In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.B. & B.K. (Minor Children) and T.K. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 28 2020, 6:23 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
William Elliott Happel David E. Corey
Thomasson, Thomasson, Long & Deputy Attorney General
Guthrie, P.C. Indianapolis, Indiana
Columbus, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination May 28, 2020
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of K.B. & B.K. (Minor Children) 19A-JT-2965
Appeal from the Bartholomew
and Circuit Court
The Honorable Kelly S. Benjamin,
T.K. (Mother), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Heather M. Mollo,
Magistrate
v. Trial Court Cause Nos.
03C01-1809-JT-5148
Indiana Department of Child 03C01-1809-JT-5149
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Bradford, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] T.K. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of B.K. and K.B. (collectively, “the
Children”).1 The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with
Mother and the Children due to concerns of drug use by Mother. The Children
were removed from Mother’s care on August 25, 2017. Three days later, the
Children were alleged to be children in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother
subsequently admitted that the Children were CHINS and the juvenile court
adjudged them as such. Following the CHINS adjudication, Mother was
ordered to complete certain services, but failed to do so. In light of Mother’s
failure to successfully complete services, DCS eventually petitioned to
terminate her parental rights to the Children. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the juvenile court granted DCS’s termination petition. On appeal, Mother
contends that (1) DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the
termination of her parental rights and (2) she was denied due process.
Concluding otherwise, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother is the biological mother of the Children. K.B. was born on October 2,
2012. B.K. was born on July 3, 2017. DCS became involved with Mother and
the Children on or about July 3, 2017, after receiving reports that the Children
1
The Children are alleged to have different biological fathers, neither of which participates in this appeal.
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were the victims of neglect and that B.K. had been born drug exposed. Mother
subsequently admitted that she and B.K.’s alleged father smoked marijuana
every night after the Children were put to bed. Mother submitted to a drug
screen and tested positive for THC and cocaine. Despite Mother’s positive drug
screen, the Children remained in Mother’s care. DCS received another report
regarding the Children on or about August 19, 2017. This report alleged that
K.B.’s alleged father had overdosed on heroin in Mother’s home after spending
the night. Mother admitted to getting her marijuana from K.B.’s alleged father
and that the marijuana was, on occasion, laced with heroin. Mother submitted
to a drug screen, the results of which were positive for THC and Fentanyl.
[3] DCS removed the Children from Mother’s care on August 25, 2017, and filed a
petition alleging that the Children were CHINS on August 28, 2017. Mother
subsequently admitted that the Children were CHINS and that she and the
Children “would benefit from their participation in services proved by DCS that
they would not otherwise be able to receive without coercive intervention of the
Court.” Petitioner’s Ex. 5. On December 17, 2017, the juvenile court, noting
Mother’s admission, adjudged the Children to be CHINS and entered a
dispositional decree. In its decree, the juvenile court noted that Mother reached
an agreement with DCS as to needed services. The essential terms required
Mother to complete certain services including therapy, home-based case
management, and a substance-abuse assessment. Mother was also ordered to
refrain from using illegal drugs and to submit to random drug screens as
requested by DCS. The Children’s permanency plan was subsequently changed
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to adoption after Mother failed to successfully complete the agreed-upon court-
ordered services.
[4] On September 24, 2018, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental
rights to the Children. The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
January 22, 2019. During this hearing, DCS presented evidence outlining
Mother’s failure to comply with services, remain drug free, and make any
significant progress in improving her ability to provide the necessary care for
the Children. Following the conclusion of the evidence, the juvenile court took
the matter under advisement. On November 15, 2019, the juvenile court issued
an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.
Discussion and Decision
[5] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although
parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the
termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their
parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be
subordinated to the best interests of the children. Id. Termination of parental
rights is proper where the children’s emotional and physical development is
threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the children are
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irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is
permanently impaired before terminating the parent–child relationship. Id.[6] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination
of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only
consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes
findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights,
our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the
evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the
legal conclusions. Id.[7] In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we
set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment terminating a parent–child
relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.
Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the
juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not
support the judgment. Id.I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[8] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of
her parental rights to the Children. In order to support the termination of
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Mother’s parental rights to the Children, DCS was required to prove, inter alia,
the following:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions,
been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Mother claims that DCS failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish the statutory requirements by clear and convincing
evidence.2
A. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)
[9] It is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written
in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find that one of the conditions
listed therein has been met. See In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003), trans. denied. Therefore, where the juvenile court determines that one of
the above-mentioned factors has been proven and there is sufficient evidence in
the record supporting the juvenile court’s determination, it is not necessary for
2
Mother does not challenge the statutory requirements set forth in subsections (A) or (D).
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DCS to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, either of the other factors listed
in Indiana Code section 31-34-2-4(b)(2)(B). See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882.
In this case, DCS had to prove either that (1) the conditions resulting in
removal from or continued placement outside Mother’s home will not be
remedied or (2) the continuation of the parent–child relationship poses a threat
to the Children.
[10] The juvenile court determined that the evidence established a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal from and
continued placement outside Mother’s care would not be remedied. When
making a determination as to whether the conditions leading to placement
outside a parent’s care are likely to be remedied, juvenile courts “should judge a
parent’s fitness at the time of the termination hearing, considering any change
in conditions since the removal.” Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children,
861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “The trial court can also consider
the parent’s response to the services offered through the DCS.” Id. “‘A pattern
of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those
providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a
finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will
change.’” Id. (quoting In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999),
trans. denied).
[11] The juvenile court made numerous findings in support of its determination that
the evidence established a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the Children’s removal from and continued placement outside
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Mother’s care would not be remedied. Mother does not challenge any of the
juvenile court’s findings, which are consistent with the testimony and
recommendations of service providers, the DCS Family Case Manager
(“FCM”) assigned to the family’s case, and the Children’s guardian ad litem
(“GAL”). We will therefore accept the juvenile court’s findings as true. See
Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged
findings of the trial court must be accepted as correct).
[12] The juvenile court’s findings establish that the Children were removed from
Mother’s care due to Mother’s drug use and the drug use of others at Mother’s
home. After the Children were removed from her care, Mother was ordered,
inter alia, to: (1) complete a substance-abuse assessment and participate in the
recommended treatment; (2) participate in home-based case management,
which would include employment and behavior management assistance; (3)
participate in individual counseling; (4) attend supervised visits with the
Children; (5) maintain weekly contact with DCS; and (6) refrain from using
illegal substances.
[13] The juvenile court found that although Mother completed a substance-abuse
evaluation, she did not successfully complete recommended treatment.
Further, although Mother achieved a temporary period of sobriety, she relapsed
and continued to test positive for drugs throughout the CHINS and TPR
proceedings. Mother attributed her drug use to her claimed mental illness but
failed to complete any psychological or mental-health treatment programs
offered to her. She did not complete a psychological evaluation aimed at
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determining appropriate services to help meet her mental-health needs. She
also failed to successfully meet any home-based case management goals.
[14] The juvenile court further found that Mother was not consistent in visiting the
Children and provided “no reasonable excuse for the inconsistency.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 15. Despite the flexibility offered by means of their
placement in relative care, Mother last visited the Children in May of 2018.
Further, despite having knowledge of K.B.’s special needs, Mother did not
inquire about K.B.’s progress or, apart from allegedly obtaining a sign-language
dictionary, seek training aimed to help her communicate with K.B. When
asked during the evidentiary hearing why she has not reached out to K.B.’s
school regarding his educational progress and needs, Mother responded as
follows:
I honestly don’t have a reason. My to do list is a mile long, and
I’m trying to put my kids last by no means … I know what needs
to be done in certain areas, like calling the school maybe, being
one of those things … I’m working on trying to, how do I put it,
put my priorities in what comes first and what comes last.
Tr. Vol. II p. 149.
[15] Mother admitted that she had multiple periods of incarceration during
pendency of the CHINS case and that at the time of the evidentiary hearing, she
was “on probation, with a few more months left of supervision.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 17. Mother was not employed or actively seeking employment
and was living with her mother. Mother also did not engage in regular
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communication with DCS or service providers. Further, despite claiming that
she “has struggled in figuring out what to do first in order to move forward,”
Mother failed to participate in services and canceled meetings aimed at helping
her do so. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17.
[16] Mother admitted that the Children “are better off in the homes they are in” and
that “she needs the Children more than they need her.” Appellant’s App. Vol.
II p. 18. In finding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions
leading to the Children’s removal from Mother’s care would not be remedied,
the juvenile court noted that although Mother “may love the Children and now
fears losing” them, Mother has been unable to make the Children “a sufficient
priority for reunification” and “drugs, jail, a lack of motivation, and perhaps a
dose of self-pity, have prevented [Mother] from making any real progress with
needed change.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. The juvenile court’s
unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the conclusion that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s
removal from Mother’s care would not be remedied. Mother’s claim to the
contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh
the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
B. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C)
[17] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in
the best interests of the children, the juvenile court is required to look beyond
the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v.
Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App.
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2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the
parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent’s historical inability to
provide a suitable environment along with the parent’s current inability to do
the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of the children.” Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 373. Furthermore, this court has
previously determined that the testimony of the case worker, GAL, or a CASA
regarding the children’s bests interests supports a finding that termination is in
the children’s best interests. Id. at 374; see also Matter of M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 79
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
[18] The juvenile court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
Children’s best interests. As for the Children, collectively, the juvenile court
found that Mother has not “demonstrated a sufficient level of concern for the
well-being of the Children.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. The juvenile court
further found that in Mother’s absence, the Children “look to their paternal
grandparents for love, support, and security.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19.
[19] With respect to K.B., the juvenile court found that K.B. has made significant
progress since his special needs were addressed by paternal grandmother. His
troubling and self-harming behaviors have stopped. In addition, his
communication has improved since being enrolled at the Indiana School for the
Deaf and placed in a home that embraces the use of sign language as a means to
communicate. The juvenile court noted that after being placed with paternal
grandmother, in the span of less than one year, K.B. “is almost up to age level
with his communication skills.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17. As of the time
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of the evidentiary hearing, K.B.’s ability to communicate with others had
improved to a level where he was able to participate in therapeutic work. The
juvenile court further noted that service providers have observed that K.B. and
paternal grandmother have an affectionate relationship. Paternal grandmother
is actively involved in K.B.’s progress and regularly communicates with his
teachers in an effort to learn how to better communicate with him. Mother, on
the other hand, has largely failed to show an interest in K.B.’s progress or
inquire about his well-being.
[20] As for B.K., the juvenile court found that B.K. “is happy and healthy, with no
developmental concerns.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. B.K. has a strong
bond with paternal grandparents and it is “unlikely” that B.K. “would know
Mother … as he was approximately ten months old at the time of [her] last
visit.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. The juvenile court noted that Mother
“has never contacted paternal grandparents to inquire of the well-being of” B.K.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 19. Again, because Mother does not challenge any
of the juvenile court’s findings, we accept the findings as true. See Madlem, 592
N.E.2d at 687 (providing that unchallenged findings of the trial court must be
accepted as correct).
[21] Further, in addition to the juvenile court’s unchallenged findings, FCM Sarah
Palacios opined that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Children’s
best interests. FCM Palacios explained the reasons behind her opinion, stating
as follows:
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I think that now is a crucial time for this to happen because
[K.B.] is really starting to grow and develop in his own, and with
his new culture that he’s created at [the Indiana School for the
Deaf] and with [paternal grandmother] at her home, he has
become just a different kid. I mean from seeing him two years
ago ‘til now, the, the difference is astounding and the fact that he
feels so loved and so cared for is very, very important to his well[-
]being and his health. And the same for [B.K.]. [B.K.] has
always been loved and he’s always been care[d] for, but with
[paternal grandparents], I mean, he’s just, he’s done so great and
he’s learned so much, and I think that introducing [Mother] back
into his life would really be harmful for him and all the progress
that he’s made.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 131–32.
[22] The Children’s GAL, Emily Yardy, also opined that termination of Mother’s
parental rights to the Children was in the Children’s best interests. GAL Yardy
explained the reasons behind her opinion, stating as follows:
So this case has had a permanency plan of adoption since July of
2018. I think the Court and the team have been very transparent
with [Mother] that coming to a termination was a very real
likelihood should [her] lack of engagement not change. I do not
feel that [Mother has] shown an urgency in completing case plan
goals, nor [has she] shown any desire to live a child[-]focused
life. Which is a huge concern for me as the [GAL]. And I don’t
feel [Mother] has been an active member of the treatment team,
or even just the team, not only for [her] own services, but to
identify services for the children. And I heard earlier that there
were issues with [Mother] feeling that there weren’t, there’s not a
good fit in services for her, but the Department specifically put in
a psychological evaluation referral to figure out services that
would be a great fit for her. So I feel like not taking advantage of
that referral could have been detrimental to her as well, in
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multiple ways I guess, but just in specifically getting treatments
and services that would be tailored to [Mother]. And I just think
that the children are doing great in their placements. [B.K.] has
no knowledge of his Mother. I think that he would probably be
able to go the rest of his life, if no one told him, he would think
that [paternal grandparents] are his biological parents. When I
came onto the case, there were a lot of issues with [K.B.] being, I
guess kind of traumatized because of the lack of contact that he
was having, specifically with [Mother]. He was wild and he at
one point thought that he saw her, and it was a major issue. He
was hurting people, hurting himself, throwing himself on the
ground, crying and screaming. It was a huge full[-]blown
tantrum, and it was really hard for [paternal grandmother] to
manage that, and that had kind of been an ongoing issue. Where
he was asking about Mom at first, and was obviously hurt when
you would, when people would tell him that she’s not coming, or
she’s not visiting. But we have really seen such a decrease in
those behaviors, and I feel like [K.B.] is finally stabilized and able
to move on without [Mother].
Tr. Vol. II pp. 139 – 40. GAL Yardy further explained as follows:
Yeah, the kids are doing great. I actually came on the case at a
really critical time for [K.B.]. So I was able to see those serious
behaviors that he was having. The disruptive, harmful, even kind
of self[-]harm behaviors that he was having. So it’s been really
wonderful to see him transition into someone who can just be
calm and communicate his wants and needs, and just with all the
testimony that we’ve said today, I totally agree that I think it’s all
because he’s able to communicate now, and he doesn’t feel like
he has to be aggressive to get what he wants. It’s been really,
really wonderful to see that. For [B.K.], I don’t think any of on
[sic] the team have had any significant concerns for [B.K.]. He’s
doing great in his placement as well.
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Tr. Vol. II p. 137. Considering the juvenile court’s unchallenged findings
together with FCM Palacios’s and GAL Yardy’s testimony, we conclude that
the juvenile court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is
in the Children’s best interests is supported by sufficient evidence. Again,
Mother’s claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for
this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806
N.E.2d at 879.
II. Mother’s Due Process Claims
[23] Mother alternatively contends that she was denied due process because DCS
did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the Children with her. (Appellant’s
Br. p. 20) DCS asserts that Mother has waived her due-process argument on
appeal because she did not raise it before the trial court. (Appellee’s Br. p. 30)
“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed
violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re
N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016); see also Hite v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of
Family & Children, 845 N.E.2d 175, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“It is well
established that we may consider a party’s constitutional claim waived when it
is raised for the first time on appeal.”); McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 194–95
(providing that the mother waived her procedural due process claims by raising
them for the first time on appeal). At the evidentiary hearing, Mother outlined
some alleged communication issues she claimed to have with DCS during the
underlying CHINS and TPR proceedings and asserted that she did not believe
that the services offered by DCS were helpful to her. However, our review of
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the record reveals that Mother never objected to the termination on the basis
that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to provide her with services aimed at
reunification. As such, Mother’s due process argument is waived on appeal.
[24] Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that Mother’s due process argument is
without merit. Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.5 provides that after a child is
found to be a CHINS, DCS “shall make reasonable efforts to preserve and
reunify families.” In this case, DCS made reasonable efforts to do so. The
record reveals that DCS offered Mother extensive services and made numerous
unsuccessful attempts to contact Mother during the pendency of both the
CHINS and TPR proceedings. Mother, herself, testified during the evidentiary
hearing that she believed that DCS had made reasonable efforts to reunite her
with the Children. Specifically, when asked if she believed DCS had done
everything it could to reunite her with the Children, Mother responded as
follows:
Absolutely. They gave me their best plan and tried to put their
best foot forward. And I just disagree with how the system is set
up. Because I feel like it’s unfair to the parents. I’m grateful, so
grateful that my kids have all this support and are loved and in a
great place and well taken care of. And I am, I am very aware of
that, that they are benefiting from where they are at, greatly.
And I am happy about it, but it’s not fair to the parents that
sometimes we all are expected to do the same things, when our
recovery isn’t the same. I am not like every other parent that
walks in here, just like they’re not like me. So why should I have
to do the same plan? Sometimes it works for some, sometimes it
doesn’t work for others. And I feel like it’s nobody’s fault, I just
feel like there should be a better program or something set up for
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parents. Somebody to help support them a little more, and less in
some other things, because it is overwhelming when you are
trying to fix your own personal affairs plus what DCS wants you,
is asking of you, and then also my own legal trouble with
Probation, trying to meet their quota as well. Everybody is
pulling you in five different directions, it’s hard to do what
everybody wants at once.
Tr. Vol. II p. 153. When pressed further about whether she believed that there
were services that were not offered by DCS that could have been beneficial to
her, Mother responded:
Yes. But I don’t think it’s something that they could have come
up with either. It’s not their fault. I am not blaming anyone, I
just found what works for me and started to go with it, tried a
bunch of different things, and honestly it gets down to what they
say at NA and AA meetings, you have to change your people,
places and things.… I truly took a huge step to look and identify
what I needed to do, and I’m taking the steps to fix it. It’s just
not in the time frame that was asked.
Tr. Vol. II p. 154. Mother admitted, however, that she had been given enough
time to participate in the offered services.
[25] In raising her contention that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify
her with the Children, Mother asserts that a case worker discouraged her and
suggested that she was “headed down the wrong path” and another “failed to
make reasonable efforts to get in touch with” her. Appellant’s Br. p. 21.
Mother relies on her self-serving testimony in support of her assertion that she
was discouraged in her attempt to make progress toward reunification by a case
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worker. The juvenile court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was not required to
believe Mother’s self-serving testimony. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d
1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to
believe a witness’s testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”).
[26] With respect to Mother’s claimed communication issues with DCS and service
providers, Mother acknowledged that “it’s a two[-]way street on
communication.” Tr. Vol. II p. 57. Mother further acknowledged that she had
spoken to FCM Palacios “a couple of times” but expressed frustration that she
had “tried to reach out a couple of times and not got returned phone calls.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 57. Mother also acknowledged that at some point, she experienced
issues with her phone and lost contact information for service providers and
K.B.’s teacher. Mother did not reach out to DCS to re-obtain the lost contact
information. Mother also indicated that due to her issues with her phone, she
had to change her email address and was not sure if she provided FCM Palacios
with her new email address. Mother relies on her self-serving testimony in
support of her claim that DCS failed to make reasonable attempts to
communicate with her throughout the pendency of the CHINS and TPR
proceedings. Again, the juvenile court was not required to believe Mother’s
testimony. See Thompson, 804 N.E.2d at 1149.
Conclusion
[27] DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove both that there is a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal from and
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continued placement outside Mother’s care will not be remedied and that
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests.
Furthermore, contrary to Mother’s claim, the record reveals that DCS made
reasonable efforts to reunify her with the Children. We therefore conclude that
Mother has failed to establish that she was denied due process in relation to the
termination of her parental rights to the Children.
[28] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2965 | May 28, 2020 Page 19 of 19