People v. Morales ( 2023 )

2023 IL App (1st) 221456-USIXTH DIVISION
December 15, 2023
No. 1-22-1456
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County
)
v. )
) No. 94 CR 29937
)
)
EFRAIN MORALES, ) Honorable
) Angela Munari Petrone,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE TAILOR delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.
Justice Hyman specially concurred.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court properly denied petitioner leave to file his fourth successive pro
se postconviction petition.
¶2 Efrain Morales appeals from an order of the circuit court denying him leave to file his
fourth successive pro se postconviction petition. Morales argues that he established the
necessary cause and prejudice to be granted leave to file his petition, wherein he made a
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proportionate penalties challenge to his sentence. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In 1994, Morales was charged with the first-degree murder of Billy Bradford and the
attempted first-degree murders and aggravated batteries of Charles Crawford and Jose Nevarro.
At a 1996 jury trial, the State presented evidence that on the night of October 24, 1994, Bradford,
Crawford, and Nevarro were working on a car in front of Bradford’s house when a group of men,
including two men later identified as Morales and codefendant Mario Gonzalez, approached and
fired guns. Bradford was fatally wounded. Crawford testified that he was shot in the knee, fell to
the ground, and hit his face on the concrete. Crawford was admitted to the hospital for “a couple
of days,” where doctors removed a 9-millimeter bullet from his leg. Nevarro testified that when
he was shot, the bullet entered the back of his leg and came out the left front of his kneecap. At
the hospital, the bullet wound was cleaned and Nevarro was given crutches. The jury found
Morales guilty of the first-degree murder of Bradford and the attempted first-degree murders and
aggravated batteries of Crawford and Nevarro.
¶5 At sentencing, the State presented testimony in aggravation of two separate shootings by
Morales that did not result in convictions. The trial court reviewed the facts of the case and
indicated that an extended-term sentence was not permissible under the law but that Morales was
“not capable of being rehabilitated.” It then sentenced Morales to 60 years for first degree
murder and a consecutive term of 30 years for attempted murder, for a total of 90 years’
imprisonment.
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¶6 Morales appealed and argued: (1) a jury instruction error; and (2) ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. We rejected those claims and affirmed Morales’s conviction. People v. Morales,
No. 1-96-2582 (1997) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶7 In 1998, Morales filed his first postconviction petition, claiming ineffective assistance of
trial counsel based on reasons different from those raised on direct appeal. Morales was
represented by counsel and the court allowed counsel to make an argument on the record. The
court then summarily dismissed the petition. Morales appealed and argued that: (1) the trial
court did not issue a proper written order; (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel;
and (3) he had new evidence that a State witness had lied at trial. We affirmed the trial court’s
summary dismissal of the first postconviction petition. People v. Morales, No. 1–98–2749 (1999)
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶8 In 2001, Morales filed a pro se successive petition alleging 11 violations of his
constitutional rights: (1) his first postconviction petition stated meritorious claims and was
wrongfully dismissed; (2) he suffered ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on his first
postconviction petition and his appeal of its denial; (3) prosecutors withheld evidence favorable
to his defense; (4) his consecutive sentences were unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); (5) his sentences were unfairly disparate from those of his
codefendant; (6) the State presented perjured testimony by the codefendant victims, Morales’s
girlfriend Katrina Scimone, and the medical examiner; (7) newly discovered evidence identified
in his attached affidavits proved his innocence; (8) the photo array in which he was identified
was impermissibly suggestive; (9) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (10) ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal; and (11) the evidence did not support his
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convictions. The trial court denied Morales leave to file the petition and we affirmed. People v.
Morales, No. 1-01-4028 (2003) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 13 On July 8, 2015, Morales sought leave to file a pro se second successive postconviction
arguing that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. The trial court denied
Morales leave to file and we affirmed. People v. Morales, 2018 IL App (1st) 153347-U. In
2019, Morales sought leave to file a third pro se successive postconviction petition, again
raising the same consecutive sentencing claim. The trial court denied Morales leave to file. We
affirmed, granting appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw because the appeal had no merit.
People v. Morales, No. 1-20-0991 (Dec. 30, 2021) (summary order).
¶ 14 In 2021, Morales sought leave to file a fourth pro se successive postconviction petition.
For the first time, Morales argued that his 90-year sentence is unconstitutional under the eighth
amendment and the Illinois Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause because (1) it is a de
facto life sentence; (2) at the time of the offenses he was 22 years old, an “emerging adult” with
childlike cognitive abilities exacerbated by substance abuse and childhood neglect; and (3) the
sentencing court neither considered those factors in concluding that he was beyond
rehabilitation, nor made a finding of “irretrievable depravity” as required by law. Morales
explained that he did not raise this issue in any of his earlier postconviction petitions because his
claim rested on “very recent Illinois decisions confirming the meritorious nature of [his] as[-
]applied challenge, and new research in developmental psychology, neurology, and social
science demonstrating that, like juveniles, the brains of emerging adults do not fully develope
[sic] until their mid-twenties.” Morales also attached various educational certificates that he
earned while in prison to his petition.
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¶ 15 The trial court denied Morales’s motion for leave to file finding that he could not show
cause for his failure to raise the proportionate penalties claim earlier because the foundation on
which it rested, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), was available when he initiated prior
litigation. The court also determined that Morales could not establish the necessary prejudice
because Morales was 22 years old when he committed the offenses in this case and was neither a
juvenile nor a young adult to which Miller-related jurisprudence applied under the proportionate
penalties clause. The court further found that Morales had not submitted proof showing that,
despite his age, he suffered from mental health issues that reduced his culpability to childlike
levels, as had the 22-year-old in People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 (cited favorably by
Morales in his filings), who challenged his 85-year sentence under the same theory.
¶ 16 It is from this judgment that Morales now appeals.
¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 Morales argues that the circuit court erred when it denied him leave to file his fourth pro
se successive postconviction petition wherein he established the necessary cause and prejudice
with regard to his claim that his 90-year sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of
the Illinois Constitution. Morales has abandoned his eighth amendment argument and therefore
we will not consider it.
¶ 19 Under the Illinois Postconviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West
2020)), a petitioner may raise claims that his conviction or sentence violates the United States or
Illinois Constitutions. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. Only a single postconviction
proceeding is contemplated under the Act. Id. ¶ 22. Issues not raised in an initial petition are
waived and the bar to successive petitions is relaxed only where the petitioner can establish
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“cause and prejudice” for failing to raise the claim earlier or where there has been a
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” based on actual innocence. Under the cause-and-prejudice
test, a petitioner must show both (1) cause for his or her failure to raise the claim in an earlier
proceeding and (2) prejudice stemming from his or her failure to do so. Id. (citing People v.
Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002)).
¶ 20 The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution states that “[a]ll penalties
shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of
restoring the defendant to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Our supreme court has
held that the “limitation on penalties” in this clause “goes beyond the framers’ understanding of
the eighth amendment and is not synonymous with that provision.” People v. Clemons, 2012 IL
107821, ¶ 40. For a petitioner to succeed in a proportionate penalty claim, he must first
demonstrate that the penalty is degrading, cruel or “so wholly disproportionate to the offense that
it shocks the moral sense of the community.” People v. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 348-49 (2009).
¶ 21 Morales’s proportionate penalties challenge is predicated on the holding in Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In Miller, the Supreme Court held that a sentence of mandatory
life without the possibility of parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes
violates the eighth amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 489;
Cf. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 61 (18 marks the line between juveniles and adults for
sentencing purposes and therefore the 23-year-old petitioner’s eight amendment challenge to his
sentence under Miller failed). The Illinois supreme court has subsequently held that, where an
offender is younger than 18 years old, the trial court must consider certain factors before
imposing a life sentence, including: his age and evidence of his “particular immaturity;” his
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family and home environment; his degree of participation in the homicide and any family or peer
pressure; his incompetence; and his rehabilitative potential. People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st)
173135, ¶ 58 (citing People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46). Miller applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206 (2016).
¶ 22 We find that Morales has failed to establish the cause necessary for leave to file his fourth
successive pro se postconviction petition. Our supreme court has specifically held that, “Miller’s
announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for
a [juvenile offender] to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Clark,
2023 IL 127273, ¶ 61 (quoting People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74); see also People v.
Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶40. “Long before Miller, Illinois law recognized the special status of
juvenile offenders for purposes of applying the principles under the proportionate penalties
clause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 41. Therefore, the essential legal tools
necessary to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate penalties clause were
present at the time Morales filed his previous postconviction petitions. Moore, 2023 IL 126461,
¶¶ 40, 42. Consequently, Morales did not, and cannot, satisfy the cause requirement necessary
for leave to file his fourth successive postconviction petition. Having found Morales failed to
establish cause for failing to raise his claim in the current petition sooner, we decline to address
the question of whether Morales established prejudice. People v. Walker, 2022 IL App (1st)
201151, ¶ 31 (citing People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 207 (2007) (where defendant has failed to
establish cause, it is not necessary for the court to consider prejudice). The trial court properly
denied Morales leave to file his successive postconviction petition.
¶ 23 Morales attempts to circumvent Clark, Dorsey and Moore by arguing that he could not
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have realistically raised his current proportionate penalties claim until this court decided People
v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, abrogated by People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186.
Morales argues that before Savage, “no Illinois defendant aged 22 years or older at the time of
the offense had been allowed to challenge his de facto life sentence under the Illinois
Proportionate Penalties Clause beyond the initial stage of post-conviction proceedings.”
Consequently, when Morales last filed a successive petition in April 2019, there was no legal
authority that would support a claim that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller.
According to Morales, that changed after Savage, wherein this court recognized that a 22-year-
old sentenced to 85 years in prison for murder and attempt murder had raised a non-frivolous
claim that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because his long history of
addiction demonstrated that he was more like a juvenile at the time of the offense. Savage, 2020
IL App (1st) 173135. Therefore, Savage provides cause to challenge the constitutionality of his
sentence under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition.
Morales urges that as his challenge is not based on Miller, and instead based on Savage, the
holdings in Clark, Dorsey and Moore are not applicable in this case.
¶ 24 In Savage, the petitioner, who was 22 years old at the time he committed first degree
murder, was sentenced to 85 years. Id. ¶ 2. In his initial postconviction petition, Savage
challenged his sentence under both the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause
arguing that he should be afforded Miller protections because his drug addiction from the age of
nine made him the functional equivalent of a “younger man,” that he was using drugs every day
at the time of the offense, and that he was attempting to rob a drug house at the time of the
murder. Id. ¶ 71. The circuit court denied the petition at the first stage. Id.8
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¶ 25 We found that although Savage was seven months past his 21st birthday at the time of the
offense, Savage’s allegations were supported by detailed hospital records and the presentence
investigation report. Id. ¶ 72. We also observed that the record failed to disclose whether the
sentencing court considered the “attributes of young adulthood *** in light of defendant’s
lifelong drug addiction.” Id. ¶ 74. We concluded that Savage’s allegations, taken as true, could
not be considered frivolous or patently without merit and advanced his petition to the second
stage. Id. ¶¶ 76, 80.
¶ 26 Morales argues that the same conclusion is warranted here because he was also 22 at the
time of the offense, was convicted of the same offense as Savage, was sentenced to almost the
same de facto life sentence, was born into gang life, and also struggled with addiction. Morales
argues that because Savage had not been decided when he filed his prior four postconviction
petitions, Savage provides the necessary cause and therefore this court should grant him leave to
file his fourth successive pro se petition.
¶ 27 We find Morales’s reliance on Savage to be misplaced. Morales relies on Savage
because it is the only published decision that has extended Miller to a petitioner over the age of
21. See People v. Buford, 2023 IL App (1st) 201176, ¶ 47 (citing People v. Guerrero, 2022 IL
App (1st) 210400, ¶ 29). But Savage does not provide an independent basis for Morales to
challenge his sentence under the proportionate penalties clause. As discussed, the petitioner in
Savage sought Miller protections and this court granted Savage relief finding that based on his
particular background, Savage’s request to have his youth and its attendant circumstances
considered at sentencing was not frivolous and patently without merit. Savage, 2020 IL App
(1st) 173135, ¶ 75. The reasoning on which Miller and Savage are based was available at the
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time Morales filed his previous postconviction petitions. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶¶ 40, 42.
¶ 28 Morales’s argument suffers from other defects as well. Savage has been regarded as an
outlier and has not been cited with approval by most Illinois courts. Guerrero, 2022 IL App (1st)
210400, ¶ 29. In addition, Savage does not support extending Miller protections to a 22-year-old
because the holding was limited to the very specific facts of the case. Finally, Savage raised his
claim in an initial pro se postconviction petition where the pleading requirements are lower, not
his fourth successive postconviction petition as Morales does here. See People v. Montanez,
2022 IL App (1st) 191930, ¶ 61 (recognizing that the pleading requirements for successive
postconviction petitions are higher than the pleading requirements for initial postconviction
petitions).
¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying Morales
leave to file his fourth successive postconviction petition.
¶ 30 CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
¶ 33 JUSTICE HYMAN, specially concurring:
¶ 34 Recent caselaw from the Illinois Supreme Court compels us to affirm. But older caselaw
from the Illinois Supreme Court calls into question the soundness of this result.
¶ 35 As I wrote in dissent before the Illinois Supreme Court bolted the courthouse doors to
petitioners like Morales, “[s]ome constitutional claims—like Miller claims and cases expanding
on it—are so novel that their legal bases are not reasonably available until a court makes them
so.” People v. Mobley, 2022 IL App (1st) 201255-U, ¶ 67 (Hyman, J., dissenting). In making that
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statement, I took as my guide the Illinois Supreme’s foundational case on “cause,” People v.
Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 461 (2002). Neither the proportionate penalties clause nor the
eighth amendment has a fixed meaning. Petitioners raise, and courts analyze, claims under them
through a historical prism and as a response to our evolving social values and norms that befit a
maturing society. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012); People v. Buffer, 2019 IL
122327, ¶ 40. Pointing to the mere existence of the proportionate penalties clause as providing
cause for claims like Morales’s distorts this solemn process.
¶ 36 It need not be this way. The Illinois Supreme Court may revisit its original understanding
of “cause” and provide those like Morales with the procedural fairness they deserve.
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