People v. Contreras , 2024 IL App (2d) 240496-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (2d) 240496-UNo. 2-24-0496
Order filed November 26, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 24-CF-1313
)
) Honorable
ELOY D. CONTRERAS, ) Salvatore LoPiccolo, Jr.,
) David Paul Kliment,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Hutchinson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s factual determinations about knowledge and possession were not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Defendant, Eloy D. Contreras, appeals, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Apr.
15, 2024), the order of the circuit court of Kane County denying pretrial release pursuant to article
110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), commonly
known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Defendant argues that the State failed to meet its evidentiary
burden of demonstrating that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Ucommitted the charged offenses and of proving that he posed a real and present threat to the
community. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On June 21, 2024, defendant was charged with the detainable offenses of unlawful
possession of a firearm in a vehicle by a street gang member (720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(2) (West
2022)), unlawful possession of firearm ammunition in a vehicle by a street gang member (id.),
unlawful possession of a firearm without a firearm owner’s identification card (430 ILCS
65/2(a)(1) (West 2022)), and four counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-
1.6(a)(1) (West 2022)). The same day, the State timely filed a verified petition to deny defendant’s
pretrial release (petition to detain), and the trial court held a hearing on it.
¶5 At the hearing, the State proceeded by way of proffer. According to the State, on April 30,
2024, defendant was arrested on an outstanding warrant for a De Kalb County domestic battery
case. At the time of the April 30 arrest, defendant possessed methamphetamine, and he was
charged with nondetainable drug offenses in Kane County case No. 24-CF-953 (methamphetamine
case), and defendant raised a factual issue regarding whether his nonattendance at subsequent
hearings was willful, bearing on the issue of conditions of release.
¶6 The State also presented defendant’s criminal and social history noting that, although
defendant was 18 years of age, he had a criminal conviction for residential burglary and a juvenile
adjudication for burglary. At the time of the detention hearing, defendant had three pending cases:
the De Kalb County domestic battery case, the methamphetamine case, and an unspecified drug
case, and defendant was on probation for his residential burglary conviction. Defendant also
admitted that he was a member of the Latin Kings street gang in Aurora.
¶7 Regarding the instant case, the State admitted into evidence a police synopsis of the
encounter leading to defendant’s arrest. At about 8 p.m., on June 20, 2024, Investigators Walden
-2-
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Uand Meyers of the Aurora police department conducted a traffic stop for improper lane usage of
the vehicle in which defendant was traveling, and the vehicle turned into a parking lot. Fausto
Fuentes was the driver, defendant was the front-seat passenger, and an unnamed person was seated
in the rear driver’s-side seat.
¶8 When Meyers approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he smelled the odor of
cannabis. Defendant showed Meyers a glass bowl and admitted that he smoked cannabis with it
about an hour before the stop. Defendant also showed Meyers an open bottle of tequila within the
car. The officers had the occupants exit the car. Meyers searched defendant and found a small
amount of cannabis on defendant’s person. Meyers’s conversation with defendant at the scene
resulted in defendant’s admission that he was a Latin King.
¶9 When Walden approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, Fuentes admitted that he did not
have a valid driver’s license, which Walden confirmed. Walden discovered a glass pipe consistent
with methamphetamine use on Fuentes’s person.
¶ 10 Meyers conducted a search of the vehicle. Under the front passenger seat, Meyers found a
loaded handmade handgun without a serial number (i.e., a ghost gun) containing nine rounds of 9
mm ammunition in the magazine in the handgun, but no round was loaded in the chamber. Meyers
also determined that the ghost gun could not have been placed under the seat from behind, only
from the front.
¶ 11 The occupants were taken to the Aurora police department booking facility. Fuentes
agreed to be interviewed. He stated that while the car was pulling into the parking lot, he saw
defendant lean forward as if he were placing something under his seat. Contreras refused to be
interviewed at the station.
¶ 12 The State also argued that defendant posed a real and present threat to the community,
demonstrated “based on the nature of [the] offenses and the fact that this was a loaded gun, driving
-3-
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Uaround at the time of day and night with an open tequila bottle. He also had drugs again in this
case with the gun.”
¶ 13 Defendant argued that there was no evidence, beyond his proximity to it in the vehicle, that
he knew of the presence of the ghost gun. Defendant argued that the ghost gun likely belonged to
Fuentes because he was the driver of the vehicle, who, due to his offenses, had a strong motive to
lie about the ownership of the ghost gun. Defendant also disputed that the gun could not have
been placed under the front passenger seat from the rear and noted that no objective evidence, like
fingerprints or DNA, linked defendant to the gun. Defendant concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate that he “was aware of the firearm” for purposes of constructive
possession.
¶ 14 Defendant also argued that the State failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
he posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community, because there was no evidence
that he brandished the gun, threatened anyone with the gun, there was no round in the chamber, no
evidence that the gun had ever been fired, and no evidence that defendant had any identified
enemies. Defendant also argued that the synopsis was self-contradictory, because it claimed that
he admitted belonging to the Latin King street gang, yet it also claimed he refused to speak with
police officers.
¶ 15 The trial court granted the State’s petition to detain. In pronouncing its judgment, 1 the
court found that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the
charged firearm-possession offenses. Regarding the charges of possession by a street gang
member, the court relied on defendant’s at-the-scene admission of being a member of the Latin
King street gang, the configuration of the front passenger seat, and Fuentes observing defendant
1
The trial court’s written judgment was consistent with its oral pronouncement.
-4-
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Ulean forward and place an object under the seat. Regarding the other firearm charges, the court
relied on the facts that defendant was 19 years old at the time of the traffic stop and ineligible by
law from owning a handgun or obtaining either a firearm owner’s identification card or a concealed
carry license. Additionally, the court noted that defendant was on probation on a Kendall County
residential burglary and took judicial notice of the conditions that prohibited him from obtaining
a firearm owner’s identification card.
¶ 16 The court also rejected defendant’s arguments on the ground that they were based on
whether the charges could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court agreed that, on the
record before it, the proof did not rise to the level of beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the
court
“believe[d] that based on the location, the officer’s statement that the only way [the gun]
could have been placed [under the front passenger’s seat] was from the front and more
importantly the defendant—driver of the vehicle who tells the officer he observes, so this
is immediately before they are being pulled over for the traffic violation, he observed the
defendant bend down as if to put something under the front seat and that’s where the
firearm is located.”
¶ 17 Turning to the threat defendant posed to the community, the trial court relied on the facts
that, as a 19-year-old, defendant was not allowed to own a handgun, or to possess a firearm owner’s
identification card or a concealed carry license, and it stated the age restriction was due to the
“built-in immaturity of an 18- or 19-year-old” in possessing a handgun. The court further noted
that defendant admitted to being a gang member. The court then analyzed the specific
circumstances of the case to find that defendant posed a real and present threat to the community:
“[Defendant] is a self-admitted gang member and they are driving around on the streets of
Aurora with—at a time where he is not supposed to have a gun, period, put on top of it the
-5-
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Ufact that it is a firearm that does not have a serial number so it can’t even be tracked, can’t
even be tracked, combined with the fact that [defendant] is on TASC probation for
residential burglary at the time that this occurs, combined with the fact that he is not to be
consuming any intoxicating substances, by his own admission he is smoking cannabis at
the time of the officer coming up—an hour before the officer comes up to him. Again,
while he was on probation, that TASC probation, he is arrested on April 30th of this year
and has methamphetamine, so again there is another violation of the order of [probation].”
¶ 18 The trial court also determined that no conditions of release would mitigate the threat posed
by defendant, because his violations of the terms of probation for his residential burglary
conviction and failures to appear at court hearings showed that electronic home monitoring or
other conditions would not prevent defendant from possessing a firearm or intoxicating substances.
Based on its considerations, the court granted the State’s petition to detain defendant pending trial.
¶ 19 On June 24, 2024, defendant filed a motion styled as a motion for relief, challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence regarding firearm-possession offenses, whether he posed a real and
present threat to the community, and whether there were no conditions available that could mitigate
the threat he posed. On July 17, 2024, the court held a hearing on defendant’s motion for relief.
Defendant proceeded by way of proffer and submitted into evidence two supplemental police
reports from the Aurora police department. The first report indicated that the firearm had been
subjected to several forms of fingerprint testing, and no comparable prints were found.
¶ 20 The second report focused on Fuentes’s interrogation following his arrest. This report
identified the back-seat occupant as Yoni Rodriguez, whom Fuentes did not know. Fuentes was
driving a car belonging to a friend from Streator, where Fuentes lived, but Fuentes frequently
visited friends in Aurora. He was flagged down by defendant, whom Fuentes had known for six
months, and asked to give them a ride to the library. Fuentes stated that, as he was pulling into the
-6-
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Ulibrary, he was pulled over by the police. As he turned into the library parking lot, Fuentes noticed
defendant reach under the front passenger seat and hide something. Fuentes did not see what
defendant placed under the seat. Once the police search had recovered the ghost gun from beneath
the front passenger seat, Fuentes concluded that it must have been the item defendant was hiding.
Fuentes also stated that, during his association with defendant, he had not observed defendant
carrying guns, had never seen defendant with a gun, and did not know that defendant had a gun in
his possession when he entered Fuentes’s vehicle.
¶ 21 The trial court denied defendant’s motion. Defendant clarified to the court that his motion
was not a “motion for relief” as contemplated by the Supreme Court Rules but was simply a motion
to reconsider defendant’s continued detention. Defendant asked that the motion be continued to
the following week and represented that the motion would be further supplemented.
¶ 22 On July 25, 2024, defendant filed a motion styled as an amended motion for relief, raising
the same issues as in the June motion. In the amended motion for relief, however, defendant
incorporated the arguments made at the July 17 hearing regarding the supplemental police reports.
On July 25, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the amended motion for relief. Defendant stood
on his written arguments in the amended motion and on the oral arguments from the previous
week. The trial court denied the amended motion for relief, and defendant timely appeals. Both
defendant and the State filed memoranda in support of their positions.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s
petition to detain. In support, defendant argues that the trial court’s findings that the State proved,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the proof was evident or the presumption great that
defendant committed the charged offenses, and that defendant posed a real and present threat to
the community, were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, regarding the
-7-
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Ufirearm charges, defendant argues that the State did not demonstrate that he constructively
possessed the ghost gun because the evidence did not demonstrate that he was aware of the gun’s
presence in the vehicle. Regarding the threat to the community, defendant argues that the trial
court based its determination on the general nature of the charged offenses, not on any specific and
articulable facts appearing in the record. We address defendant’s contentions in turn.
¶ 25 We initially note that our review of these contentions proceeds under a bifurcated standard
of review. We review the trial court’s factual findings to determine whether they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A finding is
against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or
if the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. In re Jose A., 2018 IL App
(2d) 180170, ¶ 17. We review the court’s ultimate determination for an abuse of discretion.
Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable, or if no reasonable person would agree with the court’s decision. Id. In
addition, we may sustain the court’s judgment on any ground supported in the record even if the
court did not rely on it or employed incorrect reasoning in reaching its result. People v. Johnson,
208 Ill. 2d 118, 129 (2003).
¶ 26 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
he possessed the firearm, either actually or constructively. To demonstrate actual possession, the
State was required to show that the contraband was in the immediate and exclusive control of the
defendant. People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 360 (1992). By contrast, to demonstrate
constructive possession, the State was required to show that the defendant knew the contraband
was present and exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where the contraband
was located. People v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 30. Possession and knowledge present factual
determinations to be made by the factfinder, and they may be demonstrated by circumstantial
-8-
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Uevidence and proper inferences arising from the evidence. People v. White, 2021 IL App (1st)
191095, ¶ 31.
¶ 27 Here, the State presented evidence that defendant was seated in the front passenger seat.
As the police effected a traffic stop, Fuentes saw defendant lean forward and place something
under the seat. A search of the vehicle revealed the presence of the ghost gun under the defendant’s
seat. The gun was loaded with a nine-round magazine, although no round was chambered when
the gun was discovered. Further investigation showed that the configuration of the front seat made
it impossible to place the gun under the front passenger seat from behind; it could only have been
placed there by reaching under the front passenger seat from in front of that seat.
¶ 28 The trial court concluded, that, based on this evidence, the State had demonstrated, by clear
and convincing evidence, that defendant knowingly possessed the firearm. The evidence showed
that defendant himself placed the ghost gun, thereby demonstrating knowledge and awareness of
the gun, and its location under the front passenger seat afforded defendant immediate and exclusive
possession of the gun. Thus, the court’s conclusion is based on the evidence presented at the
hearing on the State’s petition to detain and defendant’s motion for relief, and it amply supports
its factual determination. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.
¶ 29 Defendant relies on People v. Crumpton, 2024 IL App (1st) 221651, in support of his
contention that the State failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he had knowledge
of the presence of the ghost gun. As an initial matter, Crumpton involved whether the evidence
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in that case constructively possessed a firearm
found beneath his seat in an automobile. Id. ¶ 8. Here, by contrast, the State needed only to
demonstrate possession and knowledge by clear and convincing evidence, an intermediate
quantum of proof lying between a preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., People v.
Clay, 361 Ill. App. 3d 310, 322 (2005). While the analyses pertaining to the evidentiary burdens
-9-
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Umay be similar, the vast difference between the evidentiary burdens renders Crumpton
distinguishable on its face.
¶ 30 Moreover, in Crumpton, there was no objective evidence tying the defendant to the firearm,
such as direct observation of possession by another, fingerprints or DNA evidence. Crumpton,
2024 IL App (1st) 221651, ¶ 12. There was also no evidence presented that suggested the
defendant knew or could have discovered the presence of the relatively small gun under his seat at
any time before the car was stopped. Id. Here, by contrast, Fuentes told officers that he saw
defendant lean forward as he was turning into the parking lot and place something beneath the
front passenger seat. Meyers’s search of the vehicle and examination of the configuration of the
front passenger seat showed that the gun could not have been placed as found by anyone sitting
behind the front seat. Thus, there is evidence tying defendant to the ghost gun recovered from
Fuentes’s vehicle, namely, defendant’s leaning forward and the front seat configuration. This
evidence amply supports the trial court’s factual determination that defendant both possessed and
knew of the presence of the gun, because he placed it beneath his seat. For these reasons, too,
Crumpton is distinguishable and affords defendant no support for his contention.
¶ 31 Defendant disputes various details of the offense. For example, defendant labels Fuentes’s
statements to the police as unreliable because he was driving without a valid driver’s license and
possessed methamphetamine paraphernalia, which incentivized Fuentes to lie about ownership of
the gun and his observations of defendant’s actions. While these points were argued at the hearings
below, it was still the trial court’s province to evaluate the evidence, resolve discrepancies and
inconsistencies, and otherwise make the necessary factual determinations. White, 2021 IL App
(1st) 191095, ¶ 31. Defendant’s contentions about any inconsistencies or conflicts in the evidence
presented by the State at the original hearing, or inconsistencies and conflicts in evidence between
the original hearing the hearing on defendant’s motion for reconsideration/relief amount to little
- 10 -
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Umore than a plea that we reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial
court, and that we may not do. People v. Smith, 2024 IL App (2d) 240168, ¶ 20. Rather, because
the evidence in the record amply supports the trial court’s factual determinations concerning
possession and knowledge, we reject defendant’s arguments about how the court should have
interpreted the evidence and drawn its inferences and conclusions.
¶ 32 Next, defendant argues that the trial court’s determination that he presented a real and
present threat to the community was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant argues
that the trial court based its determination of threat or dangerousness on the fact that he possessed
a firearm and was a self-admitted gang member. Defendant emphasizes that he had no criminal
history of firearm use or possession, and he concludes that nothing in the record suggests that he
poses a threat to the community. We disagree.
¶ 33 Defendant’s criminal history demonstrates an escalation in the severity and frequency of
offenses over several years and particularly during 2024. Defendant had a juvenile adjudication
for burglary, and he was on probation for a residential burglary conviction at the time he incurred
the charges in this case. In addition, defendant had been arrested on an outstanding domestic
battery warrant from De Kalb County which resulted in being charged with possession of
methamphetamine, both of which occurred in April 2024. The circumstances of the instant case,
occurring in June 2024, indicate that defendant was riding in a car near dusk in Aurora, where he
admitted he was a member of the Latin King street gang, while in possession of an untraceable,
fully loaded, ghost gun. In addition, defendant admitted to smoking cannabis about an hour before
the stop, and to the possession of an open bottle of tequila in the car. These facts lead to the
inference that he was consuming alcohol while he and his companions were driving around the
streets of Aurora as dusk was falling, and it cannot be seriously argued that mixing firearms with
alcohol consumption does not pose a serious danger. Thus, defendant’s possession of a fully
- 11 -
2024 IL App (2d) 240496-Uloaded and untraceable ghost gun while under the influence of multiple intoxicants are
circumstances highly endangering the community standing alone. These circumstances combined
with the escalating type and frequency of defendant’s criminal charges strongly support the trial
court’s determination that he constituted a real and present threat to the community. Accordingly,
we cannot say that the court’s finding of dangerousness was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 34 We do not address the issue of conditions of release, even though they were addressed in
defendant’s motion for relief. Defendant submitted a memorandum in support of his appeal of his
detention which included no argument about conditions of release, and this memorandum controls
and serves to limit the issues we will consider on appeal. People v. Rollins, 2024 IL App (2d)
230372, ¶ 22.
¶ 35 Finally, to the extent that defendant separately argues on appeal that the trial court abused
its discretion in granting the State’s petition to detain, we disagree. The trial court’s decision was
neither unreasonable, fanciful, nor arbitrary, and it was solidly based on the evidence presented at
the hearings. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court
abused its discretion in granting the State’s petition to detain.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
- 12 -