In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of D.B. (Minor Child) and T.S. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Apr 29 2020, 8:58 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Talisha Griffin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General
Appellate Division
Indianapolis, Indiana Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Involuntary April 29, 2020
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of D.B. (Minor 19A-JT-2093
Child) Appeal from the Marion Superior
and Court
The Honorable Danielle Gaughan,
T.S. (Father), Judge Pro Tempore
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Scott Stowers,
Magistrate
v.
Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-1809-JT-1115
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner,
and
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Child Advocates, Inc.,
Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem,
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] T.S. (Father) appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parent-child
relationship with his daughter, D.B. (Child). He claims that he was denied due
process because the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to
prove that it sent him notice of a permanency hearing. He also maintains that
the trial court clearly erred in terminating his parental rights. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born to D.B. (Mother) on September 9, 2017. At birth, she tested
positive for cocaine and methadone. She was placed in neonatal intensive care
and remained hospitalized for about a month. At the time, Father was being
held in the Grayson County Jail in Kentucky in connection with federal charges
for narcotics possession with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person.
[3] In October 2017, when Child was cleared for release from the hospital, DCS
removed her from Mother’s care and placed her with her paternal aunt (Aunt),
where she has remained since. DCS filed a petition seeking to have Child
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adjudicated a child in need of services (CHINS), citing Mother’s drug addiction
and Child’s positive drug tests at birth. Father was identified in the CHINS
petition, but his whereabouts were listed as unknown. Counsel was appointed
on his behalf. Father subsequently was located in the Kentucky jail, and his
paternity was confirmed by a DNA test. Mother admitted to the CHINS
allegations, and Father’s counsel entered an admission to the CHINS
allegations on his behalf. Pursuant to the CHINS dispositional order, Father
was required to contact DCS within seventy-two hours after his release from
prison and to secure stable housing and employment. He also was ordered to
participate in a Father Engagement program. During his incarceration in
Kentucky, Father participated in an Inside Out Dads Program, Narcotics
Anonymous, and Alcoholics Anonymous. Between late 2017 and October
2018, Aunt brought Child for approximately ten supervised visits with Father.
[4] In August 2018, Father pled guilty to the federal charges by negotiated plea
agreement. His sentence, which included a career offender enhancement, was
188 months executed, with an expected release date of 2030, followed by six
years’ probation. 1 Not long after, he was transferred to a Michigan federal
prison to serve his sentence.
[5] During a September 12, 2018 permanency hearing, DCS sought to change the
permanency plan from reunification to adoption. Father appeared at the
1
The career offender provision was predicated on his prior convictions for dealing in illegal substances in
2004 and 2009. He also had a prior conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon
in 2009.
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permanency hearing by counsel but not in person or telephonically. The trial
court acknowledged Father’s participation in the programs offered at the
Kentucky jail. See Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 at 11 (“I’m thrilled that I have a man in
prison who is working on bettering his life. It’s refreshing.”). Father’s counsel,
his fourth public defender, indicated that she had just recently been appointed
to the case and had not had an opportunity to consult with Father. She
indicated that she had studied Father’s file and that his preference was for Child
to remain in Aunt’s care and eventually be placed with him after his release.
Aunt testified that she and Father had agreed that she should adopt Child and
that they had talked about him living with her and Child on his eventual release
and possibly giving Child the option of living with him once he gets established.
The trial court indicated that Aunt’s description of what she and Father had
discussed was not adoption. The court told Father’s counsel and Aunt that they
needed to clarify matters with Father during the ensuing months of the
termination proceedings. The trial court changed the permanency plan to
adoption, citing Mother’s heroin addiction and failure to engage in services,
Child’s need for stability and security, Child’s bond with Aunt, and the fact that
Father was facing a lengthy term of incarceration in federal prison.
[6] DCS filed a termination petition, and Mother signed a consent to adoption. 2
The court conducted a factfinding hearing on June 18 and July 24, 2019, and
Father appeared by counsel and participated telephonically from the Michigan
2
Mother did not participate in the factfinding hearing and is not involved in this appeal.
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federal prison. Father testified that although he had not seen Child since
October 2018, he had been talking to her on the phone three or four times per
week since then. He also expressed his desire to live with Aunt and Child when
he is released from prison in 2030 and to get a job so that he can help with
household expenses. Guardian ad litem (GAL) Erika Davis and two DCS
family case managers (FCMs) testified that termination and adoption by Aunt
are in Child’s best interests. Two of these service providers were questioned
concerning guardianship, versus adoption, as the best permanency plan. GAL
Davis testified that she did not believe that guardianship was a satisfactory plan
in this case due to Child’s young age and the availability of ongoing financial
help for adoptive families. Tr. Vol. 2 at 54. FCM Supervisor Laura Houston
explained that guardianship is never a recommended plan for children under
age thirteen because financial assistance is not available for younger children in
guardianships. Id. at 60-61. The trial court issued an order with findings of fact
and conclusions thereon, terminating Father’s parental relationship with Child.
Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – Father waived his due process argument by failing
to raise it in the trial court.
[7] Father first contends that he was denied due process, claiming that DCS failed
to prove that it provided him notice of the permanency hearing changing the
plan from reunification to adoption. When seeking to terminate a parent-child
relationship, the State must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. S.L. v. Ind.
Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). This means
that the State must proceed in a fundamentally fair manner that affords parents
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011).
[8] Father’s complaint pertains to one of the CHINS permanency hearings, not to
one of the termination hearings. We acknowledge the intertwined nature of
CHINS and termination proceedings and the fact that due process protections
are vital throughout the CHINS proceedings due to their potential to interfere
with a parent’s upbringing of his child. In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind.
2014). The statute governing permanency hearings includes requirements that
the court consider and approve a permanency plan, consider the
recommendations of certain persons including parents, determine whether the
existing plan must be modified, and examine procedural safeguards used by
DCS to protect parental rights. Ind. Code § 31-34-21-7(b). Those procedural
safeguards include a requirement that DCS give the parent seven days’ notice of
a permanency hearing. See Ind. Code § 31-34-21-4(a) (“at least seven (7) days
before the periodic case review, including a case review that is a permanency
hearing under section 7 of this chapter, [DCS] shall provide notice of the review
to … [t]he child’s parent and [parent’s] attorney”). “[DCS] shall present proof
of service of the notice required … at the periodic review.” Ind. Code § 31-34-
21-4(b). The parent is among those persons with the right to submit a written
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statement to the court listing his permanency recommendations and to present
oral testimony and cross-examine witnesses. Ind. Code § 31-34-21-4(d).
[9] Father alleges that DCS failed to prove that it provided him the required notice
so that he could be heard in a meaningful manner at the September 2018
permanency hearing. 3 The CHINS chronological case summary does not
indicate whether (or to what address) DCS sent Father such notice. Petitioner’s
Ex. 1. Based on our review of the record as a whole, Father appears to be
correct that DCS did not prove that it sent him the required notice of the
September 2018 permanency hearing. However, he was represented by counsel
at that hearing, and his counsel did not raise the notice issue in the trial court,
either during that hearing or at any time thereafter. Counsel indicated that she
was brand new to the case and had not yet consulted with Father personally but
had studied his file. She did not know whether he had received notice of the
hearing but stated that his file indicated his general preference to appear
telephonically at hearings and that she had not arranged for that. The hearing
took place just after Father’s sentencing in his federal criminal case, around the
time that he was transferred from the county jail in Kentucky to the federal
3
Indiana courts have held that the parent’s right to be heard does not mean that a parent has an absolute
right to be physically present at the hearing; rather, the parent’s appearance by counsel has been held to
satisfy the requirements of due process. See, e.g., Hite v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 845
N.E.2d 175, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no due process violation where incarcerated father appeared
only by counsel at permanency hearing); see also C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 920-21 (telephonic participation of
incarcerated parent at termination factfinding hearing held not to amount to due process violation); cf. In re
K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 248-49 (Ind. 2014) (fact that parent has no absolute constitutional right to be personally
present at termination hearing does not mean procedural fairness was satisfied if parent “was not heard at
any time or in any manner.”).
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prison in Michigan. At any rate, his counsel asked for a continuance, which
was denied, but did not object on the basis of insufficient notice to Father.
[10] Although procedural irregularities during CHINS and termination proceedings
may be of such significance that they deprive a parent of procedural due
process, the parent must raise due process claims at the trial level to avoid
waiver. S.L., 997 N.E.2d at 1120; see also McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family
& Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 194-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (a party may waive a
constitutional claim, including due process, by raising it for the first time on
appeal).
Compliance with the statutory procedure of the juvenile code is
mandatory to effect termination of parental rights. Although
statutory notice is a procedural precedent that must be performed
prior to commencing an action, it is not an element of plaintiff’s
claim. Failure to comply with statutory notice is thus a defense
that must be asserted. Once placed in issue, the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving compliance with the statute.
In re T.W., 831 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
[11] Here, the CHINS chronological case summary, Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, includes
no entry indicating that, in the months following the September 2018
permanency hearing, Father ever filed an objection concerning his alleged lack
of notice of that hearing or that he raised the notice issue during either of two
subsequent CHINS hearings held in January and April 2019. Additionally, he
did not raise the notice issue during the termination factfinding hearing, where
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he appeared both telephonically and by counsel. As such, he did not provide
the trial court “a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits” of his due
process claim before seeking an opinion on appeal. Endres v. Ind. State Police,
809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004). Thus, he has waived the issue for our
consideration.
[12] Notwithstanding, Father characterizes DCS’s failure to prove that it sent him
notice as fundamental error due to what he characterizes as the “domino” effect
of the change of the permanency plan. Appellant’s Br. at 18. Error is
“fundamental” if it is so prejudicial to the rights of the respondent that it makes
a fair proceeding impossible. Matter of D.G., 702 N.E.2d 777, 779 n.2 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998). As discussed more fully below, the matter about which Father
complains, i.e., that guardianship, not termination, is in Child’s best interests,
was thoroughly litigated during the termination factfinding hearing, where
Father appeared both telephonically and by counsel and therefore was
meaningfully heard. Thus, Father has failed to establish prejudice.
Section 2 – Father has failed to establish that the trial court
clearly erred in concluding that there is a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal
and continued placement outside the home will not be
remedied.
[13] Father also contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental
relationship with Child. When reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions thereon in a case involving the termination of parental rights, we
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first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the
findings support the judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We
will set aside the trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Bester v.
Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). “A
judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s
conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” In re A.G., 45
N.E.3d 471, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (2016). Unchallenged
findings stand as proven, and we simply determine whether the unchallenged
findings are sufficient to support the judgment. T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs.,
971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; see also McMaster v.
McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (unchallenged findings are
accepted as true). In conducting our review, we neither reweigh evidence nor
judge witness credibility. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. Rather, we consider only the
evidence and inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. “[I]t is not enough
that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively
require the conclusion contended for by the appellant before there is a basis for
reversal.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).
[14] “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children – but this right is not
absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,
their parental rights may be terminated.” Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45-46
(Ind. 2019) (citation omitted). To obtain a termination of a parent-child
relationship, DCS is required to establish in pertinent part:
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(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree.
….
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
[15] In recognition of the seriousness with which we address parental termination
cases, Indiana has adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard. Ind.
Code § 31-37-14-2; Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367,
377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Clear and convincing evidence need
not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the
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child’s survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by
the respondent parent’s custody.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind.
2013) (citation omitted). “[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a
[termination] petition … are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child
relationship.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).
[16] Father asserts that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that a reasonable
probability exists that the conditions that led to Child’s removal and continued
placement outside the home will not be remedied. 4 When assessing whether
there is a reasonable probability that conditions that led to a child’s removal
will not be remedied, we must consider not only the initial basis for the child’s
removal but also the bases for continued placement outside the home. In re
A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Moreover, “the
trial court should judge a parent’s fitness to care for his children at the time of
the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed
conditions.” In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
“Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not
preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of
their future behavior.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. “Due to the permanent effect of
4
Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child’s well-being. Indiana Code Section 31-
35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires DCS to prove only one of the three circumstances listed. Because we find no error
concerning the reasonable probability that the conditions prompting Child’s removal will not be remedied,
we need not address the threat to Child’s well-being.
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termination, the trial court also must evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of
conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the
child.” J.T., 742 N.E.2d at 512. In making its case, “DCS need not rule out all
possibilities of change; rather, [it] need establish only that there is a reasonable
probability that the parent’s behavior will not change.” In re Kay.L., 867
N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The court may properly consider
evidence of a parent’s substance abuse, criminal history, lack of employment or
adequate housing, history of neglect, and failure to provide support. McBride,
798 N.E.2d at 199.
[17] Father correctly points out that the conditions that prompted Child’s initial
removal pertained to Mother. However, Father’s incarceration contributed to
Child’s continued placement with Aunt. With respect to the reasonable
probability that these conditions will remain unremedied, Father specifically
challenges only the court’s ultimate finding, which reads,
20. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in [Child’s] removal and continued placement outside of
the home will not be remedied by [Father]. [Father] has been
incarcerated for [Child’s] entire life and will not be released until
2030 at which time [Child] will be thirteen (13) years of age.
Father has no viable plan for supporting the child or even himself
upon his release from prison.
Appealed Order at 2.
[18] We acknowledge Father’s assertion that his parental rights should not be
terminated solely on the basis of his incarceration. Our supreme court has
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emphasized that incarceration is an insufficient basis upon which to terminate a
parent’s rights. K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 643 (Ind. 2015)
(citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1264-66 (Ind. 2009)). Here, the trial court
chronicled Father’s lengthy criminal history, observing the following: that he
had been imprisoned for drug-related offenses from 2004 to 2006, after which
he returned to his pattern of dealing drugs and also unlawfully possessed
firearms; this precipitated a longer term of incarceration from 2009 to 2013,
followed by another cycle of drug dealing and firearms offenses. This time, the
sum of Father’s past and present offenses landed him an enhanced sentence of
over fifteen years in federal prison, with an expected release date of 2030.
Father testified that he was not addicted to drugs but was addicted to
distributing them. Tr. Vol. 2 at 22. Based on our reading of the record and the
order, we conclude that it was not Father’s incarceration, per se, that formed
the basis for termination; rather, it was the fact that he was not due to be
released for another eleven years, coupled with his pattern of reverting to
increasingly dangerous criminal behavior after each of his previous releases
from incarceration.
[19] As for Father’s plan to support himself and Child when he is released from
prison, he testified that he intends to move in with Aunt and Child and try to
build his relationship with Child, who will be nearly thirteen years old. He also
testified that he believed he could get a job and help pay the bills. These
assertions are general and speculative, especially since they involve job
prospects nearly eleven years down the road and involve a job applicant who
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has an extensive criminal record and will be on probation for six years upon his
release. We find no clear error in the trial court’s ultimate finding that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that precipitated Child’s removal and
continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.
Section 3 – Father has failed to establish that the trial court
clearly erred in concluding that termination is in Child’s best
interests.
[20] Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination of the
parent-child relationship is in Child’s best interests. To determine what is in the
best interests of a child, we must look at the totality of the circumstances. In re
A.W., 62 N.E.3d 1267, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The trial court “need not
wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child
relationship.” S.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 37, 47 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014), trans. denied. Although not dispositive, permanency and stability are key
considerations in determining the child’s best interests. G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at
1265. “A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment along
with the parent’s current inability to do the same supports a finding that
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” In re A.P.,
981 N.E.2d 75, 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of
Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).
Likewise, “the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed.
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[21] Father’s best-interests argument essentially focuses on whether adoption is a
satisfactory plan for Child. The statutory requirement that DCS establish that
“there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child” has not
typically been a difficult hurdle to overcome. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994,
1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“Indiana courts have traditionally held that for a
plan to be ‘satisfactory,’ for the purposes of the termination statute, it ‘need not
be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the
child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.’”) (quoting
Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 365), trans. denied. Where, as here, the plan involves
adoption by an aunt who has cared for a nearly two-year-old child since shortly
after her birth, the satisfactory-plan requirement is easily established. What
Father essentially maintains is that adoption, while satisfactory in a general
sense, is not the plan that satisfies the best-interests requirement.
[22] A significant portion of the factfinding hearing addressed the issue of whether
adoption or guardianship is in Child’s best interests. GAL Davis and FCM
Supervisor Houston were questioned concerning guardianship as a possible
permanency plan. These service providers articulated the differences between
the two options, and each considered it significant that there is financial
assistance available to adoptive families but not to those who serve as guardians
for children under age thirteen. They also explained that while guardianship is
considered a more viable option when a child is in her teens, adoption is
generally preferred for children who are extremely young, as in this case. Even
though Aunt was not in need of financial assistance as of the date of the
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factfinding hearing, the service providers noted that Child is presently receiving
occupational and speech therapy through DCS, and they expressed their
concern that once Aunt would begin to bear the expense of Child’s treatment
and services, she might discover that she needs financial assistance, especially
in a guardianship that spans such a protracted period.
[23] As support for his argument for a guardianship, Father relies on In re R.S.,
where our supreme court stated, “when a child is in relative placement, and the
permanency plan is adoption into the home where the child has lived for years
already, prolonging the adoption is unlikely to have an effect upon the child.”
56 N.E.3d 625, 630 (Ind. 2016). In R.S., the consensus among the service
providers was that the child shared a close bond with his father. Id. at 627-28.
Despite testimony from the family case manager, therapist, and guardian ad
litem that adoption by the grandmother was in R.S.’s best interests, the
guardian ad litem nevertheless recommended continued visitation between the
child and his father. Id. at 628. R.S. was ten years old at the time of the
factfinding hearing, and the father had been incarcerated for three years and
three months. Id. at 626. In contrast, here, Child was not yet two years old at
the time of the factfinding hearing, and Father has been incarcerated since her
birth, has never lived with her, and would not be available to live with her until
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his release in 2030, when she will be nearly thirteen years old. 5 Thus, R.S. is
distinguishable.
[24] In sum, the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s relationship with Child
was not based solely on the fact that he was incarcerated, nor was it simply a
matter of Aunt providing a “better” home. See In re R.A., 19 N.E.3d 313, 321
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (mere fact children are in better home cannot be sole basis
for termination), trans. denied (2015). Rather, the court considered the totality
of the circumstances, including Father’s pattern of committing increasingly
serious offenses, his lengthy sentence with an expected release date of 2030,
Child’s need for stability and permanency, and Child’s strong bond with Aunt
at the only home she has ever known. Child is currently two years old. Even if
Father is able to break his cycle of reverting to criminal activity and can
accomplish his goals of securing a job in 2030 and helping Aunt navigate
Child’s teen years, Child needs stability and should not have to wait a decade to
have these matters resolved. Father has failed to demonstrate clear error in the
trial court’s decision to terminate his parental relationship with Child.
Accordingly, we affirm.
5
We acknowledge Father’s assertion that it would take a court decision to dissolve Aunt’s guardianship over
Child. However, our courts have long held that where a parent is attempting to (re)gain custody of a child in
custody of a third party, “[t]here is a strong presumption that a child’s interests are best served by placement
with the natural parent … [and the] parent’s burden to show a modification of custody is justified is
minimal.” Matter of Guardianship of I.R., 77 N.E.3d 810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
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[25] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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