People v. Trottier , 2023 IL App (2d) 230317 ( 2023 )


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    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    No. 2-23-0317
    Opinion filed December 8, 2023
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    IN THE
    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
    SECOND DISTRICT
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
    OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of De Kalb County.
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
    )
    v.                                     ) No. 23-CF-519
    )
    STEVEN TROTTIER,                       ) Honorable
    ) Philip Montgomery,
    Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
    Justices Hutchinson and Kennedy concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1     Defendant, Steven Trottier, was charged in the circuit court of De Kalb County with three
    counts of possession of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2022)). The State
    filed a “Verified Petition to Deny Defendant Pretrial Release” (Petition) pursuant to section 110-
    6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)).
    Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s Petition and entered a written order of
    pretrial detention. Defendant filed a timely appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    ¶2                                     I. BACKGROUND
    ¶3     On September 21, 2023, defendant was charged by complaint with three counts of
    possession of child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2022)). Each count of the
    
    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    complaint alleged that defendant possessed an electronic video file of a prepubescent female child,
    whom defendant reasonably should have known to be under the age of 18, engaging in sexual
    conduct or penetration.
    ¶4     A synopsis of facts related to the charges against defendant was prepared by the De Kalb
    County Sheriff’s Department (Department) and, as amended, provided in pertinent part as follows.
    In May 2023, the Department received from the National Center for Missing and Exploited
    Children multiple Cyber Tipline reports of child pornography being downloaded from social media
    applications. The files were viewed by an investigator and were confirmed to be videos of child
    pornography. The Department’s investigation indicated that the downloads were associated with
    defendant. The Department obtained search warrants for the social media applications involved,
    and three video files of child pornography were provided. Also provided were chat messages from
    defendant. In those messages, defendant stated that he is “supporting a family from the
    Phillippines [sic] now and going to have the two brothers move to live with me.” Defendant noted
    that one of the brothers is 21 and the other is 11. Defendant remarked that it will be “great to have
    two naked young boys running around the house *** every day and night” and that the “sex will
    be great.” An amended synopsis further noted that the names, addresses, and phone numbers for a
    family in the Philippines were found at defendant’s residence. Also discovered at defendant’s
    residence was a computer with picture and video files of “two boys who appear to be from the
    Phillipines [sic],” videos of “a young Phillipino [sic] man *** masturbating,” and “a video file that
    appeared to have been created by [defendant] directed to the boys, being a ‘a [sic] thank you for
    loving me’ type of video.”
    ¶5     A pretrial services bond report (Report) documented that, in 1995, defendant was convicted
    of the aggravated criminal sexual assault of a victim under 13 years of age, for which he was
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    sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. The Report noted that defendant is no longer required to
    register as a sex offender but that he is still prohibited from participating in any programs or
    services exclusively directed towards children under 18 years of age; he is restricted from being
    within 500 feet of a school, school conveyance, or public park; and he is restricted from residing
    within 500 feet of a school, playground, daycare, or any facility offering programs or services
    exclusively directed for children. The Report further noted that pretrial services administered to
    defendant the revised Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (Assessment). The
    Assessment identified defendant’s “risk of pretrial misconduct as 2 out of a possible score of 0-
    14.” Based on statistical norms, “the [A]ssessment would estimate a 96% probability” that
    defendant would appear at all future court hearings and avoid new offenses. Pretrial services
    recommended release pending trial with the conditions that defendant be placed on pretrial
    supervision, that he not have any unsupervised contact with underage minors, and that he not reside
    in a home with underage minors.
    ¶6     On September 22, 2023, the State filed the Petition at issue. In the Petition, the State alleged
    that defendant was charged with an offense under article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720
    ILCS 5/art. 11 (West 2022)), an enumerated offense under section 110-6.1(a)(5) of the Code (725
    ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(5) (West 2022)), and that defendant’s pretrial release would pose a real and
    present threat to the physical safety of any person or persons or the community. The State also
    alleged that defendant has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.
    ¶7     The trial court held a detention hearing on the State’s Petition the day it was filed. After
    argument by the attorneys, the court concluded that the State had not met its burden on the issue
    of willful flight. The court went on to note that it had previously found probable cause as it relates
    to the offenses charged and that it had reviewed the arrest warrant, the synopses of facts, and the
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    Report. The court determined that the proof was evident and the presumption great that defendant
    committed the offenses charged. The court considered defendant’s previous conviction of
    aggravated criminal sexual assault and mentioned the age of the victim “as less than 13,” finding
    that this conviction evidenced a “previous history of violence, abusive or assaultive behavior.”
    Citing the current charges and the prior offense, the court found that defendant had some
    psychological issues. The court also stated, based on the information in the synopses of facts, that
    “it appears as though the defendant was actively seeking to relocate persons to his home that he
    could then potentially abuse.” The court determined that, considering the statements attributed to
    him, defendant posed a real and present danger to the community. Additionally, the court found
    that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the
    safety of any persons or the community. The court concluded that, “based on the specific and
    articulable facts of the case[,] *** the comments that are attributed to the defendant, the
    defendant’s prior criminal history[,] and the facts and circumstances that give rise to the
    defendant’s arrest,” defendant would be ordered detained. This appeal followed.
    ¶8                                         II. ANALYSIS
    ¶9     This appeal is brought pursuant to Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023),
    commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act). 1
    See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v.
    Raoul, 
    2023 IL 129248
    , ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date of Act as September 18, 2023).
    1
    The Act has been referred to as the “SAFE-T Act” or the “Pretrial Fairness Act.” Neither
    of those names is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or the public act.
    Rowe v. Raoul, 
    2023 IL 129248
    , ¶ 4 n.1.
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    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    This court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
    1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023).
    ¶ 10   The Act amended the Code by abolishing traditional monetary bail in favor of pretrial
    release on personal recognizance or with conditions of release. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2(a)
    (West 2022). In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release. 725
    ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code
    as amended by the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022). Under the Code, as amended, a
    defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain statutorily limited situations (qualifying
    offenses). 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). For most of the qualifying offenses, upon
    filing a verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by
    clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant
    has committed a qualifying offense (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)), that the defendant’s
    pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the
    community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7), (e)(2) (West 2022)) or a high likelihood of willful flight
    to avoid prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8), (e)(3) (West 2022)), and that no condition or
    combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or
    the community or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-
    6.1(e)(3) (West 2022)).
    ¶ 11   In considering whether the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any
    person or the community, i.e., making a determination of “dangerousness,” the trial court may
    consider evidence or testimony concerning factors that include, but are not limited to, (1) the nature
    and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense was a crime of violence,
    involved a weapon, or was a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant,
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    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    including the defendant’s prior criminal history indicative of violent, abusive, or assaultive
    behavior and the defendant’s psychological history; (3) the identity of any person to whom the
    defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by or
    attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding the statements; (5) the age
    and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of the victim or
    complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any
    weapons; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, the defendant was on
    probation, parole, or other form of supervised release from custody; and (9) any other factors,
    including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022)). 725 ILCS
    5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2022).
    ¶ 12   If the trial court finds that the State proved a valid threat to the safety of any person or the
    community, the defendant is likely to flee to avoid prosecution, or the defendant failed to abide by
    previously issued conditions of pretrial release, the trial court must determine which pretrial
    release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the
    safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant
    with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). In reaching its
    determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
    charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant, (3) the history and characteristics of
    the defendant, 2 (4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to the safety of any
    2
    The history and characteristics of the defendant include: “[T]he defendant’s character,
    physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence
    in the community, community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal
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    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s release, and (5) the nature and
    seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. 725
    ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). The statute lists no singular factor as dispositive. See 725 ILCS
    5/110-5(a) (West 2022).
    ¶ 13   If the trial court determines that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, the court
    is required to make a written finding summarizing the reasons for denying pretrial release. 725
    ILCS 5/110-6.1(h) (West 2022). Our standard of review is twofold. We review under the manifest-
    weight-of-the-evidence standard the trial court’s factual findings regarding whether the State
    presented clear and convincing evidence that mandatory conditions of release would fail to protect
    any person or the community, the defendant has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid
    prosecution, or the defendant failed to comply with previously issued conditions of pretrial release
    thereby requiring a modification or revocation of the previously issued conditions of pretrial
    release. See In re C.N., 
    196 Ill. 2d 181
    , 208 (2001) (applying a similar standard of review for the
    requirement of clear and convincing evidence by the State in termination-of-parental-rights
    proceeding). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite
    conclusion is clearly apparent or if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
    evidence presented. In re Jose A., 
    2018 IL App (2d) 180170
    , ¶ 17. We review for an abuse of
    discretion the trial court’s ultimate determination regarding pretrial release. See People v.
    history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings” as well as “whether, at the time
    of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending
    trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for any offense under federal law, or the law
    of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A)-(B) (West 2022).
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    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    Simmons, 
    2019 IL App (1st) 191253
    , ¶ 9 (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing
    ruling denying the defendant’s motion for bail pending trial under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
    604(c)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017)). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is
    arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by
    the trial court. People v. Williams, 
    2022 IL App (2d) 200455
    , ¶ 52.
    ¶ 14   On appeal, defendant maintains that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial release. In
    support, defendant initially argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that he posed a threat to the community. Defendant claims that his score of 2 out of 14 on the
    Assessment establishes his nearly nonexistent threat to the community if released. Defendant then
    suggests that, while the trial court considered his criminal history of aggravated criminal sexual
    assault of a victim under 13 years of age and the inherent psychological issues coinciding with his
    prior conviction, this “did [sic] warrant a finding that he was a danger to the community” as he
    complied with the registration requirements that arose with his nearly three-decades-old offense.
    ¶ 15   Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in finding that no condition or
    combination of conditions could mitigate the threat that he allegedly posed because the court relied
    mainly on his chat room communications. As noted earlier, those communications referenced that
    two brothers, aged 21 and 11, would be moving in with defendant and defendant’s statements that
    it will be “great to have two naked young boys running around the house *** every day and night”
    and the “sex will be great.” Defendant maintains not only that there was a lack of context to support
    the idea that the chat room communications could be construed as serious statements of his
    intentions, but that his current monthly income and housing expenses leave him with resources
    insufficient to internationally relocate and support the described individuals. In further support of
    this contention, defendant suggests that the imposition of mandatory and additional conditions of
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    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    release could have mitigated any threat that the court believed he posed to the community.
    Defendant lists the mandatory conditions imposed by section 110-10 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-
    10(a)(1)-(6) (West 2022)) as well as the additional conditions permissible under the same section
    (725 ILCS 5/110-10(b)(0.05)-(9) (West 2022)). Defendant argues that imposing these conditions
    would have mitigated the risk of his relocating individuals from the Philippines to his home.
    ¶ 16    In response, the State argues that, in finding defendant’s criminal history indicative of
    violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior and his chat room communications suggestive of his
    intention to relocate individuals from the Philippines to his home so he may sexually assault them,
    the trial court properly held that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the
    community. The State observes that, as set forth in section 110-6.1(g) of the Code, a court may, in
    determining dangerousness, consider evidence of a prior criminal history of violent, abusive, or
    assaultive behavior. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2)(A) (West 2022). Thus, the State reasons, due to the
    age of the prior victim mirroring that of one of the two individuals defendant discussed sexually
    abusing, the chat room communications viewed in aggregate with defendant’s prior conviction
    support the finding that he poses a threat.
    ¶ 17    The State further contends that the trial court’s subsequent finding that no condition or
    combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat defendant poses was proper
    based on specific articulable facts of the case. The trial court relied on defendant’s criminal history,
    the chat room communications attributed to defendant, and the circumstances giving rise to his
    arrest. As defendant’s criminal history involved the criminal sexual assault of a child, his chat
    room communications suggest his intention of relocating individuals—one of whom is a child—
    to be sexually abused, and his arrest arose from his alleged possession of child pornography, the
    State maintains that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate this threat.
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    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    ¶ 18   Based on our review of the record, we agree with the State. The record reflects that
    defendant has a history of serious criminality indicative of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior
    as shown in his prior conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault of a victim under 13 years
    of age. The amended synopsis establishes that the chat room communications of defendant the
    social media applications provided in response to the search warrant, along with the telephone
    numbers and addresses of individuals domiciled in the Philippines, reveal an active plan to relocate
    a person defendant believed to be a child so that defendant could commit sexual assault. The
    factual findings of the trial court that defendant met the standard of dangerousness, he posed a real
    and present threat to any person or the community if released, and no condition or combination of
    conditions could mitigate this threat are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As a
    result, based upon the trial court’s factual findings, we conclude that its order denying pretrial
    release was not an abuse of discretion.
    ¶ 19                                      III. CONCLUSION
    ¶ 20   For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb
    County.
    ¶ 21   Affirmed.
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    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    People v. Trottier, 
    2023 IL App (2d) 230317
    Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County, No. 23-CF-519;
    the Hon. Philip Montgomery, Judge, presiding.
    Attorneys                  James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Peter Sgro, of State
    for                        Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
    Appellant:
    Attorneys                  Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys
    for                        Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
    Appellee:
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2-23-0317

Citation Numbers: 2023 IL App (2d) 230317

Filed Date: 12/8/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/8/2023