Mark Novak v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                         FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Jan 24 2018, 6:40 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                              and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Mary P. Lake                                             Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    La Porte, Indiana                                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Lyubov Gore
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Mark Novak,                                              January 24, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    46A05-1707-CR-1581
    v.                                               Appeal from the La Porte Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Thomas J.
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Alevizos, Judge
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    46C01-1209-FA-453
    46C01-1211-FA-540
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018           Page 1 of 9
    [1]   Mark Novak appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation. He asserts
    that the order violated his due process rights and that the trial court erred by
    executing the entirety of his suspended sentences with the Indiana Department
    of Correction (DOC). Finding no due process violation and no error, we
    affirm.
    Facts
    [2]   On September 4, 2012, the State charged Novak with Class A felony possession
    of a narcotic drug. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, on January 10, 2013,
    Novak pleaded guilty to Class B felony possession of a narcotic drug.
    Following a February 21, 2013, sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced
    him to six years, with three years executed in the DOC, one year in work
    release, one year on electronic monitoring, and one year suspended to
    probation.
    [3]   On November 2, 2012, in an unrelated cause, Novak was charged with Class A
    and B felony dealing in a Schedule I controlled substance. On April 26, 2013,
    pursuant to another written plea agreement, the State dismissed the Class A
    felony charge and Novak pleaded guilty to Class B felony dealing in a Schedule
    I controlled substance. On the same day, the trial court sentenced him to six
    years, with two years suspended to probation and the executed portion to be
    served consecutively to his first sentence. Under the terms of Novak’s
    probation for both causes, he was not permitted to travel outside Indiana
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018   Page 2 of 9
    without an order from the trial court; he was not permitted to use, purchase, or
    possess illegal drugs; and he was required to submit to alcohol and drug tests.
    [4]   On April 4, 2014, Novak filed a motion to modify his sentence under the
    second cause and, on August 1, 2014, the trial court granted the motion and
    modified the remainder of the executed portion of his sentence to work release,
    beginning December 7, 2014. On April 13, 2015, LaPorte County Community
    Corrections filed a petition to revoke Novak’s placement, alleging that on three
    occasions in March 2015, he failed to report to work or return to the work
    release center. On July 14, 2015, after admitting to the violations at a hearing,
    Novak was sentenced to six months in the LaPorte County Jail. After serving
    that time, he returned to work release.
    [5]   On November 10, 2015, Novak was asked to submit to a drug test, and he
    admitted that it would likely come back positive for heroin and prescription
    drugs. Novak tested positive for heroin. On December 2 and 9, 2015, the
    probation department filed petitions to revoke Novak’s suspended sentences
    under the second and first causes, respectively. On January 15, 2016, the trial
    court held a hearing on both petitions and issued a bond order, releasing Novak
    on his own recognizance and ordering him to report to probation and a
    program aimed at helping those with substance abuse problems. On the same
    day, Novak was referred to the Swanson Center and he completed his intake
    there. His probation officer testified that, besides his intake, she had not
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018   Page 3 of 9
    received any confirmation that he had attended classes or otherwise completed
    the program.1 Tr. Vol. III p. 7, 11-13.
    [6]   On March 21, 2016, Novak submitted to another drug test, which was positive
    for amphetamines; consequently, on April 5, 2016, the probation department
    filed a second petition to revoke under the second cause and, on April 15, 2016,
    the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest.
    [7]   After learning about the warrant and without contacting anyone, Novak
    absconded to Texas. In April 2017, Novak was arrested in Texas and
    extradited to Indiana. On May 26, 2017, the probation department filed a third
    petition to revoke under both causes, alleging that Novak had left the state
    without a trial court order.
    [8]   On June 8, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions. At the hearing,
    Novak testified that he had a substance abuse problem and admitted that he had
    used heroin and amphetamines and left the state without an order from the trial
    court. Appellant’s Br. p. 8. After hearing testimony from Novak and his
    probation officer, the trial court found that he had violated the terms of his
    probation for “not cooperating fully with Swanson Center, by missing
    probation appointment meetings, by absconding to the State of Texas . . . , and
    by testing positive for drugs while on probation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p.
    1
    She also testified that Novak failed to attend two scheduled probation appointments on December 4 and 15,
    2015. Tr. Vol. III p. 10.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018        Page 4 of 9
    233. The trial court also noted that Novak failed to take advantage of his
    sentence modification and that the court believed that a “structured
    environment” was the “best defense against further relapses.” Tr. Vol. III p. 27.
    Accordingly, the trial court revoked Novak’s probation in both causes and
    ordered him to serve the remainder of the suspended portions of his sentences—
    a total of three years—with the DOC. Novak now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Due Process
    [9]    First, Novak contends that the trial court violated his due process rights. It is
    well established that “probationers are not entitled to the full array of
    constitutional rights afforded defendants at trial.” Lightcap v. State, 
    863 N.E.2d 907
    , 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). However, among other things, a probationer is
    entitled to written notice of the alleged violation. Wann v. State, 
    997 N.E.2d 1103
    , 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    [10]   Novak contends that two of the bases upon which the trial court relied—the
    failure to cooperate with Swanson Center and missing probation appointment
    meetings—were not listed in the petitions to revoke; he argues that,
    consequently, he never received written notice of these violations and that it
    was improper for the trial court to base its decision on them.
    [11]   A court may revoke a defendant’s probation if “the person has violated a
    condition of probation during the probationary period” and the petition to
    revoke was timely filed. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a). We have found the lack of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018   Page 5 of 9
    notice on one probation violation harmless when the probationer is found to
    have violated another condition of probation where adequate notice was
    provided. E.g., Bussberg v. State, 
    827 N.E.2d 37
    , 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
    [12]   In this case, it is undisputed that the terms of Novak’s probation did not permit
    him to use drugs or leave the state without an order from the trial court. It is
    also undisputed that the petitions to revoke expressly identified these
    conditions. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 46, 187, 217. Further, Novak admitted
    to taking heroin and amphetamines and leaving the state without an order from
    the trial court. Appellant’s Br. p. 8. Thus, even if Novak did not receive notice
    of the other violations, because he admitted to violations for which he received
    written notice, any error was harmless. See 
    Bussberg, 827 N.E.2d at 44
    .
    [13]   Novak argues that the failure to provide written notice on these two grounds
    was not harmless because the trial court was particularly “disturbed” by the
    allegations and, consequently, put undue emphasis on these violations.
    Appellant’s Br. p. 12. He notes that the two bases at issue were the first on the
    order and that the trial court specifically questioned the probation officer about
    these offenses. He speculates that the trial court may not have sentenced him to
    the entirety of his suspended sentences had evidence of these violations not
    been admitted. He also insists that the lack of notice compromised his ability to
    put up a defense, because he was not prepared to prove exactly how many
    classes he had attended at Swanson Center.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018   Page 6 of 9
    [14]   We find little merit in Novak’s arguments. Novak cites to no portion of the
    record nor do we find any that suggests that the trial court was particularly
    fixated on Novak’s alleged non-compliance with Swanson Center or missed
    probation appointments. In any event, there is no prejudice to Novak with
    respect to the Swanson Center because he admitted that he stopped attending
    the classes altogether after he absconded to Texas.
    [15]   In sum, because Novak admitted to violations for which he received adequate
    written notice, the trial court’s order did not violate his due process rights.
    II. Placement with the DOC
    [16]   Next, Novak contends that the trial court erred by executing the balance of his
    suspended sentences. Probation is a matter of grace left to the trial court’s
    discretion rather than a right to which a defendant is entitled, and we will not
    reverse the trial court’s decision unless the decision is clearly against the logic
    and effect of the facts and circumstances. Prewitt v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188
    (Ind. 2007). A trial court may revoke a defendant’s probation for violation of a
    single condition of his probation, e.g., Pierce v. State, 
    44 N.E.3d 752
    , 755 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2015), and, once a violation is found, the trial court may execute all or
    part of a suspended sentence, I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h)(3).
    [17]   Here, Novak admitted to violating his probation three times, but nonetheless
    argues that the trial court erred and was excessively harsh when it executed the
    suspended portions of his sentences. He emphasizes that this was the most
    severe choice available, that it was the first time his probation had been
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018   Page 7 of 9
    revoked, and that the trial court heavily relied on the bases for which he claims
    he received deficient notice. He also claims that the decision is unduly severe
    because his positive test for amphetamines was the result of a mistake and
    because he went to Texas to see previously unmet family. We find his
    arguments unpersuasive.
    [18]   Initially, we note that the trial court repeatedly provided Novak with leniency.
    First, the trial court placed him on work release early by modifying his
    sentence. Despite this opportunity, just months after this placement, he
    violated its terms by failing to report to work or the work release center on three
    occasions. Still, the trial court only sentenced Novak to six months in jail and
    allowed him to return to work release afterwards. Novak squandered this
    chance as well by testing positive for heroin; yet, in its bond order, the trial
    court released Novak on his own recognizance and referred him to a program
    aimed at helping those with substance abuse problems to get the help he
    needed. However, Novak then fled to Texas after his positive test for
    amphetamines.
    [19]   Further, Novak admitted that he was drug-free while in the DOC but that,
    within two months of his placement with community corrections, he had tested
    positive for heroin, supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Novak’s sobriety
    will be best served in the DOC. And Novak admitted that he made a calculated
    decision to abscond to Texas because he was scared and embarrassed of the
    situation and he has offered no reason why his family reunion prevented him
    from contacting probation or the court for the better part of a year.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018   Page 8 of 9
    [20]   In sum, because Novak admitted to taking drugs and leaving the state while on
    probation, the trial court did not err by revoking his probation. Furthermore,
    considering the trial court’s repeated attempts to provide leniency, Novak’s
    continued failure to take advantage of these opportunities, and his most recent
    decision to abscond to Texas for the better part of a year, we cannot say that the
    trial court’s decision to execute the suspended portions of his sentences with the
    DOC was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.
    [21]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 46A05-1707-CR-1581 | January 24, 2018   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 46A05-1707-CR-1581

Filed Date: 1/24/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/24/2018