Corey Middleton v. State of Indiana , 2017 Ind. LEXIS 285 ( 2017 )

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey A. Baldwin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Tyler D. Helmond Attorney General of Indiana
Voyles, Zahn, & Paul
Indianapolis, IN Jesse R. Drum
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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In the FILED
Indiana Supreme Court Apr 21 2017, 3:24 pm
_________________________________ CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
No. 32S01-1704-PC-226
COREY MIDDLETON,
Appellant (Petitioner below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Respondent below).
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Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court, No. 32D02-1502-PC-3
The Honorable Rhett Stuard, Judge
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On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 32A01-1603-PC-592
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April 21, 2017
Per Curiam.
Corey Middleton filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging several claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied Middleton’s petition, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Middleton v. State, 64 N.E.3d 895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g
denied. In so doing, the court determined Middleton’s counsel performed deficiently as to one of
Middleton’s claims. Id. at 903. But the court ultimately rejected that claim, finding Middleton
had “not established that but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 902. Middleton seeks transfer, contending, among other things, that the Court of
Appeals applied the incorrect standard in making this assessment.
We agree with our colleagues’ ultimate resolution of Middleton’s claims. We note,
however, that to demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance, a petitioner need
only show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)
(emphasis added). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Id. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 271, 274 (Ind. 2014); Wilkes v. State,
984 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Strickland).
Accordingly, we grant transfer and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals opinion
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A), with the exception of its misstatement of Strickland’s
prejudice standard.
All Justices concur.