Mathew J Cramer, II v. State of Indiana ( 2024 )

FILED
Sep 05 2024, 2:57 pm
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Indiana Supreme Court
Supreme Court Case No. 23S-LW-19
Mathew J. Cramer, II,
Appellant (Defendant below),
–v–
State of Indiana,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
Argued: April 25, 2024 | Decided: September 5, 2024
Appeal from the Allen Superior Court 6
No. 02D06-2104-MR-000007
The Honorable David M. Zent
Opinion by Justice Massa
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
Massa, Justice.
A jury found Mathew Cramer guilty of murdering and dismembering
Shane Nguyen and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole (“LWOP”), which the trial court accordingly imposed. On direct
appeal, Cramer asks this Court to revise his sentence to a term of years
under Appellate Rule 7(B). Because Cramer’s acts and character fail to
satisfy Appellate Rule 7(B)’s requirements, we reject that request and
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Mathew Cramer lived in a storage unit in Fort Wayne. One day, as
Cramer was walking to the mall, Shane Nguyen pulled his minivan beside
him and asked if he wanted a ride. Cramer accepted.
Nguyen and Cramer stopped for food and then went to Goshen to
collect Cramer’s paycheck. Upon arriving back at the storage shed,
Nguyen told Cramer that Cramer “owed” him for the ride, so Cramer
allowed Nguyen to perform oral sex. Tr. Vol. III at 206. Afterward, the two
exchanged phone numbers to talk again in the future.
A few weeks later, Cramer texted Nguyen for another ride. Nguyen
explained he was out of town and was unsure whether he had time to
drive Cramer. Cramer then promised to give Nguyen a “surprise” that
Nguyen would like if he agreed to help. Id. at 210. After receiving a
sexually explicit photograph of Cramer, Nguyen agreed to pick Cramer
up in Elkhart and drive him back to Fort Wayne. As they drove from
Elkhart, Cramer decided he wanted to kill Nguyen and hatched a plan to
murder him.
Once at the storage unit, Cramer and Nguyen climbed into the back
seats of the minivan, and Cramer asked Nguyen to remove his shirt. As
Nguyen turned around, Cramer put him in a choke hold, and increased
pressure as Nguyen’s body shook. Cramer then exited the minivan and
dragged Nguyen’s body into the storage unit causing Nguyen’s head to
hit the concrete floor. Once inside the storage unit, Cramer noticed
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-LW-19 | September 5, 2024 Page 2 of 9
Nguyen was still alive and punched him in the back of his head and
stomped on his chest.
Meanwhile, Nguyen’s wife became worried because her husband had
not yet arrived home and tried to call and track Nguyen’s phone multiple
times to no avail. Eventually, she reported her husband missing, and a
Silver Alert was issued for information on his whereabouts.
The next day, Cramer drove Nguyen’s van to a friend’s house and
informed his friends that he had killed Nguyen. The group of friends went
to two stores to buy tarps, bungie cords, a machete, shovels, a bucket, a
plastic tub, a tarp, a large sheet of all-purpose plastic, trash bags, a
hacksaw, and extra hacksaw blades.
Once back in the storage unit, Cramer and his friend Jacob Carreon-
Hamilton recorded their actions on a cell phone. Prior to decapitating
Nguyen, Cramer manipulated Nguyen’s mouth like a puppet, making
him appear to ask, “Am I dead?” and forced Nguyen’s head to nod up
and down as if answering “yes.” St. Ex. 77 at 53:28–54:00. Then Cramer
and Carreon-Hamilton began to dismember Nguyen’s arms and legs. At
one point, Cramer used Nguyen’s severed arm to give himself a high-five.
Cramer and Carreon-Hamilton placed Nguyen’s head, arms, and legs into
six separate trash bags, while his torso was put into another trash bag and
then into the plastic tub. Nguyen’s dismembered body was moved into
the minivan and Cramer and Carreon-Hamilton searched for a place to
bury the body, eventually stopping at a vacant building near the storage
facility.
While on patrol that evening, a Fort Wayne police sergeant spotted the
minivan’s tail lights behind the vacant building. The sergeant pulled up
behind the minivan, searched the license plate, discovered it was linked to
the Silver Alert for Nguyen, and initiated a stop. Once the driver, Carreon-
Hamilton, pulled over, the sergeant approached the driver’s-side door. As
he looked into the minivan, Carreon-Hamilton looked back at him and
sped off.
The sergeant followed the minivan for five blocks before Carreon-
Hamilton opened the minivan’s door, jumped out, and ran. Cramer, who
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-LW-19 | September 5, 2024 Page 3 of 9
was in the passenger seat, moved over to the driver’s side and continued
driving. Cramer swerved through a gas station parking lot, hit a light
pole, and crashed through a privacy fence. After coming to a stop, Cramer
jumped out of the minivan and fled the scene. Shortly after, officers found
the minivan, obtained a search warrant, and traced evidence to Cramer
and his friends. The police then located Cramer in Lakeville and
transported him back to Fort Wayne to await trial.
The State charged Cramer with murder, Level 6 felony abuse of a
corpse, and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. Listing the
dismemberment as a qualifying aggravator, the State requested—and the
trial court granted—permission to seek an LWOP sentence. Cramer
moved for a pretrial determination of intellectual disability, explaining
that Indiana law required a “court ordered evaluative report.” Ind. Code §
35-36-9-2. The trial court granted the motion and appointed Dr. Ned P.
Masbaum. Dr. Masbaum reported that Cramer was diagnosed with
15q13.3 microdeletion syndrome, which generates a predisposition to
“cognitive impairment, autism spectrum disorder, hyperactivity, attention
problems, withdrawal, [and] aggressive and antisocial behavior.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 88. The report also revealed Cramer was
diagnosed with conduct disorder, persistent depressive disorder, and
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder in the past. Even so, Dr. Masbaum
reported Cramer was “alert, cooperative, and had no disorganized
speech[.]” Id. at 89. Dr. Masbaum estimated Cramer’s IQ to be between 71
and 84 and determined Cramer had borderline intellectual functioning.
After a hearing, the trial court found Cramer “did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that [he] is an individual with an intellectual
disability.” Id. at 94.
A jury found Cramer guilty of Count I, murder; Count II, abuse of a
corpse, a Level 6 felony; and Count III, resisting law enforcement, a Level
6 felony. The jury recommended LWOP. The trial court imposed the
recommended sentence and found Cramer’s prior criminal history, failed
attempts at rehabilitation, and the nature and circumstances of the crime
in aggravation and did not find any mitigating factors. The trial court
sentenced Cramer to LWOP and concurrent two-year sentences for the
remaining Level 6 felony convictions.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-LW-19 | September 5, 2024 Page 4 of 9
Cramer directly appealed to this Court. See Ind. Appellate Rule
4(A)(1)(a).
Standard of Review
When a defendant is found guilty of murder by a jury and the State
pursues an LWOP sentence, the jury will reconvene for a sentencing
hearing. I.C. § 35-50-2-9(d). If the jury provides a sentencing
recommendation of LWOP, the court is required to follow it. Id. § -9(e).
When an appellant seeks revision of that sentence, the Indiana
Constitution grants this Court the authority for independent appellate
review to alter a sentence imposed by the trial court. Ind. Const. art. VII, §
4. When an appellant requests us to exercise this constitutional authority
by revisiting and reducing an LWOP sentence to a term of years, that
power is cabined in Appellate Rule 7(B).
Instead of acting as a procedural hurdle that a defendant must
overcome to be heard, the rule establishes a standard of review meant to
guide the appellate courts. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind.
2006). Appellate Rule 7(B) empowers appellate revision if the reviewing
court finds the sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B). Even if the trial
court carefully adhered to the sentencing procedure, this Court has the
authority under Appellate Rule 7(B) to modify the sentence if we deem it
inappropriate based on the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1079.
Discussion and Decision
Cramer argues the LWOP sentence was inappropriate and asks us to
revise it under Appellate Rule 7(B) to an aggregate term of years. We
disagree and affirm the trial court.
“[L]ife without parole is reserved for use in only the most heinous of
crimes that so shock our conscience as a community.” Conley v. State, 972
N.E.2d 864, 880 (Ind. 2012). Indiana’s appellate courts are authorized by
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-LW-19 | September 5, 2024 Page 5 of 9
the Indiana Constitution to conduct an independent review and revision
of a trial court’s decision. See Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4. Appellate Rule 7(B)
empowers appellate courts with the ability to “revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B); see
also Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1270–71 (Ind. 2023) (quoting
App. R. 7(B)).
Appellate Rule 7(B) serves “to leaven the outliers, rather than to
achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence,” McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554,
566 (Ind. 2018), allowing revision of a sentence if the court finds the trial
court’s decision to be inappropriate in consideration of the nature of the
offense and the offender’s character, Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203 (Ind.
2014) (quoting App. R. 7(B)). “Ultimately, our constitutional authority to
review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is
appropriate,” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up),
an act that is reserved for “exceptional” cases, Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d
231, 241 (Ind. 2015). It is up to the defendant to “persuade the appellate
court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of
review.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1080. The trial court’s sentence is
afforded considerable deference and will stand unless “compelling
evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as
accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent
examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind.
2015).”
I. The nature of Cramer’s offenses involves extreme
brutality and justifies his sentence.
Cramer argues that LWOP is not appropriate because his killing of
Nguyen, while terrible, is different from other cases that involve
dismemberment. Yet Rule 7(B) does not require us to compare Cramer’s
actions with actions of other offenders; but it does require us to compare
Cramer’s actions “with the required showing to sustain a conviction
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-LW-19 | September 5, 2024 Page 6 of 9
under the charged offense[.]” Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)),
trans. denied.
The record shows that Cramer admitted he decided to kill Nguyen as
they passed through Columbia City; Cramer intentionally put Nguyen in
a vulnerable position by asking him to take his shirt off; Cramer put
Nguyen into a chokehold; once inside the storage shed, Cramer hit and
kicked Nguyen to make certain Nguyen was dead; Cramer and his friend
video-recorded their actions on a cell phone; Cramer abused Nguyen’s
corpse by manipulating Nguyen’s mouth, making it appear to ask, “Am I
dead?” and caused Nguyen’s head to nod up and down as if to answer
“yes”; Cramer used Nguyen’s severed left arm to give himself a high-five;
Cramer and his friend used a machete to dismember Nguyen’s other
limbs; Cramer placed Nguyen’s dismembered body parts into various
trash bags and a plastic tub, and placed them into the minivan to search
for a place to bury Nguyen’s body. After lining the minivan’s floor with a
tarp, Cramer and his friend moved the trash bags and tub into the
minivan and drove to search for a place to bury Nguyen’s body,
eventually stopping at a vacant building near the storage facility; and
Cramer fled from the police, both by driving the minivan and running on
foot.
Given these facts, Cramer fails to show the offense involved restraint or
a lack of brutality. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
Cramer also asks us to consider the sexual quid pro quo nature of
Cramer’s and Nguyen’s relationship, arguing a power imbalance because
Cramer was homeless and vulnerable, and Nguyen provided him with
food and transportation in exchange for sexual acts. Yet Cramer fails to
recognize that the record shows Cramer texted Nguyen for a ride from
Elkhart to Fort Wayne and Nguyen responded that he could not help;
Cramer even testified that he offered Nguyen a “surprise” in exchange for
a ride; Nguyen responded positively to Cramer’s surprise offer; Cramer
texted a photo of his penis to Nguyen; and Cramer promised Nguyen they
would “play” when they arrived at the storage unit. These facts fail to
mitigate the brutality of the crime.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-LW-19 | September 5, 2024 Page 7 of 9
For these reasons, the nature of Cramer’s offenses is horrendous and
justifies his sentence.
II. Cramer’s criminal history reflects poorly on his
character and justifies his sentence.
Consideration of the character of the offender involves a broad analysis
of the defendant’s “qualities, life, and conduct.” Crabtree v. State, 152
N.E.3d 687, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Cramer argues that we
should consider his diagnosed genetic disorder that “predisposed him to
develop a number of conditions . . . including cognitive impairment,
ADHD, and antisocial personality disorder” to support a finding that his
sentence is inappropriate. Appellant’s Br. at 19. Cramer’s argument fails
because he does not explain how his genetic disorder contributed to him
committing the offenses, and the record includes Dr. Masbaum’s
psychiatric opinion that Cramer is not intellectually disabled, despite
Cramer having various disorders. Gibson, 43 N.E.3d at 241.
The State argues Cramer’s criminal history supports his sentence. A
defendant’s criminal history is a relevant factor in the character analysis.
Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “Even a minor
criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant’s character[.]” Reis v. State,
88 N.E.3d 1099, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The presentence investigation
report shows Cramer has five juvenile adjudications, three of which are
felonies if committed by an adult. For these reasons, his “history of
criminal conduct” weighs against relief. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d
482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind.
2007).
Conclusion
Considering the vicious nature in which Cramer took Nguyen’s life and
the lack of redemptive character, we do not find this to be an outlier case
that justifies appellate sentence modification. Finding Cramer’s LWOP
sentence appropriate, we decline to revise it under Appellate Rule 7(B).
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-LW-19 | September 5, 2024 Page 8 of 9
Rush, C.J., and Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT MATHEW J. CRAMER, II
Victoria Bailey Casanova
Casanova Legal Services, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE STATE OF INDIANA
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Courtney Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-LW-19 | September 5, 2024 Page 9 of 9