Larry Woods v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 11 2014, 6:38 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MATTHEW D. ANGLEMEYER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LARRY WOODS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1405-CR-327
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, Judge
The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate
Cause No. 49G01-1301-FA-5925
December 11, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Larry Woods appeals his conviction for class A felony child molesting following a
bench trial. Woods’s sole assertion on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion when
it excluded certain evidence at trial. Finding no abuse of discretion or, in the alternative,
finding any error harmless, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The evidence most favorable to the conviction indicates that Helania Jones is the
mother of A.M., born on June 16, 2003. In 2009, Helania and A.M. lived with Helania’s
husband, four other adults, and two other children in a house on North Concord Street in
Indianapolis. One of the other adults living in the house was Woods. After about four or
five months, the entire group moved to another house just behind the house on North
Concord Street. On Valentine’s Day in 2010, Helania and some of the adults from the house
left in the morning to go shopping. A.M., who had not yet started school, stayed home.
Woods was not in the home when Helania left but he was present when she returned. Upon
her return, Helania noticed that A.M. was very fussy and “wanted to stay to herself, which []
was not like her.” Tr. at 17. When Helania asked A.M. what was wrong, A.M. did not
answer.
By 2011, A.M. was attending school when her school hosted a speaker who gave a
presentation to the children about “good touches” and “bad touches.” Id. at 46. A.M. spoke
with the speaker after the presentation and told the speaker that she had been touched
inappropriately by Woods. The speaker reported the allegations, and the Indiana Department
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of Child Services and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department became involved in
an investigation. A.M. and Helania both gave statements which indicated that Woods had
molested A.M. During police interviews, Woods admitted to one time lying on a couch with
A.M. with his body touching hers.
The State charged Woods with one count of class A felony child molesting and two
counts of class C felony child molesting. During a bench trial, A.M. testified that one day
after her mom had gone to the store, she was sleeping on the floor in the living room when
Woods, who was on the couch, asked A.M. to “[c]ome on the couch” with him. Id. at 41.
Woods then pulled A.M. up onto the couch by her shirt. Woods put his hand into A.M.’s
underpants and between her legs. A.M. stated that she could feel that Woods’s hand went
inside her body and it “hurt.” Id. at 44. An adult named Michelle came into the living room
and Woods stopped. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Woods guilty of one
count of class A felony child molesting. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Woods challenges the trial court’s decision to exclude certain documentary evidence
at trial. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of
evidence. Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic, facts, and
circumstances presented. Id. When reviewing the admissibility of evidence, we do not
reweigh evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. Meridith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009). A claim of error in the admission
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or exclusion of evidence is subject to a harmless error analysis, and such claim will not
prevail unless a substantial right of the party is affected. Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269,
277 (Ind. 1998). “In determining whether an evidentiary ruling affected a party’s substantial
rights, the court assesses the probable impact of the evidence on the trier of fact.” Sloan v.
State, 16 N.E.3d 1018, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
During the trial testimony of Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Detective Robbin
Myers, Woods moved to admit Defendant’s Exhibits A and B which consisted of copies of
documents titled “Investigation of Alleged Child Abuse or Neglect” and “Preliminary Report
of Alleged Child Abuse or Neglect.” Tr. at 82; Exhibit Vol. at 27-34. The original
documents were purportedly prepared by the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
during the intake and investigation of A.M.’s molestation allegations. The documents
contained statements allegedly made by A.M., Helania, and the school presenter who initially
reported the abuse. Due to the ample number of hearsay statements contained in the reports,
Woods sought admission of the reports pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 803(8), the public
records exception to the hearsay rule. The State objected to the admission of the documents
on multiple bases, including that the documents were not properly authenticated. The trial
court sustained the State’s objection and did not admit the exhibits into evidence. We agree
with that decision.
Evidence Rule 803(8) provides a hearsay exception for public records which includes
in relevant part:
(A) A record or statement of a public office if:
(i) it sets out:
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(a) the office’s regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities;
(b) a matter observed while under a legal duty to [observe and] report;
or
(c) factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and
(ii) neither the source of the information nor the circumstances indicate a
lack of trustworthiness.
This exception to the hearsay rule is based upon the assumption that public officials perform
their duties properly without motive or interest other than to submit accurate reports. Fowler
v. State, 929 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
Additionally, when an item of evidence is offered as proof, its relevancy depends on a
finding that it is what the proponent of the evidence purports it to be. Ind. Evidence Rule
901(a). A public record or report may be authenticated by showing that it (1) was recorded
or filed in a public office as authorized by law or (2) is from the public office where items of
that kind are kept. Ind. Evidence Rule 901(b)(7). “Typically, a witness provides
authenticating testimony or other evidence introduced at trial supports an inference sufficient
for authentication.” Dumes v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1171, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), clarified
on reh’g, 723 N.E.2d 460 (2000) (the testimony of a witness, who need not be the actual
record keeper, may establish that the document is from the public office where such items are
found). Evidence Rule 902 provides that certain documents are self-authenticating and
therefore may be admitted without preliminary proof of genuineness. Id. This relieves the
tendering party of providing extrinsic proof of authenticity as a condition precedent to
admissibility. Id.Here, Woods concedes that neither the actual record keeper nor the DCS
representative who prepared or filed the reports was called to testify regarding the
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authenticity of the reports. As noted by the State during trial, the reports are also lacking any
signature by the preparer or anyone else for that matter. Woods makes no claim that the
reports were self-authenticating, as not only were the reports unsigned, but they were also not
certified by the custodian of the records or any other person authorized to make such
certification. See Indiana Evidence Rule 902(4) (regarding self-authenticating “Certified
Copies of Public Records”). Woods merely claims that Detective Myers’s testimony that she
had seen the reports before provided a sufficient foundation of authenticity for their
admission. Appellant’s Br. at 9. Viewing the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling, we disagree. The record reveals that Detective Myers played no role in the creation,
preparation, or custody of the reports, and, without more, her testimony was insufficient to
establish that the reports were genuine and what they were purported to be. Under the
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to admit the
exhibits into evidence.
Moreover, we agree with the State that even if the trial court improperly excluded the
documents, such exclusion was harmless. Woods claims that documents would have aided
him in impeaching A.M.’s credibility due to inconsistencies between her trial testimony and
some of the statements in the reports. However, we note that even without specific reference
to the exhibits, Woods did in fact cross-examine A.M. regarding alleged inconsistencies
between her trial testimony and her prior statements. Furthermore, our review of the
documents reveals that, in addition to some inconsistencies, the documents contain several
statements that are consistent with and corroborate A.M.’s trial testimony, which easily could
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have bolstered her credibility, rather than diminished it, in the trial court’s view. Based upon
the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court’s exclusion of the documents affected
Woods’s substantial rights. See Sloan, 16 N.E.3d at 1026. Therefore, we affirm Woods’s
conviction.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
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