Omobea Kotea Miller v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 16 2014, 1:14 pm
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
W. TRENT VAN HAAFTEN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Van Haaften & Farrar, Attorneys at Law LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Mount Vernon, Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
OMOBEA KOTEA MILLER, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 65A05-1401-CR-32
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE POSEY CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable James M. Redwine, Judge
Cause No. 65C01-1205-FC-187
December 16, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
Omobea K. Miller appeals an order revoking his probation. He specifically challenges
the trial court’s determination that he violated his probation by committing a new criminal
offense. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
In November 2012, Miller pled guilty via plea agreement to class C felony battery
resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman, class D felony strangulation, and class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. The trial court entered judgment and sentenced him
to an aggregate five-year sentence, with two years executed on home detention and the
remainder suspended to probation.
In June 2013, Miller began his probation, which was subject to a condition that he
“obey all federal, state, and local laws” and “not commit a new criminal offense.” State’s
Ex. 1. The condition further specifies, “If you do commit a new criminal offense, your
probation may be revoked.” Id.
On the morning of August 24, 2013, Mount Vernon Police Captain Dana Allyn was
dispatched to a domestic disturbance at the apartment that Miller shared with his wife Natalie
Carlino. When Captain Allyn arrived, she saw Miller, Carlino, and Carlino’s sister
screaming at each other in front of the residence. Miller saw Captain Allyn and immediately
walked away. Further inquiry revealed that Carlino was angry with her sister for having
brought alcohol over to the residence when she knew that Miller had a longstanding drinking
problem. No arrests were made.
2
About 3:00 p.m., Mount Vernon Police Officer Glenn Boyster was on his way to his
security job at Miller’s apartment complex and encountered Miller at a nearby convenience
store. Miller told Officer Boyster that “things was crazy down [at the apartment complex],”
and the officer advised Miller to stay away from there. Tr. at 6.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Boyster pulled into the complex and noticed Miller,
Carlino, Carlino’s sister, and several onlookers gathered on the sidewalk. It appeared to the
officer that Miller and Carlino were arguing. When Miller saw the patrol car, he immediately
left the scene. The agitated Carlino continued yelling until the officer threatened to arrest her
for disorderly conduct, at which point she entered her vehicle and drove away.
Immediately thereafter, Captain Allyn arrived to provide assistance. She located
Miller sitting outside a nearby apartment and noticed that he smelled like an alcoholic
beverage. Miller admitted that he had been drinking. At this time, both Officer Boyster and
Carlino drove up to the apartment. Carlino’s seven-year-old daughter was with her and was
noticeably upset. Carlino told the officers that during the argument, Miller had choked her.
She had two visible red scrapes on her neck. Her daughter told the officers that “she didn’t
like it when [Miller] hit her mom.” Id. at 24.
The officers arrested Miller for domestic battery and took him into custody. En route
to the county jail, Miller repeatedly yelled, cursed, and protested his innocence. At the jail,
police administered a portable breathalyzer test, which confirmed the presence of alcohol in
Miller’s system. Shortly thereafter, Carlino phoned police and recanted her statement that
Miller had choked her.
3
That same day, the State charged Miller with class B misdemeanor public intoxication.
A few days later, the State filed a petition to revoke Miller’s probation. The trial court
conducted a revocation hearing and concluded that Miller had violated the conditions of his
probation by committing public intoxication. The court revoked Miller’s probation and
ordered that he serve the remaining three years of his sentence in the Indiana Department of
Correction. Miller now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
Miller maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation.
Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial court’s sound discretion, not a right to which a
criminal defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The trial
court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the probationer
violates those conditions. Id. We review a trial court’s probation violation determination
using an abuse of discretion standard. Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court misinterprets
the law. Id. In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we neither
reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Mogg v. State, 918 N.E.2d 750, 755 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009). Instead, we consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Id. Because a probation revocation proceeding is civil in nature, the State
need only prove the alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Holmes
v. State, 923 N.E.2d 479, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
4
Here, the trial court determined that Miller had violated his probation conditions by
committing a new criminal offense.
When a probationer is accused of committing a criminal offense, an arrest
alone does not warrant the revocation of probation. Likewise, the mere filing
of a criminal charge against a defendant does not warrant the revocation of
probation. Instead, when the State alleges that the defendant violated
probation by committing a new criminal offense, the State is required to
prove—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the defendant committed the
offense.
Jackson, 6 N.E.3d at 1042 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In the context of
probation revocation, the State need not establish that the defendant was actually convicted of
the new offense. Lightcap v. State, 863 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).1
Here, the State charged Miller with being “in a public place or a place of last resort in
a state of intoxication caused by the person’s use of alcohol” and “breach[ing] the peace or
[being] in imminent danger of breaching the peace.” Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(3). First, we
note that Miller concedes that his altercation with Carlino occurred in a public place, that is,
the parking lot outside of their apartment. Nevertheless, he challenges the trial court’s
determinations concerning his intoxication and his breach of the peace.
Miller first challenges the trial court’s determination that he was intoxicated. Our
legislature has defined “intoxicated” as “under the influence of ... alcohol ... so that there is
an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person’s
faculties.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86. “Impairment” may be established by evidence of “(1) the
1
Miller’s public intoxication charge was eventually dismissed, but we note that the dismissal has no
bearing on our analysis.
5
consumption of a significant amount of alcohol; (2) impaired attention and reflexes; (3)
watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath; (5) unsteady balance; (6)
failure of field sobriety tests; and (7) slurred speech.” Stephens v. State, 992 N.E.2d 935, 938
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted).
Within minutes of Miller’s altercation with Carlino, Captain Allyn and Officer
Boyster detected the odor of alcohol on Miller’s breath. Miller admitted to them that he had
been consuming alcohol, and the breathalyzer test results confirmed the presence of alcohol
in his system. Additionally, Miller testified that he had consumed three or four shots and
characterized his condition as “a buzz.” Tr. at 34-35. This evidence is sufficient to support
the trial court’s determination that Miller was intoxicated.
Miller also submits that the evidence is insufficient to establish by a preponderance
that he breached the peace or was in imminent danger of doing so. Generally speaking, a
breach of the peace is a disturbance of public tranquility and includes all violations of public
peace, order, or decorum. Lemon v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In
the context of the public intoxication statute, it has been held to require either actual or
threatened violence. Brown v. State, 12 N.E.3d 952, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
The facts most favorable to the judgment show that Miller and Carlino were engaged
in an altercation disturbing enough to have attracted a crowd of observers. If anything
prevented further escalation, it was Officer Boyster’s arrival followed by Miller’s abrupt exit.
Within minutes of the fight, Carlino told police that Miller had choked her. Although she
later phoned police to recant, the red marks on her neck were consistent with her original
6
accusation against Miller. Moreover, shortly after the altercation, Carlino’s visibly-shaken
daughter told police that she did not like it when Miller hit her mother.
Simply put, our standard of review prohibits us from choosing which version of
Carlino’s story to believe. Likewise, it prevents us from determining whether the child
actually saw Miller strike her mother or was merely used by Carlino to buttress her original
claims. Such determinations are specifically left to the trial court’s discretion. The evidence
most favorable to the judgment supports the trial court’s determination that Miller violated
his probation. Consequently, we affirm.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
7