Murphy v. City of Markham , 2024 IL App (1st) 232241-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 232241-UNo. 1-23-2241
Order filed October 30, 2024
THIRD DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
KAREN M. MURPHY AND MARK KMIECIK ON ) Appeal from the
BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS ) Circuit Court of
SIMILARLY SITUATED, ) Cook County.
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) 17 CH 14834
)
THE CITY OF MARKHAM, ) Honorable
) Caroline K. Moreland,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Markham.
¶2 This appeal arises from an amended class-action complaint filed by plaintiffs Mark J.
Kmiecik and Karen M. Murphy against the City of Markham, Illinois (Markham). The certified
class is composed of vehicle owners who, from June 2017 through November 2017, received
red-light tickets issued by Markham’s automated traffic law enforcement system, commonly
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referred to as a red-light camera program.
¶3 Plaintiffs alleged that the tickets were void because they were issued during a period when
a link on Markham’s municipal website was inoperable. The link at issue allows the public to
access information regarding Markham’s red-light camera program. Plaintiffs alleged that during
the pertinent time, this link was inoperable, which prevented the public from accessing certain
online notice and reporting requirements contained in the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-
100 et seq. (West 2020)).
¶4 The issue was eventually submitted to the circuit court of Cook County on cross-motions
for summary judgment. The court granted Markham’s motion for summary judgment and denied
the plaintiffs’ motion. This appeal followed, and for the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 1
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 In July 2003, the City of Chicago, through its home rule authority, enacted an ordinance
under the Chicago Municipal Code (Chicago Municipal Code §§ 9-102-010 to 9-102-070 (added
July 9, 2003)), which established a red-light camera program. See Kennedy v. City of Chicago,
2022 IL App (1st) 210492, ¶ 3; Kata v. City of Chicago, 2018 IL App (1st) 162075-U, ¶ 6; Keating
v. City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 112559-U, ¶ 2 “The red light camera program uses electronic
monitoring devices to detect and record images of vehicles caught in an intersection in violation
of a red light traffic signal.” Keating, 2013 IL App (1st) 112559-U, ¶ 2.
¶7 Following the City of Chicago’s implementation of its red-light camera program, the
Illinois General Assembly enacted Public Act 94-795 (Pub. Act 94-795, eff. May 22, 2006), an
enabling statute which authorized red-light camera programs in eight Illinois counties (625 ILCS
In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this
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appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon entry of a separate written order.
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5/11-208.6(m) (West 2020)), including Cook County.
¶8 Relying on this enabling legislation, Markham, which is located in Cook County, enacted
its own ordinance in 2007 authorizing the installation and operation of red-light cameras at certain
intersections within its city limits. See Markham, IL., Code ¶ 72.15 (2007). Red-light cameras
were installed at three intersections: 159th Street and Dixie Highway; 159th Street and Kedzie
Avenue; and 159th Street and Pulaski Avenue.
¶9 The statutes relevant to the resolution of this appeal are subsections (k-3) and (k-7) of
section 11-208.6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/11-208.6 (k-3), (k-7) (West 2020).
¶ 10 Subsection (k-3) provides that municipalities and counties having one or more intersections
equipped with red-light cameras must provide notice to drivers by posting the locations of the
intersections on the website of the municipality or county. Id. subsection (k-3).
¶ 11 Subsection (k-7) provides that municipalities or counties which install and operate a red-
light camera system:
“shall conduct a statistical analysis to assess the safety impact of each *** system at an
intersection following installation of the system and every 2 years thereafter. *** Each
statistical analysis required by this subsection (k-7) shall be made available to the public
and shall be published on the website of the municipality or county.” Id. § (k-7).
¶ 12 To comply with subsections (k-3) and (k-7), Markham added a link to its website
(cityofmarkham.net) which allows the public to access information regarding the locations of
intersections equipped with red-light cameras and the statistical analysis results of each
intersection.
¶ 13 In April 2016, plaintiff Karen M. Murphy received a violation notice based on images from
the red-light camera located at the intersection of 159th Street and Pulaski Road. Murphy paid the
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$100 fine without contest.
¶ 14 Plaintiff Mark J. Kmiecik received a violation notice dated June 5, 2017, based on red-light
camera images from the same intersection. Kmiecik claimed that after he received the notice, he
visited Markham’s website to determine the location of other intersections with red-light cameras.
Kmiecik visited the website on June 12, 13, and 19, 2017, and each time, received an error message
stating “Apologies, but the page you’re looking for can’t be found.” Kmiecik paid the $100 fine
by check on June 19, 2017, marking the payment stub as “pay under protest.”
¶ 15 Kmiecik claimed that either he or his attorney visited the website on June 20, July 10, 24,
and 27, August 10 and 21, and October 10 and 11, 2017. Each time they tried to access the website
they received the same error message. By November 15, 2017, Markham seemed to have resolved
the website error.
¶ 16 On September 7, 2018, plaintiffs filed a two-count amended class action complaint against
Markham in the circuit court of Cook County. Count I sought a declaratory judgment that
automated red-light tickets issued from June 2017 through November 2017 were void. Plaintiffs
alleged that the tickets were void because the inoperable website link failed to comply with
subsection (k-3), since the public was unable to locate intersections with red-light cameras, and
subsection (k-7), where the public was unable to access statistical analysis results. Count II
asserted a claim for unjust enrichment based on Markham’s collection of fines for the alleged void
automated red-light tickets issued during the relevant six-month period.
¶ 17 The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In considering the
cross-motions, the court sought to determine whether the notice requirements of subsection (k-3)
and the reporting requirements of subsection (k-7), were mandatory provisions requiring strict
compliance, or directory requiring only substantial compliance.
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¶ 18 The court concluded that subsection (k-3) was a mandatory provision. However, the court
went on to find that the website’s failure to strictly comply with this provision did not render the
automated red-light tickets void. The court found that the website substantially complied with the
purpose of subsection (k-3), which the court determined was “to ensure that drivers are able to
know the location of red light cameras through online notice.” The court determined that the
website was only temporarily inoperable and that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate they were
prejudiced by the temporary outage.
¶ 19 Conversely, the court found that subsection (k-7) was a directory provision whose purpose
was “to promote road safety, particularly at traffic-light intersections.” The court concluded that
the website substantially complied with the purpose of subsection (k-7) and that the “[p]laintiffs
neither allege nor show any specific prejudice resulting from the website outage that caused the
statistical analysis to become temporarily unavailable.”
¶ 20 The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and granted summary
judgment in favor of Markham. This timely appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 A. Standards of Review
¶ 23 On appeal, plaintiffs challenge both the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Markham and the denial of their cross-motion. “The purpose of summary judgment is to
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that would require a trial.” Hodges v. St.
Clair County, 263 Ill. App. 3d 490, 492 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” 735 ILC 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). “When parties file cross-motions for summary
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judgment, they mutually agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the case
may be resolved as a matter of law.” Oswald v. Hamer, 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 9. This case involves
issues of statutory construction. “Statutory construction presents questions of law that are
appropriate for summary judgment.” Id. “Issues involving statutory construction and summary
judgment rulings are reviewed de novo.” Id.¶ 24 Here, as they did below, plaintiffs argue on appeal that any automated red-light tickets
issued from June 2017 through November 2017 were void because they were issued when the link
on Markham’s website, which allows the public to access information regarding its red-light
camera program, was inoperable. They contend that the inoperable website link prevented the
public from accessing the locations of intersections with red-light cameras and online statistical
analysis results, as required by subsections (k-3) and (k-7) of section 11-208.6 of the Illinois
Vehicle Code. Plaintiffs assert that the online-posting requirements of subsections (k-3) and (k-7)
are mandatory requirements, with which Markham was required to strictly comply.
¶ 25 B. Mandatory Versus Directory
¶ 26 At issue is whether the notice requirements of subsection (k-3) and the reporting
requirements of subsection (k-7) are mandatory provisions requiring strict compliance, or directory
provisions requiring only substantial compliance.
¶ 27 Our courts have employed a mandatory/directory analysis to assist in making this
determination. People v. Grant, 2022 IL 126824, ¶ 30. “ ‘A mandatory provision and a directory
provision are both couched in obligatory language, but they differ in that noncompliance with a
mandatory provision vitiates the governmental action, whereas noncompliance with a directory
provision has no such effect.’ ” In re M.I., 2011 IL App (1st) 100865, ¶ 47 (quoting People v. Four
Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Dollars ($4,850) United States Currency, 2011 IL App (4th)
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100528, ¶ 24). Whenever the mandatory/directory dichotomy is at issue, obligatory words such as
“shall” are not determinative. People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, 54 (2005).
¶ 28 “Whether a statutory command is mandatory or directory is a question of statutory
construction, which we review de novo.” Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 54. “The answer is a matter of
legislative intent.” Id. “The drafters’ intent is best indicated by the language of a statute or rule,
given its plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Geiler, 2016 IL 119095, ¶ 17. “ ‘ In determining
the plain meaning of statutory terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the
subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it.’ ” In re M.I., 2013 IL
113776, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007)).
¶ 29 “Statutes are mandatory when the legislative intent dictates a particular consequence for
failure to comply with the provision.” In re M.I., 2011 IL App (1st) 100865, ¶ 47. “ ‘In the absence
of such intent the statute is directory and no particular consequence flows from noncompliance.
That is not to say, however, that there are no consequences. A directory reading acknowledges
only that no specific consequence is triggered by the failure to comply with the statute.’ ”
(Emphasis omitted.) Id. (quoting People v, Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 515 (2009)).
¶ 30 “We presume that procedural commands to governmental officials are directory.” Geiler,
2016 IL 119095, ¶ 18. This “presumption can be overcome under either of two conditions: (1)
when there is negative language prohibiting further action in the case of noncompliance or (2)
when the right the provision is designed to protect would generally be injured under a directory
reading.” Lakewood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Department of Public Health, 2019
IL 124019, ¶ 29.
¶ 31 1. The Negative Language Condition
¶ 32 As to the first condition, we note that neither subsection (k-3) nor subsection (k-7) contains
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negative language prohibiting further action or specific consequences for noncompliance.
¶ 33 Subsection (k-3) provides that “[a] municipality or county that has one or more
intersections equipped with an automated traffic law enforcement system must provide notice to
drivers by posting the locations of automated traffic law systems on the municipality or county
website.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.6 (k-3) (West 2020).
¶ 34 Subsection (k-7) provides that municipalities or counties which install and operate a
red-light camera system:
“shall conduct a statistical analysis to assess the safety impact of each *** system at an
intersection following installation of the system and every 2 years thereafter. *** Each
statistical analysis required by this subsection (k-7) shall be made available to the public
and shall be published on the website of the municipality or county.” 625 ILCS 5/11-208.6
(k-7) (West 2020).
¶ 35 Neither subsection prohibits Markham from issuing drivers automated red-light tickets nor
provides specific consequences for the website’s noncompliance with these subsections. There is
no statutory language in either subsection (k-3) nor subsection (k-7) which tells us that government
action is rendered a nullity by a website’s failure to comply with these subsections. Consequently,
the negative language condition does not apply to overcome the presumption of directory
constructions of subsections (k-3) and (k-7) of section 11-208.6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code.
¶ 36 2. The Injury to Protected Rights Condition
¶ 37 We next consider whether the second condition overcomes the presumption of a directory
construction of subsections (k-3) and (k-7). In this analysis, “courts do not look to whether any
right of any person or entity will be adversely affected by a directory interpretation. Rather, we
look to whether the right the statute is designed to protect will be injured by a directory
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construction.” (Emphasis in original.) Lakewood Nursing, 2019 IL 124019, ¶ 44.
¶ 38 With respect to subsection (k-3), plaintiffs contend that the right of the public to have online
notice of the locations of intersections equipped with red-light cameras would be injured if this
subsection was given a directory reading. In support of this contention, Kmiecik claims that he
was prejudiced by the website’s noncompliance with subsection (k-3) because each time he visited
the website, he was unable to access online notice of the locations of intersections equipped with
red-light cameras.
¶ 39 Kmiecik, however, fails to demonstrate exactly how he suffered prejudice due to his
inability to access the locations of these intersections. He has not alleged or demonstrated that the
website’s outage affected his ability to obey normal traffic regulations, such as stopping at red
lights.
¶ 40 One of the main objectives of a red-light camera program is to promote public safety on
roadways by deterring drivers from disobeying the traffic laws and running red lights. See, e.g.,
Kilper v. City of Arnold, Mo., 2009 WL 2208404, at *17 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (“the use of red light
cameras and related proceedings are rationally connected to the valid public safety purpose of
reducing traffic accidents at traffic light intersections.”) This factor strongly weighs in favor of
construing subsection (k-3) as a directory provision.
¶ 41 We believe that one of the primary purposes of Markham’s red-light camera program
would be undermined if subsection (k-3) was given a mandatory construction because it would
provide drivers who run red-lights with a technical basis for avoiding an automated red-light ticket.
We doubt our legislature intended such a possibility. Consequently, we find that the right of the
public to assess the locations of intersections equipped with red-light cameras would not be injured
if subsection (k-3) was given a directory construction.
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¶ 42 As to subsection (k-7), Kmiecik fails to provide evidence of any injury or prejudice
suffered by him or any class member resulting from the inability to access online statistical
analysis. Thus, the presumption in favor of a directory reading of subsection (k-7) has not been
overcome.
¶ 43 In sum, the legal presumption that subsections (k-3) and (k-7) of section 11-208.6 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code are directory provisions, has not been overcome. As a result, plaintiffs’
argument that the automated red-light tickets they received are void, fails as a matter of law, as
does their claim for unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Martis v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., 388
Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1024-25 (2009) (when an underlying claim of unlawful or improper conduct is
deficient, then a claim for unjust enrichment should be dismissed).
¶ 44 In light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not and do not consider Markham’s
alternative arguments that plaintiffs’ claims are barred both by the doctrine of res judicata and by
their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 2
¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion
for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Markham.
¶ 47 Affirmed.
Markham failed to argue before the trial court that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by their failure to exhaust
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administrative remedies.
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