People v. Thurman , 2024 IL App (1st) 230674-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (1st) 230674-UNo. 1-23-0674
Order filed November 22, 2024
FIFTH DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 18 CR 08848
)
DONNELLE THURMAN, ) Honorable
) Peggy Chiampas,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE MITCHELL delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Oden Johnson and Justice Navarro concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder over his contention
that the trial court denied him a fair trial, where defendant testified to his state of mind in
support of his claim of self-defense.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Donnelle Thurman was found guilty of first degree murder
and sentenced to 53 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its
discretion by preventing him from testifying about his experience with firearm violence and his
belief that the neighborhood where the murder took place was dangerous in support of his theory
of self-defense. For the following reasons, we affirm.
No. 1-23-0674
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Defendant was charged by indictment with multiple offenses arising from the shooting
death of Willie Clarke. The State proceeded on two counts of first degree murder. The facts of the
shooting are largely uncontested.
¶5 Omri Robinson testified that early on April 27, 2018, she was in a vehicle with defendant,
defendant’s brother Javier Thurman, and their friend Kenichi Sims. Javier was driving, defendant
was in the front passenger seat, and Robinson and Sims were in the back seat. The group pulled
into a parking lot for Robinson to use an ATM. While she withdrew cash, a man walked through
the parking lot. Defendant exited the vehicle and walked toward the man to get a cigarette. When
asked about the shooting that followed, Robinson answered that she did not recall. Robinson
admitted to giving a statement to police, and when asked if she testified before the grand jury in
this case, she answered, “I believe so.”
¶6 Assistant State’s Attorney Ben Williams testified that he had questioned Robinson before
the grand jury. Parts of her grand jury testimony were read into the record. In her grand jury
testimony, Robinson testified that defendant took a handgun with him when he exited the vehicle
to ask the man in the parking lot for a cigarette. Robinson asked the others why defendant took the
handgun, and Javier said he did not know. She heard a gunshot, looked out the window, and saw
a green light beam on the man in the parking lot. She heard two more shots and saw the man fall
to the ground and defendant run back to the vehicle. Defendant held a handgun, but Robinson
could not see whether the man held anything. The others asked defendant why he shot the man,
and defendant answered that “it looked like he was pulling something out.” The four of them left
in the vehicle.
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¶7 Chicago Police Officer John Nagle testified that around 2:30 a.m. on April 27, 2018, he
and his partner responded to a report of shots fired at the Aldi parking lot on 63rd Street. There,
Nagle found a man lying unresponsive on the ground with a hole in his shirt and abdomen and a
pack of cigarettes on the ground next to him. State identification in the man’s wallet revealed his
name was Willie Clarke. He did not have a weapon.
¶8 Chicago police detective Joseph Paoletti testified that he also observed Clarke lying on the
ground in the parking lot, face up. Paoletti retrieved surveillance video from nearby buildings. This
footage was published and admitted into evidence and has been reviewed by this court. It shows a
vehicle at an ATM and two men walking toward each other across a parking lot. One man raises
his arm in front of him as he advances, and the second man continues toward him with his hands
at his sides. The first man then walks backward while the second man continues forward. A light
flashes from the end of the first man’s outstretched hand and the second man collapses. The first
man runs back to the vehicle, which drives away.
¶9 William Jackson, an evidence technician with the Chicago police, testified that he
photographed the area and recovered two 9-millimeter shell casings on the ground near Clarke’s
body and a shell fragment on Clarke’s left side. Dr. Emily Hansen, who performed an autopsy on
Clarke, testified that Clarke died of blood loss from the gunshot wound to his abdomen, and that
she recovered one bullet from his body. Police later recovered a firearm, which forensic analysis
showed fired the shell casings found at the scene of the shooting.
¶ 10 Defendant testified that, on the night of April 26, 2018, he was driving around aimlessly
with his brother Javier and friends Sims and Robinson. After midnight, they stopped at the Aldi
parking lot for Robinson to use the ATM. While waiting for Robinson to withdraw cash, defendant
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saw a man—later identified as Clarke—walking through the empty parking lot. Defendant yelled
at Clarke, asking if he could buy some loose cigarettes. Clarke said yes, and defendant exited the
vehicle and walked toward him. Defendant had a firearm in his jacket pocket.
¶ 11 The following exchange then occurred:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [W]hy were you carrying that gun that night?
[DEFENDANT]: Due to previous situations that I had been in, I always kept a gun
on me as protection.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And that—And when you talk about previous incidents,
what are you referring to?
[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Objection.
THE COURT: Basis?
[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Its irrelevant.
THE COURT: Sustained.”
The court then held a sidebar. Defense counsel made an offer of proof that defendant would testify
that he had been shot three times in the past and knew himself to be in a violent neighborhood that
night. Counsel argued this testimony would support defendant’s claim of reasonable self-defense.
The State argued that because defendant was the aggressor, he was not entitled to a self-defense
instruction.
¶ 12 The trial court sustained the objection, finding defendant’s past experience was irrelevant
and he was the aggressor. The court said, “Again, let me be clear, he can testify as to what happened
that night but he is not going to be testifying as to previous situations that he was in, period.” When
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the jury returned, defendant further testified, “I carry a gun all the time for protection. It’s
something I have done since I was young.”
¶ 13 Defendant testified that he told Clarke he wanted to buy two cigarettes for a dollar. Clarke
then said “something derogatory,” but defendant did not remember exactly what. Defendant
replied, “You’re tripping.” The two continued to approach each other. Clarke then “made the
insinuation that he would take what I had if I didn’t like what he had said or what the price was”
and made a movement toward defendant, “like a jumping motion towards somebody to, like,
frighten them.” Defendant “was in fear of what [Clarke] might do” and drew his handgun. He
pointed it at Clarke and told Clarke to back up. Clarke said, “What the f*** is that supposed to do?
You know what I did done before.” Defendant walked backward and Clarke continued advancing.
Clarke reached his right hand toward his left waist and “started to retract his hand in a motion to,
like, as if he was pulling something.” Defendant could not see what Clarke was reaching for
because it was dark, but he believed Clarke was reaching for a weapon, and he feared for his life.
¶ 14 Defendant fired his handgun and saw Clarke fall. Defendant testified, “I stared for a brief
moment and then in shock I ran to the car.” One of his companions asked, “Why the f*** did you
do that?” Defendant responded that Clarke was reaching for something. All four left in the vehicle
and took defendant to his cousin’s house. Police arrested defendant approximately a month later
and interviewed him at a police station, where he denied knowledge of the shooting. At trial,
defendant admitted he lied because he did not trust the police. On cross-examination, defendant
admitted he was a convicted felon and was not legally allowed to carry a firearm.
¶ 15 In closing, defense counsel claimed the video evidence showed that defendant attempted
to withdraw from Clarke by backing away and Clarke threatened him by continuing to advance.
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Counsel argued that defendant reasonably believed Clarke was reaching for a weapon, and
defendant shot Clarke in self-defense.
¶ 16 The court instructed the jury as to first degree murder, the lesser offense of second degree
murder based on unreasonable self-defense, and self-defense. The jury found defendant guilty of
first degree murder and found that defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately
caused the death of another person. Defendant moved for a new trial arguing that, among other
things, the court erred by limiting his testimony as to why he was carrying a firearm and “his life
experiences which had a direct bearing on his mental state at the time of the offense.” The trial
court denied the motions.
¶ 17 Following a hearing, the trial court merged the two counts and sentenced defendant to 28
years in prison for the murder plus a mandatory firearm enhancement of 25 years, for a total prison
term of 53 years. The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence. This timely
appeal followed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013); Ill. S. Ct. R. 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021).
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by preventing him from
testifying about why he was carrying a firearm. He argues that because this testimony went to his
state of mind at the time of the shooting, it was necessary for presenting his theory of self-defense.
¶ 20 Defendant contends that we should apply de novo review, arguing that the issue presented
is a purely legal question of whether the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a
defense. However, it is well settled that we review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. People v. Harmon, 2015 IL App (1st) 122345, ¶ 107 (citing People v. Adkins, 239 Ill.
2d 1, 23 (2010)). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or
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unreasonable, or where no reasonable person could agree with the court’s position. People v.
Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010). Even if a court abuses its discretion, we will not reverse unless
the error resulted in substantial prejudice affecting the outcome of the trial. In re Leona W., 228
Ill. 2d 439, 460 (2008).
¶ 21 A criminal defendant who asserts self-defense has the right to present evidence of his state
of mind to show he reasonably believed his use of force was necessary. Harmon, 2015 IL App
(1st) 122345, ¶ 108; see also People v. Keefe, 209 Ill. App. 3d 744, 751 (1991) (“The determinative
question where deadly force is used is whether defendant’s belief that it was necessary to use
deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances.”). As long as defendant’s belief was
reasonable, he may assert self-defense even if he was mistaken about the imminent danger. Keefe,
209 Ill. App. 3d at 751. In such a case, exclusion of defendant’s state-of-mind testimony is
ordinarily reversible error unless sufficient evidence of his intent is otherwise admitted. People v.
Christen, 82 Ill. App. 3d 192, 194 (1980). But where substantial evidence of the reasons for
defendant’s fear is admitted, exclusion of further evidence elucidating those reasons may be
harmless. Harmon, 2015 IL App (1st) 122345, ¶ 119; People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill. App. 3d 51, 60-
61 (1994); People v. Parker, 194 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1058-59 (1990).
¶ 22 A defendant claiming he or she reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary
should be given broad latitude to testify to that belief. People v. Hawkins, 296 Ill. App. 3d 830,
835 (1998) (“Where the intention, motive or belief of the accused is material to the issue, he is
allowed to testify directly to that fact, and to have the circumstances surrounding the act considered
in connection with his testimony.”); cf. Keefe, 209 Ill. App. 3d at 751-52 (explaining that where
there is “some reasonable basis” for defendant’s self-defense claim, excluding state of mind
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testimony is ordinarily reversible error). The circuit court, however, also has discretion to “ ‘reject
offered evidence on grounds of irrelevancy if it has little probative value due to its remoteness,
uncertainty, or possibly unfair prejudicial nature.’ ” People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 221555, ¶
64 (quoting People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 132 (2007)). Here, the circuit court acted within that
discretion when it excluded defendant’s proposed testimony as to other shootings on relevance
grounds.
¶ 23 Defendant argues that the circuit court nonetheless abused its discretion when it excluded
defendant’s testimony that he was fearful because he believed he was in a dangerous
neighborhood. This testimony relates to defendant’s state of mind and seems appropriate, but its
exclusion, even if an abuse of discretion, does not mandate reversal. Defendant gave substantial
testimony as to his state of mind at the time he shot Clarke. Defendant testified that he carried a
firearm for protection “[d]ue to previous situations” he had been in, that he believed Clarke was
threatening him and reaching for a weapon, and that he was afraid. Specifically, defendant
explained that Clarke insinuated that “he would take what [defendant] had” and made threatening
movements toward him. Defendant stated he “was in fear of what [Clarke] might do” and drew his
handgun from his pocket. Clarke continued to threaten him and advance toward him. When Clarke
attempted to retrieve from his waistband what defendant believed to be a weapon, defendant feared
for his life and shot him. This testimony adequately communicated defendant’s fearful state of
mind, past exposure to violent situations, and intent to defend himself. Any error in limiting his
testimony was harmless. See Damnitz, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 59-61 (exclusion of defendant’s
experience of violence from victim’s gang was harmless error where substantial evidence was
admitted concerning that gang’s rivalry with defendant’s own and defendant’s fear of the victim);
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see also Parker, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 1058 (“even though [defendant] was not allowed to detail the
reasons for his nervousness, the fact that he was nervous did get into the record”).
¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 26 Affirmed.
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