People v. Santiago , 2024 IL App (2d) 240499-U ( 2024 )

2024 IL App (2d) 240499-UNo. 2-24-0499
Order filed November 13, 2024
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 24-CF-1510
)
EDWIN A. SANTIAGO, ) Honorable
) Salvatore LoPiccolo, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Schostok and Kennedy concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting the State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial
release and ordering him detained.
¶2 Defendant, Edwin A. Santiago, appeals from orders of the circuit court of Kane County (1)
granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release and ordering him detained pursuant to
article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022))
and (2) denying his subsequent motion for relief (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024)). See
Pub. Acts 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) and 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (we will
2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Urefer to these public acts collectively as the “Acts”). 1 On appeal, defendant argues that the State
failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the proof is evident
or the presumption great that he committed the charged detainable offenses; (2) he poses a real
and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific,
articulable facts of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the
real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the
specific, articulable facts of the case. We affirm.
¶3 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶4 A. Factual Background
¶5 On July 14, 2024, defendant was charged by criminal complaint in the circuit court of Kane
County with: (1) one count of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2022)), a Class X
felony; (2) one count of being an armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2022)), a
Class X felony; (3) one count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (previous felony conviction)
(720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1) (West 2022)), a Class 2 felony; (4) one count of possession of a firearm
without having a firearm owners’ identification card (FOID) or while being ineligible for a FOID
card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2022)), a Class 3 felony; (5) two counts of aggravated unlawful
use of a weapon (loaded without having a valid license under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act
(430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2022)) or a FOID card) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(2) (West 2022)), a
Class 4 felony; (6) one count of possession of less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine
1
Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), which amended article 110 of the Code, has been
referred to as the “Pretrial Fairness Act” and the “Safety, Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-
Today (SAFE-T) Act.” However, neither title is official. Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 n.1.
-2-
2024 IL App (2d) 240499-U(720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2022)), a Class 4 felony; (7) one count of resisting or obstructing a
police officer causing injury (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-7) (West 2022)), a Class 4 felony; and (8) one
count of possession of less than 15 grams of a substance containing fentanyl (720 ILCS 570/402(c)
(West 2022)), a class 4 felony. 2
¶6 Also on July 14, 2024, the State filed a “Verified Petition to Deny Defendant Pretrial
Release” (Petition). The State urged the trial court to deny defendant pretrial release pursuant to
section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)) because: (1) defendant was charged
with a felony offense other than a forcible felony for which, based on the charge or defendant’s
criminal history, a sentence of imprisonment, without probation, periodic imprisonment or
conditional discharge, is required by law upon conviction (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022))
and (2) defendant was charged with offenses qualifying for pretrial detention, including being an
armed habitual criminal and a non-probational violation of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon
(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(6) (West 2022)). The State further alleged that defendant’s pretrial release
would pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. As
additional grounds upon which defendant should be denied pretrial release, the State cited
defendant’s criminal history, which consisted of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (Kane
County case No. 23-CF-1828), theft (Cook County case No. 13-CR-269), multiple burglaries
(Cook County case Nos. 13-CR-262, 13-CR-263, and 13-CR-270; Boone County case No. 10-CF-
2
The record reflects that, over defendant’s objection, the trial court granted the State leave
to amend the armed violence count. Moreover, on August 28, 2024, a grand jury indicted defendant
on eight counts of criminal offenses which largely overlap the counts set forth in the criminal
complaint.
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-U231; Kane County case No. 12-CF-2425; and Florida case No. 2009-CF-006902), and possession
of drug paraphernalia (Kane County case No, 12-CM-2346). The State represented that defendant
was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment on one of the burglary convictions, six years’
imprisonment on three of the other burglary convictions, and six years’ imprisonment on the theft
conviction. Further, defendant was on probation for the aggravated-battery-with-a-deadly-weapon
conviction at the time of the events giving rise to this case. 3
¶7 The State attached to the Petition a sworn synopsis drafted by the arresting agency in the
case at issue. The synopsis provides that on July 13, 2024, several officers from the Elgin Police
Department were dispatched to a gas station in response to a call of a subject with a weapon. Upon
the officers’ arrival at the gas station, they observed a male that fit the description provided by the
caller. The male subject was later identified as defendant. Defendant was accompanied by a female
who was identified as Sabrina Benson. When the officers approached, defendant and Benson fled.
As the subjects ran, the officers observed defendant throw a small black bag under a tree. After
disposing of the bag, defendant and Benson stopped running. Defendant resisted the officers’
attempts to detain him. Once handcuffed, a search of defendant’s person located two white solid
rocks which appeared to be crack cocaine. A revolver-style firearm was later discovered inside the
black bag that defendant threw under the tree.
¶8 The synopsis further provides that defendant was transported to the police station. After
signing a statement of constitutional rights and waiver form, defendant told the officers that an
individual in red clothing known as “Mickey” handed him a black bag and asked defendant to hold
3
There is no indication of the sentence, if any, in the two other burglary cases or the
possession-of-drug-paraphernalia case.
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Uon to it. Shortly thereafter, the police officers arrived. Defendant admitted possessing the black
bag, but stated that he was not aware of the presence of a firearm inside. Defendant also
acknowledged having a history of substance abuse, but claimed that the contraband discovered on
his person was not for personal use. The two white solid rocks found on defendant’s person
weighed approximately 0.7 grams and field tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl.
¶9 The synopsis also provides that Officer Oscar Nava, one of the responding officers,
contacted Carlos Carroza Gonzalez, the caller who reported the incident at the gas station.
Gonzalez told Officer Nava that upon exiting the gas station, he encountered a shirtless male
appearing to be of Hispanic descent. The man, who was carrying a black bag, was accompanied
by a female. The man and the woman asked Gonzalez for money. When Gonzalez advised that he
did not have any money to give, the male retrieved a revolver-style firearm from the black bag and
pointed it towards Gonzalez. Gonzalez ran to his vehicle, drove off, and called 911.
¶ 10 B. Detention Hearing
¶ 11 The matter proceeded to a detention hearing on July 15, 2024, before Judge Salvatore
LoPiccolo. At the beginning of the hearing, the State reviewed defendant’s criminal history, noting
that defendant is a convicted felon. The State also emphasized that defendant was on probation at
the time he allegedly committed the offenses at issue and that, as a condition of his probation, he
was ordered not to commit any other criminal violations. At the State’s request, the trial court
admitted the synopsis in this case as well as the synopsis in Kane County case No. 23-CF-1828,
the aggravated-battery-with-a-deadly-weapon case for which defendant was sentenced to
probation. The State then reviewed the facts underlying the charges in the present case as set forth
in the synopsis, arguing that there is clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the
charged detainable offenses.
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-U¶ 12 The State further asserted that defendant poses a real and present threat to the community
because the crime at issue involved a weapon and defendant’s criminal history is “indicative of
violent, abusive, or assault [sic] behavior.” The State noted that defendant is on probation for
aggravated battery with a deadly weapon in Kane County case No. 23-CF-1828. The synopsis for
the aggravated battery case shows that defendant cut the victim with a knife. The State also referred
to defendant’s multiple burglary convictions and defendant’s action in this case, which involved
pointing a gun at Gonzalez, a random member of the community, and asking him for money. Based
on this history, the State argued that defendant has “violent tendencies.”
¶ 13 Additionally, the State contended that there are no conditions that will mitigate the threat
to the community. In support of its position, the State asserted that defendant’s interaction with
Gonzalez was “random.” The State also emphasized that given defendant’s criminal history and
the fact that he was on probation, he should not have possessed a firearm or illegal substances, and
the fact that he did demonstrates that he cannot follow orders. The State added that defendant is
listed as homeless in the synopsis, so there would be no address for him to be placed on electronic
home monitoring (EHM) or global positioning system (GPS) monitoring. Even if EHM or GPS
were a possibility, the State maintained that it would not prevent defendant from possessing a
firearm or drugs or committing new offenses. Nor would EHM or GPS alert law enforcement if
defendant came into possession of a firearm or drugs or threatened a member of the public with a
weapon.
¶ 14 In response, defense counsel initially noted that defendant has four minor children and that
he suffers from some medical issues, including blindness in his left eye and seizures. Defense
counsel then argued that the State failed to meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence that
the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense, that
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Udefendant presents a real and present threat to a specific person or the community, or that there are
no conditions that can mitigate any potential threat to a specific person or the community. In
support, defense counsel pointed to Gonzalez’s description of the perpetrator, which he contended
was vague in that it only described the perpetrator as “shirtless” and of “Hispanic descent.”
Defense counsel noted that Gonzalez did not reference the perpetrator’s height, eye color, hair
color, or whether the perpetrator had facial hair, a birthmark, or a tattoo. Defense counsel argued
that any inference that defendant fled when the police approached because he knew that there was
a gun in the bag is weakened by the fact that a suspected illegal substance was found on defendant’s
person after his arrest. Defense counsel surmised that the individual who defendant says provided
him with the black bag could have been the one who approached Gonzalez.
¶ 15 Defense counsel further argued that defendant does not pose a danger to a specific person
or the community because his conduct was not indicative of a “threat” or “any aggressive action.”
Defense counsel posited that after 2013, defendant lacked any significant criminal history. Defense
counsel acknowledged the 2023 conviction from Kane County, but disputed that the 2023 offense
was random, indicating that the synopsis shows that the victim was looking for drugs, “talking
crazy,” and approached defendant in an “aggressive manner.” Finally, defense counsel argued that
there are conditions that can be put in place to mitigate any alleged threat. Defense counsel stated
that defendant has sought help from a community organization and suggested that the court can
enter an order that defendant not possess weapons or controlled substances and that he engage with
pretrial services.
¶ 16 Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court granted the State’s motion and denied
pretrial release. The court found that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant
committed the detainable offenses of armed violence, being an armed habitual criminal,
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Uaggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, and unlawful possession of a firearm without a
FOID card or at a time when he is not eligible for a FOID card. The court premised its finding on
the synopsis in the present case. The court noted that Gonzalez’s statement to the police that
defendant pulled a revolver out of the bag and pointed it at him refuted defendant’s statement that
he did not know there was a revolver in the bag. The court then explained:
“So the fact that he’s in possession of a firearm while in possession of a controlled
substance is armed violence. It’s straight-up possession. It’s not charged [as] intent to
deliver.
In addition, the fact that he has six prior burglaries and is in possession of a firearm
meets the elements of armed habitual, which is also charged in this case.
The fact he’s a convicted felon, he’s not allowed to possess a firearm. That provides
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a felon as a Class 2 felony, and lastly, as a
convicted felon, he is not allowed to possess a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card
because he’s not eligible due to those felonies.”
The court added that “the arguments made by [defense] counsel in regards to proof elements ***
may *** be things to consider in regards to beyond a reasonable doubt, but we’re not at a trial, and
so I do believe the evidence shows by clear and convincing evidence that [defendant] committed
those offenses.”
¶ 17 The court further found that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that
defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community. The court acknowledged
that the mere fact that defendant was in possession of a gun, committed armed violence, and is a
habitual criminal “may not appear to be a violent offense [sic].” The court noted, however, that in
addition to committing those offenses, defendant is alleged to have pointed a gun in the direction
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Uof another individual after asking that individual for money. The court further observed that
defendant was on probation for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon at the time he committed
the offenses at issue and he has a history of forcible felonies. Thus, the court concluded, defendant
has a history of violent offenses. The court acknowledged that the burglary convictions “occurred
a while ago,” but stated that whatever weight that argument has “goes out the window when
[defendant] commits the offense of aggravated battery—deadly weapon in 2023.” The court
explained that defendant’s conduct demonstrated “a continuing pattern from 2008 all the way
through 2023, and then we have this offense, where he, in addition to the detainable offenses,
[defendant] points a gun in the direction of another person.” The court also noted that defendant
has access to firearms and other weapons as indicated by the encounter with Gonzalez and the
2023 conviction of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.
¶ 18 Lastly, the court concluded that there are no conditions or combination of conditions of
pretrial release that could mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant. The court found
that defendant has shown an inability to follow the laws of society by committing multiple offenses
after having previously been convicted of multiple burglaries and by violating the terms of his
probation. The court acknowledged that defendant has some serious medical conditions, but stated
that it does not “have an option in front of [it] in regards to those medical conditions.” The court
also acknowledged defense counsel’s suggestion that community services are available, but stated
that it lacked information about them. The court did not believe that EHM or GPS would be a
condition that could be set in this case because defendant was homeless and, in any case, EHM
and GPS would not inform the police whether defendant possessed a gun or a controlled substance.
-9-
2024 IL App (2d) 240499-U¶ 19 After announcing its ruling, the court notified defendant that before he can file a notice of
appeal, he must file a written motion for relief in the trial court. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff.
April 15, 2024). The court entered a written order in accordance with its oral findings.
¶ 20 C. Motion for Relief and Notice of Appeal
¶ 21 On July 16, 2024, defendant filed a “Motion for Relief Under the Pretrial Fairness Act.”
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). In the motion, defendant argued that the State
failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or
the presumption great that he committed the charged detainable offenses. Defendant asserted that
the synopsis in this case was insufficient to identify him as the perpetrator with the firearm because
Gonzalez provided “only a vague description *** with no details *** such as facial hair, hair on
his head, tattoos or any other physical descriptors.” Defendant also argued that the State failed to
meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of
the case. Regarding this factor, defendant contended that the State presented little or no evidence
other than the synopses. Defendant further argued that most of his criminal history is more than
10 years old and includes non-violent, burglary-type offenses. Additionally, defendant suggested
that the aggravated-battery-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction, as detailed in one of the synopses
admitted at the detention hearing, “is not necessarily indicative of exactly what occurred, [nor does
it] account for the potential for imperfect self-defense or why *** [d]efendant chose to plea to the
charge.” Finally, defendant argued that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that there were no condition or combination of conditions that would mitigate
the risk of his release. Defendant argued that the State presented little or no evidence on this factor
and the court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating nature of his participation in a
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Ucommunity-support organization, the mitigating nature of reporting to pretrial services, or the
personal circumstances related to defendant’s children or his health issues.
¶ 22 A hearing on defendant’s motion for relief was held before Judge David Kliment on August
23, 2024. Following arguments by the parties, the court denied defendant’s motion. Defendant
then initiated the present appeal. The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was
appointed to represent defendant on appeal. OSAD elected not to file a memorandum under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (providing that the issues raised in the motion
for relief are before the appellate court regardless of whether an optional memorandum is filed).
Thus, on appeal, we are limited to the arguments made in defendant’s motion for relief. The State
filed a response in opposition to the appeal.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 Article 110 of the Code, as amended by the Acts, abolished traditional monetary bail in
favor of pretrial release on personal recognizance or with conditions of release. 725 ILCS 5/110-
1.5, 110-2(a) (West 2022). In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial
release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Under the Code, as amended, a defendant’s
pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations (qualifying offenses).
725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). For most of the qualifying offenses, upon filing a
verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has
committed the offense (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)), that the defendant’s pretrial
release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community (725
ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7), (e)(2) (West 2022)) or a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid
prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8), (e)(3) (West 2022)), and that no condition or combination
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Uof conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community
or the risk of the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West
2022)).
¶ 25 We apply a two-part standard of review to a trial court’s decision to detain a defendant. We
apply the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard to the trial court’s factual determinations,
including whether the proof is evident or the presumption great that a defendant has committed a
qualifying offense, whether a defendant poses a threat or a high likelihood of willful flight, and
whether any conditions would mitigate any threat or the risk of willful flight. People v. Trottier,
2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only
if a conclusion opposite that to the trial court’s is clearly apparent. In re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d)
180170, ¶ 17. The ultimate decision of whether a defendant should be detained is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion occurs only
if no reasonable person could agree with the trial court. People v. Williams, 2022 IL App (2d)
200455, ¶ 52.
¶ 26 On appeal, defendant raises three arguments. First, he argues that the State failed to meet
its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption
great that he committed the charged detainable offenses. Second, defendant argues that the State
failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and
present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific,
articulable facts of the case. Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that there are no condition or combination of conditions
that can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Ubased on the specific, articulable facts of the case. We do not find any of these arguments
persuasive.
¶ 27 Regarding defendant’s first argument, he contends in his motion for relief that the State’s
submission of a synopsis is insufficient to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed the charged
detainable offenses. Notably, defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence connecting him to
the firearm, arguing that the trial court’s reliance on the synopsis was improper because Gonzalez
provided “only a vague description *** with no details *** such as facial hair, hair on his head,
tattoos or any other physical descriptors.” Defendant reasons that he is presumed innocent of all
charges pending trial and that, without an adequate description, the evidence was insufficient to
identify him as the person who allegedly approached Gonzalez with a firearm.
¶ 28 We reject defendant’s claim that the State failed to meet its burden that he committed the
charged detainable offenses because Gonzalez’s description of the perpetrator was vague. The
quantum of evidence required to detain a defendant pending trial is less than what is required at
trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2), (f)(4)-(f)(6) (West
2022). Indeed, section 110-6.1(f)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2022)) expressly
permits the parties to a detention hearing to present evidence by way of proffer based on reliable
information, and this court has previously held that a police synopsis alone may be sufficient to
sustain the State’s burden. See, e.g., People v. Hill, 2024 IL App (2d) 240436-U, ¶ 29; People v.
Mancilla, 2024 IL App (2d) 230505, ¶ 24; People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (2d) 230546-U, ¶ 9;
People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 24. The arguments defendant raises in his motion
for relief were previously addressed by the trial court. The trial court stated that defendant’s
arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence “may *** be things to consider in regards to
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Ubeyond a reasonable doubt.” But, the trial court noted, “we’re not at a trial, and so I do believe the
evidence shows by clear and convincing evidence that [defendant] committed those offenses.” In
essence, defendant’s challenge constitutes an attack on the trial court’s assessment of the weight
to be accorded the evidence. As a court of review, however, we will not substitute our own
judgment for the trier of fact on issues regarding the weight of the evidence. People v. Inman, 2023
IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. Accordingly, based on our review of the record, the trial court’s finding
that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption
great that defendant committed the charged detainable offenses was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 29 Next, defendant argues in his motion for relief that the State failed to meet its burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of
any person or persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case. In
support of his position, defendant contends that, other than the two synopses, the State presented
little evidence as to this factor. Defendant further argues that most of his criminal history is 10
years old or older and includes non-violent, burglary-type offenses. Additionally, defendant
suggests that the aggravated-battery-with-a-weapon conviction, as detailed in one of the synopses
admitted at the detention hearing, “is not necessarily indicative of exactly what occurred, [nor does
it] account for the potential for imperfect self-defense or why *** [d]efendant chose to plea to the
charge.”
¶ 30 Under the Code, factors that the trial court may consider in making a determination of
dangerousness, i.e., that a defendant poses a real and present threat to any person or the
community, include, but are not limited to: (1) the nature and circumstances of any offense
charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon, or a sex offense;
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-U(2) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including whether he or she has a prior criminal
history indicative of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior; (3) the identity of any person to whom
the defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by
or attributed to the defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding the statements; (5) the
age and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of the victim or
complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any
weapons; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, the defendant was on
probation, parole, or other form of supervised release from custody; and (9) any other factors,
including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022)), the court
deems to have a reasonable bearing on the defendant’s propensity or reputation for violent,
abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022). The
statute does not list any singular factor as dispositive. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).
¶ 31 In this case, the trial court found that the nature and circumstances of the charged offenses
were violent, involving defendant pointing a gun at Gonzalez after asking him for money. The
court further observed that defendant had a history of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior. In
this regard, the court noted that defendant was on probation for aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon at the time he committed the offenses at issue. The aggravated-battery conviction involved
defendant cutting an individual with a knife. The court found that defendant has access to firearms
and other weapons as demonstrated by the encounter with Gonzalez and the 2023 aggravated-
battery-with-a-weapon conviction. The court also pointed to defendant’s history of forcible
felonies. Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that the
State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the
safety of the community was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The arguments defendant
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Uraised in his motion for relief do not persuade otherwise. Defendant protests that most of his
criminal history is 10 years old or older and includes non-violent, burglary-type offenses. The trial
court acknowledged that the burglary convictions “occurred a while ago,” but discounted the
notion that the passage of time favored defendant’s release given defendant’s recent encounters
with the law. Moreover, the trial court expressly found that defendant has a history of violent
offenses. This finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As to defendant’s claim
regarding the aggravated-battery-with-a-deadly-weapon offense, we merely point out that the trial
court was not required to view that conviction in the manner suggested by defendant. Defendant’s
disagreement represents nothing more than a difference of opinion with the trial court regarding
the weight to be given the facts supporting the dangerousness determination in this case. As noted
earlier, however, as a court of review, we will not substitute our own judgment for the trier of fact
on issues regarding the weight of the evidence. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11.
¶ 32 Finally, defendant argues in his motion for relief that the trial court erred in finding that
there are no conditions or combination of conditions that can mitigate the risk of his release.
Defendant contends that the State presented little or no evidence on this factor and that the trial
court did not sufficiently consider the mitigating nature of his involvement in a community-support
organization, the mitigating nature of reporting to pretrial services, or his personal circumstances
as they relate to his children and his health issues.
¶ 33 In determining whether a specific threat can be mitigated through the imposition of
conditions of pretrial release, the trial court considers: (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to the
safety of any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-Unature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice
process. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1)-(5) (West 2022). The history and characteristics of the defendant
include his or her “character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial
resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol
abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings” as
well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, [he or she] was on probation, parole,
or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for any offense
under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A)-(B) (West
2022).
¶ 34 Here, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or
combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant. We
cannot find that a conclusion opposite that of the trial court’s is clearly apparent. The trial court
found that defendant has shown an inability to follow the laws of society by committing multiple
offenses after having previously been convicted of multiple burglaries and by violating the terms
of his probation. Further, the trial court rejected the notion that EHM or GPS would suffice, noting
that defendant was homeless and that, in any case, EHM or GPS would not inform the police that
defendant has a gun or possesses a controlled substance. Additionally, the court addressed
defendant’s personal circumstances. The court acknowledged that defendant has some serious
medical conditions. The trial court also referenced defense counsel’s suggestion that community
services are available. Nevertheless, the trial court found that it lacked information about these
factors. Considering the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that no
condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the physical
safety of any person or persons or the community was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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2024 IL App (2d) 240499-U¶ 35 In short, considering the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court’s factual
findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Moreover, based on the trial court’s
factual findings, we conclude that its order granting the petition to deny defendant pretrial release
was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
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