People v. Monchunski , 2024 IL App (3d) 240174-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 240174-UOrder filed June 14, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appellate Court No. 3-24-0174
v. ) Circuit No. 23-CF-1966
)
JASON A. MONCHUNSKI, ) Honorable
) Sarah F. Jones,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
Presiding Justice McDade dissented.
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ORDER
¶1 Held: Trial court’s decision to continue to detain defendant was not an abuse of
discretion.
¶2 Defendant, Jason A. Monchunski, was charged on October 27, 2023, with residential
burglary (Class 1) (720 ILCS 5/19-3(a), (b) (West 2022)). Defendant was subsequently indicted.
The State filed a verified petition to detain, alleging defendant was charged with a forcible
felony, and his release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the
community under section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS
5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)).
¶3 The factual basis provided that on October 24, 2023, Erica Bailey returned home and
observed two subjects she did not know exiting her residence. Bailey approached and asked what
they were doing, to which defendant responded that they lived at the residence. When Bailey
responded that she lived there, defendant and the other subject fled in a Nissan that was backed
in her driveway. The license plate number for the Nissan was obtained. The door from her garage
into her residence had been pried open. Based on the vehicle description and plate number, the
Nissan was found in Chicago with defendant sleeping inside. As officers were looking at the
vehicle and waiting to tow it, Michael Smith approached and stated that it was his car. Both
Smith and defendant were identified in lineups by Bailey as the men at her residence. Two
neighbors witnessed the incident and corroborated Bailey’s statement, however neither could
identify anyone. The Nissan contained two pry bars, bolt cutters, pliers, a screwdriver, a hammer,
a gaming system, and security equipment.
¶4 A pretrial risk assessment indicated that defendant was a Level 6 risk, which was the
highest possible risk. He had pending cases for driving on revoked license and violation of an
order of protection. He also had convictions for, inter alia, domestic battery, criminal damage to
property, violation of an order of protection, aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol,
arson, residential burglary, retail theft, burglary, and resisting a peace officer.
¶5 An initial detention hearing was held on November 9, 2023. The written order indicates
that the court granted the State’s petition based on the nature and circumstances of the offense,
defendant’s violent criminal history, and the fact that defendant was on probation, parole,
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mandatory supervised release, or other release at the time of the offense. The transcript from the
hearing is not included in the record.
¶6 A subsequent hearing was held on February 21, 2024, which is the subject of this appeal.
Defense counsel argued that defendant was working for a home remodeling company and went
to the wrong address. He was not trying to break into the home. The court asked what conditions
defense counsel would be asking for and stated, “Because we tried the pretrial services before
and that didn’t work out. The fact that you picked up a subsequent felony and was not reporting
to pretrial services when you got revoked on both cases.” Counsel asked that defendant be placed
on electronic monitoring. The State indicated that there was “ample evidence” to show that
defendant was not working for a home remodeling company, including that defendant stated that
he lived there, and Bailey did not know of any workers that would be working at her home.
Further, there were marks indicating that the door to the house had been pried open. The State
further supplied the rest of the factual basis as well as defendant’s criminal history. The court
stated that defendant’s license was suspended and asked counsel how defendant would make it to
court. Defense counsel stated that defendant would ride the bus and rely on friends. The court
found that continued detention was necessary and noted, “we have previously tried being on
release and he was unable to maintain the conditions of his release on the older case and is now
alleged to have committed a, which if convicted, a mandatory X based on his priors.”
¶7 On appeal, defendant argues that he is not a threat to anyone and conditions such as
electronic monitoring would mitigate any threat. 1 We consider whether factual findings are
against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s
1
The State filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, based on defendant’s notice of appeal, which
only checked boxes and did not provide any further information. We took the motion with the case, and
we now deny the State’s motion to dismiss.
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petition to detain is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d)
230317, ¶ 13. Under either standard, we consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary
or unreasonable. Id.; see also People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 19. We review issues
of statutory construction de novo. People v. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45.
¶8 Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be
denied in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a
verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great
that defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to
any person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate
this threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(a), (e). Sections 110-5(a) and 110-6.1(g) set forth factors
for the court to consider when determining dangerousness and any conditions. Id. §§ 110-5(a),
110-6.1(g).
¶9 For subsequent hearings, as the one at issue here, the statute only requires the court to
find that “continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any
person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to
prevent the defendant's willful flight from prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(i-5). “Although this
determination necessarily entails consideration of the threat or flight risk posed by a defendant
and the potential mitigation of such threat or flight risk by conditions of release, the Code does
not require the court to again make specific findings that the State proved the three propositions
by clear and convincing evidence as required at the initial hearing.” People v. Casey, 2024 IL
App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13.
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¶ 10 Here, the factual basis indicated that defendant broke into Bailey’s residence, based on
the pry bar marks, the burglary tools found in the vehicle, and defendant’s stating that he lived at
the residence and fleeing. At the time of the offense, defendant was on pretrial release in another
pending matter. Based on the fact that defendant could not comply with those conditions, the
court did not believe that defendant was likely to comply with any further conditions. Taking the
evidence before us, we cannot say the court’s decision to continue to detain defendant was an
abuse of discretion.
¶ 11 In coming to this conclusion, we note that none of the caselaw defendant cites in support
of his position concern a subsequent detention hearing, like the one at issue, here. As stated
above, the necessary findings are different for subsequent hearings. Moreover, we note that the
statute does not require the court to articulate every reason for its conclusion at a subsequent
hearing.
¶ 12 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. This decision is issued in
accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023).
¶ 13 Affirmed.
¶ 14 PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:
¶ 15 I dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s order providing for
defendant’s continued detention.
¶ 16 As the majority recites, section 110-6.1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 states
that “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release. . . .” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)
(West 2022). To rebut this presumption, the State must prove the following three elements, by
clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the
defendant has committed a detainable offense; (2) that the defendant poses a real and present threat
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to the safety of any person, persons, or the community; and (3) that no conditions can mitigate this
threat. Id.¶ 17 I agree with the majority’s findings that the State satisfied the first and second of the above
elements. Relevant to the third element, the State’s petition to deny pretrial release is devoid of
any mention of mitigating conditions, or of the argument that no mitigating conditions exist. It
does not even acknowledge that conditions form an element when setting out its burden of proof.
Nor did the State mention or argue the same during the continued detention hearing. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be said that the State met its burden of proof as to the element pertaining
to mitigating conditions. See Black’s Law Dictionary 190 (7th ed. 1999) (explaining that a party’s
burden of proof includes the burden of persuasion, which is the duty to convince the fact-finder to
view the facts in a way favorable to that party). Consequently, I would reverse the circuit court’s
judgment as an abuse of discretion.
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