Pagel v. Allsop , 2024 IL App (5th) 230222-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (5th) 230222-UNOTICE
NOTICE
Decision filed 06/17/24. The
This order was filed under
text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0222
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
IN THE limited circumstances allowed
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
OPAL PAGEL, Independent Administrator of the Estate
) Appeal from the
of Dora L. Sly, Deceased, ) Circuit Court of
) Effingham County.
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 22-EV-14
)
DENNIS ALLSOP, ) Honorable
) Chad M. Miller,
Respondent-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order granting petitioner possession of the real estate
in favor of decedent’s estate.
¶2 Respondent, Dennis Allsop, appeals the Effingham County circuit court’s April 4, 2023,
order denying Dennis’s motions to reconsider the court’s February 9, 2023, order, granting
petitioner, Opal Pagel, as independent administrator of the Estate of Dora L. Sly, possession of the
premises in dispute. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. Background
¶4 We limit our recitation to those facts relevant to our disposition of this appeal. On July 1,
2021, decedent, Dora L. Sly, died intestate. At the time of her death, Dora and Dennis lived at
Dora’s home located at 12676 North 900th Street, Effingham, Illinois (premises). On August 30,
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2021, the probate court appointed Opal Pagel, Dora’s sister, as independent administrator of the
Estate of Dora L. Sly.
¶5 On June 3, 2022, Opal served Dennis a “30-Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy” to vacate
the premises on or before July 2, 2022. Dennis failed to vacate the premises and maintained
possession of the premises.
¶6 On July 8, 2022, Opal filed a complaint for eviction against Dennis requesting that the
circuit court grant Opal immediate possession of the premises. Dennis was served with a summons
for eviction on July 13, 2022.
¶7 On January 9, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on Opal’s complaint for eviction. The
following evidence was adduced. Opal testified that Dora, alone, owned the premises as evidenced
by a warranty deed on the property. Following Dora’s death, Opal attempted to take possession of
Dora’s property from Dennis on multiple occasions to sell the premises, pay outstanding expenses,
including property taxes, and distribute remaining profits to Dora’s heirs. Dennis refused to leave
the premises. As a result, Opal served Dennis with a 30-day notice to vacate; however, Dennis
refused to leave the premises.
¶8 On cross-examination, Opal acknowledged that Dennis lived at the premise for years prior
to Dora’s death. Opal testified that Dennis paid property taxes on the premises for tax years 2019
and 2020; however, property taxes for tax years 2021 and 2022 were overdue. Opal testified that
she requested that Dennis leave the premises sometime between Dora’s death and her burial in
July 2021, but Dennis refused. Opal rested.
¶9 Next, counsel for Dennis called Dennis, who testified to the following. Dennis and Dora
dated for almost 32 years before her death in July 2021. Dennis and Dora never married but lived
together in the premises for eight years. Dennis, a carpenter by trade, believed he paid property
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taxes in 2016. According to Dennis, Dora was unemployed, stating, “There wouldn’t have been a
house if I hadn’t moved in there.” Dennis paid utilities, delinquent taxes, performed work on the
roof, windows, and doors, and also painted the home. Acknowledging that he did not own the
home, Dennis claimed he paid expenses and improved the home because he “figured [he] would
be there until [he] died.” Counsel for Dennis then asked Dennis how much money he paid in taxes
for the residence, at which time counsel for Opal objected. The circuit court sustained the objection
and stated the following:
“THE COURT: And I have an issue of relevance for today. I’ll mimic the comment
I made earlier. I have a deed. I haven’t heard anything about a will that would transfer
property. Never a marriage. I think the money, I’ll hear a lot of this on another date for an
estate claim proceeding.”
Counsel for Dennis argued that Dennis’s eight years of tenancy were relevant, requesting that the
court “select an equitable amount for [Dennis] to pay on a temporary basis so the estate is not
experiencing waist [sic], and then proceed in the estate case.” The court responded that the issues
before the court were ownership interest and right to possession concerning Opal’s complaint to
evict Dennis. Counsel for Dennis then moved to admit into evidence the Illinois Supreme Court’s
Amended Order, M.R. 30370, concerning the Illinois Court-Based Rental Assistance Program in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Exhibit A) (Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Oct. 3, 2022)). Over
counsel for Opal’s objection, the court admitted Exhibit A into evidence. Counsel for Dennis
argued that the summons for eviction failed to include the notice to tenants concerning the Illinois
Court-Based Rental Assistance Program, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Order, M.R. 30370
(id.). On cross-examination, Dennis acknowledged that he never signed a lease to occupy the
premises or possessed ownership in the premises. Dennis rested.
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¶ 10 The circuit court then heard argument from parties. Counsel for Opal clarified that Opal
did not expect past-due rent from Dennis. Dora’s estate, through Opal, requested possession of the
premises to prepare the home for sale and pay outstanding expenses on the home. Counsel for
Dennis argued that Dennis would like to purchase the home. In addition, counsel for Dennis
contended that Dennis “was not served with any kind of notice with regard to his rights that’s
required to be attached to the summons.” Counsel for Dennis further argued that the order pertained
to all summonses issued in residential eviction cases, “whether they are rent based or not.”
¶ 11 Counsel for Opal agreed that the notice of tenant rights concerning the Illinois Court-Based
Rental Assistance Program must accompany the summons but denied that the issue before the
circuit court was jurisdictional. The court responded:
“THE COURT: The Supreme Court Rules are to be followed but if it’s not
jurisdictional, then there is nothing removing the case from going forward today. Do you
agree with me on that?
MR. CONNOR [Counsel for Dennis]: It does not [a]ffect the Court’s jurisdiction
over the Defendant or the property.
THE COURT: If this was an allegation of failure to give notice of other alternatives
to be removed when there is rent based, I would be more persuaded. If they are asking for
$2,000 in rent and hadn’t notified him of his ability to reach out to certain programs without
those—
MR. CONNOR: Respectfully, Judge, in reading it, it doesn’t say that. It says all
summons issued in residential eviction cases shall include the attached.”
The court found it inequitable to provide Dennis, a longtime resident of the property, with a
standard 21-day or 30-day removal from the premises. The court noted that Dennis did not pay
rent but had maintained the property in the past, and no evidence showed Dennis destroyed the
property or diminished the value for the estate. The court further noted that the warranty deed
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showed that Dora, alone, owned the premises. As such, the court granted Opal, as administrator of
Dora’s estate, possession of the premises but reserved ruling on the date of possession. 1
¶ 12 Following further argument by the parties on February 7, 2023, 2 the circuit court entered a
written order titled, “Judgment for Possession,” on February 9, 2023, granting Opal, as
administrator of Dora’s estate, possession of the premises. The court also stayed the judgment for
possession pursuant to section 9-110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/9-110 (West
2020)), ordering Dennis to vacate the premises no later than April 10, 2023, at 10:00 p.m. In the
event Dennis failed to vacate on time, the court ordered the Effingham County Sheriff’s Office to
assist in the eviction and dispossession of Dennis and his personal belongings.
¶ 13 On February 14, 2023, Dennis filed a motion to reconsider, rehear, or for a new trial. On
March 9, 2023, Dennis filed an amended motion to reconsider, arguing that the circuit court erred
by failing to enforce the Illinois Supreme Court’s Order, M.R. 30370, which required summons in
all residential eviction cases to include “prescribed forms giving notice” to tenants of their rights
in an eviction case as provided by the Illinois Court-Based Rental Assistance Program.
¶ 14 On April 4, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing on Dennis’s motions, which the court
denied. The court ruled its February 9, 2023, judgment for possession order was effective April
10, 2023. 3 In denying Dennis’s motions, the court’s docket entry stated the following:
“MOTION TO RECONSIDER IS DENIED—SUPREME COURT RULES ARE MADE
TO BE FOLLOWED HOWEVER IN THIS MATTER THE LACK OF ATTACHMENT
OF THE REQUIRED RENTAL ASSISTANCE LANGUAGE DID NOT PREJUDICE
1
Following the court’s ruling, the circuit court consolidated the estate claim (22-P-72) and eviction
claim.
2
The record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings from this hearing.
3
The record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings from this hearing. A docket entry
contained in the record on appeal indicated that the parties acknowledged the absence of a court reporter at
the hearing.
5
THIS RESPONDENT AS THERE WAS NO LEASE OR BACK RENT AND THE
MATTER INVOLVED AN INDIVIDUAL REMAINING WITHIN PROPERTY AFTER
THE DEATH OF THE PREVIOUS OWNER ***.”
¶ 15 On April 6, 2023, Dennis filed a timely notice of appeal and a motion to stay enforcement.
The circuit court’s April 11, 2023, docket entry indicated that the court granted Dennis’s motion
to stay enforcement, stating that Dennis “MAY CONTINUE TO RESIDE ON THE PREMISES”
and maintain the property during the pendency of his appeal in the eviction case. The court ordered
Dennis to immediately notify Opal in the event Dennis vacated the premises.
¶ 16 II. Analysis
¶ 17 We note that the parties do not dispute that the July 13, 2022, summons for eviction did
not contain the relevant notice to Dennis concerning the Illinois Court-Based Rental Assistance
Program. Due to this failure, Dennis argues that the circuit court erred by granting judgment in
favor of Opal, where the evidence demonstrated that the summons for eviction violated Illinois
Supreme Court Order, M.R. 30370. Additionally, Dennis argues that the court erred by finding
that Illinois Supreme Court Order, M.R. 30370 applied only to evictions based on nonpayment of
rent. We cannot agree.
¶ 18 Although an order issued by the Illinois Supreme Court is not a statute enacted by the
Illinois legislature, the interpretation of a supreme court order should follow the same guidelines
as statutory interpretation. Longstreet v. Cottrell, Inc., 374 Ill. App. 3d 549, 552 (2007). The
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature’s intent.
King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005). We look to the statutory
language, which given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of intent. Id. “In giving
effect to legislative intent, the court should consider, in addition to the statutory language, the
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reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought.” People v.
Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 171-72 (2003). Issues involving the interpretation of a statute present
questions of law that courts review de novo. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177-78 (1997).
¶ 19 On September 13, 2021, the Illinois Supreme Court initially entered an order concerning
the Illinois Court’s Response to COVID-19 Emergency/Court-Based Rental Assistance Program.
Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Sept. 21, 2021). On September 20, 2022, the Illinois Supreme Court
entered an amended order (Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Oct. 3, 2022) (new material underscored
and deleted material struck through), which stated the following:
“1. All summons issued in residential eviction cases shall include the attached, or
substantially similar, notice regarding the Court-Based Rental Assistance Program in
English and Spanish. The notices shall be attached to a copy of the summons filed with the
Clerk of the Circuit Court. Local Circuit Courts may modify this notice these notices with
more relevant local information, if possible.
2. This order shall remain in effect until further order of the Court.”
¶ 20 Equally important are the details contained in the notice concerning the Illinois Court-
Based Rental Assistance Program that the Illinois Supreme Court Order, M.R. 30370 references.
Specifically, the notice referenced in M.R. 30370 informs a tenant that they “may be eligible for
rental assistance” if they answer “ ‘yes’ ” to at least one of the following questions: (1) Are you in
eviction court because you fell behind on rent?; (2) Did you lose income or suffer financial
hardship because of COVID-19?; or (3) Are you at risk of becoming homeless? The notice then
provides two boxes. The box on the left lists eight “Tenant Documentation Requirements,” which
include (1) government-issued photo ID; (2) proof of address; (3) proof of household income;
(4) rent details and amount past due; (5) proof of public assistance, if applicable; (6) current signed
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lease, if available; (7) eviction court papers (complaint/summons); and (8) valid email addresses
for tenant and landlord. The notice notes that proof of citizenship is not required. Next, the box on
the right lists seven “Housing Providers/Landlords Documentation Requirements,” which included
(1) proof of ownership; (2) proof of unpaid rent; (3) current signed lease, if available; (4) proof of
identity or limited liability company, certificate of good standing, or articles of incorporation;
(5) fully executed and current property management agreement, if payment made to a property
manager; (6) eviction court papers (complaint/summons); and (7) valid email addresses for tenant
and landlord.
¶ 21 Our review of both M.R. 30370 and the attached notice concerning the Illinois Court-Based
Rental Assistance Program demonstrates the Illinois Supreme Court’s intention to provide rental
assistance to tenants in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Dennis correctly indicates that M.R.
30370 states that a notice is required in “[a]ll summons issued in residential eviction cases.”
However, this court must also consider the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and
the objects and purposes sought. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 171-72. A review of the notice indicates
that the Illinois Supreme Court required the notice attached to a summons for eviction to inform
tenants of the possibility of rental assistance in an effort to prevent evictions and increase housing
stability during, and as a result of, the COVID-19 pandemic.
¶ 22 Here, Opal’s reasoning behind filing the complaint and summons for eviction against
Dennis was unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic. Dennis neither paid rent nor presented a signed
written lease. As such, Opal did not file the complaint and summons for eviction seeking past-due
rent. Rather, Opal sought to evict Dennis following Dora’s sudden death. As administrator of
Dora’s estate, Opal sought to obtain possession of the property to administer the sale of Dora’s
home to pay outstanding expenses, including outstanding real estate taxes, and distribute any
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remaining funds to Dora’s heirs. As such, our reading of M.R. 30370 indicates applicability where
past-due rent is at issue and a current signed lease exists.
¶ 23 We note that even in the event that Dennis received the property tenant notice, Dennis
would have been ineligible for the program. As the circuit court correctly determined, Dennis did
not pay rent, thus, no past-due amount existed, he did not have a signed lease, and the eviction
proceedings ensued, not because of the COVID-19 pandemic, but Dennis’s refusal to vacate
following the sudden and unexpectant death of Dora, the rightful property owner as indicated on
the warranty deed to the property. Thus, we cannot say that the circuit court erred by granting Opal
possession of the premises in favor or Dora’s estate and denying Dennis’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 24 III. Conclusion
¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court of Effingham County granting Opal
possession of the premises in favor of Dora’s estate and denying Dennis’s motion to reconsider.
¶ 26 Affirmed.
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