People v. Monroe , 2024 IL App (4th) 231314-U ( 2024 )

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 231314-UThis Order was filed under FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-23-1314 November 15, 2024
not precedent except in the Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Peoria County
ANTONIO T. MONROE JR., ) No. 21CF273
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Paul P. Gilfillan,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Doherty and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) Defendant’s plea was not a “negotiated plea of guilty” under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
(2) Because defense counsel failed to comply strictly with Rule 604(d), the order
denying defendant’s postplea claims is vacated and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings.
¶2 This is the second appeal by defendant, Antionio T. Monroe Jr., from a denial of
his postplea claim after he pled guilty to vehicular hijacking. In February 2022, defendant filed a
motion to reconsider his 24-year sentence, his first postplea motion. After that motion was
denied, defendant appealed. This court granted summary remand because defense counsel failed
to file a certificate in compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶3 On remand, defense counsel did not file a motion to reconsider but filed a motion
to withdraw defendant’s guilty plea. At the hearing on that motion, defense counsel and the State
asserted defendant’s guilty plea was a negotiated plea under Rule 604(d) and, as such, defendant
was prohibited from filing a motion to reconsider his sentence. The trial court expressed concern
the parties were incorrect as to the nature of the plea, found it would “cover all bases,” and
proceeded on defendant’s previously filed motion to reconsider his sentence, as well as on the
newly filed motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied both motions.
¶4 Defendant appeals, arguing his counsel failed to comply with Rule 604(d).
Defendant concedes the certificate filed by counsel was facially compliant but argues counsel,
acting under the misconception he could only file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, did not
make the necessary amendments to present his claim his sentence was excessive. The State
contends a second remand is unnecessary as the plea was a negotiated plea and argues defendant
received a full and fair hearing on his excessiveness claim. We agree with defendant, vacate the
trial court’s order, and remand for further proceedings.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 The State charged defendant in May 2021 with aggravated vehicular hijacking
(720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2020)), vehicular hijacking (id. § 18-3(a)), and unlawful
possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2020)). According to the
charges, defendant knowingly took a motor vehicle from another while armed with a handgun.
The vehicular hijacking charge did not allege defendant was armed at the time of the offense.
¶7 In October 2021, before Judge Kevin W. Lyons, defendant entered a plea of guilty
to the vehicular-hijacking charge. According to the written “partial plea agreement,” the parties
agreed the sentencing range for defendant “is 4 to 30 years in [the Illinois Department of
Corrections (DOC)]” and defendant is not eligible for probation. The parties further agreed the
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remaining counts would be dismissed.
¶8 At the guilty-plea hearing, the State asserted the dropped charge for aggravated
vehicular hijacking, with the firearm enhancement, carried a sentencing range of 21 to 45 years.
Due to his criminal history, defendant was eligible on the vehicular hijacking charge for
extended-term sentencing, making the range of his sentence 4 to 30 years’ imprisonment. See
720 ILCS 5/18-3(b) (West 2020) (“Vehicular hijacking is a Class 1 felony.”); id. § /5-4.5-30(a)
(setting the sentencing range for Class 1 felonies at 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment and authorizing
an extended term of 15 to 30 years). After arguments by defense counsel and the State, the trial
court sentenced defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment.
¶9 In February 2022, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. In his
motion, defendant argued “the sentence imposed by the Court was excessive” and the sentencing
court “failed to consider the Defendant’s record, age and other mitigating factors.”
¶ 10 In April 2022, a hearing was held on the motion. At the hearing, defense counsel
argued in support of his motion to reconsider the sentence. Counsel emphasized defendant’s
sentence was just six years under the maximum. He highlighted defendant was 18 years old at
the time of the offense, had a difficult childhood, and had three young children. Counsel asked
the trial court to reconsider given the sentence was longer than defendant had been alive.
Counsel argued no one was injured and his client cooperated with the police. Counsel further
emphasized defendant’s chance for rehabilitation. The court denied the motion.
¶ 11 Defendant appealed the denial. The State agreed defense counsel failed to comply
strictly with Rule 604(d)’s certificate requirements. In September 2022, this court allowed
defendant’s agreed motion for summary remand. We “remanded to the circuit court for (1) the
filing of a [Rule] 604(d) certificate; (2) the opportunity to file a new Rule 604(d) motion, if
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counsel concludes a new motion is necessary; (3) a new hearing; (4) a ruling on all pending Rule
604(d) motions; and (5) strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 604(d).” On remand, as
Judge Lyons had retired, the case was assigned to a new judge, Paul P. Gilfillan.
¶ 12 On October 31, 2023, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In that
motion, defendant argued his plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered, as he “did not
fully understand the elements of his case” and, at the time of the plea, he did not understand the
possible consequences of that plea.
¶ 13 The hearing for defendant’s postplea motion was scheduled for November 8,
2023. On that day, defense counsel reported defendant wanted to withdraw his guilty plea, and
counsel stated he “can’t reconsider the sentence because it’s a partially negotiated plea.” The
matter was continued, as counsel had not yet filed his Rule 604(d) certificate.
¶ 14 On November 13, 2023, defense counsel filed a Rule 604(d) certificate, which
stated the following:
“1. I have consulted with the defendant in person, by mail
or by electronic means to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error
in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty;
2. I have examined the trial court file and the report of
proceedings of the plea of guilty and the sentencing hearing;
3. I have made any amendments to the motion necessary
for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings.”
¶ 15 On November 16, 2023, the hearing was held. Defendant testified his issue with
the plea was he “didn’t know how much time [he] received.” He agreed he understood the
sentencing range for his offense and he knew his 24-year sentence was a possibility. Defense
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counsel asked defendant the following: “Is it your contention that you just think that that’s an
excessive sentence, and that you would like to be resentenced because of that, and that’s why
you want to withdraw your guilty plea?” Defendant responded, “Yes.”
¶ 16 After the State responded it had no questions, the trial court questioned whether a
motion to reconsider should have been filed:
“THE COURT: *** I know we touched on this briefly the
last time we were together, but back to the issue of whether a
motion to reconsider sentence could be filed or not in this case, and
there was one filed on February 7th of 2022.
We had the discussion about this being a negotiated plea
which would then negate the ability to file a motion to reconsider
sentence. Do you recall that, Mr. Doubet?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Gast?
[THE STATE]: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. And in this case, it’s the attorneys’
position that this was a negotiated plea of guilty?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It is, [Y]our Honor, according to
the statute, it appears, because there was a partial negotiation on a
cap here. It would have made it a negotiated sentence, and I agree
with the statute that the Court has cited here.
***
THE COURT: Okay. And there was actually a floor to the
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sentencing range.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah. We had removed the
probation because the count that my client was pleading to was
probationable. [The State] had presented an offer to myself, and I
presented it to my client which took away the ability to get
probation. So, the bottom ceiling was gone for that, so it was
strictly a 4 to 30 year sentence because of that, Judge.
THE COURT: So, is that a plea then in which the State
recommends a specific sentence or a range of sentence?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe it is.
THE COURT: Mr. Gast?
[THE STATE]: Judge, I think I understand what the Court
is suggesting. However, I think in this case, as the transcript bears
out, a substantial charge was dismissed pursuant to this plea
agreement which would have given the defendant the possibility of
a minimum of 21 years in [DOC] with a maximum of 45 years.”
¶ 17 The trial court then read the statute and was not convinced the State’s decision to
drop the charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking made the plea “negotiated.” The court
concluded because it did not “know the exact answer,” it would “cover all bases.” The court
noted
“it’s really similar to the basis for the motion to withdraw guilty
plea that he received too much time or that he wasn’t expecting
that much time or that it was excessive. So, I’ve got that motion to
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reconsider sentence in front of me, and whether it is applicable
today or not, I am going to consider the substance of that.”
The court then requested, “briefly, argument, whether it’s moot or not, on the motion to
reconsider sentence from the defense attorney.” Defense counsel proceeded with the following:
“Your Honor, that would be our argument in this case that
that was an excessive sentence that he received in this case. It was
almost the maximum in the sentence for the charge that he had
pled to in this case.
That was what our reason was for filing the motion to
reconsider which was following Judge Lyons’s recommendation of
filing the motion to reconsider immediately which I did, and then it
came back up on this motion from the Appeals Court saying that it
was a negotiated plea.
So, therefore, we had to withdraw our guilty plea, and I’ve
explained that to [defendant]. He had to, if he wanted to do this, he
would have to withdraw his guilty plea, which would open up all
of these charges to him again.”
The court disagreed with defense counsel’s conclusion this court called the plea “a negotiated
plea.”
¶ 18 After the State argued against the motions to reconsider and to withdraw the
guilty plea, the trial court noted the following: “We’ve had a comprehensive hearing here today,
and I have reviewed as a fresh set of eyes all the prior plea transcripts and the sentencing
transcripts.” The court then denied both motions.
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¶ 19 This appeal followed.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, defendant argues he is entitled to a remand with a new hearing, as the
record establishes defense counsel failed to comply strictly with Rule 604(d). Defendant argues,
despite filing a facially compliant Rule 604(d) certificate that states he made the necessary
amendments to present adequately any defects in the plea and sentencing proceedings, counsel
did not in fact make the necessary amendments. According to defendant, as counsel incorrectly
believed defendant’s plea was negotiated and he could therefore not file a motion to reconsider
the sentence, defendant’s excessiveness-of-sentence claim was not properly raised or argued
before the trial court.
¶ 22 The State counters remand is unnecessary for two reasons. The State maintains
defendant’s plea was negotiated and, therefore, defendant was barred by Rule 604(d) from filing
a motion to reconsider his sentence. Second, the State argues, even if we find the plea is a
“negotiated plea of guilty,” remand is not required, as defendant received not one but two full
and fair hearings on his excessiveness claim.
¶ 23 A. Negotiated or Open Plea
¶ 24 We begin with the question of whether defendant’s plea was a “negotiated plea of
guilty” under Rule 604(d). If the plea falls within that definition, Rule 604(d) limited defendant’s
avenue to an appeal of his sentence to the filing of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In that
circumstance, no remand is required.
¶ 25 Rule 604(d) sets forth the procedure to be followed when a defendant seeks to
appeal from a judgment entered after a guilty plea. In re H.L., 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 7, 48 N.E.3d
1071. The rule mandates the filing of a postplea motion, such as a motion to withdraw the plea or
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a motion to reconsider the sentence, before an appeal of a plea may be taken. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). What type of postplea motion may be filed by a defendant pursuant to
Rule 604(d) depends on the type of guilty plea entered. For a “negotiated plea of guilty,” for
example, Rule 604(d) states, “No appeal shall be taken upon a negotiated plea of guilty
challenging the sentence as excessive unless the defendant, within 30 days of the imposition of
sentence, files a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.” Id. The rule
defines a negotiated plea of guilty as “one in which the prosecution has bound itself to
recommend a specific sentence, or a specific range of sentence, or where the prosecution has
made concessions relating to the sentence to be imposed and not merely to the charge or charges
then pending.” Id. In contrast, when a plea is not “negotiated,” a defendant may choose to file
either a motion to reconsider the sentence or a motion to withdraw a guilty plea or both. Id.¶ 26 The rationale underlying Rule 604(d)’s restriction for a negotiated plea is founded
on “the nature of the plea agreement and the application of contract[-]law principles.” People v.
Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶ 27, 129 N.E.3d 1239. To allow a defendant who entered a
negotiated plea with the State to pursue a motion to reconsider his or her sentence would allow
that defendant to hold the State to its end of the bargain while seeking a modification of a
sentence the defendant agreed to. Id. This practice would violate contract principles as, when a
negotiated plea is reached, the guilty plea and the sentence together are material elements of the
plea bargain. Id. “[A]llowing a defendant to move to reconsider his sentence without
withdrawing his plea ‘unfairly binds the State to the terms of the plea agreement while giving the
defendant the opportunity to avoid or modify those terms.’ ” Id. ¶ 28. (quoting People v. Linder,
186 Ill. 2d 67, 74, 708 N.E.2d 1169, 1172-73 (1999)).
¶ 27 If the plea is not negotiated as defined by Rule 604(d), “the defendant and the
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State are free to argue for any sentence permitted by statute, and the circuit court exercises its
full discretion in determining the sentence to be imposed.” People v. Gooch, 2014 IL App (5th)
120161, ¶ 18, 18 N.E.3d 175 (citing People v. Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d 182, 185, 730 N.E.2d 20, 21-22
(2000)). In those circumstances, Rule 604(d) does not require a defendant to withdraw the guilty
plea but allows that defendant to file a motion to reconsider the sentence. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d)
(eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 28 The State maintains the plea here is a negotiated plea and, therefore, defense
counsel was not mistaken in the belief he could only file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
The State notes it found no case law establishing a “floor” to the agreement, given defendant’s
agreement not to seek probation, but seems to argue that concession, coupled with the State’s
agreement not to pursue the aggravated-vehicular-hijacking charge, made the plea “negotiated.”
In support, the State relies on our decision in People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (4th) 200515,
197 N.E.3d 683.
¶ 29 Although the parties did negotiate defendant’s guilty plea in that defendant agreed
not to seek probation and the State agreed to drop the charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking,
the plea was not a “negotiated plea” as defined by Rule 604(d). The plea does not fall into the
rule’s definitions of “negotiated plea.” It was not “one in which the prosecution has bound itself
to recommend a specific sentence[ ] or a specific range of sentence.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff.
July 1, 2017). The State made no concession as to the sentencing range, as defendant was
eligible for a sentence of 4 to 30 years, the range provided by statute. Nor is the plea agreement
in this case one where “the prosecution has made concessions relating to the sentence to be
imposed and not merely to the charge or charges then pending.” Id. The State, on appeal,
emphasizes it negotiated its right to pursue the charge of aggravated vehicular hijacking,
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reducing the maximum sentence defendant faced from 45 years to 30 years. However, this is not
a concession related to the sentence but one “merely to the charge or charges then pending,” a
concession expressly excluded from the definition of a negotiated plea.
¶ 30 In addition, defendant was not eligible for probation. Section 5-5-3(c)(2)(K) of
the Unified Code of Corrections prohibits the imposition of probation for vehicular hijacking.
730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(2)(K) (West 2020). Defendant thus pled guilty with no concession by him
or by the State as to sentencing. The parties agreed he would be sentenced to 4 to 30 years,
which is the range defendant faced for his vehicular hijacking charge. See 720 ILCS 5/18-3(b)
(West 2020) (“Vehicular hijacking is a Class 1 felony.”); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2020).
This is an open plea—not a negotiated plea under Rule 604(d).
¶ 31 The State’s case, Robinson, does not support its argument. In Robinson, the State
agreed to recommend a sentence lower than the maximum sentence available. Robinson, 2021 IL
App (4th) 200515, ¶ 5. This recommendation, although nonbinding on the sentencing court, was
a concession by the State sufficient to place the plea agreement within the definition of a
“negotiated plea of guilty” in Rule 604(d). Id. ¶ 20. No concession was made here.
¶ 32 As defendant’s plea agreement was not a negotiated plea of guilty, Rule 604(d)
authorized his filing of a motion to reconsider his sentence to challenge his sentence as
excessive. Defense counsel’s conclusion only a motion to withdraw the guilty plea could be filed
on defendant’s behalf was wrong.
¶ 33 B. Whether Defendant Is Entitled to a Remand
¶ 34 Defendant contends the record establishes defense counsel, despite filing a
facially compliant Rule 604(d) certificate, did not comply strictly with that rule. Defendant
emphasizes the record shows his desire to challenge his sentence as excessive. Counsel, holding
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the mistaken belief a motion to reconsider the sentence could not be filed, was limited to filing a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea to assert that claim. Counsel argues that avenue was futile, as
an excessiveness-of-sentence claim is not a basis to secure the withdrawal of a guilty plea.
According to defendant, because counsel did not file a motion to reconsider his sentence to
reflect his excessiveness claims, counsel could not “have made any amendments to the motion
necessary for the adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings,” as required by Rule
604(d). Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 35 The State counters defendant is not entitled to a second remand, as the certificate
facially complies with Rule 604(d) and defendant was afforded a full and fair hearing on the
motion to reconsider filed before the remand. The State further argues defendant raised his
excessiveness claim in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that claim was heard and
considered. In support of its argument a remand is not required, the State relies on People v.
Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 692 N.E.2d 1189 (1998).
¶ 36 After a guilty plea, if a defendant seeks to challenge the plea or a sentence on
appeal, counsel must comply with Rule 604(d)’s certification requirements:
“The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate
stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by
phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain defendant’s
contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of
guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of
proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in
the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the
motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those
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proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
Counsel must strictly comply with Rule 604(d). People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220573,
¶ 30, 218 N.E.3d 527. Strict compliance assures defense counsel “use[s] his or her own legal
acumen to aid in the presentation of a defendant’s claims of error.” See People v. Laffey, 2024 IL
App (4th) 230764-U, ¶ 45. Remand is required when a certificate fails to comply strictly with the
rule. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220573, ¶ 30. On remand from counsel’s failure to comply, the
defendant will have the opportunity to file a new postplea motion and a new hearing on that
motion. Id. (citing People v. Bridges, 2017 IL App (2d) 150718, ¶ 6, 87 N.E.3d 441).
¶ 37 A facially compliant Rule 604(d) certificate does not necessarily comply with
Rule 604(d). If the record demonstrates counsel failed to comply with his or her obligations
under the rule, remand may still be required. Id. ¶¶ 31, 40. Our review of whether counsel
complied with Rule 604(d) is de novo. People v. Curtis, 2021 IL App (4th) 190658, ¶ 30, 186
N.E.3d 467.
¶ 38 In this case, the record plainly establishes defense counsel did not comply with
Rule 604(d)’s certification requirements. According to the record, on remand, defendant’s sole
postplea claim was that his sentence was excessive. It is clear the parties and the trial court were
aware of defendant’s excessiveness claim. Even the State on appeal concedes defendant did not
want to withdraw his guilty plea but simply wanted to challenge his sentence as excessive.
Defense counsel, acting under the misbelief the plea was a “negotiated plea of guilty” under Rule
604(d), chose not to file a motion to reconsider the sentence but raised the excessiveness claim
via a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The law establishes a challenge to the alleged
excessiveness of a sentence is not a viable claim for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Withdrawal of a guilty plea is proper only where “the plea was entered through a
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misapprehension of the facts or of the law,” “where there is doubt as to the guilt of the accused
and justice would be better served through a trial,” or “where defense counsel gives the
defendant inadequate advice” before entering the plea. Id. ¶ 31. By not filing the motion to
reconsider the sentence, counsel could not have, as Rule 604(d) requires, “made any amendments
to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects” in the plea or sentencing
proceedings. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 39 A noncompliant Rule 604(d) certification does not require a remand in all
circumstances. The State’s case, Shirley, shows a remand is not required when a defendant,
despite counsel’s noncompliance with Rule 604(d) after a remand, received “a full and fair
second opportunity to present a motion for reduced sentencing.” Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d at 369. In
Shirley, the defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentences as excessive, but no Rule 604(d)
certificate was filed at that time. Id. at 363-64. After the trial court denied the motion, the
defendant appealed, and the matter was remanded for the filing of a Rule 604(d) certificate and a
new hearing on the motion to reduce his sentences. Id. On remand, the original trial counsel filed
a Rule 604(d) certificate stating he had complied with the rule before filing the original motion to
reduce the sentences. Id. at 364-65. New defense counsel later filed “virtually the same” motion
to reduce the sentences the defendant initially filed but failed to file the Rule 604(d) certificate
until four days after the hearing on the defendant’s motion. Id. at 365-66. On appeal from that
denial, the defendant argued he was entitled to a remand and another hearing on a motion to
reduce his sentences, as counsel did not comply strictly with Rule 604(d). Id. at 366. The Illinois
Supreme Court concluded, despite counsel’s failure, a remand for a third hearing on the
defendant’s motion to reduce his sentences was unnecessary and affirmed the denial of his
motion. Id. at 369. The court did so upon concluding, in part, “the defendant was afforded a full
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and fair second opportunity to present a motion for reduced sentencing,” and it was “incumbent
upon defendant, his counsel, the State, and the circuit court to insure that compliance with the
requirements of this court’s Rule 604(d) would be met in this second hearing on the motion to
reduce sentences.” Id. at 369-70. The court concluded with the following:
“There is nothing in the record, or in the two motions to reduce
sentences, or in the two Rule 604(d) certificates filed by two
different attorneys, which indicates any reason why this court
should remand the cause for a third hearing on defendant’s claim
that his sentences were excessive. In light of all these
circumstances, requiring another remand and hearing on the
motion to reduce sentences would be an empty and wasteful
formality.” Id. at 370.
¶ 40 The circumstances in Shirley are not the same as those here. Shirley involved a
technical defect in counsel’s compliance with Rule 604(d), as the mistake made by counsel was
not in failing to present the defendant’s claim on remand but in filing the certificate after the
hearing. See id. ¶ 365-66. Our case law shows there is a distinction between cases in which
postplea counsel allegedly improperly omitted claims in the postplea motion from those cases in
which postplea motions were deficiently pleaded, like the one in Shirley. See Brown, 2023 IL
App (4th) 220573, ¶ 40.
¶ 41 In addition, our supreme court in Shirley found the defendant was given a full and
fair hearing on the same issues raised in both the initial hearing and on the hearing on remand.
The same circumstances are not present here. Defendant was not provided a full and fair hearing
on the issue during either the initial hearing or the hearing on remand. At the initial hearing, no
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Rule 604(d) certificate was filed. No Rule 604(d) certificate was filed at any time to certify the
motion to reconsider. The uncertified motion to reconsider and the hearing on that claim were
tainted by the absence of a certificate of compliance, and that hearing was “a nullity.” See People
v. Porter, 258 Ill. App. 3d 200, 202-04 (1994); see also People v. Lima, 2024 IL App (4th)
230490-U, ¶ 20. Thus, the motion to reconsider ultimately considered and ruled on by the trial
court on remand was not supported by any Rule 604(d) certificate. The first hearing, a nullity,
cannot be deemed full or fair. In Shirley, in contrast, late Rule 604(d) certificates were filed
supporting both motions to reduce the sentences. In the latter, counsel adopted essentially the
same arguments made in the initial motion to reduce the sentences that was not certified. The
“certified” issues were heard and considered twice. See Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d at 364-66.
¶ 42 The trial court’s attempt to have counsel argue defendant’s excessiveness claim
did not remedy any error nor make the hearing full or fair. Counsel’s failure to comply with Rule
604(d) due to his misunderstanding as to the type of plea entered left him unprepared to argue
defendant’s excessiveness claim. When the court asked counsel to proceed on the initial motion
to reconsider, counsel could only say “that was an excessive sentence[,] *** almost the
maximum in the sentence for the charge that he had pled to in this case.” Counsel followed that
sentence by explaining why he filed a motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on his
understanding.
¶ 43 As we have done before, we remand this case for (1) the filing of a Rule 604(d)
certificate, (2) the opportunity to file a new Rule 604(d) motion, if counsel concludes a new
motion is necessary, (3) a new hearing, (4) a ruling on all pending Rule 604(d) motions, and
(5) strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 604(d).
¶ 44 Last, we note our decision renders moot defendant’s other arguments on appeal.
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Defendant requested relief for those claims only if this court did not remand for strict compliance
with Rule 604(d).
¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 46 For the reasons stated, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
¶ 47 Vacated and remanded.
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