in-the-matter-of-the-term-of-the-parent-child-relationship-m-v-j-v ( 2015 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                Oct 08 2015, 8:41 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Cynthia Phillips Smith                                    Gregory F. Zoeller
    Law Office of Cynthia P. Smith                            Attorney General of Indiana
    Lafayette, Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    David E. Corey
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                          October 8, 2015
    of the Parent-Child Relationship                          Court of Appeals Case No.
    of: M.V. & J.V., (Minor Children)                         79A02-1503-JT-187
    And                                                       Appeal from the Tippecanoe
    Superior Court
    M.H. (Mother)
    The Honorable Thomas K.
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Milligan, Senior Judge
    v.                                                Trial Court Cause Nos.
    79D03-1410-JT-44
    79D03-1410-JT-45
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015       Page 1 of 14
    Case Summary and Issue
    [1]   M.H. (“Mother”) appeals a juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
    rights to her children M.V. and J.V (the “Children”). Mother raises several
    issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the juvenile
    court’s termination order is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
    Concluding the juvenile court’s order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On June 20, 2013, the Lafayette Police Department (“LPD”) received a request
    for a child welfare check at the residence of Mother and T.V. (“Father”).1
    Upon arrival, LPD entered the home where two-year-old M.V. was present.
    LPD recognized an odor of burnt marijuana and discovered drug
    paraphernalia. LPD immediately contacted the Department of Child Services
    (“DCS”), as conditions in the home were deplorable and Mother was being
    arrested—for almost the 25th time—on an outstanding warrant. DCS arrived
    and discovered:
    The living room was cluttered with toys and a small pillow
    mattress that [M.V.] had been sleeping on. The kitchen floor was
    filthy with large spots where dirt on the floor was swept and not
    picked up. The counters were completely covered with dishes
    that contained old food on them. There were numerous pots and
    1
    Father does not appeal the juvenile court’s decision to terminate his parental rights. The record indicates
    “Father essentially has voluntarily terminated his parental rights by knowingly quitting services.” Appendix
    of Appellant at 23. References to Father are for the sole purpose of providing clarity.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015             Page 2 of 14
    pans on the stove covered with old food. The sink could not be
    accessible due to the amount of dishes spilling out of it. The little
    bit of counter space that was visible had stains, dirt, and what
    appeared to be ashes. There was almost no food in the
    refrigerator. The first bedroom had carpet that was filthy and
    trash scattered throughout the room. There was a cup in the
    room that appeared to have ashes in it. There were two reptile
    aquariums that housed a tarantula. These were very close to the
    edge of a dresser and had no lids from preventing the large spider
    to escape. The one bathroom in the residence appeared dirty.
    There were diapers and trash piled almost to the top of the
    counter to the left of the toilet. There was fecal matter that was
    sitting in the toilet and had built up over the past 5 days. The
    floors and walls were filthy throughout the house. [M.V.’s]
    clothes appeared to be filthy . . . .
    Documentary Exhibit 1 at 2. At the time, Mother was seven months pregnant
    with J.V.
    [3]   In early July, DCS removed M.V. from Mother’s custody and placed M.V. in
    her paternal grandmother’s care. Thereafter, DCS initiated Child in Need of
    Services (“CHINS”) proceedings. On July 15, Mother entered a guilty plea to
    aiding a burglary, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to six years in the
    Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), suspended to probation. On July
    31, M.V. was adjudicated a CHINS based on Mother’s recent arrest, the
    presence of illegal substances in the home, the condition of the home, and
    parents’ inability to provide a safe home environment. The juvenile court
    ordered M.V. remain in her paternal grandmother’s custody.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 3 of 14
    [4]   Mother and Father subsequently moved in with the paternal grandmother, thus
    reuniting with M.V. On August 14, the court ordered Mother and Father
    participate in reunification services. Specifically, Mother, who has a history of
    substance abuse and bipolar disorder, was to submit to mental health and
    substance use assessments, and participate in case management therapy. She
    never participated in any assessment and cancelled some therapy sessions.
    Following the court order, Mother gave birth to J.V. J.V. was not immediately
    removed from Mother’s and Father’s care because they were residing in the
    home of the Children’s paternal grandmother, had obtained employment, and
    were actively participating in services on M.V.’s case. On September 30,
    however, DCS filed a CHINS petition due to concerns regarding J.V.’s weight.
    [5]   On October 8, Mother was arrested for violating the terms of her probation and
    was released on home detention. On November 8, however, Mother was again
    arrested for violating the terms of her probation and home detention when
    alcohol was discovered in her residence. After the arrest, DCS made a surprise
    visit to the residence. DCS discovered “spice”2 and drug paraphernalia under a
    couch cushion. Additionally, both Mother and J.V., who was two months old
    at the time, tested positive for opiates. Because the paternal grandmother was
    moving to another state, the juvenile court ordered the Children be placed with
    a paternal great aunt and uncle. The trial court revoked Mother’s probation
    2
    “Spice” refers to certain synthetic forms of marijuana. See Elvers v. State, 
    22 N.E.3d 824
    , 828 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2014).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015              Page 4 of 14
    and Mother was sent to DOC, where she currently remains. On December 11,
    the juvenile court adjudicated J.V. a CHINS.
    [6]   On October 6, 2014, DCS filed a petition for termination of Mother’s parental
    rights. In December, the juvenile court conducted parent-child termination
    proceedings. DCS’ case manager testified Mother’s parental rights should be
    terminated:
    [DCS:] Why is it then that you articulate the position that we
    will be unlikely to remedy the problems that led to removal from
    [Mother]?
    [Case Manager:] Well [Mother] is currently incarcerated and
    will be for the next two years and she’s incarcerated due to things
    that she did at the beginning of the case.
    [DCS:] And so – and you had an opportunity to look backward
    at her history before the case began?
    [Case Manager:] Yes.
    [DCS:] And did [Mother], well tell us what – and I don’t think
    we need details just generally about [Mother’s] criminal history
    before our case began?
    [Case Manager:] She has a pretty extensive criminal history of
    runaways and theft.
    [DCS:] Is it fair to say that if [Mother] gets out of the
    Department of Corrections [sic] and does well, finds a job, keeps
    a job, finds a house, keeps a house, stays out of legal trouble that
    it will really be the first time in her life that she done so?
    [Case Manager:] Yes.
    Transcript at 33-34. Moreover, because M.V. displays symptoms of attention
    deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”) and bipolar disorder, and J.V. suffers
    from respiratory issues, DCS expressed concerns about Mother’s ability to care
    for her Children’s special needs. DCS recommended the Children be adopted
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 5 of 14
    by their paternal aunt and uncle because the Children were thriving in their
    placement with those relatives. The court-appointed special advocate
    (“CASA”) also recommended termination of Mother’s parental rights, noting
    Mother could not “provide a safe, supportive environment for [M.V.] and
    [J.V.].” 
    Id. at 82.
    [7]   On February 27, 2015, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother’s
    and Father’s parental rights. In doing so, the court noted, in relevant part:
    Mother has been continuously incarcerated since October 10,
    2013. Her projected outdate, at the time of termination hearing
    was August 16, 2016. She has not been available to participate in
    services since incarceration. Prior to incarceration, she only
    participated in services sporadically. She did not follow any of
    the assessments she had with treatment or other services and
    appeared to be unable or unwilling to cooperate with and follow
    the directives of the court and the Department of Child Services.
    Mother has not been able to maintain her own home, maintain
    employment, or provide stability or security for the [C]hildren.
    She has shown no satisfactory substance abuse treatment or
    mental health treatment. She has not demonstrated any
    understanding of reasonable expectations for child appropriate
    behavior and development as children grow and develop.
    ***
    The parents have not demonstrated a willingness to make lasting
    changes from past behaviors or maintain stability in order to care
    and provide adequately for the [C]hildren. Continuation of the
    parent-child relationships poses a threat to the well-being of the
    [C]hildren. The [C]hildren need parents with whom the
    [C]hildren can form a permanent and lasting bond to provide for
    the [C]hildren’s emotional and psychological as well as physical
    well-being. The [C]hildren’s well-being would be threatened by
    keeping the [C]hildren in parent-child relationships with parents
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 6 of 14
    whose own choices and actions have made them unable to meet
    the needs of the [C]hildren. DCS has a satisfactory plan of
    adoption for the care and treatment of the [C]hildren following
    termination of parental rights. The [C]hildren can be adopted
    and an appropriate permanent home has been found for the
    [C]hildren and that is to be adopted by the paternal great aunt
    and uncle with whom they have been in foster placement.
    App. of Appellant at 22-23. Mother now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Standard of Review
    [8]   “[T]he involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is
    designed to be used as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have
    failed.” In re C.G., 
    954 N.E.2d 910
    , 916 (Ind. 2011). Indiana Code section 31-
    35-2-4(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, what must be proven in order to
    terminate parental rights:
    (2) The petition must allege:
    ***
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
    outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
    child.
    ***
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 7 of 14
    The State must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. In re
    G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1261 (Ind. 2009). “Clear and convincing evidence need
    not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the
    child’s very survival.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 148 (Ind. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, it
    is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that “the child’s
    emotional and physical development are threatened” by parents’ custody. 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    “[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a petition . . . are
    true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Ind. Code § 31-35-
    2-8(a). “When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh
    the evidence or judge witness credibility.” In re 
    G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260
    .
    Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable
    to the juvenile court’s judgment. 
    Id. [9] Because
    the juvenile court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in
    terminating Mother’s parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review.
    First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we
    determine whether the findings support the judgment. 
    Id. We set
    aside a
    juvenile court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. 
    Id. A judgment
    is
    “clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the . . . conclusions or the
    conclusions do not support the judgment.” 
    Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 8 of 14
    II. Termination Order
    [10]   Mothers contends the juvenile court’s termination order was clearly erroneous
    in several respects. She claims DCS failed to prove the conditions resulting in
    the Children’s removal will not be remedied; DCS failed to prove she posed a
    threat to the Children’s well-being; and DCS failed to prove termination was in
    the Children’s best interest.
    [11]   First, Mother argues DCS failed to prove there was a reasonable probability the
    conditions leading to the Children’s removal from her care will not be
    remedied. “In determining whether the conditions that led to a child’s removal
    will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for her
    child at the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration
    evidence of changed conditions.” In re A.B., 
    924 N.E.2d 666
    , 670 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2010). The court may properly consider the services the State offered to
    the parent, and the parent’s response to such services. In re C.C., 
    788 N.E.2d 847
    , 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Further, DCS need not rule out all
    possibilities of change, but only establish there is a reasonable probability the
    parent’s behavior will not change. In re 
    A.B., 924 N.E.2d at 670
    .
    [12]   In terminating Mother’s parental rights, the court stated “Mother’s history of
    criminal convictions, drug use, and mental health issues along with her
    unwillingness or inability to address those issues leads the court to find that the
    aforesaid conditions and circumstances will not be remedied.” App. of
    Appellant at 23. Mother contends she has been drug free for the entirety of her
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 9 of 14
    incarceration, has completed classes in the DOC, and has been unable to
    complete mental health and substance use assessments due to her incarceration.
    We, however, must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to
    determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” In re
    
    A.B., 924 N.E.2d at 670
    (citation omitted).
    [13]   Following the birth of M.V. in September 2010, Mother violated the terms of
    her probation stemming from a conviction for possession of marijuana, and
    entered a guilty plea on multiple charges, including public intoxication,
    unlawful possession or use of a legend drug or precursor, and aiding a burglary.
    After the initiation of M.V.’s CHINS proceedings in July 2013 and the birth of
    J.V. the following month, Mother again was arrested for violating the terms of
    her probation by missing required appointments; she was released on home
    detention. Mother then violated the terms of her home detention by having
    alcohol in her residence and was arrested; DCS later discovered “spice” and
    drug paraphernalia in the home during a surprise visit. Moreover, Mother
    admitted to using heroin twice after the birth of J.V., and J.V. tested positive for
    opiates.
    [14]   Notwithstanding Mother’s criminal history, it is worth noting DCS did not
    immediately remove J.V. from Mother’s and Father’s custody. Nearly two
    months after the birth of J.V., however, DCS removed J.V. for the same reasons
    M.V. was removed: substance abuse and conditions of the home. Therefore,
    Mother was aware of the conditions she needed to remedy and had an
    opportunity to do so. She did not complete a mental health or substance use
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 10 of 14
    assessment prior to her incarceration; instead, she opted to abuse drugs and
    violate the terms of her probation. Mother’s unwillingness to take appropriate
    action—not her incarceration—evidences a “substantial probability of future
    neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 643 (Ind. 2014); see also In re
    L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“A pattern of unwillingness to
    deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social
    services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there
    exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.”), trans. denied,
    cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 1161
    (2002). The juvenile court did not clearly err in
    concluding the evidence shows a reasonable probability the conditions resulting
    in the Children’s removal will not be remedied.
    [15]   Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in finding that continuation of the
    parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being. However,
    Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive and
    requires only one element in that subsection be true to terminate parental rights.
    See In re I.A., 
    903 N.E.2d 146
    , 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Because we conclude
    the evidence is sufficient to show a reasonable probability the conditions
    resulting in the Children’s removal will not be remedied, we need not determine
    whether the court erred in concluding continuation of the parent-child
    relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being.
    [16]   Finally, Mother argues DCS failed to prove termination was in the Children’s
    best interest. Specifically, she contends the Children “have a relationship with
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 11 of 14
    [her], and it would not be in their best interests to have their relationship with
    their biological parent severed.” Brief of Appellant at 14.
    [17]   “In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the trial court is
    required to look beyond the factors identified by the DCS and look to the
    totality of the evidence.” In re H.L., 
    915 N.E.2d 145
    , 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before
    terminating the parent-child relationship. Recommendations of
    the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to
    evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be
    remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing
    evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.
    In re A.S., 
    17 N.E.3d 994
    , 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted), trans.
    denied.
    [18]   First, and as noted above, there is sufficient evidence that the conditions
    resulting in the Children’s removal will not be remedied, and both the CASA
    and the DCS case manager recommended termination. Second, the DCS case
    manager testified the Children have adapted well to their paternal aunt and
    uncle and recommended those relatives adopt the Children:
    [DCS:] And can you share with the Court please your
    observations about how they’re doing with these relatives?
    [Case Manager:] The children are extremely bonded to them.
    The relatives provide a very structured home for the kids. It’s
    safe.
    [DCS:] [H]ave you walked into a house yet where you
    immediately could feel these are foster parents; this is a foster
    home. This is not a normal family. Have you had that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 12 of 14
    experience?
    [Case Manager:] Yes.
    [DCS:] When you walk into this family’s home do you get any
    of that sense that this is a temporary or substitute home for these
    children or does it just feel like this is their home?
    [Case Manager:] Absolutely not, I mean they’re like a family
    when we go.
    [DCS:] All right, I mean everything about them functions like
    any other family with two young children?
    [Case Manager:] Yes.
    ***
    [DCS:] So if the Court were to grant the termination of parental
    rights, what is the department’s plan for the long term care and
    treatment of the [C]hildren?
    [Case Manager:] The plan is for [M.V.] and [J.V.] to be adopted
    by the paternal great-aunt and uncle.
    Tr. at 35-36, 41. The CASA agreed, noting the Children’s placement with
    relatives provided a safe home environment and assisted M.V. with her
    behavioral issues:
    [DCS:] And how is the – are you in agreement with that plan?
    [CASA:] Yes.
    [DCS:] And can you describe to the Judge the relationship with
    these children and their relative placement?
    [CASA:] They have formed a very strong bond with the entire
    family . . . aunt and uncle are incredibility [sic] supportive; they
    have provided much needed medical assistance to [M.V.] and
    [J.V.], much needed structure, discipline, proper nutrition. It is
    absolutely a family not just a foster home.
    [DCS:] And have you seen – what type of progress, if any, have
    you seen in [M.V.]’s emotional behavior while she’s been with
    relative placement?
    [CASA:] Well, since November I have observed that at the
    beginning when [M.V.] was asked to do something as simple as
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 13 of 14
    sit at a table and finish your meal from start to finish, she
    couldn’t do it at that beginning; massive temper tantrums,
    wouldn’t go to bed, had no bedtime set until she moved in with
    [aunt and uncle] and now I seen, although she still has issues, I
    mean she’s got a long road ahead of her, I see structure,
    discipline; she’s less tired, there are fewer temper tantrums. She
    will ask for things, not interrupt people; she just won’t take
    things. Overall a happier kid.
    
    Id. at 82-83.
    Finally, we note the Children need a stable environment,
    especially in light of M.V.’s behavioral issues and J.V.’s respiratory issues; the
    paternal relatives have shown they can provide the necessary support.
    [19]   Accordingly, DCS presented clear and convincing evidence from which the
    juvenile court could conclude that termination of Mother’s parental rights was
    in the best interests of the Children.
    Conclusion
    [20]   We reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of clear error.
    There is no such error here. DCS established by clear and convincing evidence
    the requisite elements to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights.
    The judgment of the juvenile court terminating Mother’s parental rights is
    affirmed.
    [21]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1503-JT-187 | October 8, 2015   Page 14 of 14