Glenn A. Eads, Jr. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Dec 18 2014, 8:10 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JEFFREY E. STRATMAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Aurora, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CHRISTINA D. PACE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
GLENN A. EADS, JR., )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 15A04-1406-CR-271
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge
Cause No. 15C01-0803-FC-15
December 18, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Glenn A. Eads, Jr. appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation. Eads raises
a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered him to serve the entirety of his originally suspended term. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 25, 2008, Eads pleaded guilty to stalking, as a Class C felony. The trial
court sentenced Eads to eight years, with seven years and 111 days suspended to
probation. One of the conditions of Eads’ probation was that he “not commit another
criminal offense. If you do commit another criminal offense, your probation may be
revoked.” Appellant’s App. at 19.
On December 5, 2013, the State filed a notice of probation violation, in which the
State alleged that Eads had committed at least six crimes in Ohio during his term of
probation. On May 22, 2014, after several continuances requested by Eads, the court
held a fact-finding hearing on the State’s notice. Eads was disruptive during the fact-
finding hearing. See, e.g., Tr. at 14-18. At one point, the trial court, understandably
frustrated, told Eads to “keep your mouth shut.” Id. at 17. Later, while on the witness
stand, Eads testified that he did not know “what the probation terms” were and that the
probation department “let[] me commit new crimes in another state without putting a
warrant out for me.” Id. at 32-33. Eads also admitted that he had committed the Ohio
offenses alleged by the State, but Eads was quick to add that he “did not know” that “it
was a condition of . . . probation that you can’t commit another crime.” Id. Following
the parties’ closing statements, the court took notice of the fact that it had “conducted the
[original] sentencing in this case, and as a matter of fact upon my acceptance of this
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plea[] I read Probation Conditions to Mr. Eads,” which included the condition that “if you
do commit another criminal offense, your probation may be revoked.” Id. at 39. The
court then revoked Eads’ probation.
In the sentencing phase of the hearing, the State argued that Eads “doesn’t take
anything seriously[,] particularly probation and parole . . . . [T]here’s numerous
violations, and then th[is] multitude of new crimes while he was on probation clearly
states that . . . .” Id. at 39. Eads’ counsel asked the court “to revoke no more time th[a]n
what [Eads] currently has in at this time.” Id. at 41. The court ordered Eads to serve the
full balance of his originally suspended term, stating:
I’m showing thirty-five priors, four prior probation violations, I believe
now two prior felonies if I’ve correctly counted . . . , it appears nine new
arrests, six new convictions since his sentencing in this case, and based
upon . . . this atrocious history and also the fact that I hear absolutely no
remorse for any of these actions at all, it appears to me that there are seven
years and one hundred[,] eleven days remaining suspended, I’m revoking
all of it, every single day because I think Mr. Eads has earned it . . . .
Id. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
On appeal, Eads argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered
him to serve the entirety of his originally suspended sentence. As our supreme court has
explained:
Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to
which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court determines the
conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are
violated. Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation
rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in
deciding how to proceed. If this discretion were not afforded to trial courts
and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be
less inclined to order probation to future defendants. Accordingly, a trial
court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using
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the abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion occurs where the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances.
Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citations omitted).
According to Eads, the trial court abused its discretion because its sentencing
decision was “based at least partly upon the trial court’s frustrations with [Eads’] ongoing
interruptions and requests during the hearings.” Appellant’s Br. at 7. But this is pure
speculation by Eads. We reject his suggestion that the trial court did not fairly apply the
facts to the law.
Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Eads to serve the
entirety of his originally suspended sentence. Following the imposition of his probation,
Eads was convicted of six new crimes in Ohio, which was plainly contrary to the terms of
Eads’ probation, and it was imminently reasonable for the court to also consider Eads’
multiple prior probation violations in determining how much of Eads’ originally
suspended sentence to impose. Further, Eads’ defense to the State’s notice of probation
violation was to admit that he had committed the new crimes but then blame the court for
not telling him that committing new crimes was contrary to the terms of his probation or
blame the State for “letting me commit new crimes in another state without putting a
warrant out for me.” Tr. at 32-33. Eads’ own statements were sufficient to support the
court’s additional rationale that Eads showed “absolutely no remorse for any of these
actions at all.” Id. at 41. We affirm the trial court’s revocation of Eads’ probation and
order that he serve the entirety of his originally suspended term.
Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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