People v. Rowlett , 2023 IL App (3d) 220309-U ( 2023 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2023 IL App (3d) 220309-UOrder filed December 7, 2023
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
) Du Page County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-22-0309
v. ) Circuit No. 13-CF-672
)
SHARON A. ROWLETT, ) Honorable
) Margaret O’Connell,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McDade and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) The circuit court had jurisdiction to conduct drug court termination
proceedings. (2) The termination proceedings did not violate defendant’s right to
due process.
¶2 Defendant, Sharon A. Rowlett, appeals her conviction for burglary. Defendant argues that
(1) the Du Page County circuit court lacked jurisdiction to terminate defendant from drug court,
and (2) the termination proceedings violated her right to due process. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 1, 2013, defendant submitted a signed jury waiver and entered into a
“Du Page County Drug Court Program Plea Agreement.” According to the plea agreement,
defendant would plead guilty to burglary, the State would dismiss several charges, and defendant
would remain on bond “with sentencing deferred until either the completion of or unsuccessful
discharge from the program.” The agreement continued, “[u]pon successful completion of the
program” defendant would be “sentenced to 24 mo[nth]s probation, considered served.”
Defendant agreed that “[i]f the defendant has an outstanding warrant from Du Page County Drug
Court for more than 90 days, the defendant will be terminated from the Program” and “[i]f the
defendant is unsuccessfully terminated from the program for any reason, a Pre-Sentence Report
will be ordered [and] the case shall proceed to immediate sentencing.” Defendant also signed the
“Du Page County Drug Court Program Contract,” which stated that defendant agreed with all the
conditions of the drug court program, including appearing on court dates. The court entered a
written order finding defendant guilty of burglary, that defendant’s plea was knowing and
voluntary, and that a factual basis existed to support the plea. Additionally, the court ordered
defendant’s sentence to be “deferred pending [her] successful or unsuccessful completion of drug
court” and orally admonished defendant that if she successfully completed drug court, she would
“be sentenced to 24 months probation considered served.” The court admonished defendant of
the rights she waived by pleading guilty. The court did not admonish defendant of her appeal
rights.
¶5 On August 8, 2013, the Du Page County jail released defendant on bond and ordered her
to appear in court on a future date. The order also stated that “as a condition of bond defendant
shall remain in treatment until further order of court.” On November 4, 2013, defendant failed to
appear, and the court issued a “Drug Court Bench Warrant.” The court set the case for drug court
2
status on February 6, 2014, January 15, 2015, January 14, 2016, and January 12, 2017.
Defendant did not appear on any of these dates. Instead, defendant appeared on May 8, 2022, for
the first time since her release in August 2013.
¶6 On May 9, 2022, defense counsel made an oral motion to dismiss following the State’s
acknowledgment that it had not filed a “petition to revoke” defendant’s drug court agreement.
On May 10, 2022, the State filed a “Verified Petition for Termination/Discharge from the Drug
Court Program.” The State alleged that defendant’s termination from the program was mandated
due to defendant’s outstanding warrant for more than 45 days. On May 11, 2022, the State
argued that due to the predispositional nature of the agreement, it was permitted to file a petition
to terminate. Defense counsel argued that the court did not have jurisdiction where the State
failed to file a petition to revoke or terminate defendant from drug court within 90 days of her
violation. The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss and transferred the case back to drug
court. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied.
¶7 On May 12, 2022, the matter proceeded to a hearing on the State’s motion to terminate.
The court granted the State’s motion, ordered a presentence investigation report, and continued
the matter for sentencing. Following a hearing, the court imposed a sentence of three years’
imprisonment. Defendant appealed.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 Defendant argues that (1) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to terminate her from drug
court, and (2) the termination proceedings violated her right to due process. Under the Drug
Court Treatment Act (Act) (730 ILCS 166/1 et seq. (West 2022)), the drug court program is a
special form of probation that facilitates an “intensive therapeutic treatment to *** assist
participants with substance use disorders in making positive lifestyle changes and reducing the
3
rate of recidivism.” Id. § 10. Drug court “is a form of conditional liberty ***. Each program
requires the participant to comply with certain conditions or face the loss of the privilege.
Revocation of that privilege may not be accomplished without inquiry.” People v. Anderson, 358
Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1114 (2005). Due to the unique nature of a drug court program, criminal
proceedings may be suspended or stayed during participation in the program and reinstated
following a defendant’s dismissal. See id.; see also, e.g., 730 ILCS 166/35(a) (West 2022).
¶ 10 A defendant may be terminated unsuccessfully from a drug court program by violating
the program requirements. 730 ILCS 166/35(a), (b) (West 2022). To terminate a participant from
the program, the Act requires the court to inform defendant that her drug court probation “may
be revoked and the defendant may be sentenced *** for the crime charged” if she fails to meet
the conditions of the drug court program.” Id. § 25(b). The Act also mandates that a defendant
enter a written agreement to the terms and conditions of the program. Id. § 25(c).
“No participant may be dismissed from the program unless, prior to
dismissal, the participant is informed in writing:
(1) of the reason or reasons for the dismissal;
(2) the evidentiary basis supporting the reason or reasons for the dismissal;
and
(3) that the participant has a right to a hearing at which the participant may
present evidence supporting the participant’s continuation in the program.” Id.
§ 35(a-20).
A participant considered for unsuccessful termination from a drug court program shall be
afforded the same due process rights that are afforded to probationers and parolees in revocation
hearings. See Anderson, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1114-15.
4
¶ 11 The court must look at the evidence presented and determine whether a participant
(1) has violated the conditions of the program, and (2) should be dismissed from the program.
730 ILCS 166/35(a-5) (West 2022). If the court finds that a participant has violated the terms and
conditions of the program, the court may “dismiss[ ] the participant from the program, and ***
reinstate criminal proceedings *** or proceed under *** a violation of probation, conditional
discharge, or supervision hearing.” Id. § 35(a).
¶ 12 At the outset, we find that defendant entered a preadjudicatory agreement. A “ ‘[p]re-
adjudicatory drug court program’ *** allows the defendant *** to enter the drug court program
before plea, conviction, or disposition and requires successful completion of the drug court
program as part of the agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 10. Here, defendant waived her right
to a jury trial and signed an agreement pleading guilty in exchange for the State’s dismissal of
several charges. However, defendant’s plea and “Drug Court Program Plea Agreement,” do not
preclude the “pre-adjudicatory” characterization of her agreement, as the court entered neither a
conviction nor disposition. See id. This conclusion is supported by the repeated statements in the
record that defendant’s “24 mo[nth]s probation” sentence was “deferred until either the
completion of or unsuccessful discharge from the program.” In further support of the
preadjudicatory nature of the agreement, the court placed defendant on bond and ordered her to
comply with certain bond conditions. See 5 ILCS 70/1.43 (West 2022). Additionally, the court
did not admonish defendant regarding her appeal rights at the time she entered the agreement,
tending to show that a sentence had not yet been imposed. Therefore, defendant’s drug court
agreement was preadjudicatory. 1
1
We note that at the time defendant entered her agreement, the Act defined “pre-adjudicatory drug
court program” as “a program that allows the defendant, with the consent of the prosecution, to expedite
the defendant’s criminal case before conviction or before filing of a criminal case and requires successful
completion of the drug court program as part of the agreement.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 166/10
5
¶ 13 We find that the language used in the defendant’s agreement put defendant on notice that
the State would terminate her from the program if her warrant status were to exceed the 90-day
time frame, and the court maintained jurisdiction to revoke her probation. People v. Hayes, 2022
IL App (2d) 210014, ¶ 30 (court maintained jurisdiction to terminate defendant from drug court
because discharge from drug court is not equivalent to revocation of probation). Neither the
language of the agreement nor the Act created a requirement that the State file a petition to
terminate within 90 days following the issuance of defendant’s warrant to maintain jurisdiction
in the circuit court. See People v. Anderson, 369 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976 (2007) (stating that “[n]o
provision of the Act nor any other provision of law barred the State from resurrecting
defendant’s dormant burglary charge after the initial 24 months of defendant’s participation in
the program”). The Act outlines a special drug court program that does not follow the same rules
as a standard term of probation. See People v. Holcomb, 2022 IL App (3d) 210038, ¶ 16; see also
cf. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(a)(1)-(3) (West 2022) (when a defendant has violated probation, the State
must notify defendant of the violation, provide a summons for a hearing, and order a warrant for
defendant’s arrest, which “shall toll the period of probation”); see cf. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(d), 5-
4.5-35, 5-4.5-40, 5-4.5-45 (West 2022) (no period of probation shall exceed four years for
probationable offenses). The lack of a definitive time frame for defendant’s drug court
participation is a result of the special nature of the drug court program. See Holcomb, 2022 IL
App (3d) 210038, ¶ 16.
¶ 14 A defendant is granted the benefit of the ability to successfully complete the program on
her individual recovery timeline. See id.; see also 730 ILCS 166/10 (West 2022). Thus,
(West 2012). The change in the definition does not affect our analysis where, while defendant entered a
plea and the State filed charges, the court did not enter a conviction.
6
defendant maintained some control over the length of her participation in the program. In this
case, the length of defendant’s pending agreement was due to her outstanding warrant. Given the
special nature of the drug court program and defendant’s actions to prolong her participation in
the program, the State was not required to file a petition to toll the drug court program agreement
for the court to maintain jurisdiction over defendant’s proceedings. See Hayes, 2022 IL App (2d)
210014, ¶ 30; Anderson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 976 (2007). Cf. People v. Johnson, 265 Ill. App. 3d
509, 511-12 (1994) (the State failed to toll defendant’s standard probation by filing a petition to
revoke probation prior to its expiration). Therefore, the court did not lose jurisdiction to
terminate defendant’s drug court agreement.
¶ 15 Moreover, when defendant entered the written agreement, the circuit court informed
defendant that her drug court agreement may be revoked if she failed to comply with the terms.
See 730 ILCS 166/25(b), (c) (West 2022). The agreement specified the terms and conditions of
the program and the consequences for her failure to appear and subsequent warrant status. See id.§ 25(c). Prior to defendant’s unsuccessful discharge, the State served defendant with a “Verified
Petition for Termination” from the drug court program, moving to dismiss defendant for her
outstanding warrant that exceeded 90 days. See id. § 35(a-20). The court held a hearing on that
motion, allowing defendant to present evidence to rebut the allegation and support her continued
participation in the program. See id.; see also Anderson, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1114-15. While
defendant did not provide an argument or evidence supporting such a claim, the hearing allowed
her the opportunity to do so. Supra ¶ 7. From the evidence presented, the court determined that
defendant violated the terms of her agreement, dismissed defendant from the program, and
reinstated criminal proceedings. See 730 ILCS 166/35(a) (West 2022). Accordingly, under the
special circumstances of the drug court program, the requirements of due process have been met.
7
See id. § 35(a-5); see also Anderson, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1114-15 (“[B]oth the interests of a
defendant and the State are better protected only if the minimum requirements of due process are
met, in the form of a hearing, prior to the revocation of or dismissal from participation in the
drug-court program.”). Therefore, the delay in filing the petition to terminate did not violate
defendant’s right to due process where the record shows the due process requirements were met
by the State and the court.
¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 17 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.
¶ 18 Affirmed.
8