Sophia L. Masters v. Ryan E. Masters ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
Dec 19 2014, 10:22 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID P. MURPHY MICHAEL E. BORING
David P. Murphy & Associates, P.C. Boring & Boring, P.C.
Greenfield, Indiana New Palestine, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
SOPHIA L. MASTERS, )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 30A01-1406-DR-238
)
RYAN E. MASTERS, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE HANCOCK SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Terry K. Snow, Judge
Cause No. 30D01-1205-DR-1134
December 19, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sophia L. Masters (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s grant of Ryan E. Masters’
(“Father”) petition for a temporary order restraining Mother from removing the parties’
children out of the state. But we do not reach the merits of the issues Mother raises on
appeal because we lack jurisdiction. We dismiss.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother and Father are divorced and have two minor children together. After the
divorce, the children lived with Mother, and Father exercised liberal parenting time. In
early 2014, Mother applied for an active duty position in the United States Army Guard
Reserve (“AGR program”), was accepted into the program, and was stationed in North
Carolina. Accordingly, Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate with the trial court.
Father objected and moved the trial court for an order restraining Mother’s relocation
with the children. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered that Mother “is restrained
from removing the children . . . out of state without prior approval of the Court.”1
Appellant’s App. at 8. This interlocutory appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
In her notice of appeal, Mother alleged that this court’s jurisdiction is based on
Appellate Rule 14(B)(3). But Mother sought neither certification of this discretionary
interlocutory appeal from the trial court nor acceptance of the appeal from this court.
Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction under Appellate Rule 14(B)(3) to hear this appeal. See
Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 838 N.E.2d 449, 449-50 (Ind. 2005).
1
Father has since filed a motion for modification of parenting time, custody and support, and,
according to Father, a final hearing was held on September 8, 2014.
2
Further, we note that the appellate docket includes an entry by the Clerk of this
court stating that Mother claimed jurisdiction under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(5).
And, in Mother’s brief, she asserts that this is an interlocutory appeal based on Appellate
Rule 14(A)(5) and results from the entry of a temporary restraining order. Appellant’s
Br. at 11. These statements conflict with Mother’s notice of appeal and amended notice
of appeal, both of which allege jurisdiction under Rule 14(B)(3). Regardless, our
supreme court has held that a temporary restraining order is not appealable as of right
under Rule 14(A)(5). See Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 203 (Ind. 2012).
Dismissed.
MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
3