Santiago Valdez v. State of Indiana ( 2015 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    Jan 22 2015, 10:03 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the
    case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                                  ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
    JOEL C. WEINEKE                                          GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Weineke Law Office, LLC                                  Attorney General of Indiana
    Plainfield, Indiana
    JESSE R. DRUM
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    )
    SANTIAGO VALDEZ,                                 )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                      )
    )
    vs.                                )   No. 18A05-1407-CR-304
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                       )
    APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Kimberly S. Dowling, Judge
    Cause No. 18C02-1204-FB-3
    January 22, 2015
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BAILEY, Judge
    Case Summary
    Santiago Valdez (“Valdez”) was found mentally competent to stand trial on charges
    of Attempted Rape,1 Criminal Confinement,2 Attempted Incest,3 Intimidation,4 and
    Battery,5 but his motion to proceed pro-se was denied. Valdez pursued an interlocutory
    appeal, presenting the sole issue of whether the denial is clearly erroneous. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    On April 7, 2012, Muncie police officers responded to a 9-1-1 call at a residence
    where they found a naked, screaming woman and Valdez standing behind her. The State
    brought criminal charges against Valdez and he was appointed a public defender. On July
    13, 2012, counsel filed a “Suggestion of Insanity” and requested that Valdez be examined
    by Dr. Craig Buckles, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Frank Krause, a psychologist. (App. 85.)
    Counsel also advised the trial court that Valdez had previously been a professional boxer
    and had sustained blows to his head.
    After interviewing Valdez, Drs. Buckles and Krause opined that Valdez was able to
    appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Valdez was found competent to stand trial.
    On August 16, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on Valdez’s request to proceed
    pro-se and initially granted the motion.
    Over the next few months, Valdez filed numerous motions.                         Although some
    appeared to be appropriate motions, Valdez also claimed that he needed to be tested for
    1
    Ind. Code §§ 35-42-4-1, 35-41-5-1.
    2
    Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3.
    3
    Ind. Code §§ 35-46-1-3, 35-41-5-1.
    4
    Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1.
    5
    Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1. We refer to the statutes in effect at the time of Valdez’s alleged offenses.
    2
    mind-altering drugs and requested an investigation of the sheriff’s department.                      On
    December 28, 2012, the trial court ordered an evaluation of Valdez’s competency to stand
    trial.
    Dr. Rebecca Mueller, a psychiatrist, was appointed to evaluate Valdez. After
    administration of a “cursory exam that was along the lines of a Folstein mini mental status,”
    Tr. 57, Dr. Mueller did not perceive “glaring thought disorders.” (Tr. 65.) Nor did she
    find evidence of “dementia pugilistica.”6 (Tr. 65.) Dr. James McDaniel, a psychologist,
    evaluated Valdez on January 11, 2013. He opined that Valdez was competent to stand trial
    and to proceed pro-se.
    On February 4, 2013, Valdez was examined for seven hours by Dr. Javan Horwitz,
    a neuropsychologist. According to Dr. Horwitz, Valdez appeared rational for the first four
    or five hours. However, he subsequently talked incoherently and displayed psychotic
    symptoms. Valdez reported to Dr. Horwitz that he was suffering persecution and had been
    subjected to electronic monitoring in his jail cell and the court room. He also reported that
    he was forced to undergo electronic surgery; specifically, his throat and heart had been cut.
    He complained of being sprayed with sulfuric acid and “dummy dust.” (Tr. 116.) Valdez
    offered to display burns on his body. To support his claim of torture, Valdez also proffered
    for testing a Ramen noodle bag containing fecal and saliva samples. Dr. Horwitz provided
    the trial court with a written report concluding that Valdez was not competent to stand trial
    or to represent himself. He diagnosed Valdez as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
    6
    Dr. Mueller also referred to the condition as “punch drunk encephalopathy,” a result of too many blows
    to the head. (Tr. 66.)
    3
    On March 7, 2013, the trial court conducted a competency hearing, at which Drs.
    Mueller, Horwitz, McDaniel, Buckles, and Krause testified and affirmed their written
    recommendations. The latter three acknowledged that Dr. Horwitz had performed the most
    extensive examination of Valdez to date. Dr. Horwitz testified that, although Valdez
    displayed moments of lucidity, he was not competent to stand trial due to “executive
    dysfunction and the significant thought disorder related to his schizophrenia.” (Tr. 112.)
    Valdez testified at the hearing, claiming that jail staff had tortured him and
    attempted to murder him. He stated that he had been given a “speed-type drug” causing a
    sixty-pound weight loss. (Tr. 136.) According to Valdez, food and water had been
    electronically removed from his stomach, chemicals had been emitted under his cell door,
    he had been cut up inside his body, he had been subjected to electronic implants, and he
    had been burned by lasers. He reported that jail employees and the Muncie Police
    Department were aiding the prosecution by monitoring him in the shower, cell, and
    courtroom. Valdez proffered a Cheetos bag of purported evidence and he asked that the
    trial court order his body examined for burns.
    At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Valdez’s
    request to proceed pro-se. The trial court concluded that “the Defendant here cannot
    communicate coherently with the Court” and provided specific examples:
    The Defendant has provided “Cheetos” bags with paper towels folded up in
    them requesting the Court have them tested for poisons, etc.
    The Defendant has provided envelopes to the Court with pages of magazines
    folded inside of them asking that they be tested for poisons, and admitted as
    evidence.
    4
    The Defendant has filed voluminous pleadings and motions that ramble, are
    repetitive and are incoherent. Many of the motions make reference to being
    tortured in jail, the sheriff’s office attempting to murder him, being poisoned,
    etc.
    The Defendant has provided fecal and saliva samples to the FBI and to Dr.
    Horwitz asking that they be tested for proof of poisons.
    The Defendant has reported to numerous people that he hears voices coming
    from the ducts in the jail, and has asked to be moved to different cells as a
    result.
    The Defendant has difficult differentiating between fantasy and reality.
    The Defendant struggles with the connection between his moral knowledge,
    appreciation of his behaviors and social context, and his chosen actions and
    consequences.
    (App. 508.) The State, defense counsel, and the trial court agreed that Valdez was not
    competent to stand trial and Valdez was committed to the Logansport State Hospital
    Division of Mental Health. On June 6, 2013, the Superintendent certified that Valdez “has
    attained the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his
    defense.” (App. 516.)
    Valdez, through counsel, filed a renewal of his motion to proceed pro-se. On May
    29, 2014, a hearing was conducted at which Valdez testified. Valdez testified that “all
    through the night” prior to the hearing, he had been subjected to electronic cutting. (Tr.
    186.) He claimed to have suffered cuts to his neck, throat, and chest area. He described
    the defense he wished to assert on his own behalf, that is, that the victim had perjured
    herself during her deposition. He anticipated arguing that the 9-1-1 tape was false and that
    evidence had been fabricated by the Muncie Police Department. He opined it would be
    necessary to discuss his subjection to surveillance and electronic surgeries because it
    5
    formed part of the fabricated case against him. According to Valdez, he needed to depose
    police officers to garner evidence of the plot against him. Valdez’s counsel suggested that
    an insanity defense might be appropriate, but Valdez insisted he had never been insane.
    The trial court issued a second order with respect to Valdez’s request to proceed
    pro-se, specifically incorporating the findings from the order of March 7, 2013. The order
    included additional findings, providing in pertinent part:
    The Defendant has, and by his own admission, filed over one hundred (100)
    “motions” in this case, some while he was representing himself and some
    while he had counsel. The term “motion” is used loosely by the Court, in
    that most, if not all of these documents, were rambling documents wherein
    the Court was mostly unable to determine what action the Defendant wanted
    the Court to take; that is other than requesting the Court order full body scans
    of the Defendant because of the allegations that the Sheriff’s department is
    trying to murder him by using lasers to cut the backs of his eyes, his throat
    and his chest.
    As a part of this hearing, the Defendant demonstrated that he does not have
    a working knowledge of the rules of evidence. The Defendant’s definition
    of hearsay, for example, was nonsensical and rambling. His assertion that
    there is “totempole” hearsay is incomprehensible.
    The Defendant also demonstrated, through his testimony, that he does not
    have a working knowledge of voir dire, asserting that he is entitled to three
    strikes.
    The Defendant further demonstrated his lack of trial skills by asserting that
    his defense will be that these charges were fabricated ahead of time, that the
    police paid the alleged victim money and cocaine to file the report, and that
    the police falsified the 911 tape.
    Finally, the Defendant maintains that he continues to be tortured, that the Jail
    Staff is conducting illegal surveillance, and that the most recent incident of
    torture was continuously during the night before our hearing.
    (App. 591.) Concluding that Valdez’s “lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction
    or sentence and undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives of
    6
    providing a fair trial,” the trial court denied Valdez’s motion to proceed pro-se. This Court
    accepted jurisdiction of Valdez’s interlocutory appeal.
    Discussion and Decision
    A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is essential to the fairness of a
    criminal proceeding. Drake v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 389
    , 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
    Gideon v. Wainwright, 
    372 U.S. 335
    , 344-45 (1963)). Implicit in the right to counsel is
    the right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 
    422 U.S. 806
    , 819 (1975).
    However, the right of self-representation is not absolute. “[A] trial court may deny
    a defendant’s request to act pro se when the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial
    but suffers from severe mental illness to the point where he is not competent to conduct
    trial proceedings by himself.” Edwards v. State, 
    902 N.E.2d 821
    , 824 (Ind. 2009) (citing
    Indiana v. Edwards, 
    554 U.S. 164
    (2008)).7 The trial court’s determination of competence
    to act pro se will be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 
    Id. “Clear error
    is that
    which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Austin
    v. State, 
    997 N.E.2d 1027
    , 1040 (Ind. 2013). In reviewing for clear error, we neither
    reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the
    probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. 
    Id. Mental competency
    is not a static condition; accordingly, it is to be determined at
    the time of trial. 
    Edwards, 902 N.E.2d at 827
    . “[I]f a defendant is so impaired that a
    7
    Article 1, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides “no broader right to self-representation of
    mentally impaired persons” than that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
    Edwards, 902 N.E.2d at 828
    .
    Valdez also alleged a violation of Article 1, section 3 of the Indiana Constitution, but developed no
    corresponding argument.
    7
    coherent presentation of a defense is unlikely, fairness demands that the court insist upon
    representation.” 
    Id. at 829.
    The record reveals that Valdez suffers from a severe mental illness. Dr. Krause
    rendered to the trial court a report including a diagnosis that Valdez suffers from an
    antisocial personality disorder and schizotypal personality disorder. Dr. Buckles issued a
    report including his finding that Valdez displays symptoms suggestive of schizophrenia.
    Dr. Horwitz, who examined Valdez most thoroughly, diagnosed Valdez as a paranoid
    schizophrenic.
    As to Valdez’s competence to conduct trial proceedings himself, the trial court heard
    abundant testimony and was in a position to observe Valdez’s demeanor and conduct at
    multiple hearings. Valdez consistently claimed that he had been framed for crimes he did
    not commit, he had been subjected to torture at the hands of law enforcement personnel,
    and an appropriate defense would include claims that all evidence against him, including
    the 9-1-1 call tape, had been fabricated. He had filed numerous motions – many of which
    were indecipherable – and he had requested a polygraph test to reveal the truth of his
    accusations of torture. Valdez had, on multiple occasions, proffered food bags containing
    his excrement, which he asserted would reveal evidence of his subjection to torture.
    Valdez, by counsel, points to evidence that Valdez is intelligent and articulate, and
    asserts that the “trial court’s criticisms were unfounded and exaggerated.” (Appellant’s
    Br. at 16.) According to Valdez, he displayed an appropriate understanding of the
    definition of hearsay and the process of voir dire. Valdez presents us with an invitation to
    reweigh the evidence, which we decline. 
    Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040
    .
    8
    Conclusion
    The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Valdez suffers from severe mental
    illness such that he is not competent to represent himself at trial.
    Affirmed.
    ROBB, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A05-1407-CR-304

Filed Date: 1/22/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021