In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.W. (Minor Children), and P.F. (Mother) and F.W., II (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 21 2019, 8:44 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
Patrick M. Schrems INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
Kara E. Krothe CHILD SERVICES
Bloomington, Indiana Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-349 | August 21, 2019 Page 1 of 21
In the Matter of the Termination August 21, 2019
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of: J.W., An.W., F.W., III, 19A-JT-349
Ak.W., and N.W. (Minor Appeal from the Monroe Circuit
Children), Court
and The Honorable Stephen R. Galvin,
Judge
P.F. (Mother) and F.W., II Trial Court Cause No.
(Father), 53C07-1806-JT-481
53C07-1806-JT-482
Appellants-Respondents,
53C07-1806-JT-483
v. 53C07-1806-JT-484
53C07-1806-JT-485
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] P.F. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to J.W., Ak.W.,
F.W., An.W., and N.W. (the “Children”). F.W., II (“Father”) appeals the
termination of his parental rights to F.W., An.W., and N.W. We affirm.
Issues
[2] Mother and Father raise several issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying
Father’s motion to continue the termination of parental
rights hearing.
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II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
Facts
[3] J.W. was born in November 2007 and Ak.W. was born in January 2009 to
Mother and M.W. 1 Mother and Father are the parents of F.W., born in
November 2010; An.W., born in December 2011; and N.W., born in June
2014.
[4] In November 2015, the Monroe County Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
received multiple separate reports of neglect and physical abuse regarding the
Children. During the investigation, Father ultimately admitted to using a belt
to discipline Ak.W., which left a laceration on her thigh. DCS was also
informed regarding sexualized behaviors by Ak.W. DCS made a
recommendation for an informal adjustment. Shortly thereafter, however,
Mother informed DCS that she was moving out of the state with Ak.W., and
DCS was unable to make contact with the family.
[5] In February 2017, the Bloomington Police Department was involved in a drug
investigation regarding Father. Father was arrested during a traffic stop while
two of the Children were in the vehicle with him. Father possessed marijuana
at the time. During a search of the family’s residence pursuant to a search
warrant, Mother and two of the Children were present, and the officers found
1
M.W.’s parental rights were also terminated, but he does not appeal.
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marijuana, digital scales, and a handgun. Mother admitted that she had
disposed of other drugs prior to the execution of the search warrant. Father
admitted that he had been dealing heroin and marijuana out of the family’s
residence, and Mother admitted that marijuana was smoked in the residence.
[6] The State charged Father with four counts of dealing narcotics, maintaining a
common nuisance, and neglect of a dependent. The State charged Mother with
neglect of a dependent, obstruction of justice, and maintaining a common
nuisance. DCS removed the Children from Mother’s and Father’s care at that
time and placed them in relative care with their paternal grandmother.
[7] On February 6, 2017, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were
children in need of services (“CHINS”). After a fact-finding hearing, the trial
court found that the Children were CHINS. Specifically, the trial court found:
2. On February 3, 2017, [Mother] was arrested and charged
with Neglect of a Dependent, Obstruction of Justice, and
Maintaining a Common Nuisance. Marijuana was found
on [Mother]. A gun was found wrapped in a diaper in the
children’s bedroom. The children were in their mother’s
care at the time of her arrest. [Mother] admitted to
smoking marijuana while the children were in her care.
3. On November 3, 2017, [Father] was arrested on charges of
Dealing Narcotics, Maintaining a common Nuisance, and
Neglect of Dependent. Undercover officers had observed
[Father] selling heroin on at least 4 occasions. [Father]
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admitted to ongoing marijuana and heroin use.[ 2] [Father]
also has a pending charge for Possession of Marijuana.
4. As a noncustodial parent, [M.W.] would not receive
custody of his children if they are not found to be Children
in Need of Services. The children would be returned to
their mother. This is not in the best interests of the
children.
5. Given [Mother’s] ongoing use of controlled substances and
her criminal behavior while the children were present; and
in light of [Father’s] ongoing use of controlled substances
and his criminal behavior, the coercive intervention of the
court is clearly necessary to ensure the health and safety of
the children.
Ex. Vol. I pp. 71-72.
[8] At some point, the Children disclosed that they are victims of sexual abuse by
multiple perpetrators, which occurred in North Carolina at maternal
grandmother’s residence. F.W. described that he witnessed the rape of J.W.
[9] Paternal grandmother requested that J.W. and Ak.W. be removed from her
care after discovering J.W. and Ak.W. engaging in sexualized behaviors with
the other Children. The remaining Children were later removed from paternal
grandmother’s care after the Children received inappropriate physical
discipline. A protective order was obtained to prevent paternal grandmother
2
DCS presented evidence at the termination of parental rights hearing that Father was dealing heroin, but no
evidence was presented during the termination hearing that he was using heroin.
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from having any contact with the Children, and the Children were placed in
foster care.
[10] In July 2017, the trial court entered a dispositional order, which ordered the
parents to receive training in the developmental effects of sexual and physical
trauma on the Children. The trial court also ordered Mother, in part, to: (1)
participate in a substance abuse evaluation and follow all recommendations; (2)
submit to weekly random drug screens; (3) participate in weekly therapy; (4)
participate in a parenting assessment; (5) participate in weekly supervised
visitation; and (6) participate in home-based case management services. The
trial court ordered Father, in part, to: (1) participate in a substance abuse
evaluation and follow all recommendations; (2) submit to weekly random drug
screens; (3) participate in weekly therapy; (4) participate in weekly supervised
visitation; (5) participate in home-based case management services; and (6)
participate in the Fatherhood Engagement Program. The trial court ordered the
following for the Children:
1. Life skills therapy shall be provided.
2. The IEP [Individualized Education Program] process shall be
initiated at their schools. Each IEP should include a
comprehensive educational evaluation and accommodations for
both educational and behavioral deficits in order to minimize
school exclusion.
3. Visits with the mother shall be fully supervised and
therapeutic. They shall take place at least weekly for 2 hours.
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4. Group trauma therapy and/or trauma camp program should
be investigated and the children should be allowed to participate
in these programs when appropriate.
5. Fully supervised and therapeutic sibling visits should occur
monthly between [J.W.] and [Ak.W.].
Ex. Vol. I p. 74.
[11] Mother and Father made minimal progress in achieving the goals. The
Children have significant needs that even experienced therapeutic foster parents
struggled to address. The Children struggle with sexualized behaviors,
aggressive behaviors, and multiple mental health disorders. Two of the
Children required inpatient treatment. Each child required multiple different
placements in foster care and facilities due to the Children’s behavioral issues.
[12] DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights in June
2018, and a hearing on the petitions was held on November 29, 2018. At the
start of the hearing, Father’s attorney stated that DCS’s attorney indicated that
“they intend[ed] to go to 9:00 p.m.” and that she had a conflict. Tr. Vol. II p. 5.
The trial court stated that it intended to “complete this case today.” Id. at 6.
Later in the day, Father’s attorney requested a continuance, which the trial
court denied. On January 14, 2019, the trial court entered extensive findings of
fact and conclusions of law and terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights to the Children. Mother and Father now appeal.
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Analysis
I. Motion to Continue
[13] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
continue the termination of parental rights hearing. “Generally speaking, a trial
court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is subject to abuse of
discretion review.” In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 244 (Ind. 2014). An abuse of
discretion may be found in the denial of a motion for a continuance when the
moving party has shown good cause for granting the motion; however, no
abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated
that he or she was prejudiced by the denial. Id.[14] At the start of the hearing on the termination of parental rights petitions,
Father’s attorney expressed displeasure at staying late in the day to complete
the presentation of evidence. Later in the day, Father’s attorney requested a
continuance. At the time of Father’s motion, the only remaining witnesses
were Father, Mother, the CASA, and a DCS employee that Mother recalled.
Father contends that the long day of testimony led to instances of lapses in
attention. Father, however, has failed to demonstrate how these lapses of
attention prejudiced him or how he was harmed by the denial of the motion to
continue. As the State points out, Father does “not point to any substantive
evidence [he] would have presented or testimony [he] decided not to present or
challenge to support [his] contention the denial of a continuance impacted [his]
defense.” Appellee’s Br. p. 27. Given the failure of Father to demonstrate
prejudice, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
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denying the motion to continue and requiring the parties to complete the
presentation of evidence in one day.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[15] Mother and Father challenge the termination of their parental relationship with
the Children. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their
children. In re K.T.K. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989
N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent’s interest in the upbringing of [his
or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65,
120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize that parental interests are not absolute
and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper
disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id. Thus, “‘[p]arental
rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their
parental responsibilities by failing to provide for the child’s immediate and long-
term needs.’” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258,
265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied).
[16] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge witness credibility. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind.
2011). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most
favorable to the judgment. Id. We must also give “due regard” to the trial
court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.(quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)).
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[17] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), “[t]he trial court shall enter
findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections
(a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights. 3 Here, the
trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in granting DCS’s
petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. When reviewing
findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in a case involving the
termination of parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First,
we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we
determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the
trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly
erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the
conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.[18] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the
allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true,
the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section
3
Indiana Code Sections 31-35-2-8(a) and (b), governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a
delinquent child or CHINS, provide as follows:
(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the
allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall
terminate the parent-child relationship.
(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall
dismiss the petition.
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31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship
involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:
(A) That one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for
at least six (6) months under a dispositional
decree.
(ii) The court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-
21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family
preservation or reunification are not required,
including a description of the court’s finding, the
date of the finding, and the manner in which the
finding was made.
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and
has been under the supervision of a local office
or probation department for at least fifteen (15)
months of the most recent twenty-two (22)
months, beginning with the date the child is
removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or
a delinquent child.
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal
or the reasons for placement outside the
home of the parents will not be remedied.
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions,
been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child;
and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of the child.
DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re
V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).
A. Challenge to Findings
[19] The trial court here made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Mother and Father argue that several of the findings were “either problematic
or insufficiently supported by the evidence presented at trial.” Appellants’ Br.
p. 16. Our review of the evidence, the findings, and Mother’s and Father’s
arguments reveals that most of the arguments are merely requests that we
reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we
cannot do. See C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 923. Many of the arguments address minor
factual issues that do not impact the ultimate conclusions of the trial court. To
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the extent necessary, we will address challenges to the findings in the context of
the arguments below. 4
B. Remedy of Conditions Resulting in Removal
[20] Mother and Father challenge the trial court’s conclusion that there is “a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or
the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.” 5 I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). “In determining whether ‘the conditions
that resulted in the [Child’s] removal . . . will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a
two-step analysis.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting
K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to
removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability
that those conditions will not be remedied.’” Id. In analyzing this second step,
the trial court judges the parent’s fitness “as of the time of the termination
proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” Id.
4
DCS concedes that Finding No. 75 contains a scrivener’s error, as the finding refers to Father, but the
testimony concerns F.W. This error, however, does not impact the outcome here.
5
Mother and Father also argue that there was no reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-
child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is
written in the disjunctive. Consequently, the DCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence a reasonable probability that either: (1) the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied, or (2) the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children. See, e.g., Bester v. Lake County Office
of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 n.5 (Ind. 2005). The trial court here found a reasonable probability
that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do
not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
Children.
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(quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152). “We entrust that delicate balance to the
trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily
than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts
to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding
that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.
[21] The Children were initially removed from Mother’s and Father’s care when
both Mother and Father were arrested as a result of Father selling drugs out of
the family’s residence. It appears from the record that the charges against
Mother were resolved, and the charges against Father were still pending at the
time of the termination hearing. The Children remained out of Mother’s and
Father’s care because of Father’s continued drug usage and Mother’s and
Father’s inability to protect the Children and address their special needs.
Although the trial court ordered services in July 2017, Mother and Father made
little to no progress during the proceedings.
[22] After their removal, the Children disclosed that they were subjected to
significant sexual abuse by multiple third parties. The Children have also
molested each other. Mother and Father were generally uncooperative in
attempts to identify the perpetrators. Each of the Children has multiple mental
health issues that have made caring for them difficult. J.W. has been diagnosed
with reactive attachment disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and
oppositional defiant disorder. Ak.W. has also been diagnosed with
oppositional defiant disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; she is
sometimes incontinent and has been violent and has required inpatient
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treatment. F.W. has been diagnosed with PTSD, attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder, a depressive disorder, and encopresis; he has hallucinations and a fear
of restrooms. An.W. has been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and
possibly PTSD; he required inpatient treatment and has been violent and
aggressive. N.W. has sexualized behaviors and is agitated for several days after
visits with Mother and Father.
[23] Mother had a psychological assessment in October 2018. Mother received the
following diagnosis: “border line intellectual functioning, post-traumatic stress
disorder also called PTSD, major depressive disorder recurrent episode
unspecified with anxious distress, child neglect suspected initial encounter,
personal history which is a past history of spouse or partner violence physical
personal history, past history a spouse or partner psychological abuse.” Tr. Vol.
I pp. 143-44. The therapist recommended counseling with a focus on PTSD,
depression, and parenting skills.
[24] Mother’s attendance at individual therapy was inconsistent, and she failed to
make substantial progress in the therapy sessions. Mother’s drug screens were
negative, but she missed several of the screens. Mother consistently denied any
responsibility for the removal of the Children from her care. Mother did,
however, participate in education on the developmental effects of sexual and
physical trauma for the Children.
[25] Although Mother attended supervised visitations with the Children, there were
issues that visitation service providers had to address. On one occasion,
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Mother smoked and cursed in front of J.W.; Mother called visits at the library
“boring”; Mother spoke negatively about the family case manager and the
service provider supervising visits. Tr. Vol. I p. 29. Once, Mother became very
angry, and J.W. told Mother to “calm down and to breath [sic] and to try to
have a positive visit.” Id. at 31. Service providers observed a lack of
consistency in bonding between Mother and J.W.; J.W. would try to hug
Mother, but Mother would not respond to J.W. During visits, Mother and
Father had little control over N.W. and were unable to calm N.W.
[26] In January 2018, Father obtained a substance abuse evaluation. At the
evaluation, Father minimized his substance abuse, the need for involvement of
DCS, and the safety of the Children. Father told the therapist that he “will
never quit using marijuana.” Ex. Vol. II p. 256. Although therapy was
recommended, Father “disclosed he had no plans of engaging in treatment.”
Id. During the proceedings, Father failed multiple drug screens due to positive
results for marijuana, cocaine, and benzoylecgonine. Although Father started
treatment in intensive out-patient treatment (“IOP”) and recovery coaching, his
attendance was sporadic. Father was dismissed from his IOP, and there was no
progress in his substance abuse treatment.
[27] At the time of the termination hearing in November 2018, Mother and Father
had simply made too little progress. Father continued to use illegal drugs, and
Mother and Father were unable to meet the Children’s high needs. Mother was
inconsistent in admitting her knowledge of the sexual abuse of the Children
prior to DCS’s involvement. Although Mother admitted to some providers that
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she was aware of the abuse, she claimed to others that she was unaware of the
abuse until the Children were removed. Mother often told providers that the
Children would behave better if they were simply returned to Mother’s care.
Although Mother had obtained housing prior to the termination hearing, but it
was a two-bedroom apartment, which most service providers testified was
inappropriate to meet the Children’s needs due to their sexualized behaviors
and sexual abuse of each other. 6
[28] Mother consistently minimized her involvement in the cause of the Children’s
removal and continued placement outside of her home, and Mother and Father
consistently failed to recognize the Children’s significant needs. Given the lack
of progress by Mother and Father, we conclude that the trial court did not
clearly err when it found a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the Children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the
home of the parents will not be remedied.
B. Children’s Best Interests
[29] Both Mother and Father argue that it was not in the Children’s best interests to
terminate their parental rights. In determining what is in the best interests of a
6
Mother was also pregnant at the time of the hearing on the termination of parental rights. Mother and
Father challenge the trial court’s Finding No. 59, that they are engaged to be married and living together.
The family case manager testified that she believed Mother and Father were engaged, but no further evidence
was presented on the issue. As for housing, Mother and Father were repeatedly vague about their housing
situation. Mother had recently obtained a two-bedroom apartment, and Father testified that he had been
“trying to get the money for this apartment so we can get the kids.” Tr. Vol. II p. 97. Regardless, any errors
in the finding do not impact the ultimate conclusions here.
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child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Z.B. v.
Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans.
denied. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents
to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is
proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. In
re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is
irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social
development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child
relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is a “central
consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.
[30] These Children experienced significant sexual trauma and have debilitating and
significant mental health needs. In fact, during the foster care placements, both
An.W. and Ak.W. required inpatient treatment. Even foster parents with
significant experience and training to care for high needs children struggled to
care for the Children, and accordingly, multiple placements were required for
each child. The Children displayed sexualized behaviors, aggressive behaviors,
and incontinence. All of the Children require a high degree of stability and
supervision, especially while sleeping. Mother and Father did not make
meaningful progress in learning to address the Children’s needs. Mother and
Father displayed a lack of understanding of the challenges of parenting the
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Children. 7 Mother often told service providers that the Children’s behaviors
would improve if they were returned to her.
[31] The CASA testified that termination of parental rights was in the Children’s
best interest. According to the CASA, Mother and Father “failed to protect
[the Children] from extensive physical, sexual, and emotional abuse” and
“failed to acknowledge how their actions or inactions have resulted in this
abuse.” Tr. Vol. II p. 110. Mother and Father “minimize[d] and dismiss[ed]
their children’s troubling behaviors even to the point of blaming the children for
some of those behaviors.” Id. Father, additionally, has not achieved sobriety.
The CASA testified: “There’s no indication that the parents have any ability to
obtain and maintain stability in residence, employment, or personal care.
There’s no indication that this will ever change.” Id. According to the CASA,
the Children “cannot progress in their personal trauma until the parent child
relationship is terminated.” Id.
[32] Under these circumstances, the trial court’s conclusion that termination of
Mother and Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the Children is not
clearly erroneous.
7
Mother contends that her mental disability, alone, is not a proper ground for terminating her parental rights.
It is clear, however, that the trial court’s decision was not based on Mother’s mental disability.
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C. Adequate Plan
[33] Finally, Mother and Father also challenge the trial court’s finding that there is a
satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children. Indiana courts
have held that for a plan to be “‘satisfactory’” for the purposes of the
termination statute, it “‘need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense
of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child
relationship is terminated.’” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366,
375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied.
[34] Mother and Father argue that DCS has failed to provide proper foster care for
the Children and that Mother is willing and able to care for the Children. DCS,
however, is only required to offer a general sense of the plan for the Children
after termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The DCS family
case manager testified that the plan for the Children was adoption, and
adoption is a satisfactory plan. See, e.g., Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 375 (holding that
adoption and independent living are satisfactory plans). Some of the Children
are already in pre-adoptive homes, and the family case manager testified that
adoptive homes could be found for all of the Children. The trial court’s finding
that DCS had a satisfactory plan is not clearly erroneous.
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Conclusion
[35] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Father’s motion for a
continuance. Furthermore, the trial court’s termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights is not clearly erroneous. We affirm.
[36] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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