People v. Avila , 2024 IL App (3d) 230359-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2024 IL App (3d) 230359-UOrder filed June 18, 2024
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
) La Salle County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-23-0359
v. ) Circuit No. 18-CF-5
)
ESTEBAN M. AVILA, ) Honorable
) H. Chris Ryan, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s denial of defendant’s postconviction petition following a third-
stage evidentiary hearing was not manifestly erroneous.
¶2 Defendant, Esteban M. Avila, appeals the La Salle County circuit court’s dismissal of his
postconviction petition following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On January 2, 2018, the State charged defendant by information with one count of
aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(1) (West 2016)) and one count of
aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2016)) in connection to a drive-by shooting.
When present at an April 12, 2018, pretrial conference, defendant waived his right to a jury trial,
and on September 12, 2018, the cause proceeded to a bench trial. The court convicted defendant
on both counts and subsequently sentenced defendant to 12 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois
Department of Corrections.
¶5 Defendant appealed his conviction arguing that there was insufficient evidence presented
to prove that he was driving the vehicle in question when the crime occurred. This court
disagreed and, in a February 16, 2021, disposition, affirmed defendant’s conviction, holding the
evidence was sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Avila, 2021 IL
App (3d) 180727-U, ¶ 15.
¶6 Thereafter, defendant retained new counsel and filed a postconviction petition which
argued, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate his alibi
defense, (2) waiving a jury trial prior to an investigation into defendant’s alibi defense, and (3)
stipulating to certain material questions of fact. Further, defendant argued within his petition that
the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Four affidavits
supported defendant’s petition: the first was from defendant; the second was from his brother
José Avila Jr.; the third from the mother of his children, Sara Makarczyk; and the fourth from his
mother, Linda Orozco-Avila. The first three affiants averred to their personal knowledge of
defendant’s whereabouts away from the scene of the crime at the relevant timeframe. In Orozco-
Avila’s affidavit, she swore that defendant’s trial counsel made unfulfilled strategy decisions that
he spoke with her about in anticipation of defendant’s trial. The petition advanced to a third-
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stage evidentiary hearing where three witnesses, José, Makarczyk, and Orozco-Avila, testified on
defendant’s behalf. The circuit court denied his petition finding that, among other deficiencies,
he failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.
¶7 A. Defendant’s Trial
¶8 The following evidence was adduced at trial on September 12, 2018. Cheyenne Donnelly
testified that after spending time at her cousin’s house the previous evening, she and five other
individuals returned to her house during the early morning hours of December 31, 2017.
Defendant was among the group. At this time, Donnelly resided in a two-story home in
Marseilles, Illinois, with her bedroom situated on the top floor. The six individuals congregated
in Donnelly’s bedroom where defendant soon fell asleep. Donnelly asked one of her friends to
assist defendant downstairs to sleep, but in doing so, defendant and the friend began fist fighting.
Once the fight concluded, the group asked defendant to leave, however, more fighting ensued as
defendant made his way downstairs. According to Donnelly, the scuffles took place around 6:30
a.m. and 7:00 a.m., and defendant eventually left with a bloodied face. Several individuals saw
defendant operate a white four-door vehicle that morning, and one individual confirmed that he
saw defendant leave in it.
¶9 Following defendant’s departure, those remaining at Donnelly’s returned upstairs to her
bedroom. Suddenly, drywall began “flying all over the place” causing hysteria among the group,
and Donnelly felt a burning sensation in the back of her neck. It was later revealed that an
individual had discharged a firearm from the street towards Donnelly’s bedroom and Donnelly
was struck by debris. After crawling to the bathroom, the group called 911 around 7:38 a.m., and
Donnelly received medical attention at a nearby hospital thereafter. The other individuals present
testified consistently with Donnelly’s testimony.
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¶ 10 Marseilles Police Detective Jack Callahan testified that he was dispatched to Donnelly’s
residence concerning a shooting just after 9:00 a.m. on December 31, 2017. Upon arrival, he
collected four bullet casings from the street in front of the house. During his exterior examination
of the residence, he noted three bullet holes surrounding the upstairs window. After entering
Donnelly’s residence, he swabbed several “red, blood-like substance[s]” and retrieved two fired
bullets from upstairs. Stipulated forensic analysis of the reddish, bloodlike substances matched
defendant’s DNA. Callahan also spoke with the group members concerning the incident.
¶ 11 At 3:15 p.m., Callahan drove to defendant’s residence in the neighboring town of Ottawa,
Illinois. There, he had the opportunity to speak with defendant and his father and examine the
exterior of the residence. During his interview with defendant, he noted visible injuries to
defendant’s face. Callahan located a bullet casing on top of a white four-door Kia Optima parked
in the driveway next to the home. Pursuant to a search warrant, Callahan collected a total of five
bullet casings on the exterior of the Kia, two of which were embedded in snow atop the vehicle.
He did not locate a firearm or ammunition during his search of the residence. Stipulated forensic
analysis of the collected shell casings identified a “major female DNA profile.” Further, it was
stipulated that the State’s firearms analyst issued a report that the casings found on the street in
front of Donnelly’s residence and on the Kia were discharged from the same firearm.
¶ 12 Callahan obtained a set of surveillance footage from a school located in Ottawa, Illinois
and a beauty salon located near Donnelly’s residence. The footage depicted the Kia leaving
Donnelly’s residence at 7:01 a.m. A vehicle matching the Kia’s description then drove to Ottawa
and reversed its path past Donnelly’s residence at 7:36 a.m. Defendant stipulated to the
foundation and entry of this footage. However, defendant’s counsel objected to Callahan’s
characterization that the video depicted defendant, stating the videos spoke for themselves.
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¶ 13 On September 21, 2018, the court found defendant guilty on both counts. At the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing, it imposed a 12-year sentence for each offense, to be
served concurrently.
¶ 14 B. Defendant’s Postconviction Petition
¶ 15 On May 12, 2021, without representation, defendant filed a postconviction petition which
contended a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel for his trial counsel’s failure
to investigate and present his alibi defense. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2020). After retaining
appellate counsel, defendant filed an amended petition in early 2023 which supplementally
alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising and pressuring him to waive his right to
a jury trial, failing to pursue a motion to suppress evidence over the bullet shell casings, and
stipulating to the introduction of evidence concerning the shell casings and surveillance footage.
Defendant averred that he provided his trial counsel with José’s and Makarczyk’s contact
information, asked his trial counsel to pursue them as alibi witnesses, that these witnesses would
have testified he was not near the place where the shooting happened when it occurred, and his
counsel did not make an effort to investigate his alibi defense. Various exhibits supported the
amended petition, including an April 25, 2018, letter penned by trial counsel to his client which
indicated that defendant disclosed an alibi defense but that counsel was unaware of his alibi
witnesses. The letter also cautioned putting on an alibi defense, stating if the court “does not buy
it, I expect he might hold that against you.” Defendant’s petition also contained affidavits from
José and Makarczyk, averring that on December 31, 2017, during the timeframe of the crime
they possessed firsthand knowledge that defendant remained at home. Orozco-Avila’s affidavit,
also attached to defendant’s petition, averred to trial counsel relaying to her pretrial strategies
that went unpursued.
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¶ 16 Defendant also attached an evidence deposition of his trial counsel in support of his
amended petition. In explaining his recommendation to proceed to a bench trial, counsel
explained “we were going to stand on [defendant’s] presumption of innocence rather than
present an affirmative defense, and I thought we had a better chance relying on the presumption
of innocence *** with the judge than we would have with the jury,” later opining that judges
better understand the presumption. Further, based on the forensic evidence he believed “it was
inescapable” that the shell casings recovered from the top of defendant’s vehicle were fired from
the same weapon from the shells retrieved from the ground of the crime scene. He testified that
aside from defendant’s mother, defendant did not provide him with other potential alibi
witnesses. His recollection, to which he could not testify with certainty, was that he spoke with
defendant’s mother concerning the alibi and she either was not willing to testify or it was his
opinion that it would not be a viable defense. Defendant’s trial counsel also testified to the phone
call record-keeping practices of his law office. For phone messages, his secretary would write
down the name and phone number of the caller and the date and time at which they called on a
separate sheet of paper. After reviewing these logs in anticipation of his deposition, he confirmed
that there was no record of any phone calls from José Avila Jr. or Sara Makarczyk. Had
defendant disclosed these witnesses, his trial counsel testified that he would have contacted
them.
¶ 17 C. Third-Stage Evidentiary Hearing
¶ 18 On May 15, 2023, defendant’s postconviction petition advanced to a third-stage
evidentiary hearing.
¶ 19 1. José Avila Jr.’s Testimony
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¶ 20 José testified that at approximately 7:24 a.m. on January 1, 2018, he heard knocking at
the door of the residence he shared with his brother. José answered the door to find defendant
looking a “little roughed up” with marks on his face, a black eye, and dried blood. Defendant
explained that he had been in a fight. After going to the bathroom, José observed defendant head
downstairs to his room where he remained until police took custody of him. José testified that he
contacted defendant’s trial counsel and left a “couple voice messages” to let him know that he
was willing to cooperate with his brother’s defense. According to José, defendant’s trial counsel
never returned his calls. During cross-examination, the State inquired into why José did not
formalize a statement explaining his brother’s whereabouts after his brother was brought into
custody. José explained that he was unaware of an obligation to do so.
¶ 21 2. Sara Makarczyk’s Testimony
¶ 22 Makarczyk testified that before heading to work on January 1, 2018, she drove to
defendant’s residence to drop off their children. She testified that there was no car in the
driveway. Upon arrival, she encountered José on the couch who explained defendant was
downstairs in the basement. Around 7:40 a.m., she went downstairs to find defendant looking
exhausted with a “very swollen” and bloodied face. After confirming that defendant was okay,
Makarczyk testified that she left the residence at “about 7:50 [a.m.]” Makarczyk explained that
she was never given the opportunity to talk with defendant’s trial counsel. She testified to calling
and leaving voice messages with trial counsel’s secretary over the course of weeks. She
approached trial counsel in court, but counsel “brushed it off.”
¶ 23 3. Linda Orozco-Avila’s Testimony
¶ 24 Orozco-Avila testified that after she retained defendant’s counsel, she met with him in-
person approximately five times and frequently spoke with him over the phone. She stated that
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counsel advised her of the need to retain their own DNA expert and file a motion to suppress, but
he failed to accomplish either.
¶ 25 After additional briefing, the matter came before the court on July 6, 2023, for final
argument and ruling. The court found that there was nothing presented to suggest defendant was
pressured to waive his right to a jury. In addition, the court found insufficient evidence to
conclude that a constitutional violation occurred when trial counsel failed to call an alibi witness.
It stated that trial counsel’s conduct was not so egregious so as to fall below an acceptable
standard. It further concluded that defendant failed to establish that the outcome would have
been different had counsel pursued an alibi defense.
¶ 26 Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 On appeal, defendant argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
when he failed to appropriately investigate his alibi defense, waived a jury trial prior to an
appropriate investigation into his alibi defense, and stipulated to material issues of fact. Further,
he argues that these errors taken together amount to reversible cumulative error.
¶ 29 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a mechanism for criminal defendants to
challenge convictions and sentences by asserting via petition that the judgment resulted from a
substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or
both. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2022); People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21; People
v. Harris, 206 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2002). A postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack on the
proceedings and not an appeal from the judgment of conviction. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21.
To be entitled to postconviction relief, defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of
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federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings resulting in conviction. See Harris, 206
Ill. 2d at 12.
¶ 30 For postconviction petitions challenging noncapital offenses “the Act provides a three-
stage process.” People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 71 (2008). Here, defendant’s petition advanced
to a third-stage evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 122-6 of the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-6
(West 2022). “At a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the defendant bears the burden of making a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” People v. English, 406 Ill. App. 3d 943, 951
(2010). At this stage, the court assumes the role of factfinder, “making credibility determinations
and weighing the evidence.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51. We will not reverse a trial
court’s decision following an evidentiary hearing where fact-finding and credibility
determinations are involved unless its ruling is manifestly erroneous. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d at 72.
Manifest error is one that is “ ‘ clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.’ ” People v. Johnson, 206
Ill. 2d 348, 360 (2002) (quoting People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 385-86 (1997)).
¶ 31 A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Trial
¶ 32 Defendant asserts that he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel in
three ways. First, defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to investigate his alibi defense of
which his counsel was aware. Second, defendant claims his trial counsel’s decision to waive a
jury trial prior to an investigation into the alibi defense constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. Third, defendant states he received ineffective assistance when his trial counsel
stipulated to material questions of fact introduced by the State at his trial. He also claims that,
considered together, his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted in reversible cumulative error.
¶ 33 A criminal defendant is afforded the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. To prevail on a claim that
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counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show that his or her counsel’s representation was
deficient to the extent that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the
defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). This two-pronged test requires both a showing that trial counsel’s
“performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that there is
a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’ ” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In the first prong of the Strickland test, the “performance” prong,
there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell into a wide range of reasonable
representation.” People v. Cloutier, 191 Ill. 2d 392, 402 (2000). It is defendant’s burden to
“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy.” Id. The second prong of the Strickland test, the “prejudice”
prong, requires a showing that “counsel’s deficient performance rendered the result of the
proceeding unreliable or fundamentally unfair.” People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 317-18 (2000).
A failure to satisfy either prong “precludes a finding of ineffectiveness.” People v. Simpson,
2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35.
¶ 34 1. Failure to Investigate
¶ 35 Defendant contends his trial counsel’s failure to investigate his alibi defense and
interview purported alibi witnesses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The State
responds that trial counsel appropriately investigated defendant’s alibi defense based on the
information that was provided to him.
¶ 36 “Trial counsel has a professional duty to conduct ‘reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’ ” Domagala, 2013 IL
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113688, ¶ 38 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). A counsel’s duty to investigate extends to
“both factual and legal investigations on behalf of the[ir] client.” People v. Montgomery, 327 Ill.
App. 3d 180, 185 (2001) (citing People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 437, 452 (1954)). “The failure to
investigate a witness may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], especially where
the witness is known to counsel and his testimony could serve to exonerate the defendant
[citation].” People v. Jarnagan, 154 Ill. App. 3d 187, 194 (1987); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d
366, 398 (1998). Whether defense counsel's failure to investigate falls below the objective
standard of reasonableness is determined by the value of the evidence and the closeness of the
case. See Jarnagan, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 194; see also People v. Dillard, 204 Ill. App. 3d 7, 10
(1990). We apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgment” when reviewing “the
reasonableness of a decision to investigate.” Cloutier, 191 Ill. 2d at 402-03; see also Strickland,
466 U.S. at 691.
¶ 37 Defendant contends that his trial counsel’s letter, dated April 25, 2018, proves his
counsel’s awareness of his alibi defense. While the letter indicates that defendant conveyed a
potential alibi defense, it does not conclusively establish that specific witness identities and
contact information were ever tendered to his counsel. During counsel’s evidence deposition, he
testified to his recollection of the conversation giving rise to the letter, recalling that defendant
later identified his mother as an alibi witness. Defendant’s counsel further recalled that he spoke
with defendant’s mother concerning the alibi and she either was not willing to testify or did not
present, in his opinion, a viable alibi defense. Defendant’s mother confirmed having
conversations with her son’s counsel at the evidentiary hearing, wherein she testified that she
met with counsel in-person “about five times” and “talked to him often on the phone.”
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¶ 38 Defendant’s position that his counsel was aware of the witnesses supporting his alibi
defense relies on his witnesses’ account of unreciprocated outreach efforts. Indeed, at the
evidentiary hearing, both José and Makarczyk testified that they left voicemails with trial
counsel’s office explaining their availabilities to testify on defendant’s behalf. However, trial
counsel testified during his evidence deposition that after reviewing his office’s phone records,
he never received a phone call from either witness. See People v. English, 403 Ill. App. 3d 121,
136 (2010).
¶ 39 The alibi witnesses also undermined their credibility by testifying inconsistently with
their affidavits filed in support of defendant’s petition. Id. at 137. While they correctly identified
the date of the incident in their affidavits, José and Makarczyk misidentified the date as January
1, 2018, at the third-stage evidentiary hearing. In sum, the circuit court could reasonably
conclude that counsel was unaware of the alibi witnesses that defendant suggested supported his
defense.
¶ 40 Further, the record indicates that trial counsel adequately investigated the alibi witness of
which he was made aware. While unable to recollect with certainty, trial counsel recalled
evaluating Orozco-Avila as an alibi witness. Counsel’s resultant refusal to call Orozco-Avila as a
witness falls squarely within the ambit of trial strategy, which “enjoy a strong presumption that
they reflect sound trial strategy, rather than incompetence [citation], and are, therefore, generally
immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation].” People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d
361, 378 (2000). We hold that it was not manifest error for the court to find that defendant failed
to meet his burden of showing his trial counsel was ineffective for his failure to investigate his
alibi defense.
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¶ 41 Even if counsel was apprised of José and Makarczyk as alibi witnesses and that their
omittance fell below the reasonable standard of advocacy, we hold that this deficiency would not
render defendant’s conviction unreliable or fundamentally unfair. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d at 317-18.
The bevy of evidence against defendant, including motive and circumstantial evidence
connecting him to the crime, independently supports his conviction and minimizes any potential
influence from these witnesses’ testimony over the outcome of the case.
¶ 42 2. Jury Waiver
¶ 43 Defendant next asserts that his trial counsel’s decision to waive a jury trial prior to
investigating defendant’s alibi defense rendered his assistance ineffective. Like the right to
effective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant’s right to a jury trial is enshrined in both the
United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13.
“When a defendant's challenge to a jury waiver is predicated on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must determine: (1) whether counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) ‘whether
there exists a reasonable likelihood that the defendant would not have waived his
jury right in the absence of the alleged error.’ ” People v. Batrez, 334 Ill. App. 3d
772, 782 (2002) (quoting People v. Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d 116, 142-43 (1992)).
¶ 44 We must first point out that it was not his counsel’s decision, but defendant’s decision to
waive his jury trial right. “[T]he prerogative to choose a bench trial over a jury trial belongs to
the defendant and not to his counsel.” People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. App. 3d 919, 943 (2008).
Further, counsel’s advice on whether to waive defendant’s jury trial right is “the type of trial
strategy and tactics that cannot support a claim of ineffectiveness.” People v. Elliott, 299 Ill.
13App. 3d 766, 774 (1998). There is nothing in the record to challenge the court’s determination
that defendant was not pressured into waiving his right to a jury trial and that he did so
voluntarily. The court and defendant’s trial counsel explained the suggestion of waiver as
calculated legal advice. The court stated that maybe defendant’s counsel “thought jurors would
go a little bit softer than courts as far as proofs. We see more than jurors do.” According to
counsel, he advised defendant to waive his right to a jury because he “thought [defendant] had a
better chance relying on the presumption of innocence *** with the judge than we would have
with the jury” because, according to counsel, judges better understand the presumption. Such
advice does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v. Simon, 2014 IL App
(1st) 130567, ¶ 74.
¶ 45 3. Stipulations to Material Facts
¶ 46 Defendant next asserts that his trial counsel’s failure to challenge the admissibility of
certain evidence, including the surveillance videos and forensic findings, amounted to
objectively unreasonable and ineffective assistance. The State responds that defendant failed to
present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing to support his argument that his counsel
performed deficiently in stipulating to the entry of this evidence.
¶ 47 While defendant focuses on inconsistencies in the State’s evidence, such as a time
discrepancy in one of the surveillance videos, uncertainty about the record custodian’s authority
over the other surveillance video, and forensic evidence of a female DNA profile on the shell
casings, he fails to explain how such evidence would be excluded save these stipulations. See In
re T.R., 2019 IL App (4th) 190529, ¶ 134. Further, perseverating on evidence that
circumstantially tied defendant to the crime scene—namely the bullet casings—including any
cross-examination of forensic findings, may have provided additional opportunity for the State to
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reemphasize its forensic findings that the bullet casings were discharged from the same gun,
were found at the crime scene, and were also found on the vehicle that defendant was confirmed
to be driving a mere 35 minutes before the commission of the crime. See id. ¶ 135. Due to the
stipulation which clarified that the shell casings had a “major female DNA profile,” defense
counsel was able to argue that the State failed to connect defendant, a male, to the shooting in his
closing argument while preventing further examination by the State.
¶ 48 As such, defendant fails his burden to overcome the presumption that his counsel’s
efforts to minimize the importance of what his attorney deemed the “inescapable” conclusion
that the shell casings found on the Kia were fired from the same weapon as those casings
recovered from the scene of the crime, reflected sound trial strategy. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d at 378;
Cloutier, 191 Ill. 2d at 402. We also hold that stipulating to the entry of the surveillance footage,
which trial counsel explained was self-evident, was similarly the product of sound trial strategy.
¶ 49 B. Cumulative Error
¶ 50 Defendant’s final appellate contention is that his trial counsel’s deficient performance
collectively resulted in cumulative error which deprived him of a fair trial. “There generally is no
cumulative error where the alleged errors do not amount to reversible error on any individual
issue.” People v. Green, 2017 IL App (1st) 152513, ¶ 118. Having concluded that defendant’s
trial counsel was not ineffective, we hold that there is no cumulative error. People v. Sims, 2019
IL App (3d) 170417, ¶ 60.
¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 52 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed.
¶ 53 Affirmed.
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