Allison K. Harper v. James Likens and Jennifer Likens (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                            FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                         Dec 30 2016, 7:57 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                         CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                  Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
    Caitlin M. Miller                                       John A. Kesler II
    Hunt, Hassler, Kondras & Miller LLP                     Kesler & Kesler
    Terre Haute, Indiana                                    Terre Haute, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Allison K. Harper,                                      December 30, 2016
    Appellant-Respondent,                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    84A01-1606-MI-1279
    v.                                              Appeal from the Vigo Superior
    Court
    James Likens and Jennifer                               The Honorable David R. Bolk,
    Likens,                                                 Judge
    Appellees-Petitioners.                                  Trial Court Cause No.
    84D03-1512-MI-8715
    Najam, Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Allison K. Harper (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order granting
    grandparent visitation to James Likens (“Grandfather”) and Jennifer Likens
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 1 of 12
    (“Grandmother”) (collectively, “Grandparents”) with Mother’s minor daughter
    B.L. (“Child”). Mother raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate
    and restate as whether the trial court’s judgment is clearly erroneous. We
    affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History1
    [2]   In 2011, Mother gave birth to Child. Mother and Joshua Likens, Child’s father
    (“Father”), were not married. For the first eighteen months of Child’s life,
    Mother and Child lived with Grandparents, Father’s parents. Father lived with
    them during part of that time but left after he and Mother “broke up.” Tr. Vol.
    1 at 6. Despite the break-up, Mother and Child continued to stay with
    Grandparents for a time. During those eighteen months, Father worked and
    Mother both worked and went to school. Meanwhile, Grandmother, a
    registered nurse, worked on weekends and, during the weekdays, was a “stay at
    home grandma” so the Child “didn’t have to go to daycare.” 
    Id. [3] Mother
    and Father have a “volatile” history. Tr. Vol. 2 at 11. Father has a
    criminal history and a history of drug use. At Mother’s request, in 2014 the
    juvenile court ordered Father to submit to a drug screen, which he failed. As a
    result, the juvenile court modified Father’s parenting time to permit only
    supervised visitation with Child. In light of those circumstances, Mother “felt
    1
    The Statement of Facts in Mother’s Brief is not in accordance with our standard of review on appeal. See
    Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(b). Mother also challenges a number of the trial court’s findings of fact as not
    supported by the record. Having reviewed the record, we largely reject those challenges without further
    discussion. Insofar as the trial court did state facts not supported by the record, we have omitted those facts
    from our analysis and they have not played a part in our decision.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016             Page 2 of 12
    like it was important for me[,] who had care of [C]hild, . . . to be aware of the
    situation [with Father] at all times.” 
    Id. [4] After
    Mother and Child moved out of Grandparents’ home, Mother continued
    to permit Grandparents to have regular visitation with Child. As Grandmother
    later testified, over the ensuing two to two-and-one-half years Mother permitted
    the Grandparents to exercise two overnights per week with Child. Tr. Vol. 1 at
    8-9. Grandmother acknowledged that, during this time, “everything . . . was
    fine. . . . [W]e were able to see [Child] and enjoy her and . . . [Mother] was
    gracious with her visitation . . . .” 
    Id. at 9.
    And Grandmother further testified
    that
    [i]f there was something special going on, if there was a family
    situation or something special either [Father] . . . or . . . I would
    ask [Mother] to . . . do something . . . kind of off the record . . . .
    And . . . almost always [Mother] allowed it. I can’t recall a time
    that she didn’t.
    
    Id. Those special
    occasions included trips Grandparents would take with Child
    that lasted between seven and ten days each. 
    Id. at 10.
    [5]   Near the end of June 2015, Father tested positive for methamphetamine.
    Father has since been incarcerated and is not projected to be released until June
    of 2017 at the earliest. Following Father’s failed drug test, Mother began
    supervising Grandparents’ visitations with Child. According to a timeline of
    visits created by Grandmother, between July 2 and October 29, 2015, Mother
    allowed Grandparents to have supervised visits with Child on eight occasions;
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 3 of 12
    Mother allowed Grandparents to have an unsupervised visit on one occasion;
    Mother allowed Grandparents to Facetime with Child on nine occasions; on
    one occasion Grandparents had to cancel a planned visit with Child; and on
    another occasion Grandparents attempted to contact Child over Facetime as
    scheduled but there was no answer. Grandmother’s timeline also demonstrates
    open communication between her and Mother regarding scheduling visits.
    [6]   On October 29, 2015, Mother permitted Grandparents to have an unsupervised
    visit with Child. During that visit, Grandparents took Child to a park and had
    professional photographs made of them. Mother did not know that the
    Grandparents intended to have professional photographs made, although
    Grandmother had attempted to inform Mother of that plan. On November 1,
    Mother “sent [an] angry text” to Grandmother “over the pictures and ask[ed] if
    we took [Child] to our home (which we did not).” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at
    37. Thereafter, Mother did not permit Grandparents to have visitation or
    communication again with Child for twenty-eight days despite Grandmother
    requesting “some type of contact” on six different occasions during that
    timeframe. 
    Id. [7] On
    November 25, twenty-seven days after the photo shoot, Grandparents filed
    a petition for Grandparent Visitation with the trial court.2 The next day, Child
    2
    On December 18, Grandparents refiled their petition in a court of proper venue.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 4 of 12
    called Grandparents and visited with them over Facetime.3 On December 11,
    Grandparents spoke with Child on the phone, and, on December 20,
    Grandparents had Christmas with Child for four hours. In January, February,
    and March of 2016, Mother permitted Grandparents to have one two-hour
    supervised visit each month. Mother also permitted Grandparents to visit with
    Child over Facetime “for a long while” on January 27 and again on February
    14. 
    Id. at 38.
    But Mother also did not respond to numerous other attempts by
    Grandparents to communicate with or visit Child.
    [8]   In March, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the Grandparents’
    petition. Only Grandmother and Mother testified at that hearing. On May 10,
    the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon and ordered
    Mother to permit the Grandparents to visit with Child.
    [9]   In its order, the court found the following facts:
    12. The Grandparents have established a strong bond with
    [C]hild, inasmuch as [C]hild was brought at birth directly to the
    home of the Grandparents where [C]hild continued to live for the
    first 18 months of her life.
    13. After [C]hild moved from the Grandparents[’] home, at
    approximately 18 months of age, . . . Grandparents continued to
    3
    The trial court did not find that Mother knew about the petition the day after the Grandparents had filed it,
    and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that she had such knowledge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016            Page 5 of 12
    have regular and consistent, almost daily[,4] visitation with
    [C]hild until July 2015.
    14. [F]ather . . . tested positive for methamphetamine in July
    2015 and at that time . . . [M]other began restricting the
    Grandparents’ visits with [C]hild and . . . insisted that all visits be
    supervised by her.
    15. [G]randparents were allowed to visit with [C]hild on October
    29, 2015[,] unsupervised. However, [M]other was upset because
    they took photographs of [C]hild . . . .
    16. Mother believed that Grandparents lied to her on the
    October 29, 2015[,] occasion by failing to tell her in advance
    about the photo shoot.
    17. Mother further believes that Grandparents lied to her by
    telling her that they would not pay their son’s child support
    obligation for [Child] and have done so . . . .
    18. Mother further believes Grandparents lied by telling her that
    they would not hire an attorney for their son in the Paternity or
    Name Change action[s] and then did so.
    19. Following the October 29, 2015[,] visitation Mother did not
    let Grandparents have visitation until after they filed their
    Petition for Grandparent Visitation.
    4
    Mother asserts that the trial court’s finding that Grandparents exercised “almost daily” visitation with
    Child prior to July of 2015 is not supported by the record. But, while the trial court’s statement is imprecise,
    we cannot say it is clearly erroneous because the record does show that Grandparents generally had two
    overnights with Child per week during that timeframe.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016             Page 6 of 12
    20. Grandparents did not get to see [C]hild until December 20th,
    2015[,] and that visit lasted for approximately four (4) hours.
    21. The only visit during the month of January was a two (2)
    hour supervised visit . . . .
    22. The only visit during the entire month of February was a two
    (2) hour supervised visit . . . .
    23. The only visit . . . from March 1st through March
    21st . . . was a two hour supervised visit . . . restricted to Dairy
    Queen.
    
    Id. at 12-13.
    And the court concluded as follows:
    4. In support of an order granting or denying grandparent
    visitation, the trial court must set forth findings and conclusions
    that address: (1) the presumption that a fit parent acts in his or
    her child’s best interests; (2) the special weight that must be given
    to a fit parent’s decision to deny or limit visitation; (3) whether
    the grandparent has established that visitation is in the child’s
    best interests; and (4) whether the parent has denied visitation or
    has simply limited visitation.
    5. The issue as presented by Mother is whether a two (2) hour
    supervised visit per month with Grandparents satisfies prong four
    (4) . . . . Asked another way is “what is the minimum amount of
    visitation a parent may provide that forecloses the entry of a
    grandparent visitation order by the Court.”
    6. Mother is a fit parent[,] as acknowledged by Grandparents at
    the hearing.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 7 of 12
    7. Although Mother has permitted very limited post-filing
    supervised visitation, the Court finds that no visitation occurred
    between the time Mother was upset that [G]randparents took
    [Child] to a park for photographs and the time the Petition for
    Visitation was filed.
    8. No basis exists for visitation to be supervised and [M]other
    failed to demonstrate any credible basis for this. Mother’s
    complaints about [G]randparents’ purported “lying” are
    pretextual in nature.
    9. Undoubtedly a strong bond has been forged between [Child]
    and [G]randparents; this is not surprising since [G]randmother
    provided care for [Child] the first eighteen (18) months of her life
    while [M]other worked.
    10. The Court does conclude that it would be in the best interest
    of [C]hild to have regular and consistent visitation with the
    Grandparents inasmuch as a strong bond has been established
    between [C]hild and [G]randparents and there has been
    meaningful contact between them since birth.
    11. The Court concludes that Grandparents have had regular
    and consistent visitation with [C]hild since birth and there is no
    reason why that should not continue.
    
    Id. at 14
    (citation omitted). The court then ordered Mother to permit
    Grandparents to have “unrestricted visitation” with Child from 6:00 p.m. on
    the third Friday of each month to 6:00 p.m. the following Saturday; to permit
    Grandparents to “also have [C]hild on the first (1st) Wednesday of each month
    from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.”; and “to allow [G]randparents [F]acetime visits
    with [C]hild every Wednesday evening at 8:00 p.m. (except when they receive
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 8 of 12
    visitation) . . . for a minimum duration of 10 minutes.” 
    Id. at 15.
    This appeal
    ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [10]   Mother appeals the trial court’s order on grandparent visitation. As our
    supreme court has explained:
    Because the Grandparent Visitation Act requires specific findings
    of fact and conclusions of law, Ind. Code § 31-17-5-6, we apply
    the two-tiered Indiana Trial Rule 52 standard of review, Megyese
    v. Woods, 
    808 N.E.2d 1208
    , 1213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We first
    determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then
    whether the findings support the judgment, In re K.I., 
    903 N.E.2d 453
    , 457 (Ind. 2009). We set aside findings of fact only if they
    are “clearly erroneous,” deferring to the trial court’s superior
    opportunity “to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” 
    K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 457
    , quoting T.R. 52(A). In turn, “[a] judgment is
    clearly erroneous when . . . the findings fail to support the
    judgment,” or “when the trial court applies the wrong legal
    standard to properly found facts.” 
    K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 457
    , citing
    Fraley v. Minger, 
    829 N.E.2d 476
    , 482 (Ind. 2005).
    K.J.R. v. M.A.B. (In re M.L.B.), 
    983 N.E.2d 583
    , 585 (Ind. 2013).
    [11]   Grandparent visitation must be balanced with the fact that the “natural parents
    have a fundamental constitutional right to direct their children’s upbringing
    without undue governmental interference,” and “a child’s best interests do not
    necessarily override that parental right.” 
    Id. at 586.
    To protect this
    fundamental right, our supreme court has mandated that a trial court’s order on
    grandparent visitation must address the following four factors:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 9 of 12
    (1) a presumption that a fit parent’s decision about grandparent
    visitation is in the child’s best interests (thus placing the burden
    of proof on the petitioning grandparents);
    (2) the “special weight” that must therefore be given to a fit
    parent’s decision regarding nonparental visitation (thus
    establishing a heightened standard of proof by which a
    grandparent must rebut the presumption);
    (3) “some weight” given to whether a parent has agreed to some
    visitation or denied it entirely (since a denial means the very
    existence of a child-grandparent relationship is at stake, while the
    question otherwise is merely how much visitation is appropriate);
    and
    (4) whether the petitioning grandparent has established that
    visitation is in the child’s best interests.
    
    Id. Moreover, “the
    Grandparent Visitation Act contemplates only occasional,
    temporary visitation that does not substantially infringe on a parent’s
    fundamental right” to direct her child’s upbringing. 
    Id. at 588.
    [12]   Here, there is no question that the trial court found Mother to be a fit parent
    and that that finding is supported by the record. The trial court also found that
    Mother had permitted Grandparents to exercise extensive visitation with Child
    prior to July 2015 but that that visitation had decreased between July and
    October 29, 2015, and then it had further decreased from that date through the
    court’s order. Those findings also are supported by the record. And the court
    found that Grandparents had established that visitation with Child was in
    Child’s best interests. Again, the court’s finding is supported by the record.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 10 of 12
    [13]   On appeal, Mother asserts that the trial court did not give her the presumptions
    and weight to which she was entitled as a fit parent who had not altogether
    denied Grandparents visitation. But we conclude that Mother has not met her
    burden on appeal to demonstrate that the trial court’s judgment is clearly
    erroneous. Aside from expressly considering Mother’s fitness, her history of
    permitting visitation, and Child’s best interests, the court also found that
    Mother had no “credible basis” for her July 2015 decision to begin reducing
    Grandparents’ visitation with Child and that her stated reasons were
    “pretextual in nature.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 14. The court further
    suggested that the limited visits Mother did permit after Grandparents had filed
    their petition were merely attempts to provide the “minimum amount of
    visitation” necessary to “foreclose[] the entry of a grandparent visitation
    order . . . .” 
    Id. The court’s
    findings demonstrate that, absent a court order,
    Grandparents’ ability to visit Child was in fact at stake despite the limited
    amount of visitation Mother had permitted.
    [14]   In other words, the trial court, acting as a fact finder, discredited Mother and
    credited Grandmother. Once the court had assessed the credibility of the
    witnesses, the court at least implicitly concluded that Grandparents had
    overcome the presumptions to which Mother was entitled. Mother’s arguments
    on appeal that the court did not give her the weight to which she was entitled
    are really requests for this court to credit her testimony and evidence over the
    testimony and evidence credited by the trial court, which we will not do.
    Further, the authority on which Mother relies on appeal is plainly inapposite, as
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 11 of 12
    none of the cases she relies on involves a trial court judgment in which the court
    properly considered the four required factors.
    [15]   Mother also argues that the visitation ordered by the trial court is “a substantial
    infringement of her rights as a parent.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. We cannot agree.
    The court ordered twelve overnights and twelve additional three-hour visits per
    year. The court also ordered about three Facetime visits per month. The
    court’s visitation order is substantially less onerous than the two-overnight-
    visits-per-week average that Mother had permitted Grandparents prior to July
    2015. See In re 
    M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 587
    . And the visitation ordered here is far
    less onerous than grandparent visitation schedules that the Indiana Supreme
    Court has approved. See, e.g., R.W. v. M.D. (In re L-A.D.W.), 
    38 N.E.3d 993
    ,
    996 n.4 (Ind. 2015); see also 
    id. at 1002
    (Rush, C.J., concurring in result) (“the
    trial court’s award of 24 overnights per year, plus short weekly visits and for a
    few special occasions, does not unduly infringe on Father’s parental rights
    under these circumstances.”). In light of the circumstances of Grandparents’
    relationship with Child, the court’s ordered visitation was well within the trial
    court’s discretion. See 
    id. at 998-1001.
    Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    [16]   Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1606-MI-1279| December 30, 2016   Page 12 of 12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 84A01-1606-MI-1279

Filed Date: 12/30/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021