person is charged with a detainable offense is not enough to order
detention”). Seizing upon this holding from Stock, defendant insists that there was no evidence
beyond “the alleged facts of the charged crime” to show that he poses a real and present threat to
the safety of any person or persons or the community.
¶ 27 We find defendant’s argument unpersuasive. Contrary to defendant’s claim, the State in
this case did not rely on the mere fact that defendant was charged with first degree murder to
support its position that defendant poses a threat to the safety of any person or the community.
Rather, the State relied on the specific facts surrounding the offense charged. At a bare minimum,
defendant’s behavior, as alleged, was dangerous and shows an utter disregard for the safety of any
person or persons in the community. See Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 14 (holding that the
State provided clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, who was charged with aggravated
battery/discharge of a firearm, posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons
or the community where the evidence established that he needlessly discharged a firearm in his
home in the presence of various individuals, including his 15-year-old daughter). Considering this
record, we cannot say that the trial court’s factual finding that defendant poses a real and present
threat to the safety of any person or the community was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 28 D. Conditions of Release
¶ 29 Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the State proved by clear
and convincing evidence that there are no conditions that could mitigate the risk of his release.
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-UDefendant’s argument is twofold. First, again relying on Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753,
defendant asserts that there was no evidence beyond the crime charged to establish this element.
Second, defendant asserts that the error was compounded because the trial court failed to either
orally enunciate or enter a written finding as to why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a
real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific
articulable facts of the case.
¶ 30 Section 110-6.1(e)(3) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)) directs a court
to consider the conditions set forth in section 110-10. (725 ILCS 5/110-10 (West 2022)). Section
110-10(a) requires all defendants released under the Act to appear for court dates, obey court
orders, refrain from committing further offenses, and surrender all firearms. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(a)
(West 2022). In addition, a court may impose additional conditions, including the supervision of
Pretrial Services or a similar agency, and compliance with any other reasonable condition. 725
ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022).
¶ 31 We observe that the trial court’s written findings on this issue are cursory. It signed a
preprinted form that provides that “no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real
and present threat to the safety of any person or persons for offenses listed in 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(1) through (7) OR the defendant’s willful flight for offenses listed in 725 ILCS 5/110-
6.1(a)(8).” The form provides no space for the trial court to explain its findings and the court did
not attach an addendum doing so. In People v. Andino-Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 230463, ¶ 19, we
discussed the Act’s requirement in section 110-6.1(h)(1) of a written order with a summary of the
trial court's “reasons for concluding less restrictive conditions would not avoid” a threat to safety
posed by defendant’s release. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). Looking at the Act as a
whole, we found the purpose of that requirement was to ensure that detention decisions (1) were
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-Ubased upon specific articulable facts and individualized to each defendant, (2) provided notice to
the parties of the reasons for the court’s decision, and (3) preserved this reasoning for appellate
review. In Andino-Acosta, we held that in assessing the sufficiency of a trial court’s findings, its
written findings must be read in conjunction with its oral pronouncements. Andino-Acosta, 2024
IL App (2d) 230463, ¶ 19.
¶ 32 Here, while the trial court’s oral pronouncement adequately addressed why defendant
posed a threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific
articulable facts of the case, it is devoid of findings why any condition or combination of conditions
would not mitigate the risk of his release. The court merely noted that defendant, although blind,
was at a party in a parking lot with a number of people, that defendant had a loaded weapon, that
he gave the loaded weapon to another person, and that the other person shot the victim who died.
It then pronounced that, “[b]ased on these facts,” the State had proven by clear and convincing
evidence that there are no conditions or combination of conditions that can mitigate the real and
present threat to the safety of any person and that less restrictive conditions would not assure safety
to the community. In other words, the trial court cited nothing to explain why less restrictive
conditions to detention would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or
persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case.
¶ 33 In short, there is no indication in the trial court’s oral ruling or written order that it
considered less restrictive conditions to detention, let alone did it provide an explanation of why
less restrictive conditions would not mitigate the threat defendant poses. Accordingly, we vacate
the trial court’s detention order and remand the matter to the trial court to reconsider its decision
on this element. On remand, should the trial court decide to detain defendant, it shall make
individualized findings explaining why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and
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2023 IL App (2d) 230521-Upresent threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific
articulable facts of the case. We, of course, express no opinion on what the trial court’s ruling
should be. We merely direct the trial court to consider the possibility of less restrictive alternatives
under section 110-10(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022)) and explain why or why
not such alternatives would mitigate the threat defendant poses.
¶ 34 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 In light of the foregoing, the order of the circuit court of Lake County is vacated and this
cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order.
¶ 36 Vacated and remanded, with directions.
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