People v. Watson ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (2d) 210688-UNo. 2-21-0688
Order filed December 14, 2023
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 94-CF-1239
)
SVONDO WATSON, ) Honorable
) Brian F. Telander,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to amend the sentencing
judgment to include presentence custody credit; the credit was already included in
the judgment and defendant had “fair warning” that additional credit could be—
and was—removed by a supreme court decision issued during his direct appeal;
affirmed on different grounds.
¶2 In this case, a criminal defendant brought a nunc pro tunc motion some 25 years into his
sentence to “correct” his sentencing judgment regarding pretrial custody credit. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
472(a)(3) (eff. May 17, 2019). The trial court denied the motion, and because the written order is
2023 IL App (2d) 210688-Uconsistent with the sentencing court’s pronouncement and an intervening decision from our
supreme court eliminated the credit defendant sought, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In the early morning hours of June 7, 1994, Leo McDaniel and his girlfriend, Keisha
Twitty, were shot multiple times with a .380 caliber pistol as they slept in their apartment in
Lombard. McDaniel died and Twitty was seriously injured. Detectives noted that there was no
forced entry into the residence.
¶5 The investigation quickly focused on defendant who had been staying at the apartment for
over a week before the shooting. According to Twitty, defendant was the only other person who
had a key to the apartment, and she identified defendant as the shooter. Separately, at an apartment
in Chicago that defendant also stayed at, the police found .380 ammunition and around $14,000,
which were believed to be drug-sale proceeds belonging to McDaniel. Defendant also gave a short
confession to the shootings, but later attempted to recant it. The State’s theory of the case was that
defendant shot McDaniel and Twitty so that he could keep McDaniel’s drug money.
¶6 A jury initially found defendant guilty, but we reversed for trial errors not relevant here.
People v. Watson, No. 2-95-0809 (1996) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In
1998, following his retrial, defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(1) (West 1994)), attempted first-degree murder (id. § 8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1)) and aggravated battery
with a firearm (id. § 12-4.2(a)(1)).
¶7 Meanwhile, apart from defendant’s case and before his sentencing, a conflict had arisen in
Illinois’ reviewing courts regarding the interpretation of a sentencing statute, 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(e)
(West 1994). Prisoners in Illinois are generally entitled to one day of credit against their sentence
for each day spent in presentence custody, and districts of the appellate court were divided on the
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2023 IL App (2d) 210688-Uquestion of whether a defendant is entitled to credit for presentence time served for each
consecutive sentence or a single credit toward the aggregate sentence. In People v. Johnson, 286
Ill. App. 3d 597, 601 (1997), we adopted the former view, which in effect granted defendant’s two
days of credit for each day in the county jail. The First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts, however,
adhered to the view of issuing a single credit to apply to the combined aggregate term. See People
v. Biggs, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1054-55 (1st Dist. 1998); Johnson v. Washington, 294 Ill. App. 3d
472, 474-75 (3d Dist. 1998); Feazell v. Washington, 291 Ill. App. 3d 766 (4th Dist. 1997); People
v. Plair, 292 Ill. App. 3d 396 (5th Dist. 1997).
¶8 At the time of defendant’s sentencing, on July 29, 1998, the trial court (Hon. Ann B.
Jorgensen) applied our holding in People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597, as it was the appropriate
authority to follow. See Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 92 (1997) (“when
conflicts arise amongst the districts, the circuit court is bound by the decisions of the appellate
court of the district in which it sits”). Accordingly, in pronouncing sentence, the trial court made
clear that defendant would receive separate credit for time served on each of the consecutive
sentences for first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and aggravated battery. The court
sentenced defendant to a 60-year prison term for first-degree murder and 30-year prison terms for
each of the other offenses. The 30-year prison terms were to be served concurrently with one
another; Twitty was the named victim for both convictions and attempted murder was the more
serious offense. However, that sentence was required to be served consecutively with the 60-year
term for murder. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 1994).
¶9 With respect to presentence credit, the court told defendant the following:
“You will receive credit for all the time [(1513 days)] that you have previously
spent in custody on this case.
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2023 IL App (2d) 210688-UAnd under the current law in the Second District, it appears to me you will receive
credit on both counts of the—both counts—you will receive credit for all the time you have
previously been in custody both on the first-degree murder count as well as the attempt
murder count.
I make that ruling based on the fact that that’s the status of the case law in the
Second District now, and it is at this time that you are being sentenced and should receive
the benefit of that case law.”
¶ 10 Defense counsel asked whether the mittimus would reflect that ruling and the court said
that it would. We note that the trial court’s use of the word “both” referred to the murder and
attempted murder counts. In addition, although the written sentencing orders did not contain a
reference to People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597, all three of the orders stated that “defendant
shall receive credit on this count for all time in custody since 6-7-94”—or 1513 days.
¶ 11 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court denied. No issue
regarding presentence custody credit was raised. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. On
appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements to
police. No issue regarding presentence custody credit was raised. We determined that there was
no error in the admission of defendant’s statements and affirmed. People v. Watson, 315 Ill. App.
3d 866 (2000) (Watson II).
¶ 12 While defendant’s direct appeal was pending, our supreme court decided People v. Latona,
184 Ill. 2d 260 (1998), which overruled our decision in Johnson, and made clear that defendants
were entitled only to a single day of credit for each day in custody against their aggregate sentence.
As defendant raised no issue concerning his sentence, however, the fact that defendant received
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2023 IL App (2d) 210688-Ucredit against both his murder sentence and his concurrent sentences was never addressed in his
direct appeal.
¶ 13 In 2008, defendant filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)) asserting that the first-degree murder statute was
unconstitutional. Later, defendant amended his petition to include a claim that he was improperly
arrested on the complaint of a peace officer, without consultation with the State’s Attorney. No
issue regarding presentence custody credit was raised. The trial court dismissed the petition, and
we affirmed. People v. Watson, No. 2-09-0532 (2010) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 23) (Watson III).
¶ 14 On October 7, 2021, defendant filed a motion to amend the mittimus nunc pro tunc to
“correct” the written judgment. Defendant sought to have the credit applied separately to each
conviction. Attached to the motion was a “Sentence Calculation Worksheet” (which we will
address below) as well as a letter from the Du Page County Sheriff showing the time defendant
spent in the county jail.
¶ 15 The trial court denied the motion on its belief that defendant was not entitled to “double
credit” for each day spent in presentence custody and further suggested that what defendant was
seeking would result in a void sentence. Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly denied defendant’s
“nunc pro tunc” motion, which as we noted earlier was cognizable under Rule 472. The trial court
denied defendant’s motion, finding that he was, in effect, seeking “double credit,” which would
thereby create a void sentence. We determine that the trial court properly denied the motion,
although we make that determination on different grounds.
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2023 IL App (2d) 210688-U¶ 18 We review de novo whether a defendant is entitled to presentence custody credit as well as
whether an order qualifies for a nunc pro tunc correction. See People v. Jones, 2016 IL App (1st)
142582, ¶ 12; People v. Jones, 2015 IL App (4th) 130711, ¶ 12. The phrase nunc pro tunc is Latin
for “now for then” and, in law, it connotes the retroactive correction of errors. See, e.g.,
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294 n. 3 (2001). In other words,
“ ‘[a] nunc protunc order is an entry now for something previously done, made to make the record
speak now for what was actually done then.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Harreld v. Butler, 2014 IL
App (2d) 131065, ¶ 13 (quoting Kooyenga v. Hertz Equipment Rentals, Inc., 79 Ill. App. 3d 1051,
1055 (1979)).
¶ 19 It is axiomatic that for a nunc pro tunc correction to issue, there must first be an error to
correct. That did not happen in this case. The sentencing judge’s written orders on all three of
defendant’s convictions state that defendant would receive 1513 days’ credit on each conviction,
exactly as the trial court stated pursuant to People v. Johnson, 286 Ill. App. 3d 597 (1998).
Accordingly, none of the orders varied from the sentencing judge’s oral pronouncement of
defendant’s sentence, and there was, therefore, nothing to correct. We could affirm on this basis
alone.
¶ 20 We note, too, that the trial court denied defendant’s pro se motion because the court
believed that what defendant was seeking was “double credit.” The trial court, however, was
mistaken in part; defendant was told that he would get double credit, as the sentencing judge stated
pursuant to Johnson, which was the law of the district at the time defendant was sentenced.
Johnson, however, was not the final point on that matter.
¶ 21 While defendant’s direct appeal was pending, our supreme court issued its decision in
People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260 (1998), which overruled Johnson. Defendant was sentenced on
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2023 IL App (2d) 210688-UJuly 29, 1998, and his notice of appeal was filed on September 2, 1998. The decision in Latona,
184 Ill. 2d 260, was handed down on November 19, 1998, while defendant’s direct appeal was
pending. A basic principle of criminal procedure is that judicial decisions announcing “a new rule
for the conduct of criminal prosecutions [are] applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal,
pending on direct review or not yet final” (Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987))—and
defendant’s conviction was not yet final at the time Latona was decided. See also People v.
Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (2001). Thus, because the holding in Latona applied retroactively to
defendant’s sentence, he has no legitimate claim to “double credit” under Johnson, which Latona
explicitly overruled.
¶ 22 Our determination causes defendant no injury as defendant had “fair warning” regarding
the conflicting interpretations of 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(e) (West 1994), and how that conflict could
impact his sentence. See People v. Granados, 172 Ill. 2d 358, 370-72 (1996). We further note one
additional problem with defendant’s nunc pro tunc claim. The “Sentence Calculation Worksheet”
that defendant submitted is from 1998 and it does not appear to accurately reflect how the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC) is presently treating his sentence. The worksheet that defendant
submitted shows his projected “out” date as June 7, 2039, yet IDOC’s website, which we take
judicial notice of, states that his projected parole date is October 9, 2037. See Internet Inmate
Status, Ill. Dep’t of Corr., https://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/search/inms_print.asp?idoc=B6
7687 (last visited Dec. 8, 2023) [https://perma.cc/8UCW-AN2C]. We cannot discern how IDOC
arrived at defendant’s revised projected parole date because it appears to be based on a
combination of presentence custody credit and good-conduct credit, and in general, both are
internal matters for IDOC’s administration. See People v. Joyner, 20222 IL App (2d) 210045,
¶¶ 29-33. Of course, there may be a difference between what a sentencing order states, and how
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2023 IL App (2d) 210688-UIDOC treats that order in its projections. To the extent defendant has a concern about the latter, his
remedy, if any, would lie in a mandamus proceeding against IDOC’s Director and not in a
nunc pro tunc proceeding to “correct” orders that were consistent with the sentencing judge’s oral
pronouncements.
¶ 23 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 24 As defendant has not identified an error subject to nunc pro tunc correction, and the
decision in Latona effectively nullified his “double credit,” we affirm the judgment of the circuit
court of Du Page County denying defendant’s motion under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
472(a)(3).
¶ 25 Affirmed.
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