Jemel Young v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Feb 15 2016, 9:24 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. Burns Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jemel Young, February 15, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1505-CR-316
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela D. Davis,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Allan Reid,
Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1411-CM-52686
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Jemel Young appeals his conviction for battery as a class B misdemeanor.
Young raises two issues, one of which we find dispositive and which we revise
and restate as whether the court abused its discretion in admitting certain
testimony. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On November 18, 2014, Indiana State Trooper Corey Berfield was patrolling
southbound on Interstate 465 when he received a dispatch regarding an
occurrence on the interstate. He turned around and proceeded northbound,
and at some point he came upon the vehicle in question and observed a male
and female inside. He learned that the male driver was a Good Samaritan, who
had observed the female, later identified as Amber Rogers, walking along the
interstate and let her sit in his car until police arrived. Trooper Berfield
observed that Rogers was very upset, was “crying,” and was “just kind of
frantic about the situation and what had occurred.” Transcript at 8. Trooper
Berfield observed redness and swelling on the left side of Rogers’s jaw, and
although she complained of tenderness in that area she declined medical
attention both at the scene and later at the State Police Post. Based on his
conversation with Rogers, Trooper Berfield made a report to the Noblesville
Police Department to “keep an eye out for a certain vehicle, individual at a
certain location,” that being Young. Id. at 23. The entire time Trooper Berfield
spoke with Rogers, she was upset and crying.
[3] Young was located in downtown Noblesville by Noblesville Police Officer
Jason McDermott, who confirmed that he was following Young, activated his
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lights and sirens, pulled Young over, and detained him. Officer McDermott
informed Young of his Miranda rights, and Young voluntarily began speaking
with him. He admitted to the officer that he was driving with Rogers on the
highway, that they were arguing in the car, that he told Rogers to “get the f---
out the car,” Exhibit 6 at Officer McDermott Camera 1, 11:25:58- 11:26:02,
and that when she refused he “nudged her” out of the vehicle. Transcript at 42.
Young also acknowledged that Rogers was stuck on the interstate after she had
been nudged from the vehicle.
[4] On November 24, 2014, the State charged Young with battery resulting in
bodily injury as a class A misdemeanor. On April 17, 2015, the court held a
bench trial. Rogers did not appear as a witness. Over Young’s objection, the
court admitted the testimony of Trooper Berfield pursuant to Ind. Evidence
Rule 803(2) that Rogers had told him that there had been an incident in a
vehicle with Young, that Young drove a white Chevrolet Impala, and that
Young was on his way to work at a golf course located in Hamilton County. In
admitting the statements, the court stated: “We have not established how much
time elapsed during this time frame. I think that [the State] is correct there is no
limitation on the excited utterance. If the Officer testifies that she was still very
excited, I think you accept the scope wise.” Id. at 17.
[5] At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Young moved for involuntary
dismissal under Ind. Trial Rule 41(B), and the court ruled that, although the
State did not prove that Young was guilty of battery resulting in bodily injury as
a class A misdemeanor, it could proceed under the lesser included offense of
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battery as a class B misdemeanor. Young testified as to his version of the events
leading to Rogers exiting the vehicle on the date in question. At the conclusion
of trial, the court found Young guilty of battery as a class B misdemeanor and
sentenced him to 180 days with 152 days suspended to probation and the
balance credited for time served.
Discussion
[6] The dispositive issue is whether the court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence of Rogers’s statements to Trooper Berfield under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule. Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling on
the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Noojin v.
State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. 2000). We reverse only where the decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v.
State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied. We will not reverse an
error in the admission of evidence if the error was harmless. Turner v. State, 953
N.E.2d 1039, 1058 (Ind. 2011). Errors in the admission of evidence are to be
disregarded unless they affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 1059. In
determining the effect of the evidentiary ruling on a defendant’s substantial
rights, we look to the probable effect on the fact-finder. Id. The improper
admission is harmless error if the conviction is supported by substantial
independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court that there is no
substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Id.
[7] Young challenges the court’s decision to admit statements Rogers made to
Trooper Berfield that an incident occurred, the identification of Young, and
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how to locate Young, arguing that such statements were inadmissible hearsay
because they do not conform to the excited utterance exception. Hearsay is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule
801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless admitted pursuant to a recognized
exception. Ind. Evidence Rule 802. An excited utterance is such an exception
and is defined as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.” Ind. Evidence Rule 803(2). Application of this rule is not
mechanical and admissibility should generally be determined on a case-by-case
basis. Palacios v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Love
v. State, 714 N.E.2d 698, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied). Thus, the heart
of the inquiry is whether the statement is inherently reliable because the
declarant was incapable of thoughtful reflection. Id. (citing Yamobi v. State, 672
N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ind. 1996)). The statement must be trustworthy under the
specific facts of the case at hand. Id. The focus is on whether the statement was
made while the declarant was under the influence of the excitement engendered
by the startling event. Id. The amount of time that has passed between the
event and the statement is not dispositive; rather, the issue is whether the
declarant was still under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event
when the statement was made. Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007).
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[8] Young specifically argues that time had elapsed between the time Rogers
entered the car of the Good Samaritan and spoke with him and the time that
Trooper Berfield came upon the car, that the State did not present evidence
regarding the length of time that had elapsed, and that accordingly the State did
not lay an adequate foundation to show that Rogers’s statements were made
under extreme and continuing stress of the startling event. The State argues
that the amount of time that passed between the startling event and the
statement is not dispositive and that the evidence demonstrated that Rogers was
crying and upset when she spoke with Trooper Berfield. The State also argues
that any error in the admission of the testimony was at most harmless in nature.
[9] The parties discuss the case of Young v. State, 980 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012). In Young, on the morning of May 28, 2011, Dulce Gomez visited
defendant James Young and Blanca Medrano at their apartment and observed
them argue and saw James leave with the couple’s two-year-old child. 980
N.E.2d at 416. She did not observe any physical contact between the couple
while she was there and until she left at around 10:30 a.m. Id. Around noon,
Medrano walked across the street to the fire department and eventually sat
down on a bench outside and cried. Id. Acting Lieutenant Michael Hochstetler
approached her and asked what was wrong. Id. At first Medrano did not tell
him and continued crying, Hochstetler observed “bruising on her arm and on
her neck and an abrasion on her hand,” and Medrano then told him that her
husband had beaten her and left with their other child. Id. Hochstetler asked
another firefighter, Gene Sanders, to do a patient assessment, and he called
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dispatch for a police officer. Id. Medrano spoke to Hochstetler and Sanders for
about forty-five minutes before the police arrived, but they had trouble
communicating due to a language barrier. Id. By the time the police arrived,
Hochstetler believed that Medrano “was ‘getting kind of antsy to leave’ and
when the police arrived, she ‘was no longer crying.’” Id. at 417. When
Corporal Laurie Stuff of the Elkhart City Police Department arrived, she
“noticed that Medrano had ‘redness to her neck,’ a bandage on her right hand,
and some bruising,” she “thought Medrano appeared ‘upset, she was crying,
she seemed scared,’ and Medrano told Officer Stuff that ‘her husband had
strangled her’ until she could not breathe.” Id. James was charged with
strangulation as a class D felony and domestic battery as a class D felony. Id.
At trial, Medrano failed to appear and the firefighters and Officer Stuff testified
regarding the statements Medrano made to them, which were admitted as
excited utterances. Id. James was found guilty as charged. Id.
[10] On appeal, James admitted that the statements of the firefighters were
admissible as excited utterances, but he challenged Officer Stuff’s testimony in
that regard.1 Id. at 418, 420. We noted that “[w]hile lapse of time is not
dispositive, if a statement is made long after a startling event, it is usually less
likely to be an excited utterance” because “[a] long period of time reduces the
likelihood that a statement is made without deliberate thought and under the
1
James challenged the admissibility of the firefighters’ testimony under the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause. 980 N.E.2d at 418-420.
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stress of excitement of an event.” Id. at 421 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). We held that Medrano’s statements were not admissible as excited
utterances because Officer Stuff did not speak with her until about an hour after
the incident, and the firefighters had treated her injuries prior to Officer Stuff’s
arrival. Id. at 421-422. We further noted that although Officer Stuff testified
that Medrano was crying when she arrived, the evidence revealed that at some
time prior to her arrival Medrano had stopped crying and “was ‘antsy to
leave.’” Id. at 422. We also concluded that the admission of Officer Stuff’s
testimony was not harmless because it “was not cumulative; rather, it was the
only testimony that supported the State’s strangulation charge against [James].”
Id. We ruled that “[i]t is axiomatic that improper admission of the only
proffered evidence that supports a charge cannot be harmless error” and that
accordingly “[w]e must therefore reverse [James’s] conviction for strangulation,
subject, however, to possible retrial.” Id. (citing Stahl v. State, 686 N.E.2d 89(1997) (“[I]f all the evidence, even that erroneously admitted, is sufficient to
support the jury verdict, double jeopardy does not bar a retrial on the same
charge.”).
[11] The evidence presented revealed that Rogers was walking on Interstate 465
when she entered the vehicle of the Good Samaritan. Later, Trooper Berfield,
who was driving southbound on the interstate, received a dispatch regarding the
vehicle, and he turned around and proceeded to the vehicle. It is the State’s
burden to lay a proper foundation for evidence it seeks to admit. Here, the
State failed to establish any length of time as to how long Rogers was in the car
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with the Good Samaritan before Trooper Berfield came upon the scene, nor did
the State show that Rogers remained under the stress of excitement from the
time of an incident with Young until she spoke with Trooper Berfield. In
admitting these statements, the court stated: “We have not established how
much time elapsed during this time frame. I think that [the State] is correct
there is no limitation on the excited utterance. If the Officer testifies that she
was still very excited, I think you accept the scope wise.” Transcript at 17. It is
unclear exactly what the trial court meant, but we find that the State did not
establish that Rogers was still under the stress of excitement caused by the
startling event or whether she had the opportunity for thoughtful reflection
before Trooper Berfield came upon the scene. Thus, we find that the court
abused its discretion when it admitted Trooper Berfield’s testimony regarding
Rogers’s statements under the excited utterance exception.
[12] Also, similar to Young, we cannot say that the error was harmless. Rogers’s
statements were not cumulative and constituted the only evidence indicating
that an incident between Young and Rogers had occurred and provided the
identity evidence necessary to link Young to the incident, including his name,
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the car he drove, and where he could be located. 2 We therefore reverse Young’s
conviction for battery as a class B misdemeanor, subject to retrial. 3
Conclusion
[13] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Young’s conviction for battery as a class
B misdemeanor, subject to retrial.
[14] Reversed.
Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
2
We note that the State does not argue that some or all of the statements were admissible for another
purpose, and the trial court made clear that it was accepting the statements for the truth of the matters
asserted and not as course of investigation testimony.
3
To the extent that Young challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him, we note that Young told
Officer McDermott that he was driving with Rogers on the highway, that they were arguing in the car, that
he told Rogers to “get the f--- out the car,” Exhibit 6 at Officer McDermott Camera 1, 11:25:58- 11:26:02,
and that when she refused he “nudged her” out of the vehicle. Transcript at 42. See Stahl v. State, 686 N.E.2d
89 (1997) (“[I]f all the evidence, even that erroneously admitted, is sufficient to support the jury verdict,
double jeopardy does not bar a retrial on the same charge.”).
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